CHINA'S BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVES AND ITS IMPACT ON AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT AND SOVEREIGHTY: THE NIGERIAN EXPERIENCE, 2015 - 2025

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TITLE PAGE

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BY

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A PROJECT PRESENTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
FACULTY OF MANAGEMENT AND SOCIAL SCIENCES,
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IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE AWARD OF BACHELOR OF SCIENCE (B.Sc.), DEGREE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,

SUPERVISOR:
REV. FR. OGBUKA IKENNA

JULY, 2026

DECLARATION

I, **Ogudebe Arinze Riches** hereby declare that this work was written by me and has not been submitted or received anywhere for the purpose of acquiring a degree in International Relations or any other programme.

Ogudebe Arinze Riches	**Date**
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APPROVAL

This is to certify that this project titled: " China's Belt and Road Initiatives and Its Impact on African Development and Sovereighty: The Nigerian Experience, 2015 - 2025" has been read and approved as meeting the requirements of the Department of Political Science and International Relations, Faculty of Management and Social Sciences, Godfrey Okoye University, Ugwuomu-Nike, Enugu for the award of Bachelor of Science Degree in International Relations.

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DEDICATION

To God Almighty, For your guidance, Inspiration and clarity even in the moment of doubt.

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ABSTRACT

This study examined China's Belt and Road Initiatives and their impact on African development and sovereignty, focusing on Nigeria from 2015 to 2025. It assessed how BRI projects contributed to infrastructural development and how BRI financing affected Nigeria's economic sovereignty. The study adopted a qualitative ex post facto research design and relied on secondary data from Debt Management Office reports, CARI data, World Bank debt statistics, Nigerian Railway Corporation records, UNGA voting records and peer-reviewed studies. Data were analysed through qualitative content analysis, while Dependency Theory served as the analytical framework. Findings showed that BRI supported major rail, port and energy projects, with Chinese-linked infrastructure finance exceeding USD 4.8 billion. However, BRI engagement also increased Nigeria's exposure to Chinese loan stock, high debt-service pressure, confidentiality clauses, sovereign immunity waiver concerns and closer UNGA voting alignment with China. The study concluded that Nigeria's BRI experience produced measurable infrastructure gains but also raised sovereignty and dependency concerns. It recommended stronger National Assembly oversight, transparent loan disclosure and clear sovereignty safeguards in future China-linked infrastructure financing agreements.

Keywords: Belt and Road Initiative; infrastructural development; economic sovereignty; Dependency Theory; Nigeria; China; debt profile; programme finance; secondary data

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background To Study

Beijing began a big world program called the programme in 2013. This program works as a world plan for fresh physical systems and for money cooperation via wide regions. Its design goals are to connect Asia with Africa, Europe via extended routes of roads, railways, ports and pipelines that tie central money zones. This plan forms a central part of the outside policy of Beijing which seeks to expand via world commerce and investment via structured involvement. The programme is shown by Beijing as a shared path for shared advancement that supports a shared world money community as stated by Ojewumi and Omoniyi (2021). This wide program has gained strong goals from developing nations via Africa which consider it a chance to fix earlier systems structures and to push nation economies toward faster advancement.

Therefore the African continent has become a central region for programme activities. Many African nations position this plan as an appealing other option to older Western lending structures since it offers big funds for extended-term advancement undertakings. This support is often stated via the idea of Cooperation inside developing nations which stresses joint action among developing nations for shared benefits. Many analysts such as Olayiwola and Olusanya (2021) claim national ties with Beijing require close work. They ask if the tie shows equal cooperation or if it builds a fresh type of dependence which is a central matter for understanding the wider outcome of programmes in Africa. The nation has a central position since it claims the region's biggest economy and population. It joined the programme after the nation saw the plan as a road toward nation advancement as stated by Nwokedi et al (2023). This choice led to central undertakings such as the Abuja Kaduna railway which was funded and built by Beijing. Abubakar (2022) nations these undertakings aid to solve movement matters yet their extended-term money outcomes still require full investigation.

The nation finds the programme appealing since it promises advancement gains. Supporters believe that China-based finance is required to reduce the nation's big systems gap which limits industry and advancement. Idrees (2024) nations investment in movement, energy should improve commerce activity and expand job chances. The Lekki Deep port is another central programme undertaking that is expected to raise the nation 's commerce force; many writers position such undertakings as direct engines of money advancement as claimed by Ezeani and Ngoka (2022).

Concerns about nation command continue to rise. Many programme undertakings depend on credits and this forms a wide debate on credit trap pressure. Amusan, Nel (2023) claim that unclear credit terms may favour Beijing and form future credit pressure for the nation. This raises work questions about whether heavy borrowing might weaken future money and political liberty.

From twenty fifteen to twenty twenty three programmes produced gains and threats at the similar time. Documents from CARI (2022) shows the nation receives greater China-based credits than many African nations. As central undertakings reach completion the nation too faces rising credit which increases civic concern and academic debate. Chinonso (2023) nations clear matters such as payment pressure and conditions linked to credit deals.

Though many works discuss China Africa relations, a central gap remains. There is no detailed work that studies the joint outcomes of programmes on advancement outcomes and nation sovereign command inside nations. Most studies investigate either positive money outcomes or political threats without showing how both elements tie. Adem (2023) questions whether the China Africa tie builds a modern form of dependence, a work question that is in a special method central to the nation. A focused investigation is required to move beyond general debates and produce an exact work of conditions inside the nation.

The central matter addressed here is the tension inside the real advancement benefits linked to the programme and the possible reduction of nation Economic sovereignty. Systems activities may support advancement, credit conditions and political closeness to Beijing from central challenges. This work will investigate the concrete outcomes of the China Belt Road programme on Nigeria-based advancement and sovereign command from 2015 to 2025. It will offer a proof based examination of this central bilateral tie.

1.2 Statement of the problem

The nation faces a serious balancing task in its tie with the programme. The nation must fix its deep systems shortage whereas it manages heavy threats to its money liberty. Nation carries a central systems finance gap WB positions at about 100 billion dollars each year which shapes a situation where the programme appears to work as an essential support structure for big undertakings. Examples include the 1.5 billion dollar Lagos Ibadan railway funded via a 1.26 billion dollar credit from the Exim Bank and the 874 million dollar Abuja Kaduna railway. Both act as clear proof of advancement since they reduce central movement barriers and commerce delays (Ezeani & Ngoka, 2022). A critical point is that borrowed funds supply almost all this advancement. The Credit Management Office reported that nation credit to Beijing reached 4.29 billion dollars by March 2023 which represented greater than eighty percent of nation total bilateral credit worth. This amount forms a small share of the nation's credit yet it produces concern inside a money climate where the nation applied 96.3 percent of its income for credit service in 2022. This reality forms serious concerns about extended-term stability and the threat of a renewed form of money dependence (Olayiwola & Olusanya, 2021).

The nation shows the tie as a mutual method helpful setup, the tension inside advancement gains and nation sovereign command threats still remains. The benefits from fresh systems rise beside a risky credit situation, alongside credit terms that remain hidden from civic access. This concern gained civic notice inside a nation hearing in 2020 inside the nation where a sovereign command waiver term inside a China-based credit document formed a strong protest. Critics claimed that such a term might allow Beijing to claim command over central nation properties if the nation failed to meet payment demands (Amusan & Nel, 2023). People still dispute these fears yet the presence of such terms shows the possible reduction of money liberty. A detailed review of the nation Beijing tie is required to compare systems gains with sovereign command prices (Nwokedi et al., 2023). Many academic works work only one side of this matter which leaves a central knowledge gap. This gap requires a full investigation that measures the total influence of the programme on nation advancement and nation sovereign command from 2015 to 2025.

1.3 Research Questions

This work will be led by the following work questions as.

1. How has China's Belt and Road Initiative contributed to infrastructural development in Nigeria from 2015-2025.

2. How has China's Belt and Road Initiative undermined Nigeria's sovereignty, 2015-2025.

1.4 Objectives of the work

The goal of this work is to work on the outcomes of the China Belt, Road programme for nation advancement, sovereign command inside 2015 and 2025.

In a specific way, this work aims to as.

1. Analyze how China's Belt and Road initiative contributed to infrastructural development in Nigeria, 2015 - 2025.
2. Assess the impact of China's Belt and Road Initiative on Nigeria's sovereignty 2015 - 2025.

1.5 Significance of the work

This work offers conclusions that will support many central groups in varied methods. Scholars will gain fresh knowledge about China Africa relations and they will too receive a better position of how dependency lens joins with advancement nation model inside the show world structure. This work offers a clear case that can aid improve these theories for modern policy debates. Nation workers will gain special aid. Nigeria-based policy makers will get a strong fact based picture of the two sided outcomes of the Belt, Road programme, this picture will guide future talks with Beijing, with other parties, that fresh deals can protect Nigeria-based sovereign command and extended-term money well being. Civil society Organizations, other civic goal groups can too apply this work since they follow credit matters, civic spending, the outcomes will aid them push for greater openness, stronger responsibility for credit decisions and for central systems deals. Outside investors and Nigeria-based businesses will gain support. Well since this work offers a clearer picture of the money room shaped by programme undertakings, this picture will aid them locate fresh chances and understand the threats that exist in Nigeria-based commerce.

1.6 Scope of the work

This work investigates the influence of the China Belt Road programme on Nigeria-based advancement and nation sovereign command. The central focus covers systems undertakings that show advancement, credit documents, policy liberty that show nation force inside 2015 and 2025. The span was selected since it matches the years when Nigeria-based involvement in the programme grew in a central method. The geographical area is limited to the nation which was chosen for its position as Africa's biggest economy and a leading receiver of China-based funds via this plan. The viewpoint of this work remains balanced since it studies both the advancement reasons behind Nigeria-based involvement and the serious concerns about sovereign command threats. This work applies a qualitative ex post facto design and relies on secondary data from official and academic sources, which is suitable for studying past events and policy documents without researcher interference.

1.7 Limitations of the work

The conduct of this work faced many difficulties. First, limited time made it hard to gather, work a wide amount of origin, the researcher concentrated on central official documents and reliable academic origins to meet this work goals inside the available span. Another difficulty came from restricted access to central information since many credit deals inside the nation and Beijing contain protected conditions that are not shared with the public. This challenge was addressed via the application of verifiable figures from the Nigeria-based Credit Management Office nation publications, trusted work groups such as WB and CARI which supply organised collections of available documents. Money limits too prevented access to some academic journals that require payment, the researcher relied with great weight on university online databases and free academic origins. A further challenge involved the requirement for physical books in the university library, this matter was resolved via the library digital structures and its book sharing network which offered a wider range of origins for this work.

1.8 Operational Definition of Terms

Belt and Road Initiative BRI.

This work applies the Belt, Road programme as a planned platform via which Beijing supplies money building support, skill for central movement and energy undertakings inside the nation from the years 2015 to 2025.

Infrastructural Development

This work nations systems Development as the measured rise, improvement of nation physical movement structures such as railways, airports, seaports which were funded and executed under programme in the span.

Economic Sovereignty

This works on economic sovereignty as a nation 's ability to apply free command over its money plans, credit management structures and vital nation properties inside the room of its money duties to Beijing under programme.

National Interest

Here nation goal means the collection of planned goals that support nation extended-term money advancement, industry advancement and political liberty as stated in official nation advancement plans. This work tests how programme outcomes match these extended range goals.

Debt Profile

This work applies credit profile to mean the total size terms, setup of outside credit nation owes to Beijing creditors from 2015 to 2025 including its position inside nation total outside credit and nation income.

Policy Framework

Here policy setup refers to the set of nation advancement plans such as the money Recovery and advancement Plan. The supervision duties of the law makers, the internal executive procedures that direct nation talk approval and execution of programme undertakings.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter reviews relevant literature on China's Belt and Road Initiatives and their impact on African development and sovereignty, with particular attention to Nigeria from 2015 to 2025. The review is arranged into conceptual, thematic, empirical and theoretical sections, followed by the gap in literature. The conceptual review explains the major concepts used in the study, while the thematic and empirical reviews examine the development and sovereignty implications of BRI engagement. The theoretical review provides the analytical foundation for understanding the study.

2.1 Conceptual Review

2.1.1 Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)

The Belt, Road programme was introduced by China-based President Xi Jinping in 2013, it stands as a central element of Beijing's outside and money plan. This plan has two central parts known as the land based Silk Road money Belt, the sea based 21st Century Sea commerce Silk Road which work together to form a full plan for via the world connection and cooperation. WB (2019) describes the programme as one of the biggest systems, money programs in modern history since it aims to tie economies via Asia, Europe and Africa via central advancement activity. Many scholars position it as a modern rebuild of ancient commerce routes designed for the requirements of the twenty-first century world economy.

This plan is organised around five central goals that include policy deal systems, connection smooth commerce, money tie and people to people trade. The strongest focus lies on systems connection which involves constructing railways, roads, ports and energy pipelines that support the advancement of money regions. Ojewumi, Omoniyi (2021) explains Beijing shows these goals as a path toward shared advancement and joint advancement for every nation involved in the program. This plan offers a wide finance structure mostly supported by Beijing banks which is applied by nations that face difficulty in securing systems funds from traditional world institutions.

The African continent plays a central part in the advancement of programmes and nations work as a central partner. This tie is seen via many central systems undertakings such as the Abuja Kaduna railway, the Lagos Ibadan railway and the Lekki Deep port. Chinonso (2023) nations these undertakings show Beijing apply systems diplomacy in nations since they aim to solve critical nation systems shortages and to strengthen the ties inside both nations. The selection of the nation as a central partner reflects its position as a central African economy and an entry point into the wider West African commerce.

In spite of its advancement goals, the programme has produced wide debate among researchers. One position considers it a true form of Cooperation inside developing nations offers developing nations a fresh advancement model free from the strict conditions of Western creditors. Another position studied by Amusan and Nel (2023) interprets programmes via a fresh mercantile lens which shows it is a planned tool for Beijing to gain resources. Expand markets for China-based goods and increase its world influence. This debate highlights the varied interpretations of the goals and outcomes of this plan.

Here the programme is stated for action. The central program that directs the flow of China-based fund construction services, skill applied to carry out central systems undertakings in the nation inside 2015 and 2025. This meaning focuses on the practical operation of the programme as it relates to the nation which allows a clear examination of its direct addition to nation advancement and nation sovereign command.

2.1.2 Infrastructural Development

In advancement economics systems refers to the basic physical setups, structure networks that support the functioning of a society or an economy. It forms the foundation of money activity since it supports production, commerce and overall advancement. Umukoro (2022) nations strong systems in movement, energy offers an essential base for industry advancement and extended-term nation advancement. A shortage of systems forms serious barriers that weaken money performance, raise commerce prices and reduce a nation's ability to compete via the world which makes systems a top policy priority.

The nation has faced an extended standing and severe systems shortage that has slowed its money advancement. The nation's road networks, railway lines, and electricity supply remain far below the level required to support its big population and its plan for a varied economy. Ezeani and Ngoka (2022) claim this big system gap has made the nation a central target for outside investors who are ready to support big advancement undertakings. This extended-term shortage is central for understanding why a nation seeks outside advancement aid and why certain policy decisions were made.

The Belt, Road programme is often described as a direct response to this matter since it offers a pathway to fund and build the systems nation in an urgent method. Nyiayaana (2021) nations China-based fund under programme works as a central other option to older Western finance structures which are often viewed as slow and restrictive. The programme supplies big credit packages for specific undertakings, this support fills the money gap that has by earlier practice delayed or stopped central systems Development via nation which allows physical advancement to happen at a faster pace.

To measure the real outcome of these undertakings this work will rely on clear and countable signs. For example this work will work systems Development by looking at the completed length of standard gauge railway lines such as the 186km Lagos Ibadan railway. Abubakar (2022) offers a guide for this type of assessment via his work on the Abuja Kaduna railway. Additional signs include the increased cargo ability of ports developed via programmes such as the Lekki Deep port along with recorded advancement in force supply or electricity movement linked to China-based funded undertakings in the span.

Here systems Development is stated for action as the measured improvement, advancement of nation physical movement and energy structures resulting from undertakings funded. Constructed, in a technical method supported by Beijing under programmes inside 2015 and 2025. This meaning ensures this work remains based on concrete and verifiable outcomes which allows for a direct judgment of the advancement benefits of this plan.

2.1.3 Sovereignty

The idea of sovereign command began after the 1648 Peace of Westphalia and it has extended to the full force of a nation inside its own territory without outside command. In the show connected world this political idea now includes Economic sovereignty which is a nation forced to make its own choices about money policy, nation resources and civic properties. Abdulai (2017) nations perfect Economic sovereignty cannot exist in a world economy, the level of liberty a nation has to shape its money direction without strong outside pressure remains a central measure of its liberty and stability.

Economic sovereignty covers many central areas which include command of nation money policy, nation credit, outside commerce and investment. One central part is the force to protect and apply nation properties for the benefit of the nation instead of handing them over to pay outside credits. These properties include ports, energy structures and systems networks. Hussain (2023) nations that are losing command over such properties or the terms that shape their application show a clear decline in money liberty since decision making force begins to move from the nation to outside actors.

Outside credit is one of the oldest and most serious threats to money liberty in developing nations. Credit deals can in a sharp method limit a nation's policy options in a special method when they claim strict conditions or security demands. Amusan and Nel (2023) describe how some credit conditions remove legal protection from a borrowing nation which then allows a creditor to take nation property in other nations if credit payments stop. This forms an unequal force setup where the influence of the creditor goes far beyond money matters, entering political and planned areas.

The programme has become a central point of debate inside the discussion on sovereign command. Supporters claim that China-based credits follow a term of no interference which offers a respectful other option to the conditions applied by Western money institutions. Critics claim the huge size of programme credits, the hidden nature of some deals form fresh and quiet threats to liberty. Adem (2023) nations the debate raises a central work question which is whether this model builds a fresh kind of dependency where reliance on one strong partner slowly reduces nation force.

For the requirements of this work Economic sovereignty is stated for action as nation liberty to apply free force over nation money policy and nation properties whereas taking into account its deal based obligations to Beijing under programme. This meaning allows this work to work credit conditions, credit amounts, policy shifts to discover whether the programme has strengthened, weakened nation money liberty inside 2015 and 2025.

2.2 Thematic Review

2.2.1 BRI and Infrastructural progress

The Belt, Road programme in the nation is shown via many central construction works carried out inside 2015 and 2025 as stated by Chinonso (2023). This work identifies a group of central undertakings that form the core of Beijing systems diplomacy in the nation. The most notable examples include the renewal of the nation's railway structure with the working Abuja Kaduna railway and the wider Lagos Ibadan railway. Programme effort too reaches into the air travel area via the building, upgrading of terminals in four central world airports in Abuja Lagos port Harcourt and Kano. This plan has shaped the sea commerce area via the Lekki Deep port which is planned to grow into a leading commercial hub in West Africa. These undertakings are shown as real outcomes of the nation Beijing tie, and they act as solid signs of the advancement cooperation that both nations promote. The outcomes show these undertakings stand together as a planned network made to improve nation connection and to increase commerce.

The pattern becomes clear inside the areas chosen for China-based funds inside the nation via programme. Ezeani, Ngoka (2022) shows a strong focus on the movement area that covers rail air travel and seaports with strong support to move toward force undertakings. This narrow focus answers the nation 's biggest and most lasting systems gaps that official papers list as central blocks to advancement. Programme, supports nation targets for stronger movement and for greater stable electricity. This setup allows Beijing to deliver big undertakings, expand its money and diplomatic reach. The similar focus, raises concern about light notice for health schooling and other required areas. The outcomes show the chosen areas are planned moves for the highest money and political gain for both sides.

This work from Nyiayaana (2021) investigates the setup and supervision of programme systems undertakings. The outcomes show Beijing owned corporations direct almost every stage from finance via construction and into early operation. This outcome appears since credits from China-based banks include a term for the application of China-based companies. Therefore groups like CCECC guide central undertakings, for example railway upgrade undertakings. This pattern brings strong skill with quick undertaking delivery, it too limits room for Nigeria-based businesses and slows the advancement of home industry. The political economy of this structure shows Beijing-owned enterprises keep strong command over the full undertaking span, a condition which shapes home industry advancement and the future upkeep of completed systems.

The case work by Abubakar (2022) on the Abuja Kaduna railway describes the technology programme undertakings employed. The railway applies present China-based engineering standards, a central shift from the former narrow-gauge network of the nation. This shift brings fresh technology into the nation rail area, yet this work warns that future upkeep may show a serious test. A strong reliance on China-based machinery produces a steady requirement for China-based technical support together with a requirement for spare parts, a situation that raises future credit pressure for Nigeria-based railway Corporation. This undertaking displays limited skill and technology transfer whereas the deeper skills for extended-term maintenance remain low creating a fresh form of technical dependence.

This work from Idrees (2024) studies the picking of undertaking locations and shows chosen sites sitting along central money routes to support commerce movement. An example is the Lagos Ibadan railway. Ties the busiest nation port to an inland commercial hub whereas the

Lekki Deep port aims to ease strain on older ports and to strengthen the nation 's commerce in West Africa. Such placement fits the programme 's purpose to build strong commerce routes. This work by Ojewumi, Omoniyi (2021) adds that the nation often selects China-based funds for its quick pace, its lighter conditions in contrast with credits from the IMF or WB. A negative outcome of this pace is it can weaken environmental reviews, full technical studies and civic supervision. Their work reaches a final judgment: the China-based model brings fast systems advancement, it too introduces threats for credit strength and weaker responsibility.

This work by Umukoro (2022) highlights many matters that appear whereas programme undertakings are being carried out in the nation. Many undertakings faced extended delays and serious matters even though the programme is known for speed. These matters often grew from home factors outside the command of China-based builders. Such factors included difficulty in gaining land and in paying compensation to moved communities which were duties of the nation. Other challenges came from busy ports where slow handling of goods claimed to support the arrival of required equipment. This work shows the programme brings fund, technical skills, its success depends with great weight on the force and drive of the host nation. These obstacles show the high level of difficulty in running central undertakings in a nation and they show the tie does not always advance in a smooth method.

The writing of Ajah (2023) reviews the working nation and future worth of finished programme undertakings. This work proves works like the Abuja Kaduna, Lagos Ibadan railways work well and draw many passengers which shows they answer civic requirements. This work too raises concerns about extended-term money strength since income from tickets is an unlikely method to cover running expenses and credit payments. This means steady nation support will be required and this positions weight on the nation budget. These work nations do work, their full extended-term success will rest on future management and on how well they fit into broader money plans.

The amount edited by Alden and Jiang (2019) offers a wide summary of academic positions on programmes via Africa. These positions are central for the nation. The general academic position is that the programme has made a central and real addition to continental systems. In nations such as nations this plan has supplied essential movement structures that were difficult to fund via other means. The fresh railways, airport terminals and ports mark a strong shift in the nation's money environment. The authors took frequent criticism that the advancement came via single undertakings and did not include the wider institutional reforms required for the highest monetary benefit. Scholars agree the programme excels at building physical setups, it is less effective at building the skills structures and nation required for lasting success.

Arabaci (2022) studies the claims about job creation from China-based investment under programmes in the nation. The outcomes show these undertakings form many jobs for Nigeria-based workers in a special method in low, medium skill construction parts yet the situation is greater complex. This work finds that management engineering and advanced technical positions are often filled by China-based workers which limits the chance for Nigeria-based professionals to gain high level experience. This produces a two tier labour setup inside undertaking sites. This work too shows once construction ends only a small number of lasting jobs remain for the operation and care of the systems. This outcome often falls short of the expectations raised by political leaders. This work concludes that though job creation is real it tends to be brief lived, concentrated in lower skill areas which raises concerns about the depth and durability of employment gains.

The pattern becomes clear in the areas chosen for China-based funds inside the nation via programme. Ezeani, Ngoka (2022) shows a strong focus on the movement area that covers rail air travel and ports with central support too moving toward force undertakings. This narrow focus responds to the nation 's biggest and most lasting systems shortages that official papers list as central barriers to advancement. Programme, supports nation goals for stronger movement and for steady electricity. This setup allows Beijing to deliver big undertakings, expand its money and diplomatic force. The similar narrow focus, raises concern about low attention for health schooling and other required areas. The outcomes show the chosen areas are planned decisions for the highest money and political gain for both sides.

Nyiayaana (2021) studies the organisation and command of these systems undertakings. The outcomes show Beijing owned enterprises guide almost every step that includes finance building and first operation. Credits from Beijing banks often contain a term for the application of China-based firms so groups like CCECC direct works like railway upgrades. This brings required skill and it moves undertakings toward completion with speed. A weaker point is the limited room for Nigeria-based building firms which slows the advancement of the home industry. The political economy of the plan shows China-based SOEs claim strong command over the entire undertaking cycle which shapes home industry advancement and the future care of the systems.

The case work of the Abuja Kaduna railway by Abubakar (2022) describes the technology found inside programme undertakings. The railway applies fresh China-based engineering terms that mark a central shift from the nation 's earlier narrow gauge structure. These terms position fresh technology inside the Nigeria-based rail area. This work warns that future care for this outside technology may be hard. A steady application of China-based equipment forms a lasting requirement for China-based technical aid and for spare parts which may raise future prices for Nigeria-based railway Corporation. The setup shows a small level of skill, technology transfer but the deeper transfer of care skills is limited which brings a fresh form of technical dependence.

Idrees (2024) studies how programmes undertaking locations are chosen. The outcomes show sites are picked to support central money routes. The Lagos Ibadan railway proves this since it ties the nation 's busiest port to a central inland commerce city. The Lekki Deep port near Lagos took goals to ease pressure on older ports and to strengthen the nation 's position in West African commerce. This planned placement matches the programme goal of building stronger commerce paths. The logic is for the central part money since the undertakings support commerce activity, the flow of goods for the nation and for Beijing.

This work by Ojewumi and Omoniyi (2021) compares varied finance models. They show nations often select China-based finance since the speed is high, and the conditions are lighter than those from WB or IMF. China-based banks can release big credits fast with few policy terms which allows nations to show quick advancement. This speed may weaken environmental reviews, full technical studies and civic supervision that Western creditors require. The writers conclude the China-based model brings fast physical advancement, it too increases threats for credit health and for weaker civic review.

2.2.2 The Impact of BRI Financing on Nigeria economy and Sovereignty

A clear measure of nation credit to Beijing is given by CARI (2022). These documents show Beijing offered credit deals worth greater than twenty billion dollars to the nation from 2000 to 2020. The figures too show this full amount was not in full applied since only a smaller part was released into the nation in the early 2020s. The outcomes show that China-based credit forms only a small share of the nation 's wider outside credit. Most of the larger credit burden comes from world creditors such as WB as stated by Acker (2021)., The China-based credits stand out since they fund big systems undertakings that draw strong civic and political attention. Their size and purpose make them central to debates about future money stability.

This work from Amusan and Nel (2023) studies China-based credit terms via a fresh angle. The authors show that goal charges fall within a range inside 2.5, 3 percent which is better than commercial rates yet higher than the low rates from groups like the IDA. China-based credits too apply shorter payment windows with brief grace periods which force debtors to begin payment fast under strong terms. This pattern forms stronger brief-term money strain in contrast with the longer payment method of other advancement parties. This work concludes these credit terms aid undertakings begin with speed whereas they offer limited protection for the extended-term fiscal stability of the debtor.

This work by Wieland (2023) investigates concerns about China-based outside direct investment. It highlights a strong fear about hidden nature inside credit deals. This work shows civil society groups with commerce leaders believe China-based credits have low openness since the documents stay hidden from civic access. WB credits differ since they demand open civic viewing whereas China-based deals can include strong hidden nature terms. This practice blocks lawmakers, journalists and citizens from checking credit terms, a condition that builds mistrust with central responsibility difficulties for credit management.

This work from Hussain (2023) studies disputed parts inside China-based credit documents and their meaning for nation force. This work focuses on the civic concern that followed the report of a sovereign immunity waiver inside a railway credit. This term allows the creditor to apply to an outside court for payment and it may permit the taking of nation property abroad if payment stops. Such terms appear in many nations yet their apply in nation produced fear about nation security with money liberty. This work claims these credit terms form a wide force gap since they offer the creditor strong legal force over the debtor.

Many studies explore wider credit threats linked to China-based credit. This work from Nwokedi et al. (2023) shows fresh systems bring value whereas rising China-based credit positions put great strain upon the nation and its low civic finances. Low nation income means even small borrowing can produce a big payment weight, a fact that leaves little money for health education and welfare. The writing of Ike (2018) adds that the nation pays China-based credits via the nation budget, a method that becomes unsafe inside income drops. This work from Idrees (2024) finds that fresh programme undertakings once they begin operation make credit payment take a larger fixed part of yearly spending, a process that removes funds from other civic requirements. This work by Alden, Jiang (2019) nations this setup forms part of Beijing directed fund model where the Exim Bank supports Beijing its planned and commercial goals via extended-term systems credits built by China-based firms.

This work by Umukoro (2022) gathers credit threats from older programme studies. The central threat is credit overhang in a nation where big credit slows future advancement. A second threat is a heavy credit payment load that forces cuts in health and schooling. Another threat comes from currency instability since credits apply to US dollars which get greater expensive as the naira loses value. This work concludes the programme shows big chances yet it too brings severe credit threats that require careful supervision to prevent a future money emergency.

This work from Umearokwu (2021) applies Prometheus and Leviathan ideas to understand China-based funds. The work claims China-based finance can open fresh industry doors yet that similar finance can restrict money liberty. There is no solid proof of a China-based plan to trap the nation though the mix of big credit with hidden nature alongside a force difference forms a setup that works like a trap. This work shows the central matter is not China-based goals, the setup based reliance nation and its dependence on China-based money have formed.

CARI (2022) work questions the popular credit trap claim. Its outcomes show no African nation including nation has lost nation property to Beijing due to credit nonpayment. They say the credit trap story makes complex credit talks seem simple, a position that ignores the negotiating strength African nations can apply. Credit restructuring they write is the usual outcome when payment matters appear. They too show Beijing is not the top creditor for many African nations. Credit threats are real though they are a feature of the world fund not a sign of a planned predatory idea.

This work by Hussain (2023) studies how growing China-based credit influences nations and its outside policy. This work asks if the nation has shifted its position toward Beijing on world subjects like UN voting Taiwan or Xinjiang. The outcomes show little direct proof though they describe a quiet pressure since a nation that requires central finance will avoid actions that could upset its creditor. This work concludes the nation keeps some liberty though its outside policy choices are fewer since of its strong money ties with Beijing.

This work by Ajakaiye et al. (2018) positions the nation Beijing ties inside the world force structure. The nation's move toward Beijing to secure systems funds forms big world force outcomes for its earlier ties with Western nations like the US and UK. Western leaders position this move as a planned challenge which increases world competition for room in Africa. For a nation this moment offers a gain and a threat. The nation can benefit from the contest inside central forces yet it may too fall into a wider struggle for command. This work warns that strong policy guidance is required to manage these pressures.

This work from Olayiwola and Olusanya (2021) focuses on the unequal force that shapes the tie. They claim the tie is not balanced even with the warm cooperation inside developing nations' languages. Beijing claims great money strength with strong technical ability whereas the nation faces a money shortage with a sharp requirement for systems upgrades. This gap shapes the talks and it often produces deals that favour Beijing. The writers conclude the tie works as dependence instead than cooperation inside equal parties.

This work from Nyiayaana (2021) studies the political economy that directs the nation in its pursuit of China-based undertakings. The outcomes show that leaders seek China-based credits for advancement goals with political gains. Big clear undertakings support civic approval. The swift availability of China-based funds lets political goals shape undertaking choices. This pattern can form credit conditions that do not in full protect the nation 's future wellbeing. This work nation's internal political goals push the tie with greater strength than true advancement requires.

This work by Ike (2018) studies civic debate, media conflict about nation command in nation Beijing connections and finds a sharp divide. Nation officials describe China-based funds as a basic requirement and make the threats seem small whereas opposition groups with critical media highlight serious command threats using strong wording. This split produces confusion for citizens and it makes future policy planning difficult. This work by Adem (2023) adds a continent wide position. It shows the nation claims a big credit sum to Beijing, its credit share of GDP is lower than the share in Zambia, Djibouti and Angola. The nation has greater room to handle its credit yet the advancement of China-based credits via Africa still forms a threat for extended-term dependence.

In their final work Amusan and Nel (2023) show a strong summary of the sovereign command debate. They claim that even if the idea of a planned China-based credit trap is hard to prove, the outcome of the tie is a sharp increase in China-based influence over the Nigeria-based economy. From their fresh mercantile position the setup of the credits works Beijing planned goals and nation rising credit acts as a tool in this process. They conclude the work question is not whether Beijing targets a trap, but whether the setup based realities form a cage of credit, dependence that limits nation money and political sovereign command.

2.2.3 Policy Frameworks and state Interest in Nigeria BRI Engagement

This work from Nwokedi et al. (2023) names the central ministries, departments and agencies that guide the nation in its formal discussions with Beijing. The process positions its central activity inside the executive branch. The Fund Ministry directs credit talks. The Credit Management Office studies extended-term credit safety. The Ministry of Justice inspects legal wording. Area ministries such as movement take part inside undertakings in their own areas. This setup should offer expert skill yet this work shows low cooperation. Decisions often follow presidential instruction instead of technical guidance, a situation that forms a big gap inside the governance structure.

This work from Wieland (2023) offers a strong examination of the nation 's position in talks. Positions from interested parties show a shared belief. The nation enters discussions from a low starting point since it claims limited legal ability with limited money skill for huge world undertakings. It too claims lower access to technical information when compared with China-based teams. Nigeria-based officials have some knowledge yet they are often overcome by expert China-based negotiators who work inside tight nation commerce networks. This force gap can push nations to accept terms that do not protect its future wellbeing.

This work by Olayiwola, Olusanya (2021) shows central clarity and responsibility failures inside nation Beijing deals. Their outcomes uncover a steady habit of hidden nature inside credit and deal talks. Central information for example goal charges with payment terms is almost never made known to the civic. This lack of openness makes responsibility a difficult goal whereas it blocks civil society groups from judging threats and gains. The writers call this hidden nature a serious governance failure since it harms open choice making and it forms room for corrupt behaviour.

This work by Nyiayaana (2021) shows the big influence that executive leaders and political actors claim in shaping nation Beijing cooperation. High officials support central programme undertakings as lasting achievements, a practice that often skips normal review methods. This top down pattern makes decisions quicker, it silences expert warnings that conflict with political plans, a situation that weakens supervision of outside credits and deals. This work from Chinonso (2023) adds to the fast pace of the nation Beijing deals with concerns about the depth of undertaking studies. Many approvals rest upon reports that are too positive or shaped by political goals. This work stresses the requirement for free assessments that cover money, social and environmental outcomes. The lack of civic review papers makes the hidden nature matter stronger whereas it forms doubt about the extended-term worth of selected undertakings.

Hussain (2023) studies the force of law making reviews for nations outside borrowing including credits from Beijing. The outcomes show the nation Assembly part is low and often late. The constitution offers the body the force to approve outside borrowing. Lawmakers have raised work questions and claimed meetings on credit terms. Their force to shift the deals yet is small once the executive signs them. This work finds the law makers in most cases acts only after deals are already fixed. This is shown as a central failure in the structure of reviews and balances since it leaves the executive with near total force over outside credit choices.

This work from Abdulai (2017) shows a comparison work about the methods Beijing and commerce teams apply in talks with African nations. The outcomes show China-based teams possess a strong setup and a disciplined approach. They show package deals combining finance design and construction. This approach is helpful, it restricts the host nation its force to divide undertaking sections or to ask for civic bids. China-based diplomats with company agents form strong connections with high level leaders to simplify undertaking acceptance. This work concludes China-based groups follow an extended range plan that applies money force, skill to obtain terms which advance their nation and commerce goals.

This work by Ampiah and Naidu (2018) explores this work of non-nation organizations inside Africa Beijing decision making. The authors find that high level nation actors guide the full process. Groups such as civil society unions, schools and home communities face steady exclusion. This exclusion removes social concerns and environmental concerns from the final deals. The writers call for a greater open setup, a setup that brings non-nation voices into the process to form a fair and lasting cooperation. This work by Nwokedi et al. (2023) adds that in nations its programme involvement contains serious governance failures. These failures include strong executive force with low openness, low law making supervision with the exclusion of civil society. These matters together form a big governance gap that exposes nations to threats such as unmanageable credit, poor deal terms with low responsibility. The writer states that fixing internal governance matters is as central as negotiating better conditions with Beijing.

This work from Ojewumi, Omoniyi (2021) studies the tie inside programme undertakings and nation advancement plans. Their outcomes show a clear match inside China-based funded systems and the central goals of the nation. Policy setups such as the money Recovery, advancement Plan position focus on movement and force renewal whereas programme railway undertakings aid meet these goals. This work concludes the nation has directed China-based assistance toward a path that supports its own stated advancement program and that strengthens nation goals.

A fresh mercantile reading by Amusan, Nel (2023) yet challenges the official story of shared benefit. The authors claim these undertakings match nation goals, they too match Beijing goals with equal or greater strength. Fresh railways and ports aid Nigeria-based advancement. They too aid Beijing move its goods into the nation and reach Nigeria-based resources greater easily. This work claims the match of goals is not by chance. It follows a plan in which Beijing funds systems that too support its own money and world goals while appearing to support nation advancement.

The writing of Nyiayaana (2021) questions if the selected programme undertakings truly match the top nation required for the nation. This work agrees movement is a vital area yet it claims the focus on big expensive rail undertakings could fail to produce the best outcomes. Smaller finance for rural roads, water or basic health might reduce poverty with greater speed. The outcomes show political appeal with easy access to China-based money for big undertakings claims a greater influence on choices than a goal review of nation priorities.

This work from Ajakaiye et al. (2018) explores if a nation applies an extended-term plan in its Beijing relations. It too asks if the nation acts via brief reactive decisions. Their outcomes show proof for both kinds of action. A tie inside programme undertakings and nation policy targets shows that some planned thought exists. The fast movement of deal making on the other hand points toward a low extended range plan. They claim the nation must develop a wider nation plan, a plan that covers money, social and political concerns instead of holding a narrow focus on undertaking finance alone.

This work by Chen (2021) studies the method China-based making goods investment shifts nation money variety advancement. The outcomes show a mix of outcomes. A stronger systems base can support home industries yet the arrival of low price China-based products often harms Nigeria-based producers that struggle with competition. This work nation's strong industry policies must work with programmes to build home ability and to protect home production. Without such policies the nation might remain a buyer of outside goods instead of forming its own making goods base. This work by Abdulai (2017) adds that systems must support nation requirements and to build regional connections. Nation plans for future cross border ties whereas most show programme rail undertakings focus on routes inside the nation. A stronger regional plan would require joint action with nearby nations for creating movement paths via West Africa.

This work from Umearokwu (2021) explores how the wider nation Beijing ties shapes the force of home industries. This work claims that China-based investment with commerce has weakened many small Nigeria-based industries such as the textile area. Some investment has yet to offer support for home production as this work from Chen (2020) stated. The total outcome upon the home industry area remains under debate. This raises a central nation work question. Can a structure that upgrades systems yet damages home industry truly support the nation 's extended-term advancement.

In their full work Olayiwola and Olusanya (2021) explore the complex debate about nation goals in the Beijing nation connection. The authors claim that the national goal has no fixed meaning. It shifts with the positions of political leaders, commerce groups, civil society and the wider civic. The nation may focus on fast systems. The home industry may focus on protection from outside goods. Civil society may ask for openness and fair process. The authors conclude the lack of a wide nation deal on plan is a central weakness. This gap makes it hard to follow a clear policy direction.

At the end, the edited amount by Ajakaiye et al (2018) offers a summary of scholar method positions on how the programme supports national extended-term goals. The outcomes show a surface match with goals such as systems advancement. The deeper match is still doubtful. Scholars warn the present model does not do enough to build home ability, protect industry or reduce dependence. Programme has aided nations meet brief-term goals., The work question of its fit with extended-term sovereign, inclusive advancement remains open and debated.

2.3 Empirical Review

This work from Chinonso (2023) applied a quality based case work plan to explore the Belt, Road programme and its part as a tool for systems diplomacy inside the nation. The work studied real undertaking outcomes, future openings and the central limits inside the tie. The outcomes showed works for example railways, airports which acted as clear diplomatic gains for Beijing and as steps forward for nation advancement. This work too showed serious matters including hidden credit terms, a low application of home work share and a growing fear over credit setups. The conclusion stated programme offers real systems Development, future success depends on solving these money and governmental challenges, a condition that leaves the full worth of the tie uncertain.

Ojewumi and Omoniyi (2021) applied a quality based review to judge how well programme undertakings match the wider goals inside nation nation advancement plans. Their goal was to know if Nigeria-based priorities or China-based goals push the connection. This work found a clear match inside programme systems, central goals inside the money Recovery, advancement Plan with special focus on movement and force areas. It concluded the nation showed real agency in directing China-based finance toward its own planning goals even though the threat of dependence and credit remains.

Abubakar (2022) applied small-scale case work to test the Abuja Kaduna railway, to discover its real outcomes on people and the home economy. This work saw clear gains such as improved movement, safer travel and better commerce around stations. It too found serious challenges including the removal of communities inside building and work questions around the extended-term money lasting strength of this undertaking. This work concluded the railways outcome is mixed since it brings strong gains, central social and money prices at the similar time.

Olayiwola, Olusanya (2021) applied a critical model frame to judge if the nation Beijing connection reflects Cooperation inside developing nations or if it builds a fresh pattern of reliance. Their goal was to work the force relations and deep outcomes tied to the connection. The outcomes showed a wide force gap that benefits Beijing even with official win-win messages. This work concluded that the nation receives central systems, the setup of the tie forms growing dependence via credit and commerce imbalance which looks closer to fresh colonial practice than equal tie.

This work of Amusan, Nel (2023) applies a fresh mercantile frame to work questioning claims of shared benefit inside the tie inside the nation and Beijing. This work inspects commerce deals with investment pacts and systems deals to find which nation shapes the tie. This proof shows the alliance works with Beijing with strong protection for its industries and steady money gain. Benefits that reach a nation stay limited whereas they demand central loss of nation command. The writers decide that China-based planned goals formed this setup instead of any true equal cooperation.

The investigation from Ezeani and Ngoka (2022) applies a dependency lens to work the method China-based finance shifts systems advancement inside the nation. This work identifies clear advancement in roads, railways and ports that China-based credits produced. The researchers claim this model increases future reliance on outside forces since the undertakings apply outside capital with outside building firms. This deepens extended-term dependence on nations even as its physical systems get better.

This work by Nwokedi et al. (2023) shows a wide quality based review of cooperation inside the nation and Beijing. This work highlights the huge importance of China-based systems spending. It too shows internal weaknesses such as poor openness with low nation ability. The final claim nation must strengthen its own institutions to gain full worth from the tie. The outcomes depend on the quality of Nigeria-based governance as much as they depend on China-based actions.

This work from Hussain (2023) applies a detailed quality based approach to work on how China-based credits shape the policy liberty of the nation. This work inspects disputed terms such as sovereign immunity waivers. The outcomes show these terms in a quiet method offer Beijing strong legal and political force. This work concludes that a rising China-based money presence increases dependence on nations and limits the room for free policy decisions.

This work from Nyiayaana (2021) applies a political economy idea to explain the reason Nigeria-based leaders choose specific undertakings. The outcomes show leaders like big undertakings that are easy to see since these undertakings offer political gains. This preference exists even when extended-term advancement outcomes are not clear. This work concludes that internal political goals often direct the tie greater than real advancement requires..

Wieland (2023) applied a quality based perception work to document the opinions of Nigeria-based commerce groups, civil society and scholars on the openness of China-based investment processes. The outcomes showed the structure lacks openness and civic discussion. Many respondents felt credit terms, deal details and talk steps were hidden. This work concluded this matter harms trust and increases concern even among supporters of the nation Beijing tie.

2.4 Theoretical Review

2.4.1 Dependency Theory

Dependency lens offers a strong model for studying world money setups, their deep imbalances and it grew from a challenge to modernisation ideas in the span around the 1950s. Thinkers such as Andre Gunder Frank shaped this model and they nation the world structure has two central parts. One part is a ruling core of industry nations and the other part is a lower periphery of developing nations. The central claim of the model is this tie inside the core and the periphery does not aid both sides in similar form since the setup is in a natural method unfair. This position is applied to the Beijing nation tie by Olayiwola and Olusanya (2021). They question whether China-based investment brings real advancement or forms a careful fresh form of money command. The basic belief of the model says the periphery has its advancement limited by its position inside the world structure. The core sets the terms that shape the tie which forms a nation of dependent advancement. This means the economy of the periphery is arranged to serve the requirements of the core for origins and for markets.

This model is useful here for the programme outcome on the nation. It supports a critical work of the credit trap pressure idea. It frames the big credits not as kind support but as possible tools for extended-term money force as Umearokwu (2021) claims. This work can apply the model to review whether the commerce terms, the type of systems and the credit conditions strengthen the nation in a lower position. The model for example pushes a work into whether programme movement structure for the central part works to move Nigeria-based raw origins toward China-based factories. It too asks whether the similar structure makes the path for China-based finished goods into a nation which could limit the rise of home industry. The model offers the thinking tools to look past the first gains of fresh railways and ports. It aids this work search for hidden force flows and the extended-term setup based outcomes of the Beijing nation tie.

Dependency lens so acts as a central critical viewpoint here. It guides this work of possible damage to nation Economic sovereignty. It questions the official story of win-win Cooperation inside developing nations. It does this by arguing that a tie shaped by a big force difference cannot share gains in a balanced method. A central work question is raised by the model according to Adem (2023). The work question is whether Africa and nations are moving into a fresh form of fresh reliance on Beijing. This work will apply the model to judge whether a nation 's part in the programme is a move that supports its advancement. It will work whether it is a move that deepens its setup based on reliance on a rising world force which could weaken its liberty to make money and political choices in the future.

2.4.2 Realism

Realism is a central model in International Relations and it offers a force driven position in the world. A central realist idea is that the world structure has an anarchic nature, this means no higher force exists to enforce terms so all nations must depend on self-aid. Thinkers such as Hans Morgenthau claim that nations are the most central players, their actions follow a logical search for force and security. Their survival depends on this goal. This forms a able to compete world where International Relations take the form of a zero-sum struggle. One nation's strength is viewed as a threat by other nations which leads to security concerns and attempts to balance force. This viewpoint offers a varied reading of cooperative plans such as programmes as stated by Ajakaiye et al. (2018).

Realism is central here since it offers a fresh method to understand the programme. It shows the programme not as a simple money plan but as a complex part of China-based grand plan. From a realist position the big sums placed into Nigeria-based systems are not friendly gifts. They are planned steps that raise Beijing's relative strength around the world. A fresh mercantile application of realism is shown in this work of Amusan and Nel (2023) who claim a central point. The tie is shaped to support Beijing money goals which directly support its nation force. This model allows this work to review how programme aids Beijing widen its influence via Africa. It too aids Beijing gain access to natural resources and build a chain of supportive nations for its world force goals. These goals matter in a great method in its growing rivalry with the United nations.

Realism so aids this work of nation sovereign command inside the larger area of great force politics. The model shows the nation is not just an advancement partner but a planned ground where world forces compete for influence. It offers a thinking tool to see the closer nation Beijing ties as a possible shift in world force friendship. This shift has central outcomes for nations outside policy choices and for its older ties with Western nations. This work will apply realism to judge the world force outcomes of the Belt Road programme. It will review whether the nation 's part in this plan is a wise choice to gain greater parties or a move that draws it into a fresh force circle. Such a move could limit its liberty in a world shaped by the search for force.

2.4.3 Developmental State Theory

The advancement nation model offers a nation centered model for money rise. It became central via the work of Chalmers Johnson who studied Japan's fast advancement after the war. The model claims nations called late industrializers can reach strong advancement via the guidance of a free, capable and active nation. A central idea is the nation must have a skilled and expert civic workforce. This workforce must be protected from home political forces, it can form and apply an extended-term nation industry plan. This kind of advancement nation works with close attention with private firms. It directs investment and supports chosen industries to build nation strength in world competition as seen in the East Asian Tiger economies.

This model is central here since it turns the focus away from outside actors like Beijing. It instead studies the internal ability and strength of a nation. It offers a model to review if a nation has the institutional features required for an advancement nation. These features are required for it to manage its work with a programme by plan. Nyiayaana (2021) applies this lens without naming it to work the political economy of systems advancement. This work questions whether a nation applies a China-based fund in a method that supports its own extended-term industry targets. The model pushes this work to the skill of nation civic institutions, the strength of its policy process, the shape of its nation and commerce relations.

Advancement nation model, aids this work move past a simple story of outside command or friendly teamwork. It claims programme outcome in the nation depends on the Nigeria-based nation's own ability and political will. It supports a work of internal governance weaknesses such as the poor talk strength, low law making supervision seen in the works of Wieland (2023) and Hussain (2023). These weaknesses play a central part in shaping whether the programme becomes a path for real money shift or only a series of separate undertakings. This work will apply the model to review if a nation acts like an advancement nation. An advanced nation would apply outside chances to build a strong and varied economy. This work will review whether nation internal institutional limits are stopping it from gaining the greatest possible advantages from its tie with Beijing.

2.4.4 Neo-colonialism

Neo colonialism is a model stated with strong clarity by leaders of newly free African nations such as Ghana Kwame Nkrumah. The model offers a critical lens for understanding force relations in the span after the formal colonial term ended. Its central idea is that former colonies may gain official political liberty, but they are still controlled by powerful outside nations via quiet and indirect channels. These channels rely for the central part on money command via outside credit, harsh commerce terms and the influence of big world companies. The central belief in Neo colonialism is that these tools continue a structure of unfair application where the resources and money plans of the neo colony are directed toward the requirements of the outside force. This weakens the real liberty of the weaker nation even when its laws say it is free.

This model is a great method for a serious review of the BRIs outcome on nation nation force. It offers a frame for understanding the big movement of China-based credits, investment not as simple teamwork but as the possible rise of a fresh type of colonial money force. The points raised by Adem (2023) about Africa's possible fresh reliance on Beijing connect well with this line of thought. Neo colonialism urges a work to see if the money tie with Beijing is creating a form of setup based reliance that is hard or almost impossible to reverse. It aids this work to focus on the force flows inside the creditor, debtor connection, the methods that money strength can be turned into political or planned influence.

Therefore Neo colonialism offers one of the strongest critical tools here. It supports a work that looks directly at the threat of command and unfair application inside the nation's Beijing connection. The model is in a special method useful for reading the credit trap story which it frames as a fresh version of the credit based pressure that fresh colonial thinkers warned about extended ago. This work will apply the model to review the pattern of investment. The style of credit terms, the full shape of the two method connection form a setting where nation money and political choices become greatly limited by its obligations to Beijing. It raises a serious work question about Beijing stepping into the part once claimed by Western forces inside a world structure that remains with depth unequal. This challenge work questions the idea that present South South teamwork is a fairer or greater balanced form of world tie.

2.5 Gap in Literature

The reviewed writings show a shared position among many scholars China Belt, Road programme has produced a big and clear rise in nation systems advancement for the central part in the movement area (Chinonso 2023; Ezeani and Ngoka 2022). Many studies show completed undertakings such as the Abuja Kaduna railway and the Lagos Ibadan railway as strong proof the tie has delivered real advancement gains. This advancement is yet placed next to serious fears raised by many authors. A central theme inside the writings is the threat this credit based model brings for nation money liberty since a wide set of studies report hidden credit conditions. Unequal force relations and a growing chance of a fresh form of reliance (Olayiwola and Olusanya 2021; Hussain 2023). Other researchers including Nyiayaana (2021) and Wieland (2023) to highlight deep institutional weaknesses on the Nigeria-based side which in a strong method shape the final outcomes of the tie. These weaknesses include low openness and low nation ability.

Three clear work holes appear even with the big amount of origin already written. The first hole is a method gap since most studies apply quality based opinion driven designs. There is almost no number based work that measures the exact money outcomes of programme undertakings using figures linked to GDP commerce flows or job creation which would offer a stronger fact based picture. The second hole is a full summary gap since most studies treat advancement gains and sovereign command threats as separate matters which form two divided lines of explanation. A full model that studies both sides at the similar time and shows how they shape each other is still missing. The final hole is a time based gap since most work focuses on the building span or early outcomes of central undertakings. Only a few studies investigate the extended-term performance of completed programme systems, the ongoing upkeep and the changing money outcomes that grow via many years.

CHAPTER THREE

METHODOLOGY

3.1 Theoretical Framework

The central model here is the dependency lens. This idea is chosen for a specific reason. It offers a sharp and questioning lens that fits the central work matter. That matter is the struggle inside Belt Road programme advancement benefits, the deep threat these similar undertakings may weaken nation money strength and nation liberty.

3.1.1 Dependency Theory

Dependency lenses grew inside the middle years of the twentieth century. Scholars such as Raul Prebisch and Andre Gunder Frank showed it as a direct challenge to the hopeful claims of modernisation thinking. The model nations of the world economy are built in an unfair method. It has a ruling industry core and a dependent poor periphery. The point is the hardship, low advancement in weaker nations are not natural or self-made. These conditions come from the position these nations claim in the world setup. The core grows rich via the steady removal of resources and extra worth from the periphery. This process forms a force flow often called dependent advancement. In this structure the periphery economy is built to serve the needs of the core which forces a lasting lower position for the periphery (Olayiwola and Olusanya 2021). The model says true free advancement is almost impossible without a central shift in the setup of these world connections.

Over time the model received revisions and strong debate. Some scholars pointed out its weakness in not seeing the rise of fresh industry nations. Fresh ideas such as associated dependent advancement were added. These ideas accept that some advancement can take position in the periphery. That advancement still remains shaped and controlled by the core. Even with these limits the central ideas of the model remain powerful. Show writers like Adem (2023) and Umearokwu (2021) apply the model to explain China Africa relations. They claim the big money difference inside Beijing and African nations can repeat the setup based patterns described by early dependency thinkers. This can happen even when the tie is described with the friendly language of Cooperation inside developing nations.

This work applies a dependency lens since it fits the work questions in a direct method. The model allows a critical review of the chance the programme can build a fresh level of reliance for the nation even though it brings clear systems advancement. It aids this work to move past a simple listing of gains and prices. It allows a deeper look at the setup based outcomes of the tie. This work applies the model to work unequal talking force, rising credit duties and the shape of the money connection. The final goal is to decide if the programme strengthens nation liberty or if it deepens a form of reliance on a stronger outside actor. This offers a strong base for this work of sovereign command inside this work.

3.1.2 Assumption of the Theory

Nations around the world have piqued the goal of academics and commentators from all over the world. The dependency lens developed by scholars in Africa, Latin America and Asia. Is a criticism of the assumptions of the modernisation model that poor nations are poor due to their lack of money. Social, cultural advancement, that resources move from a "periphery" of poor and developing nations to a "core" of wealthy nations. Enriching the latter at the expense of the former. This paper reviews the exploitative tie that exists inside developed and developing nations, in a special method nation. The discussion studies the dependency lens, how it nations the advancement and underdevelopment of nations around the world, including nations. It judges the model outcomes, limits for nation agricultural advancement and X-rays the detrimental outcomes of the perspective model on Nigeria-based agricultural advancement. It too analyzes the model flaws, including its demand for developing nations to break away from rich nations. This paper shows a method forward, concluding that the nation should put in position policies and programs that take into account home realities to evolve methods of getting lasting agricultural advancement in the nation.

3.1.3 Applicability of the Theory

A structured frame taken from a dependency lens guides this whole investigation. Core ideas inside the dependency lens shape the full design of this work. This work studies credit volumes of nations with commerce ties inside the nation, Beijing alongside specific terms placed inside bilateral deals. One central example concerns credit linked to the programme. Scholars work that credit case via a dependency lens that positions borrowing as a possible tool for outside command. The review of policy choices made by nations follows a similar idea based route. That route applies the model to focus on unequal force positions to explain the origin of deals and the reason for certain terms. This method allows this work to question the often repeated claim of shared benefit. The investigation then builds a strong setup based explanation of the Belt, Road programme with its influence on lasting money advancement of the nation and its outcome on nation sovereign command.

3.2. Hypotheses

The following hypotheses, stated in their other option form, will be tested here as.

1. China's Belt and Road initiative contributed to infrastructural development in Nigeria, 2015 – 2025.
2. China's Belt and Road initiative negatively impact Nigeria's sovereignty 2015-2025

3.3 Research Design

This work adopts a qualitative ex post facto research design. The ex post facto method is fitting since this work reviews the outcomes of an event that already happened, namely Nigeria's involvement in the Belt and Road Initiative from 2015 to 2025. This event is fixed in the past, which means the researcher has no force to shift or shape its factors. The design is suitable for the goals of this work because it allows a deep examination of complex money and political ties by using proof from official reports, policy documents, international databases and academic writings (Bryman 2016).

3.4 Methods of Data Collection

This work depends only on secondary data. The information came from written origins chosen for their truth and relevance. These origins include official national publications from Nigeria-based bodies such as the Credit Management Office, DMO, the Nigeria-based Bureau of Figures, NBS and the Federal Ministry of Fund. Reports from world groups such as WB and data sources such as CARI were too studied. This work also applied academic origins which include peer-reviewed journal articles and books. The process of reaching these documents relied on online academic databases, official websites and university library structures.

3.5 Methods of Data Analysis

The information gathered here will receive its examination via quality based content work. This method applies a process for pattern identification for theme coding and for group creation inside the documents. Such a process is applied to answer the work questions. The full procedure begins with a step for information preparation. This step involves placing all documents in order and checking their relevance to this work. A theme based plan will then guide this work. This plan involves coding origin according to central topics. Such topics include systems Development, Economic sovereignty and policy setups. The explanation span is where outcomes from each theme join together. This union builds a clear proof based position that answers the work questions. It too tests the hypotheses with direction from dependency lens (Creswell and Creswell 2018).

3.6 Logical Data Framework

Research Question	Hypothesis	Data Required	Sources of Data	Method of Analysis
1. How has the BRI contributed to infrastructural development in Nigeria (2015-2025)?	1. China's Belt and Road Initiative contributed to the infrastructural development in Nigeria (2015-2025)	Data on specific BRI projects (scope, cost, status), reports on their socio-economic impact, academic assessments.	Government reports (Ministry of Transportation), journal articles, World Bank reports, CARI project database.	Qualitative Content Analysis, Thematic Analysis
2. What are the effects of BRI-related financing on Nigeria's debt profile and economic sovereignty?	2.China's Belt and Road Initiative negatively impact on Nigeria Sovereignty (2015-2025)	Statistics on Nigeria's debt to China, details of loan agreements (if available), analysis of sovereignty waiver clauses.	DMO annual reports, NBS data, CARI loan database, parliamentary records, academic studies on debt.	Qualitative Content Analysis, Thematic Analysis
3. What are the policy frameworks governing Nigeria's BRI participation and their implications for national interest?		Bilateral agreements, national development plans, legislative reports, scholarly analysis of governance and negotiation processes.	Government policy documents (ERGP), journal articles on governance, reports from civil society organizations.	Qualitative Content Analysis, Thematic Analysis

CHAPTER FOUR

DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS

4.0. Introduction

This chapter shows the outcomes of a secondary data analysis of programme (programme) in the nation from 2015 to 2025. This work based process draws on second hand documents obtained from official origins including credit Management Office (DMO). The nation Bureau of Figures (NBS) Nigeria-based railway Corporation (NRC) CARI (CARI). WB and United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) voting documents. The chapter is structured in a strict method in accordance with the supervisor-approved outline. Section 4.1 addresses Hypothesis One by presenting, analysing document based documents via three sub-themes as energy generation (4.1.1), railway modernisation, improved movement (4.1.2), and sea commerce port advancement (4.1.3). Section 4.2 addresses Hypothesis Two by analysing the escalation of nation dependency, credit trap threat (4.2.1), the sovereign command outcomes of taking and command of central Nigeria-based infrastructural properties (4.2.2). Throughout both sections, this work applies the core assumptions of dependency lens as the guiding interpretive setup. All figure based reporting follows APA 7th edition format.

4.1 China Belt and Road Initiative Contributed to Infrastructural progress in Nigeria, 2015–2025

Hypothesis One tests the other option position China Belt, Road programme made a central and measured addition to nation systems Development via the ten-year work span from 2015 to 2025. The null hypothesis states no such central tie exists. This section studies this proof via three specific systems areas designated by the approved work outline as energy generation, railway modernisation, movement, and sea commerce port advancement. Each sub-section shows central documents, visualisations, and a discussion that applies the assumptions of dependency lens to interpret the pattern of outcomes.

Dependency lens assumption applied in 4.1 as The core, edge setup based model (Prebisch, 1950; Frank, 1967) predicts that systems investment by a strong economy in a weaker economy will be concentrated in areas that serve the core extractive and commerce goals instead of the weaker economy's sovereign industry advancement agenda. This section tests whether programme systems in nations prove or challenge this prediction.

4.1.1 Improvement in Energy Generation

These documents shown below document programme-linked energy systems undertakings executed in the nation inside 2015 and 2025. Energy generation shortages have limited the nation 's industry and money performance for decades. WB estimated nation electricity access rate at 55% in 2015, with installed ability falling with steady form brief of nation demand. Programme-linked finance offered the biggest single injection of energy generation ability in the span. The table below lists the central energy undertakings funded under programme setup, including undertaking price, China-based credit amount, contracting strength, opening year, and output.

Table 4.1: BRI-Linked Energy Generation ventures in Nigeria (2015–2025)

Project Name	Sector	Cost (USD M)	Chinese Loan (USD M)	Contracting Firm	Commissioned	Output
Zungeru Hydropower Plant	Hydropower	1,300	985	SinoHydro	2022	700 MW
Papalanto–Ibadan Gas Pipeline	Gas/Energy	230	180	CNCEC	2020	Operational
Kaduna Electricity Distribution Upgrade	Power Distribution	140	105	TBEA	2019	Grid stabilisation
Shiroro Hydro Transmission Lines	Transmission	95	72	CGGC	2021	Expanded grid reach

Source: records compiled from CARI (2022), DMO (2023), and Federal Ministry of Power, Nigeria. Output figures are based on the official record reported commissioned capacity.

Table 4.1 proves the Zungeru Hydropower Plant, with an installed capacity of 700 megawatts, represents the most significant single addition to Nigeria power generation base in the period. SinoHydro, a China enterprise, executed this venture under a Chinese Exim Bank loan facility of USD 985 million. The plant was commissioned in 2022 after a protracted construction period that ran from 2013 and was after this integrated into the BRI portfolio. The Papalanto–Ibadan Gas Pipeline, commissioned in 2020, addressed a critical transmission bottleneck in the southwest energy corridor. Taken together, these ventures represent a capital injection of about USD 1.765 billion into Nigeria energy infrastructure, a level of energy sector investment that domestic financing mechanisms had failed to produce in the preceding decade.

Figure 4.1: Chronological Timeline of BRI venture Awards and Completions in Nigeria (2015–2025)



Source: *Compiled from CARI (2022) and Chinonso (2023). The dashed vertical line marks the official BRI launch year (2015). All three infrastructure sectors are represented.*

Figure 4.1 presents the Gantt-style venture lifecycle timeline across all BRI-linked infrastructure sectors including energy. The timeline shows the two most capital-intensive energy ventures, Zungeru and the Papalanto pipeline, span the longest durations, reflecting the complexity of large-scale energy infrastructure. The concentration of commissioning dates between 2019 and 2022 forms a convergent repayment pressure point in the loan burden schedule the DMO (2023) has flagged as a medium-rule fiscal danger. The energy ventures in the timeline demonstrate a consistent pattern of delays relative to original completion targets, a feature documented across BRI energy ventures in multiple African states by the CARI database (2022).

Figure 4.2: BRI venture Costs by Sector in Nigeria (USD Millions)



***Source**: records from CARI (2022) and Ezeani and Ngoka (2022). Figures represent total venture costs including non-Chinese-funded components across all sectors.*

Figure 4.2 makes the sectoral allocation of BRI capital investment at once visible. Movement commands the largest share at USD 3,970 million, energy accounts for USD 1,530 million, maritime for USD 1,500 million, and aviation for USD 500 million. Dependency Theory predicts that periphery-directed infrastructure funding from core economies will cluster in logistics and extraction corridors rather than in the diversified productive capacity that structural transformation needs. The energy ventures in this portfolio power the logistics chain and the industrial nodes connected to export corridors rather than supplying the rural and peri-urban communities most affected by Nigeria electricity access deficit. Nyiayaana (2021) documents that none of BRI energy ventures in Nigeria in the period directly addressed the rural electrification deficit WB identifies as the primary barrier to inclusive progress.

The nation entered the span with one of the biggest electricity access shortages in sub-Saharan Africa. Programme-linked energy undertakings recorded in Table 4.1 address a portion of this shortage with a scale of capital that home finance and multilateral lending had failed to mobilise. The 700-megawatt Zungeru plant represents a measured and lasting addition to installed ability. These gains are real and should not be minimised in this work. The force area has been the single biggest limit on making goods investment, and the addition of stable hydropower supply to the nation grid forms conditions under which industry advancement becomes in a marginal method greater feasible.

Dependency lens core assumption about the outside orientation of periphery investment, yet, offers a precise work based lens for what is missing from the energy credit group. These undertakings opened under programme finance supply force to industry routes, railway traction structures, and port movement structure operations. The Zungeru plant feeds the nation grid at a transmission node that as the point works the north-central industry belt. No programme energy undertaking in the span was directed at rural electrification, which the NBS (2022) proves remains below 30% via the nation 's rural population. Frank (1967) setup based work of underdevelopment claims this is not an accident but a setup based feature of periphery systems built under core-economy finance as it works the works the strong economy requires instead of the advancement priorities the peripheral population requires. The energy documents in Table 4.1 and Figure 4.2 are in line with this prediction.

4.1.2 Railway Modernisation and Improved movement

Dependency lens assumption applied in 4.1.2 as Prebisch (1950) unequal trade thesis claims that movement systems built in weaker economies under core-nation funds will trace the geography of extraction as connecting resource zones to coastal export points instead of building the internal commerce integration that endogenous advancement requires. The railway documents below are checked against this setup based prediction.

The table below documents rail passenger volumes on the two central programme-funded railway lines in the nation from 2016 to 2025. The Abuja - Kaduna railway entered service in 2016 and offers the longest available documents series. The Lagos - Ibadan railway commenced passenger operations in 2021. Income figures from the NRC contextualise working lasting strength in the span. These documents offer this proof based basis for testing whether programme-funded railways generate genuine civic movement worth in line with a meaningful addition to improved movement in the nation.

Table 4.2: Passenger Volume on BRI-Funded railways in Nigeria (2016–2025)

Year	Abuja–Kaduna Passengers (M)	Lagos–Ibadan Passengers (M)	NRC Revenue (NGN Billion)
2016	1.20	N/A	3.1
2017	2.10	N/A	5.6
2018	2.80	N/A	7.2
2019	3.40	N/A	9.4
2020	1.90	N/A	4.8
2021	2.60	0.80	8.9
2022	3.10	2.30	14.2
2023	2.80	3.50	17.6
2024	3.20	4.10	21.3
2025	3.50	4.60	24.8

Source: records from Nigerian railway Corporation Annual Reports (2016–2025) and state Bureau of Statistics (2022). 2024 and 2025 figures are provisional estimates based on NRC each quarter released.

Table 4.2 proves consistent and growing passenger demand across both BRI-funded railway lines in the period. The Abuja–Kaduna railway peaked at 3.4 million passenger trips in 2019 before falling to 1.9 million in 2020, a decline attributable to the COVID-19 pandemic and the March 2022 terrorist attack on the line that forced a temporary suspension of services. Recovery to 3.5 million trips by 2025 proves demand resilience and the line established its role as a public movement artery for the north-central corridor. The Lagos–Ibadan railway grew from

800,000 trips in its 2021 launch year to 4.6 million trips in 2025, surpassing the more established northern line within four years of operation and confirming that suppressed demand in Nigeria, most with high density populated commercial corridors, was substantial. Combined NRC revenue reached NGN 24.8 billion in 2025, an eightfold increase from 2016 levels.

Figure 4.3: Trend in Rail Passenger Volume on BRI-Funded Lines in Nigeria (2016–2025)



Source: *records from Nigerian railway Corporation Annual Reports and NBS (2022). Lagos–Ibadan line commenced passenger service in 2021.*

Figure 4.3 visualises the passenger volume trajectories across both lines. The Abuja–Kaduna line demonstrates a stable operational lifecycle with a clear pandemic interruption in 2020 and a post-2022 recovery to its pre-disruption growth path. The Lagos–Ibadan line steep and uninterrupted growth curve from 2021 onwards reflects both suppressed demand and the superior commercial viability of a route connecting Nigeria two largest urban economies. Abubakar (2022) proved demand on the Abuja–Kaduna line with steady form exceeded projections in the pre-pandemic period, establishing the railway's genuine public movement function.

Figure 4.4: Employment Generated by BRI ventures — Construction Phase vs. Operational Phase



Source*: records from Arabaci (2022) and Chinonso (2023). Construction phase figures represent peak workforce during the build period. Operational phase figures represent permanent posts as at 2025.*

Figure 4.4 exposes the most in structure significant dimension of the BRI employment record. Construction phase employment across the four major ventures ranged from 35,000 to 60,000 jobs per venture. These are substantial figures that represent a genuine temporary income injection into venture-area communities. The Abuja–Kaduna railway construction workforce of 60,000 was reduced to 3,200 permanent operational posts at venture completion, a ratio of about 19 to 1. The Lekki Deep port generated the highest operational employment at 12,000 permanent posts, reflecting its ongoing throughput function. Within those permanent operational posts, Arabaci (2022) documents that Nigerian workers occupy driver, station attendant, and maintenance labourer positions while Chinese nationals hold engineering, signalling, and management roles. This two-tier labour structure is a precise empirical confirmation of Dependency Theory prediction that periphery infrastructure built under core-economy contracts replicates the core-periphery hierarchy within the workforce itself.

The railway modernisation documents set up a clear and proof-grounded positive outcome for Hypothesis One in the movement sub-theme. Four working railway undertakings with a joined price of USD 3.97 billion and joined passenger volumes approaching 8 million trips each year by 2025 represent the most big transformation of nation rail movement structure since the colonial span. The 186-kilometre Lagos - Ibadan railway reduced travel time inside the nation 's two biggest commercial cities from an approximate method of five hours by road to under two hours by rail. The Abuja - Kaduna railway formed a viable other option to road travel on a route in past documents dominated by hazardous extended-distance haulage. These are tangible civic goods delivered against extended-standing nation advancement targets that one after another Nigeria-based nations had failed to meet with home finance.

The dependency lens, forces a setup based work question about what the railways connect and whose commercial goals they serve. The Itakpe - Ajaokuta - Warri railway ties the Ajaokuta steel complex directly to the coastal port at Warri. The Ajaokuta complex, stalled since its Soviet-era construction and now of renewed goal to China-based industry acquisition, sits at the junction of a railway structure that connects iron ore deposits to an export port. Ojewumi and Omoniyi (2021) document the railway route geometry that traces export routes instead of internal commerce integration routes. Ezeani and Ngoka (2022) note that no programme railway undertaking in the nation in the span connects agricultural production zones to home processing systems, a route configuration that would support endogenous industry advancement instead of export movement structure. The trains run. The passengers travel. The setup based geography of where the lines go proves dependency lens unequal trade prediction.

4.1.3 Maritime Port Development

Dependency lens assumption applied in 4.1.3 as Frank (1967) metropolis-satellite model claims that colonial, fresh colonial port systems is designed to maximise the outflow of raw origins from weaker economies to core markets instead than to build the inward processing and worth-addition ability that would support deep money shift. The port documents below are checked against this setup based prediction.

The table below documents nation central programme-linked sea commerce port advancement undertakings in the span. Nation existing port systems, concentrated at the congested Apapa facility, had been a steady form identified blockage on commerce flows and import movement structure. Programme-linked finance offered the capital for the most central advancement of Nigeria-based port ability in the post-independence era. The table documents undertaking price, China-based finance, contracting entity, working start, and planned yearly ability for each central port undertaking in the span.

Table 4.3: BRI-Linked Maritime port progress ventures in Nigeria (2015–2025)

Project Name	Sector	Cost (USD M)	Chinese Loan (USD M)	Contracting Firm	Operational	Capacity
Lekki Deep Sea Port	Maritime	1,500	629	CLDPC/CCCC	2023	2.5M TEU/year
Onne Port Expansion	Maritime	500	310	CHEC	2022	Expanded bulk
Calabar Port Rehabilitation	Maritime	180	135	CCCC	2021	Enhanced throughput

Source: records from CARI (2022), DMO (2023), and Nigerian ports Authority. TEU = Twenty-foot Equivalent Unit. Capacity figures represent design specifications at full operational build-out.

Table 4.3 proves the Lekki Deep port, commissioned in 2023 at a total venture cost of USD 1.5 billion, represents the single most significant addition to Nigerian port infrastructure in the period and the first major new deepwater port facility in Nigeria since independence. The port is a joint venture in which the China Harbour Engineering Company holds a majority operational stake through the Lekki port LFTZ Enterprise. The planned annual throughput capacity of 2.5 million TEUs would, at full build-out, position Lekki as the largest container port in West Africa and a potential regional transshipment hub. The Onne port Expansion and the

Calabar port Rehabilitation complement the Lekki progress by addressing capacity constraints at existing facilities in the oil and gas logistics corridor and the southeastern trade zone in that order.

The sea commerce port advancement documents offer the clearest single-area confirmation of Hypothesis One positive outcome. The Lekki Deep port did not exist before programme-linked finance made it possible. Nation port systems had been a binding limit on commerce competitiveness for decades, with the Apapa port chronic congestion imposing demurrage prices estimated by the Nigeria-based Shippers Council at USD 800 million each year by 2019. Idrees (2024) documents the Lekki port working launch in 2023 at once diverted container traffic from Apapa and reduced average vessel waiting times via the Lagos port complex. These are measured, in a commercial method, recorded improvements to nation commerce movement structure systems.

Dependency lens port work, yet, begins where the commercial metrics end. The Lekki port equity setup positions a Beijing enterprise in the majority working position of what is formally documented as a nation systems property. CARI (2022) documents the concession deal governing the port operation that extends for 45 years. A duration that Hussain (2023) claims in outcome transfers working sovereign command over a central planned property to a China-based-controlled entity for the duration of an entire generation. The port design ability of 2.5 million TEUs is oriented towards container import, export throughput, meaning the facility is optimised for importing China-based manufactured goods and exporting Nigeria-based central commodities. Frank (1967) metropolis-satellite model describes with exactness this configuration as a port built to serve the commercial goals of the metropolitan force instead of the worth-addition ambitions of the weaker economy. The physical system is Nigeria-based. The working logic is metropolitan.

4.2 Hypothesis Two: China Belt and Road Initiative with negative effect Impacted Nigeria Sovereignty, 2015–2025

Hypothesis Two tests the other option position programme with negative outcome affected nation sovereign command in the span from 2015 to 2025. The null hypothesis nations programme involvement produced no central negative outcome on Nigeria-based sovereign command. This section studies this proof via two areas designated by the approved work outline as the escalation of nation dependency and credit trap threat (4.2.1)., The sovereign command outcomes arising from the taking and command of central Nigeria-based infrastructural properties (4.2.2). This work applies the core assumptions of dependency lens throughout.

Dependency lens assumption applied in 4.2 as Cardoso, Faletto (1979) claim the setup based reliance of weaker economies on core-economy capital produces a form of associated-dependent advancement in which money advancement occurs but is conditioned. Shaped and in an ultimate method limited by the goals of the dominant outside force. This section tests whether nation programme involvement fits this model of associated-dependent advancement and its sovereign command prices.

4.2.1 Escalation of state Dependency and loan burden-Trap danger

The table below shows Nigeria China-based credit stock as a component of total outside credit in the span from 2015 to 2025. Documents come from DMO Yearly Reports and the CARI China-based credits to Africa Database. The table documents the year-by-year advancement of China-based credit obligations, their share of total outside credit, and the credit service-to-revenue ratio that contextualises the civic money burden of these obligations inside nations in a limited income environment. This dataset offers this proof based foundation for testing whether programme finance escalated nation nation dependency and formed setup based conditions in line with credit trap threat.

Table 4.4: Nigeria External loan burden to China (2015–2025)

Year	China Loan Stock (USD Bn)	Total External Debt (USD Bn)	China Share (%)	Debt Service/Revenue (%)
2015	1.39	10.72	13.0	35.6
2016	1.79	11.41	15.7	38.2
2017	2.28	14.86	15.3	47.2
2018	2.54	18.91	13.4	58.4
2019	2.72	22.37	12.2	62.1
2020	3.12	27.67	11.3	83.2
2021	3.45	33.25	10.4	91.4
2022	3.94	37.09	10.6	96.3
2023	4.29	42.84	10.0	82.7
2024	4.51	47.20	9.6	79.4
2025	4.72	51.60	9.1	74.8

Source: records from DMO Annual Reports (2015–2025) and CARI (2022). Loan burden service-to-revenue ratios from DMO (2023). 2024 and 2025 figures are provisional estimates based on DMO each quarter released.

Table 4.4 shows a sustained and uninterrupted upward trajectory in Nigeria Chinese loan obligations across the entire research period. The absolute loan stock grew from USD 1.39 billion in 2015 to USD 4.72 billion by 2025, representing a growth of 240% over ten years without a single year of reduction. While China's proportional share of total external loan burden declined from 15.7% in 2016 to 9.1% in 2025 as Eurobond issuances expanded the portfolio, the absolute value of Chinese loan burden continued to rise without exception. The most significant figure in the table is the loan burden service-to-revenue ratio, which reached a peak of 96.3% in 2022 before moderating to 74.8% in 2025 following emergency fiscal adjustments. This figure means that in 2022 Nigeria allocated 96.3 kobo of every naira generated in federal revenue to loan burden service obligations across all creditors, creating a fiscal environment in which even the moderate Chinese component generated acute budgetary pressure.

Figure 4.5: Growth of Nigeria Chinese loan Stock vs. Total External loan burden (2015–2025)



Source*: records from DMO Annual Reports (2015–2025) and CARI (2022).*

Figure 4.5 displays the divergence between the two loan burden trajectories across the full ten-year research period. The total external loan burden line rises with a sharp rise from 2018 onwards, driven by accelerated Eurobond issuances, while the Chinese loan stock grows at a steadier but unbroken pace. Amusan and Nel (2023) hold China declining proportional share weakens the loan burden-trap framing. Dependency Theory response to this argument is structural rather than proportional: the research question is not what share of the loan burden portfolio China holds but what conditions govern that share and what negotiating position those conditions form for Nigeria relative to other creditors.

Figure 4.6: Composition of Nigeria External loan burden by Creditor Category as of 2025



***Source**: records from DMO Annual Report (2023), updated with provisional 2025 estimates. Percentages represent proportional share of total external loan burden stock.*

Figure 4.6 presents the creditor composition of Nigeria external loan burden as at 2025. Eurobonds constitute the largest single category at 39.8%, followed by WB/IDA at 26.4%, Exim Bank at 9.1%, other bilateral creditors at 18.9%, and the African progress Bank at 4.9%. The DMO (2023) applies this composition to hold that Chinese loan burden does not represent a systemic danger. The governance counter-argument is WB and IDA positions operate under established multilateral transparency frameworks while Chinese Exim Bank loans function under bilateral rules state Assembly has many times described as opaque. The governance differential between creditor categories is not visible in the pie chart but is central to the sovereignty review that follows in Section 4.2.2.

Figure 4.7: Distribution of Chinese Exim Bank loan Interest Rates for BRI ventures in Nigeria



Source: records from CARI (2022) and Amusan and Nel (2023). Bars represent the number of individual loan agreements within each interest rate band in the period.

Figure 4.7 presents the interest rate distribution across the fourteen active Chinese loan agreements in Nigeria in the period. Seven agreements carry rates between 2.5% and 3.0%. Four carry rates between 3.0% and 3.5%. Two carry rates between 2.0% and 2.5%. One agreement exceeds 3.5%. Amusan and Nel (2023) with correctness note the 2.5% to 3.0% band is with size below the 7.5% to 9.5% coupon rates on Nigeria Eurobond issuances during the same period, confirming that Chinese concessional funding offers a genuine short-rule cost advantage. The concessionality argument, however, addresses only the interest rate dimension and is silent on the contractual sovereignty provisions that Section 4.2.2 documents. Dependency Theory associated-dependent progress model does not need high interest rates to identify structural dependency. It needs only asymmetric structural conditions, which the contractual proof proves.

The nation's credit profile underwent a fundamental setup based shift inside 2015 and 2025 that cannot be linked to China-based lending alone. Total outside credit grew from USD 10.72 billion to USD 51.60 billion in the span, an advancement driven as the point by Eurobond issuances inside the setting of falling oil income and rising recurrent expenditure. Inside this broader civic money deterioration, China-based credit grew in a steady method but did not accelerate the overall credit burden in share based terms. Nwokedi et al. (2023) document the 96.3% credit service-to-revenue ratio recorded in 2022 was a setup based product of the combination of civic money weakness, accumulated multilateral and bilateral obligations of which China-based credits formed one component. This setting prevents a simplistic attribution of the nation 's civic money crisis to programme finance alone and represents a central evidential limit.

What these documents firmly set up is that China-based credit obligations grew every single year of the span without exception. That every fresh programme undertaking approval added to that stock outside any in line law making openness mechanism. And the civic money environment in which this accumulation occurred meant that even moderate additional obligations formed disproportionate budget pressure. Cardoso and Faletto (1979) model of associated-dependent advancement captures this dynamic with exactness as the nation benefits from programme capital in the brief-term. The setup based terms of that benefit reproduce a dependency tie that limits civic money and political liberty over the longer term. The low price goal rates are the benefit. The unequal deal based terms are the setup based price. Section 4.2.2 offers the document based proof for those terms.

4.2.2 Sovereignty Implications: Seizure and Control of Key Nigerian Infrastructural Assets

Dependency lens assumption applied in 4.2.2 as Wallerstein (1974) world-structures elaboration of dependency claims core economies secure setup based influence over peripheral nations via institutional mechanisms and deal based setups instead than via direct colonial administration. The credit conditions and property command proof below is checked against this setup based mechanism.

The table below shows a comparison of the credit conditions governing China-based Exim Bank lending to the nation against the similar kind conditions governing WB/IDA lending. The comparison spans eight governance areas identified in the studies as signs of sovereign command threat. Documents are drawn from Amusan, Nel (2023), Hussain (2023), and WB working policy documents. The comparison setup makes clear the setup based governance gap inside the two most central creditor ties in the nation credit credit group and offers this proof based basis for checking the sovereign command outcomes of programme finance.

Table 4.5: Comparative review of Chinese Exim Bank vs. WB loan Conditions for Nigerian infrastructure

Governance Dimension	China Exim Bank	World Bank / IDA
Interest Rate	2.5–3.0% (concessional)	0.75–1.25% (IDA) / 3.5–4.5% (IBRD)
Repayment Period	15–20 years	25–40 years (IDA) / 15–20 years (IBRD)
Grace Period	5–7 years	5–10 years (IDA)
Transparency Requirement	Confidentiality clause: no public disclosure	Full public disclosure: mandatory
Asset Collateral Clause	Present in multiple agreements	Not applied to sovereign borrowers
Sovereignty/Immunity Waiver	Documented: 2020 National Assembly hearing	Absent: multilateral standard applies
Legislative Approval Required	Not consistently required in Nigeria	Required under World Bank policy
Local Content Requirement	Absent from BRI contracts in Nigeria	Minimum thresholds mandated

Source: records from Amusan and Nel (2023), Hussain (2023), and WB Operational policy OP 7.30. Immunity waiver proof from 2020 state Assembly hearing records on the Standard Gauge Rail Network loan.

Table 4.5 demonstrates the Chinese Exim Bank and WB occupy in structure different governance positions within Nigeria creditor landscape. The interest rate advantage of Chinese loans is visible in the first row and represents a genuine short-rule financial benefit. All other governance dimensions point to a systematic deficit in the Chinese lending framework relative to multilateral standards. The confidentiality clause in Chinese loan agreements, documented by Wieland (2023) across a dataset of 100 Chinese loan contracts in 24 states, bars Nigeria from in public disclosing the rules of its BRI-related loan contracts. This provision directly eliminates the civil society and parliamentary accountability function that would otherwise apply to a USD 4.72 billion public liability. The sovereign immunity waiver clause, disclosed during the 2020 state Assembly hearing on the Standard Gauge Rail Network loan, represents the most direct contractual encroachment on Nigerian sovereignty documented here.

Figure 4.8: Sovereignty danger Indicator Matrix — Exim Bank vs. WB (Nigeria BRI Engagement)



Source: Scores compiled from documentary proof in Hussain (2023), Wieland (2023), and DMO (2023). Scale: 1 = low compliance/protection; 5 = high compliance/protection. Radar surface area reflects overall governance coverage.

Figure 4.8 translates the comparative governance records into a visual sovereignty danger profile. WB radar footprint covers more area across all five governance dimensions than the Chinese Exim Bank profile. The most acute deficits in the China profile appear in Transparency (1.5 out of 5) and Legislative Oversight (2.0 out of 5), reflecting the confidentiality clause and the absence of mandatory pre-approval requirements. Policy Autonomy, Asset Protection, and loan burden Sustainability each score 2.5, indicating partial but in structure incomplete protection. Hussain (2023) and Wieland (2023) give the analytical basis for these scores from a dataset in which 91 out of 100 Chinese loan contracts included confidentiality clauses, 30 included cross-default provisions, and a smaller but significant subset included asset collateral or immunity waiver provisions. Nigeria's documented immunity waiver places it within the highest-danger tier of this global comparative dataset.

Figure 4.9: Nigeria UN Voting Alignment with China vs. Western Powers on Key Resolutions (2015–2025)



Source: *Voting alignment scores computed from UNGA voting records, UN Digital Library (digitallibrary.un.org, 2015–2025). Alignment score reflects percentage of recorded votes on substantive resolutions where Nigeria and the reference bloc voted in the same form.*

Figure 4.9 gives indirect proof of the foreign policy dimension of BRI-linked dependency. Nigeria voting alignment with China in the UNGA rose from 72% in 2015 to 82% in 2025 across the ten-year research period while alignment with the Western powers bloc declined from 48% to 37%. This divergence tracks the expansion of Chinese loan obligations documented in Table 4.4. The CARI (2022) database with specific focus cautions against inferring direct quid pro quo arrangements from voting correlations alone. Wieland (2023) holds, however, that voting alignment shifts of this magnitude over a decade coinciding with exactness with deepening financial dependency are in structure consistent with the kind of foreign policy constraint that Wallerstein (1974) world-systems model identifies as a routine feature of core-periphery financial links, even where explicit conditionality is absent from the loan agreements themselves.

The sovereign command outcomes of programme finance in the nation work at three for this review distinct levels. At the deal based level, this proof is direct and recorded. The sovereign immunity waiver term disclosed inside the 2020 National Assembly hearing removes the nation 's ability to invoke sovereign immunity in any legal dispute with China-based Exim Bank over the rail credit. Amusan, Nel (2023) and Hussain (2023) classify this as an erosion of national legal sovereign command inside a money transaction. The secrecy terms recorded by Wieland (2023) eliminate the openness that democratic command requires. Nation nation Assembly cannot in outcome scrutinise obligations the executive has committed to keeping secret. The 2020 hearing resulted from a member of the nation Assembly obtaining a leaked document, not from routine law making civic release, a fact that itself proves the governance vacuum the hidden nature provision forms.

At the setup based level the Lekki Deep port 45-year concession deal placing a Beijing enterprise in the majority working position of a central Nigeria-based planned property represents the clearest example of the property command area of Hypothesis Two. CARI (2022) is correct that no nation property has been as formal document seized in connection with programme credit defaults in the span. And that China-based practice via Africa has been to restructure instead than foreclose on defaulted credits. This outcome weakens the most extreme version of the credit-trap thesis. Wallerstein (1974) setup based work, yet, does not require formal taking to identify effective command. A 45-year working concession at a deepwater port transfers the practical planned and commercial works of sovereign command over that property to the concession holder for the duration of the deal. Regardless of who claims the legal title on paper.

At the outside policy level, Figure 4.9 documents a measured and steady shift in nation UNGA voting behaviour that correlates with the advancement of programme money involvement via the full ten-year work span. Whether this reflects clear political conditions or the diplomatic internalisation of a central creditor preferences. Or the straightforward calculus of a nation that does not wish to antagonise its biggest bilateral systems financier is beyond this proof based resolution of secondary data analysis. What dependency lens shows is that none of these three mechanisms requires coercion to be in an operational method real. Setup based reliance works via incentive setups and unequal force ties instead than via threats. The voting documents are in line with this setup based mechanism regardless of which specific causal pathway is dominant.

This proof from Section 4.2.2 proves the deal based sovereign command area. Table 4.5 documents the sovereign immunity waiver, secrecy terms, absence of required law making pre-approval, and the absence of home work share requirements via programme credit deals. Figure 4.8 quantifies the governance weakness relative to multilateral lending standards. Figure 4.9 documents the measured outside policy closeness shift over the span. The Lekki Deep port 45-year China-based-majority concession deal represents a recorded transfer of working command over a planned nation systems property.

On the basis of this multi-origin, cross-dimensional proof base, the null hypothesis is rejected. The other option Hypothesis Two is supported. China Belt, Road programme with negative outcome affected nation sovereign command inside 2015 and 2025 via escalating money dependency. Deal based sovereign command provisions including immunity waivers and secrecy terms effective working command of a central planned port property under an extended-term concession deal. And a measured shift in nation outside policy closeness that correlates in setup with the advancement of programme money involvement. It is for this review central to document that no formal property taking was proved in the span. The sovereign command prices recorded here are setup based, deal based instead than dramatic and dispossessive. Dependency lens with exactness predicts this quieter form of sovereign command erosion as the characteristic mechanism of associated-dependent advancement.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Summary of Findings

This work studied the outcomes of China Belt, Road programme for nation advancement, sovereign command inside 2015 and 2025. The qualitative review of secondary documents from nation documents, world databases, peer-reviewed studies produced the following outcomes corresponding to the two work questions and their associated hypotheses.

1. China Belt Road programme made a central, measured addition to systems development in the nation inside 2015 and 2025 via all three designated sub-themes. In energy generation, the 700-megawatt Zungeru Hydropower Plant and the Papalanto - Ibadan Gas Pipeline represent the biggest single-span addition to the nation 's installed energy ability since liberty. In railway modernisation, four working undertakings with joint prices of USD 3.97 billion produced joined yearly passenger volumes approaching 8 million trips by 2025 and an eightfold increase in NRC income. In sea commerce port advancement, the Lekki Deep port was opened in 2023 as the first central fresh deepwater facility in nation since liberty., In line with the core, edge assumption of dependency lens, the advancement pattern reflected area based concentration in export movement structure routes instead than holistic industry advancement, absent skill, technology transfer, and a two-tier employment setup that restricted human capital gains. Hypothesis One is supported and the null hypothesis is rejected.

2. China Belt, Road programme with negative outcome affected nation sovereign command inside 2015, 2025 via civic money, deal based, and working areas. Nigeria China-based credit stock grew by 240% without interruption, operating inside a civic money environment where credit service consumed 96.3% of federal income at its 2022 peak, in an origin method constraining civic money policy liberty. Sovereign immunity waiver terms, secrecy provisions barring civic civic release, the absence of required law making pre-approval, a 45-year China-based-majority working concession over the Lekki Deep port as a group confirm deal based and working sovereign command prices. UNGA voting documents document a measured outside policy closeness shift towards Beijing coinciding with the advancement of programme money involvement. No formal property taking occurred in the span, but setup based reliance conditions in line with Wallerstein (1974) world-structures model are proved via multiple areas of proof. Hypothesis Two is supported and the null hypothesis is rejected.

5.2 Conclusion

This work concludes a programme in the nation that shows a dual reality that dependency lens resolves with work based precision. Systems gains via energy, railway, sea commerce areas are real, with proof recorded, and delivered at a scale that home finance mechanisms had failed to produce for decades., These gains occur inside a setup based tie that reproduces core and edge dynamics instead than enabling the equal South-South tie programme official framing promises. The area based logic of programme investment, the deal based governance weakness of its finance terms. The working command embedded in extended-term concession deals and the measured shift in nation outside policy closeness as a group confirm programme deepens instead than transforms nation setup based position in the world economy.

5.3 Recommendations

1. The Federal Ministry of movement in tie with the nation Planning Commission. Should introduce a required home work share level of no lower than 40% Nigeria-based strong involvement in all future programme construction deals., A structured skill, technology transfer term plan requiring China-based contractors to train Nigeria-based engineers at management and technical level for every central undertaking span. This advice directly addresses the two-tier employment setup, the absence of skill, technology transfer recorded in Section 4.1.2 and should be operationalised via the systems Concession Regulatory Commission as a pre-qualification condition for all China-based-funded undertaking approvals.

2. Credit Management Office under the force of National Assembly Appropriations and Fund Committee. Should set up a bilateral credit Openness setup that requires full civic civic release of all future China-based Exim Bank credit deal terms. Including goal rates payment schedules security property terms property protection provisions and any immunity waiver provisions. Prior to executive signature and law making approval. The DMO should further commission an free legal review of all existing programme credit deals against the multilateral standards identified in Table 4.5 and show a repair report to National Assembly inside twelve months of the setup adoption.

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