

**THE IMPACT OF RUSSIA-UKRAINE WAR ON NIGERIA FOOD
SECURITY FROM 2021-2025**

BY

IKE ADAOBI YVONNE

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SUPERVISOR: REV. FR. DR. IKENNA OGBUKA

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ABSTRACT

The study reviewed the impact of the Russia-Ukraine war on Nigeria food security and international relations from 2021 to 2025. The main objective was to review the general effects of the conflict for Nigeria, directed by two specific objectives: to review how the war shaped food availability, accessibility, and affordability in Nigeria, as well as to study how Nigeria diplomatic relations with Russia, Ukraine, as well as other international partners were shaped by the conflict. Secondary data were taken from official publications of the National Bureau of Statistics, Central Bank of Nigeria, World Bank, Food and Agriculture Organization, UN General Assembly Digital Library, and verified peer-reviewed scholarly sources. The study covered Nigeria from 2021 to 2025 using an ex post facto and documentary research design with documentary analysis, descriptive statistics, thematic analysis, as well as temporal analysis as the methods of data study. Black Sea export disruption raised food inflation above 40 percent by 2024, pushed one million more Nigerians into poverty in 2022, and forced 72 percent of families to reduce meal portions. This explains why the study found, first, that the war made a serious and lasting harmful impact on food availability, accessibility, as well as affordability in Nigeria. Nigeria adopted a careful balancing plan marked by chosen UN voting, kept Russia trade and security ties, active Ukraine humanitarian engagement, as well as refusal to full Western side taking through African agency assertions. This explains why the study found, second, that the Russia-Ukraine conflict in a significant way shaped Nigeria diplomatic relations across all key bilateral and multilateral dimensions. Nigeria's conduct in food security and diplomacy was driven by reasoned national interest calculation under external pressure. This explains why the study concludes that Realist Theory provides the most clear approach for explaining both outcomes. The recommendation states that the Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security set up a National Strategic Grain Reserve with a minimum 90-day wheat buffer funded at no less than 5 percent of the yearly federal budget.

Keywords: Russia-Ukraine war, food security, food inflation, diplomatic relations, foreign policy, Nigeria, Realist Theory, Black Sea grain, wheat import dependence, African agency.



CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background to the Study

People need regular access to safe food for healthy living. This explains why food security forms a main part of human security and national stability in the current world. The Food and Agriculture Organization states that food security exists when every person at all times has physical, social and economic access to safe, nutritious as well as proper food that meets individual dietary needs for healthy growth as well as development (Mottaleb et al., 2022). People need enough food in the country and they in addition need the ability to reach food through stable income as well as sound physical access while proper food use as well as lasting stability support these parts. This explains why this idea covers four linked parts.

The Russia Ukraine war that started in February 2022 upset this balance across many regions because it weakened supplies that supported world food markets (Nweke et al., 2022). Nasir et al. (2022) explain that both countries supply about 30% of world wheat exports, which makes them large players in food systems around the world. The conflict closed Black Sea shipping lanes and weakened farmland as well as transport routes as well as sanctions on Russia in addition made clear shocks in food trade systems (Kapelista et al., 2023). Wheat prices rose above 40% in three months and prices for sunflower oil as well as fertilizer in addition increased which turned the conflict into a world food security problem that placed heavy pressure on food importing states in Africa (Lytovchenko, 2023).

Nigeria holds the largest population in Africa with more than 200 million people and this made clear risk when the conflict began. High import dependence and low domestic production shaped deep food security challenges across many regions (Aiyedogbon et al., 2022). This explains why the country before this point faced weak food supply systems before the war. Bright (2024) states that climate related pressure before this point threatened millions of Nigerians and weak infrastructure, low mechanisation as well as insecurity in farming zones reduced yields across the country. Nigeria imports about 95% of its wheat which makes the country to an extreme level open to unstable world grain markets (Halidu, 2025).

These weaknesses became worse when the war began and prices for basic goods increased in a short time across many states. Hatab (2022) reports that wheat prices in Nigeria rose above 50% between February and June 2022 as well as cooking oil prices grew by 35% during the same period. Fertiliser shortages that followed reduced Russian exports in addition weakened domestic food production and this happened during a period of foreign exchange shortages, high inflation as well as falling revenue which made it hard for Nigeria to soften the damage through imports or subsidies (Adeyemo, 2023).

The country had long term defence and economic ties with Russia that dated back to earlier political cooperation (Anaele & Ogali, 2022). This explains why diplomatic links of Nigeria with Russia and Ukraine made added difficulty. Russia supplies military equipment used in the fight of Nigeria against Boko Haram and both states in addition discuss energy as well as oil sector projects which strengthen their strategic partnership. Many Nigerian students lived in Ukraine when the conflict started (Duyile & Nwachukwu, 2022). This explains why Nigeria in addition keeps ties with Ukraine in the main in agriculture and education as well as these ties matter.

Ukraine had in addition shown interest in supporting Nigerian wheat production and food processing which shaped a large part of bilateral contact. The country needed to keep balanced relations with both states while addressing domestic issues that came from the conflict (Nzewigbo & Appolonia, 2023). This explains why these ties placed Nigeria in a hard diplomatic space when the war began.

Nigeria had to make careful foreign policy decisions during the conflict and these decisions followed patterns seen across many African states that tried to balance different interests. United Nations General Assembly votes that condemned the invasion actions of Russia showed the effort to balance external pressure and national issues (Neji Obaji & Akpet, 2024). Agyemfra (2023) explains that many African governments took useful positions that protected partnerships while in addition recognising the humanitarian cost of the conflict. Nigeria called for peace and dialogue as an alternative of choosing a clear side because this position matched its long history of non-side taking as well as in addition protected national economic as well as security interests (Oghenerukevwe, 2024).



The country needed Russian military supplies while in addition needing support from Western partners that provided aid and investment. This explains why western states placed pressure on African governments to support sanctions and this placed Nigeria in a hard position. African states often find it hard to shape large international events that shape domestic conditions (Shiferaw & Hauck, 2022). This explains why the conflict in addition revealed the limited world shape of Nigeria.

Several regional and international bodies made programs that aimed to support African states including Nigeria as they faced rising food security pressure. The European Union designed food security steps for Africa during the 2022 crisis to support agricultural strength and emergency food support (Kołodziejczyk, 2024). The Black Sea Grain Initiative made by the United Nations and Turkey in July 2022 allowed Ukraine to restart grain exports which reduced pressure on world food prices as well as brought some stability to many markets (Hamulczuk et al., 2023). Nigeria in addition worked with the World Bank and African Development Bank as well as similar partners to obtain funds that supported agricultural investment as well as social protection schemes designed for at-risk groups.

ECOWAS and the African Union in addition pushed for stronger intra African trade as well as domestic crop production while in addition supporting peaceful conflict resolution across the region to strengthen food security (Ouko & Odiwuor, 2023). The long length of the conflict and slow program delivery reduced their general impact on Nigeria as well as other states (Zainab, 2023). This explains why these steps faced limits.

The conflict keeps shaping world supply systems and these conditions show clear gaps in national policy as well as scholarly study. This explains why Nigeria still faces large food security issues. Kokori et al. (2024) warn that armed conflicts damage world food and health systems as well as states with lower income levels face the strongest impact. Nigeria keeps on dealing with high food prices, fertilizer shortages foreign exchange stress and weak grain reserves which reduce national food system stability (Eneh & Eneh, 2025). The crisis has shown that world supply chains have weak points and reliance on imports from unstable regions creates large risks for national food systems.



Although some studies discuss the impact of the conflict on food security in Africa there is limited research that covers full effects on the food supply of Nigeria and diplomatic relations from 2021 to 2025 (Yingi, 2024). This gap matters because Nigeria plays a key role in West Africa and national instability could shape nearby states in serious ways. The study for this reason aims to study how the Russia-Ukraine conflict has shaped Food security of Nigeria and international relations from 2021 to 2025 as well as it in addition seeks to offer evidence as well as policy ideas that guide Nigeria as well as other African states. As they respond to world conflicts that shape food systems and diplomatic action.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

The Russia Ukraine war that began in February 2022 made a serious food security crisis in Nigeria because it showed clear weaknesses in world agricultural supply chains that support the country. Nigeria depends on wheat imports from Russia and Ukraine which together supply about 80% of national wheat needs which creates a large risk during sudden trade shocks (Human Rights Watch, 2022). Nweke et al. (2022) state that world wheat prices rose above 30% within months which pushed Nigerian wheat prices above 50% between February and June 2022.

National inflation reached 18% in 2022 while food inflation rose above 20% to 30% across the country. This explains why inflation in addition increased in clear ways. Beans increased by 50.1% and bread rose by 34.11% as well as yam climbed by 39.92% in yearly terms (Halidu, 2025). This explains why basic foods showed steep price rises.

Of food price pressure (Al Jazeera, 2022). This explains why the World Bank explains that these conditions pushed 1 million more Nigerians into poverty by the end of 2022 which added to 6 million before this point estimated to fall into poverty. The country had to balance international pressure while protecting national interests that link Russia and Ukraine (Neji Obaji & Akpet, 2024). This explains why the conflict in addition placed Nigeria in a complex diplomatic space.

Nigeria keeps trade relations with Russia worth more than 2 billion dollars each year and these ties include military equipment used in counterterrorism as well as the 8-billion-dollar Ajaokuta steel project while more than 5,000 Nigerians studied in Ukraine at the start of the conflict (Vanguard, 2022). During United Nations General Assembly votes on the invasion Nigeria supported the resolution that condemned

Russia but later abstained from stronger steps such as the vote to suspend Russia from the United Nations Human Rights Council. Scholars describe this pattern as a value driven and pragmatic indifferent stance that aimed to maintain balance in a tense external climate (Anaele & Ogali, 2022).

Several steps were made to reduce the crisis impact which included the United Nations Black Sea Grain Initiative and new European Union food security plans for Africa as well as Nigeria in addition sought support from partners to secure funding as well as find new wheat suppliers (Kołodziejczyk, 2024; Hamulczuk et al., 2023). High food prices persist and fertiliser shortages weaken domestic crop production as well as foreign exchange stress limits imports while Withdrawal of Russia from the Black Sea Grain Initiative further reduces grain supply (Ouko & Odiwuor, 2023). This explains why yet the situation stays unstable.

President Tinubu did not attend the Russia Africa Summit in 2023 which suggested a quiet shift despite official claims that the partnership remains firm. This explains why diplomatic relations with Russia in addition weakened. The conflict has in addition shown that Nigeria has limited power in shaping world decisions that shape core national interests (Shiferaw & Hauck, 2022). Some studies discuss the effect of the conflict on food security in Africa yet full research on Food security of Nigeria and international relations from 2021 to 2025 remains limited (Zainab, 2023). This gap frames the aim of this study which is to study how the Russia-Ukraine war has shaped Food security of Nigeria and international relations from 2021 to 2025 by answering the following research questions.

1.3 Research Questions

- How has the Russia-Ukraine war shaped food availability, accessibility and affordability in Nigeria from 2021 to 2025?
- How have Diplomatic relations of Nigeria with Russia, Ukraine and other international partners been shaped by the Russia-Ukraine conflict from 2021 to 2025?

1.4 Objectives of the Study

The main objective of this study is to study the impact of the Russia-Ukraine war on Food security of Nigeria and international relations from 2021 to 2025.

To achieve this aim, the study will pursue two specific objectives:

- To review how the Russia-Ukraine war has shaped food availability, accessibility and affordability in Nigeria from 2021 to 2025.
- To study how Diplomatic relations of Nigeria with Russia, Ukraine and other international partners have been shaped by the Russia-Ukraine conflict from 2021 to 2025.

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1.5 Significance of the Study

The results of the study will support several groups because it offers clear knowledge and useful guidance for different users. The study adds simple knowledge about the ways world conflicts shape food security in developing countries. This explains why the scholarly group will gain conceptual value. The study shows that distant geopolitical events can create serious economic pressure in African states which helps to strengthen ideas used in international relations and food security research. It in addition provides useful insight for scholars who study Foreign policy of Nigeria because it explains how the country reacts to world crises and this supports wider discussions about African positions in world politics.

The study explains the country's clear dependence on food imports and the need to raise domestic production as well as broaden agricultural activity. This explains why Nigerian policymakers in the Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development will gain useful support. The study shows the difficulty of balancing international demands while protecting national interests and this gives lessons for sound diplomatic action in a divided world. This explains why diplomats and foreign policy experts will in addition benefit. The study explains how external shocks hurt at risk people which helps them design stronger interventions and early warning plans for future crises as well as encourages better long-term planning that reduces similar risks. This explains why international development partners and humanitarian agencies that work on food security in Africa will in addition gain value.

1.6 Scope of the Study

The study examines the ways the Russia Ukraine war has shaped the food security of Nigeria and international relations from 2021 to 2025. The objectives guide

the work by focusing on clear areas that explore changes in food availability, accessibility and affordability across the country. The study in addition examines shifts in Diplomatic relations of Nigeria with Russia, Ukraine and other international partners during this period to understand changes in external engagement. It further explores how Foreign policy of Nigeria positions and regional working together efforts developed as the conflict kept as well as made new pressures for the country.

The demographic scope covers the Nigerian population with attention on at-risk groups that face the strongest impact from rising food prices and the general population shaped by foreign policy choices. The geographical scope focuses on Nigeria because it is the most populous African state, a large West African economy and a country that depends on wheat imports from Russia as well as Ukraine which makes it a significant actor in African diplomatic affairs. The ideological scope uses realist ideas and liberal institutionalist ideas in international relations to explain how national interests as well as international working together shape Nigeria's reactions to world crises.

The methodological approach uses a documentary and ex post facto research design because it allows the researcher to study existing data, official documents, statistical reports as well as policy statements without collecting new primary data which suits a study focused on events that before this point happened between 2021 as well as 2025.

1.7 Limitations of the Study

The study faced several limitations during its process, although steps were taken to reduce their effects and protect the quality of the work. The research had to be finished within a short scholarly period which reduced the depth of some sections. This explains why limited time made the first challenge. This issue was managed by selecting the most large data sources and focusing on key measures that offered the clearest insight into the research questions.

Real time food security figures and private diplomatic records could not be accessed which made it hard to gain complete detail on Food security of Nigeria as well as foreign policy actions. This explains why a second limitation came from missing data. This gap was reduced by comparing information from several reliable sources that included government reports, international organisations, scholarly journals and trusted media outlets to ensure broad coverage. The researcher could not reach some paid

databases or attend international conferences that might have provided deeper explanation. This explains why financial limits formed a third challenge.

This limit was managed by using free scholarly databases, open access journals, government documents and university library materials to gather enough related information. The study in addition relied on resources available in the university library and open access platforms which meant that some useful materials behind paywalls could not be reached. This final limitation was reduced through interlibrary loan services, institutional subscriptions and careful use of high quality open access sources that provided clear scholarly value as well as reliable evidence for the research.

1.8 Operational Definitions of Terms

The following key terms are for this study defined as they are used in this study in clear and specific ways.

1. Russia Ukraine War

The Russia Ukraine war began as a large military attack launched by Russia against Ukraine on 24 February 2022 after earlier tension linked to the takeover of Crimea in 2014. For this study , the Russia Ukraine war means the full conflict that started on that date and the related effects that include international sanctions, supply chain disruptions as well as diplomatic changes that shaped Food security of Nigeria as well as international relations from 2021 to 2025.

2. Food Security

Different groups explain it in different ways based on their focus. This explains why food security has gained different meanings over time. For this study , food security means the condition of food availability, food accessibility and food affordability within Nigeria as these conditions changed during the Russia Ukraine war from 2021 to 2025.

3. International Relations

International relations studies the ways countries and other participants relate within the wider world system. For this study international relations means Bilateral ties of Nigeria with Russia Ukraine and other world partners as well as its place in multilateral bodies such as the United Nations African Union as well as ECOWAS as these ties shifted during the Russia Ukraine conflict from 2021 to 2025.

4. Diplomatic Relations

Diplomatic relations describe official contact between independent states through accepted official routes. For this study diplomatic relations means Official contact of Nigeria with Russia and Ukraine which includes embassy duties, official visits, trade engagement, security cooperation as well as the treatment of each nation's citizens as these ties were maintained, changed or placed under strain during the Russia Ukraine conflict from 2021 to 2025.

5. Foreign Policy

Foreign policy is a national plan that guides a country's conduct toward other states and world participants. For this study in this study foreign policy means Positions of Nigeria, statements and voting records in international bodies such as the United Nations as well as its decisions on side taking or neutrality in the Russia Ukraine conflict. As well as the policies used to protect national interests including food security, economic stability as well as diplomatic ties from 2021 to 2025.

6. Food Availability

Food availability forms a main part of food security because it focuses on the presence of food within a country. For this study , food availability means the physical presence of food in Nigerian markets in special terms such as wheat cooking oil and other large staples linked to Russia as well as Ukraine measured through import levels of domestic production as well as market disruptions from 2021 to 2025.

7. Food Affordability

Food affordability issues the economic ability of families to reach and purchase food. For this study , food affordability means the ease with which Nigerian families can buy enough food measured through food inflation, income pressure and changes in purchasing power for items such as bread, wheat products, cooking oil as well as related goods shaped by the Russia Ukraine conflict from 2021 to 2025.



CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

The chapter reviews existing literature that relates to the study focus on the Russia Ukraine war as well as its effects on Nigeria food security and international relations. It in addition examines conceptual and thematic as well as conceptual as well as empirical works that guide the research so that key arguments as well as scholarly contributions as well as research gaps become clear which this study aims to address.

2.1 Conceptual Review

2.1.1 Food Security

Food security has moved from a narrow idea of having enough food into a wider approach that includes availability and access as well as use as well as stability. The concept moved past national and world levels to include household as well as individual needs (Mottaleb et al., 2022). This explains why this broader meaning grew after the 1974 World Food Conference. The Food and Agriculture Organization defines food security as a condition where all people at all times have physical and social as well as economic access to safe as well as nutritious food that meets dietary needs as well as preferences (Nweke et al., 2022). The four pillars work as one connected system through food presence from production and imports as well as economic as well as physical access with proper dietary use as well as stable conditions that keep the other pillars without disruption (Ouko and Odiwuor, 2023).

Linked challenges include climate change and population growth as well as weak infrastructure with insecurity in farming zones as well as clear import dependence (Bright, 2024). This explains why in developing countries such as Nigeria food security becomes weaker. The Russia Ukraine conflict led to sharp price increases across Nigeria (Halidu, 2025). This explains why this dependence creates high weakness during world supply disruption. Assessment tools include food price indices and malnutrition measures which help policymakers identify these problems as well as plan responses (Aiyedogbon et al., 2022). Geopolitical shocks can weaken all four pillars at the same time which can shift early availability strain into wider access and stability crises across at-risk food systems (Adeyemo, 2023).

2.1.2 International Relations

International relations works as an scholarly field as well as a real world practice that explains how states and international organisations as well as non state participants as well as individuals relate across borders through diplomatic as well as economic as well as security as well as cultural exchanges. The main conceptual frameworks give different accounts of state conduct where realism stresses national interest and security competition while liberalism points to institutional working together as well as shared democratic values as well as constructivism centres on ideas as well as norms while dependency theory studies structural inequality between powerful nations as well as weaker nations (Neji Obaji and Akpet, 2024). Current international relations rests on state sovereignty as well as territorial integrity which the United Nations Charter protects while Russia invasion of Ukraine has challenged these principles and has pushed other states to weigh legal commitments against strategic interests (Agyemfra, 2023; Shiferaw and Hauck, 2022).

States take part in international life through bilateral dealings as well as multilateral forums within bodies such as the United Nations and African Union (Nzewigbo and Appolonia, 2023). Power differences between states create world hierarchies where hard power as well as soft power shape shape and independence (Anaele and Ogali, 2022). For African states the idea of African agency has grown in importance because it reflects efforts to follow independent foreign policies and resist great power pressure as well as protect national interests despite colonial legacies as well as systemic inequalities (Oghenerukevwe, 2024). Explaining these dynamics is basic for study of how Nigeria managed international relations during the Russia Ukraine conflict.

2.1.3 Diplomatic Relations

Diplomatic relations describe the official system through which sovereign states communicate and relate while this system rests on mutual recognition as well as permanent missions as well as agreed international rules that protect each state's interests abroad. The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961 provides the governing approach because it sets diplomatic privileges and immunities as well as duties that help states keep contact even during political disagreement (Anaele and Ogali, 2022).



Diplomatic missions carry out core works which include representing the sending state and negotiating shared issues as well as collecting information as well as helping citizens abroad (Nzewigbo and Appolonia, 2023). Diplomatic immunity in addition supports diplomat work without intimidation although it can create tension in cases of misuse (Oghenerukevwe, 2024). They let states state positions and issue warnings as well as seek peaceful settlement through bilateral meetings as well as multilateral forums as well as mediation (Neji Obaji and Akpet, 2024). This explains why diplomatic routes remain mainly for crisis management.

Such conflict pushes states toward side taking. This explains why these works face clear strain during large conflicts. The country tried to keep positive relations with Moscow as well as Kyiv while it in addition managed Western pressure and protected national interests across military cooperation as well as food imports as well as education links (Duyile and Nwachukwu, 2022). This explains why Nigeria's experience during the Russia Ukraine war showed this challenge in a clear way. Nigeria's response in addition showed that effective diplomacy in such conditions needs careful management of competing pressure as well as strategic communication with a form of planned ambiguity to keep vital relationships without full side taking with any single party (Shiferaw and Hauck, 2022).

2.1.4 Foreign Policy

Foreign policy includes the full set of plans, goals, principles and actions a state uses in dealing with the outside world, designed to protect national interests including security, economic growth, international status as well as ideological values. It draws from multiple influences including territorial defence priorities, domestic politics, leadership beliefs, bureaucratic pressures, public opinion, historical experiences and external systemic pressures from power distribution as well as world norms (Anaele and Ogali, 2022).

Foreign policy of Nigeria has evolved through separate phases since independence in 1960, directed by core principles of African unity, sovereignty, non-side taking and economic diplomacy, shifting from its with strength Afrocentric as well as anti-colonial orientation of the 1970s as well as 1980s toward a more pragmatic economic focus in recent decades (Nzewigbo and Appolonia, 2023; Oghenerukevwe, 2024).



States carry out foreign policy through diplomacy, economic tools, military instruments and soft power across bilateral as well as multilateral settings (Neji Obaji and Akpet, 2024). Decision-making involves multiple participants including presidents, foreign ministries, legislatures, intelligence agencies and civil society (Agyemfra, 2023). Developing states face particular challenges through limited resources, weak joint planning and domestic instability (Shiferaw and Hauck, 2022). The Russia-Ukraine war showed these challenges for Nigeria through a direct link, requiring the government to formulate responses to an unexpected conflict at the same time affecting food security, bilateral partnerships, Western working together and basic principles of international law.

2.1.5 Geopolitical Conflicts and Their Spillover Effects

Geopolitical conflicts come from competition over territory and resources as well as political shape or ideological control which can change regional or world order while harm reaches distant countries through linked trade as well as finance as well as supply networks (Neji Obaji and Akpet, 2024). The Russia Ukraine war shows this in a clear way because it grew from post Soviet tensions with NATO expansion disputes as well as wider power struggles between Russia and Western states (Kapelista et al., 2023).

Such conflicts create four main spillover pathways that shape third party states. Supply chain disruption can damage production sites and block transport routes as well as use strategic exports as leverage which can cause shortage as well as price instability across food as well as energy as well as manufacturing sectors. Control of both countries in wheat and corn as well as barley as well as sunflower oil exports made this impact clear for import dependent regions across Africa as well as the Middle East as well as Asia (Nasir et al., 2022; Mottaleb et al., 2022). Economic spillover can add pressure through rising import costs and weaker foreign exchange reserves as well as reduced investment as well as growing debt burdens which can produce sharp inflation as well as poverty increase in at-risk states such as Nigeria (Halidu, 2025; Nweke et al., 2022).

Many African governments faced Western pressure to condemn Russia (Agyemfra, 2023; Shiferaw and Hauck, 2022). This explains why diplomatic spillover can push states that prefer neutrality toward hard side taking choices. Humanitarian



spillover can displace populations and disrupt education as well as worsen food insecurity as shown by over 5,000 Nigerian students who needed evacuation from Ukraine (Duyile and Nwachukwu, 2022; Kokori et al., 2024).

2.2 Thematic Review

2.2.1 Impact of the Russia-Ukraine War on Food security of Nigeria

Mottaleb et al. carried out a number based study on how the Ukraine Russia war shaped world wheat food security. Their results showed that both countries supplied about 30% of world wheat exports before the conflict. By using economic modelling they showed that closed Black Sea routes and destruction of Ukrainian farm infrastructure as well as sanctions uncertainty made serious market disruption as well as they estimated wheat price increases of 40% to 50% in the early months. Weak domestic wheat production could not replace missing imports and other exporters had limited spare supply to close the gap. This explains why the study ended by showing that import dependent states such as Nigeria faced high risk.

Nasir et al. studied how the Russia-Ukraine conflict shaped world food crops and they found large disruption to exports of wheat as well as corn as well as barley as well as sunflower oil. Their research showed that Ukrainian farm damage and worker displacement as well as suspended planting caused large supply cuts that moved through world markets. Because Black Sea port blockades kept millions of tons of grain from reaching buyers even when the grain stayed in storage. A key point of the study was that Russia placed restrictions on its own agricultural exports to protect domestic supply which turned food into a conflict tool and increased pressure beyond battlefield damage while it deepened supply shortfalls across import dependent regions worldwide.

Kapelista et al. showed that the war caused deep effects on world food and environmental security that reached beyond the battlefield. Steep fertiliser cost rises pushed developing states including Nigeria toward a choice between unaffordable input or reduced yield. This explains why their study showed that Russian fertilizer supply disruption caused harm on a scale like grain shortage. Reduced planting and fertilisation during 2022 led to smaller harvests in late 2022 as well as 2023. This explains why this made a second wave of food availability problems. Their investigation in addition showed that the conflict harmed agriculture through several

pathways at the same time which led to compounding and delayed effects that pushed the food security crisis far beyond early projections.

Hamulczuk et al. studied agri food supply as well as retail food price change during the early months of the war and they found that the speed as well as size of price rise went beyond earlier food crisis experience. World wheat prices rose over 60% in some markets between February and May 2022 while edible oil prices in addition rose at a high rate which made affordability problems even when physical stock stayed available. Because market speculation and uncertainty grew the supply disruption became a shock of unusual severity. The Black Sea Grain Initiative which the United Nations and Turkey negotiated in July 2022 restored part of Ukrainian exports although shipments stayed below pre war levels while Russia 2023 withdrawal from the agreement brought back fear of renewed shortage.

Zhang et al. used network study to study how the Russia Ukraine conflict changed international trade networks for large food staples. Their findings showed that importing states moved to search for other suppliers within a short time which changed the long standing trade route as former buyers moved toward the United States and Canada as well as Australia as well as Argentina. This shift increased competition which raised prices even in states with no direct link to the conflict. A main result was that wealthier states with diversified trade networks adjusted with higher success while poorer states with limited foreign exchange struggled to replace lost imports. As a result the harshest effects fell on the most at risk populations with a clear concentration across sub Saharan Africa including Nigeria.

Halidu studied how the Russia-Ukraine conflict shaped the Nigerian economy with focus on food price inflation as well as household welfare effects. Nigeria inflation rose to 18% in 2022 while food inflation rose between 20% and 30% with wheat products rising over 50% as well as cooking oil rising by 35%. Because low and lower middle income families spent 60% to 75% of earnings on food they faced the greatest strain which led to reduced meal quantity or a shift toward weaker nutritional quality alternatives. Headline inflation reached 28.92% by December 2023 and 32.70% by September 2024 which showed a prolonged economic crisis that kept beyond early conflict shock. This explains why the crisis in addition lasted.

Nweke et al. studied the effects of the Russia Ukraine conflict on African food security by using surveys as well as economic data across many countries including Nigeria. Prices rose faster than household income which rationed food by cost instead than by scarcity. This explains why their findings showed that the conflict made large affordability problems even when food supplies stayed available in physical terms. Nigerian families responded through reduced meal frequency and smaller portions as well as substitution of cheaper cassava or yam for wheat bread with removal of children from school. Although these coping actions gave short term relief they caused long term harm to nutrition and child development as well as poverty reduction which reversed earlier gains in household living standard as well as general food security outcome.

Aiyedogbon et al. (2022) studied population growth and food security in Nigeria as well as showed pre-existing structural weakness that the Russia Ukraine conflict made worse. Their research showed that Nigeria's domestic food output failed to match population expansion at a rate near 2.6% each year among over 200 million people which made heavy import dependence and higher weakness to world shock. Nigeria made near zero quantity even when national demand stayed clear. This explains why wheat was the clearest example. When conflict disrupted import urban populations that depended on wheat based food and poor rural families that lacked dietary flexibility or subsistence farming capacity faced the most serious outcome which showed how demographic pressure can add force to external supply disruption.

Hatab (2022) carried out cross country comparative research on African food security during the Russia Ukraine conflict and the findings showed that Nigeria's situation was serious. High import dependence and weak foreign exchange reserve as well as limited social protection left many Nigerians showing sharp price increases with little government support. Unlike some African states that had grain reserves or fiscal capacity that could support food price subsidy, Nigeria reserves were not enough while fiscal constraint closed effective market intervention or social support expansion. Hatab (2022) concluded that the crisis showed deep structural weakness in Nigeria's food security system which relied on short term import solutions instead of long term investment in domestic farming and storage infrastructure as well as strategic grain reserves.



Zainab (2023) studied the effects of the Russia Ukraine conflict on African food security through comparative study across many states and the study found sharp food insecurity increase as tens of millions moved into new hunger or deeper hunger. Conflict linked food price increase added to 6 million who before this point faced poverty from existing economic pressure. This explains why in Nigeria the study used World Bank estimates that estimated 1 million more people falling into poverty by the end of 2022. Female headed families and rural net food buyers as well as northeast conflict zone residents with urban informal workers faced the strongest hardship from rising food prices as well as weaker access to adequate nutrition during the crisis period. This explains why the study in addition showed that impact differed across groups.

2.2.2 Impact of the Russia-Ukraine War on Diplomatic relations of Nigeria

Anaele and Ogali e(2022) xamined Nigeria foreign policy as well as bilateral relations under Presidents Jonathan as well as Buhari from 2010 to 2021 which offers background for explaining Nigeria diplomatic position when the Russia Ukraine war began. Their work showed that Nigeria built clear economic and security ties with Russia during this period which included military cooperation through arms purchase for counterterrorism as well as nuclear energy discussion with efforts to revive the 8 billion dollar Ajaokuta steel project. These strategic links made clear reasons to keep positive relations with Russia even when Western pressure pushed for full condemnation after the invasion. Nigeria relationship with Russia rested on useful sector working together instead than shared ideology which helps explain refusal to in full support Western sanction.

Duyile and Nwachukwu (2022) studied the humanitarian side of Nigeria ties with Ukraine with focus on over 5,000 Nigerian students who studied there when conflict began. This created an urgent diplomatic crisis that required fast intervention to support safe evacuation through neighbouring Poland as well as Romania and Hungary while reports of discrimination against African students at border crossing in addition needed attention. The Nigerian government placed citizen protection first through active joint planning by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Thousands of Nigerian families had direct links with Ukraine through affordable quality education that was not available at home. This explains why the researchers concluded that this emergency showed a people centred side of Nigeria Ukraine relations.



Nzewigbo and Appolonia (2023) reviewed Nigeria foreign policy role in African development from 2010 to 2022 as well as they identified patterns that shaped Nigeria's approach toward Russia as well as Ukraine during the conflict. Their study showed that Buhari foreign policy focused on economic diplomacy as well as strategic partnership across Western and non Western states. Nigeria kept balanced relations across many international partners to gain economic benefit while it avoided heavy dependence on one state. This plan kept links with both Russia and Ukraine during the conflict. Nigerian officials in addition said that both relationships stayed intact which showed an effort to separate the conflict from Nigeria national interest as well as development partnership.

Oghenerukevwe (2023) studied Nigeria United States relations in theory and the work explored how this link shaped Nigeria's response to American pressure on the Russia Ukraine conflict. Despite clear trade and investment as well as development ties with Washington Nigeria resisted a pattern of automatic acceptance of American position on world issues. They stressed sovereignty and African perspective as well as a right to follow with national quality defined interest in an independent way. This explains why Nigerian policymakers rejected demands for full condemnation of Russia or adoption of sanction. This balance matched wider patterns in Nigeria United States relations where working together existed with disagreement while Nigeria asserted independence on issues seen as European instead than African which set a useful precedent for future dealings with Western partners.

Shiferaw and Hauck (2022) studied how the Ukraine conflict shaped the Africa Europe peace as well as security partnership as well as they found that European pressure on African states to support Western position made diplomatic strain. Many African states including Nigeria felt that Europe's focus on Ukraine pulled attention as well as resources away from African security challenges and development needs. Europe demanded African solidarity on Ukraine while it showed limited concern for the African crisis. This explains why African leaders in addition raised concern about double standards. Nigeria responded by stressing mutual respect as well as African agency instead of automatic side taking and this position may shape how African states engage Europe in a later world crisis that needs collective response.

Neji Obaji and Akpet (2024) re-studied the security impact of the Russia Ukraine conflict on Africa as well as they showed that Nigeria as well as other African



states faced clear Western pressure to condemn Russia as well as support sanctions. Nigeria answered with a cautious balanced stance that criticised territorial integrity violation in general while it avoided direct penalty against Russia or full acceptance of Western narrative. Their study showed that this stance reflected a calculation that full Western side taking offered limited benefit while it could harm strategic interest with Russia. This approach in addition linked to concern about keeping foreign policy independence as well as resisting Western efforts to direct African position on conflict seen as outside immediate African interest.

Agyemfra (2022) studied Africa's response to the Russia Ukraine conflict as a possible opening for deeper partnership with China as well as Russia. Nigeria's reluctance to condemn Russia in clear terms matched the positions of China as well as large developing states which made space for expanded South South working together among states that resisted Western pressure. Some Nigerian officials and analysts read the conflict as evidence of a multipolar world where African states could act with more independence by engaging several power centres at the same time. The study suggested that Nigeria's stance reflected rising confidence in stating African interest even when it differed from Western expectation which may point toward a more independent Nigerian foreign policy in later international crises.

Ouko and Odiwuor (2023) studied drivers of the emerging food crisis in sub Saharan Africa as well as they studied international partner response to food security pressure linked to the Russia Ukraine conflict. Western governments and international financial institutions as well as donors increased food aid as well as promised agricultural development support although the scale stayed too small as well as support often came with governance conditions. Nigeria worked with many partners that included the World Bank as well as African Development Bank with bilateral donors while it explored South South working together with Brazil as well as India for farming input and technology. The study stressed that effective working together required respect for African priority instead of an external solution and this matched a stance that Nigerian officials stated in dealings with international partners during the crisis period.

Kołodziejczyk (2024) studied European Union food security policy toward Africa during the 2022 world food crisis and the study found that the EU made initiatives that included the Food as well as Strength Facility with 600 million euros as



well as the World Alliance for Food Security that gathered more donor support. Although these programs gave useful assistance they in addition showed patterns of European designed plan with limited African input which made tension with African demand for stronger ownership as well as voice. Nigeria took part in EU food initiatives while it in addition argued for approaches that support local agricultural development instead than in the main supporting food import which reflected fear of long term dependence and a preference for structural food system transformation over emergency relief.

Mhlanga and Ndhlovu studied how the Russia Ukraine conflict shaped progress on sustainable development goals in Africa as well as they found that the crisis shifted world attention as well as resources away from long term development programs toward emergency relief as well as geopolitical priority. African officials including Nigerians feared reduced development assistance or a shift of funds from long term goal toward short term crisis response. This explains why this change placed strain on Africa development partnership with Western states. States stressed that Western partners must keep development commitment to Africa while they addressed Ukraine instead than expect automatic African support or treat African development needs as less large than European security interest. This explains why these worries shaped African diplomatic positions on the conflict.

2.2.3 Evolution of Foreign policy of Nigeria and Regional Cooperation

Anaele and Ogali (2022) studied bilateral relations as well as foreign policy under Presidents Jonathan as well as Buhari which helps explain how Nigeria foreign policy change shaped its response to the Russia Ukraine conflict. Their research showed that Buhari's focus on economic diplomacy and national interest as well as strategic independence marked a shift from earlier ideological Afrocentrism. When the conflict began Foreign Minister Geoffrey Onyeama stated Nigeria's opposition to territorial integrity breach while he stressed dialogue as well as peaceful settlement. Nigeria joined 140 states in support of the March 2022 United Nations General Assembly condemnation resolution while it later adopted more cautious positions that balanced principled commitment against useful national interest that needed ongoing diplomatic management.



Neji Obaji and Akpet (2024) re-studied the Russia-Ukraine conflict as well as wider African security concerns as well as they studied how Nigeria shaped its positions during the war. Their research recorded Nigeria abstention from the April 2022 vote on Russia Human Rights Council suspension as well as the October 2022 war reparations vote although Nigeria supported the March condemnation. Nigerian officials defended these abstentions by saying that human rights investigation needed completion before punishment and that reparations demand could weaken peaceful settlement effort. The authors described Nigeria's stance as value driven as well as pragmatic indifference where principled opposition to territorial violation existed with protection of strategic interest under rising external pressure.

Nzewigbo and Appolonia (2023) studied Nigeria foreign policy role in African development from 2010 to 2022 as well as they identified leadership patterns that shaped Nigeria diplomacy during the Russia Ukraine crisis. Their research showed that Nigeria tried to coordinate African positions through the African Union as well as ECOWAS with focus on shared concern that included food security and refusal to external pressure. African states had different relationships with Russia and Ukraine as well as Western nations. This explains why although this effort matched a tradition of continental working together as well as independence, common positions were hard to form. Of internal mixed signal as well as reluctance among African states to follow Nigeria lead on issues seen as European instead than African. This explains why Nigeria regional leadership in addition became weaker.

Oghenerukevwe (2024) studied Nigeria United States relations in theory and the work explains how Nigeria balanced Washington ties while it defended foreign policy independence during the Russia Ukraine conflict. Nigerian officials saw American pressure for full anti Russia side taking as a conflict with sovereignty as well as African priorities that placed food security and economic consequence above geopolitical side taking. Nigeria's refusal to follow American demand without condition matched a wider pattern where working together existed with independence claims when positions differed. The study showed that Nigeria's response signalled to Western partners that Nigeria expected equal treatment with legitimate interests instead of a subordinate role of automatic support which may shape a more assertive Nigerian diplomacy in later international crises.



Agyemfra studied Africa's response to the Russia Ukraine conflict as a chance for closer partnership with China as well as Russia and the study studied how the conflict shaped African foreign policy choice as well as alliance. Nigeria refused to condemn Russia in full matched positions taken by China and India as well as South Africa with other large developing states which made space for stronger South South working together. Some Nigerian analysts read the conflict as proof of world multipolarity which could give African states more independence through engagement with several power centres at the same time. The study suggested that Nigeria's stance showed stronger confidence in an African interest led foreign policy although dependence on Western investment as well as development support limited how far Nigeria could move away from Western preference.

Ouko and Odiwuor (2023) studied causes of the emerging food crisis in sub Saharan Africa as well as they studied how regional working together responded to Russia Ukraine conflict effects on food security. ECOWAS states including Nigeria held emergency meetings that made regional action plans to strengthen intra African agricultural trade as well as support domestic food production with early warning system development. Nigeria took a leading role in the ECOWAS food security debate and it argued for deeper regional working together to reduce dependence on imports from conflict prone world regions. Financial resources stayed limited while regional market integration remained weak and non tariff limit kept while joint planning stayed hard among states with different agricultural systems as well as competing national priority. This explains why although the approach held promise, progress slowed.

Kołodziejczyk (2024) studied European Union food security policy toward Africa during the 2022 world food crisis and the study studied how African regional organisations worked with European partners on food security. The African Union directed member states toward African ownership of food security plans instead of donor driven programs. African regional bodies stressed long term investment in farming productivity and rural infrastructure as well as food processing instead of short term emergency aid that keeps external dependence. Nigeria took part in continental discussion while it argued for sustainable long term approaches over temporary relief measures. Tension remained between African structural transformation goals and European Union preference for rapid emergency assistance which showed different priorities on food system ownership as well as long term development path.



Shiferaw and Hauck (2022) showed that the Ukraine conflict changed the Africa Europe peace as well as security partnership as well as this shift shaped food security cooperation as well as broader bilateral relations. African regional bodies including the African Union as well as ECOWAS worked with European partners by linking African food security support to working together on Ukraine matters which used the crisis as a diplomatic tool. Nigeria and other African states used regional platforms to take sides in negotiations while they sought development aid as well as farming assistance as well as debt relief in response to a crisis that began from a European conflict. African states still faced weak negotiating positions as well as kept dependence on European markets and financial systems. This explains why although regional joint planning improved African bargaining position in part the final outcomes stayed limited.

Hatab (2022) studied African food security during the Russia Ukraine conflict and the study looked at regional initiatives that aimed to strengthen food system strength as well as reduce weakness to world shock. Several regional programs started or expanded which included the African Union CAADP approach as well as African Development Bank emergency food production facilities with a regional grain reserve system. Although these steps mattered, long term change needed stable political as well as financial commitment which raised doubt on whether early urgency would become lasting reform momentum. The study stressed that Nigeria's engagement with the regional food security program needed domestic reform that included a higher agricultural budget as well as stronger infrastructure with policies that support smallholder farmer productivity as well as strength.

Zainab (2023) studied the impact of the Russia Ukraine conflict on African food security and the study studied how regional working together grew in response to the crisis. The conflict renewed African Union and regional discussion on food sovereignty through stronger domestic production as well as intra African trade instead of keeping dependence on imports from outside the continent. Nigeria took part in regional forums that supported coordinated agricultural development and harmonised food safety standards as well as joint negotiation with world partners on technology transfer with agricultural investment. Although this made new momentum real progress faced limits that included weak fiscal resources as well as competing national priority with weak carrying out capacity which shows that long term working together needs lasting political will as well as much stronger international capacity building support.

2.3 Theoretical Review

2.3.1 Realist Theory of International Relations

Realist theory shaped by Morgenthau *Politics Among Nations* (1948) as well as Waltz *Theory of International Politics* (1979) and Mearsheimer *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (2001) argues that states act within an anarchic international system that lacks central authority for survival. Security as well as power become the main drivers of state conduct (Neji-Obaji and Akpet, 2024). States act as reasoned unified participants that pursue with national quality defined interests through self help while moral principles carry less weight than power and security issues (Anaele and Ogali, 2022). Classical realism links competitive conduct to human nature while neorealism places it within systemic anarchy with defensive and offensive variants that debate whether states in the main seek security or hegemony (Oghenerukevwe, 2024). Critics note realism, rigidity and its weak attention to international institutions as well as economic interdependence with non-state participants as well as feminist views of security.

Despite these limits realism remains related to this study because it helps explain Nigeria prioritisation of food security and strategic partnerships over abstract legal principles while it in addition explains careful balancing between Russia as well as Western partners as well as refusal to ideological pressure that clashed with clear national interests (Nzewigbo and Appolonia, 2023; Shiferaw and Hauck, 2022). But realism cannot in full explain Nigeria's partial UN condemnation of Russia as well as engagement with regional institutions through ECOWAS and the African Union or the role of normative shape in its choices which means the study needs more conceptual frameworks for a full study.

2.3.2 Liberal Institutionalism / Neoliberal Institutionalism

Liberal institutionalism developed by Keohane in *After Hegemony* (1984) as well as Nye and Keohane in *Power as well as Interdependence* (1977) as well as Ruggie through work on multilateralism argues that international institutions support working together by lowering transaction costs. While they in addition supply information and monitor conduct as well as build expectations of reciprocity even within anarchic systems (Shiferaw and Hauck, 2022).



Complex interdependence and repeated interaction can build cooperative tendencies over time (Kołodziejczyk, 2024). This explains why the theory holds that states follow interests beyond security while absolute gains matter more than relative gains. Institutional design through issue linkage and transparency as well as normative constraint can reduce collective action problems even when self interest might block working together (Ouko and Odiwuor, 2023). Critics note that the theory can overstate institutional independence from power structures while it can carry Western normative bias and can struggle to explain institutional failure as well as great power manipulation of multilateral frameworks.

Despite these limits liberal institutionalism offers clear value for this study because it explains the Black Sea Grain Initiative negotiated by the United Nations and Turkey in July 2022 as evidence that institutions can broker working together between adversaries through neutral mediation (Hamulczuk et al., 2023). It in addition explains Nigeria's active engagement with the United Nations and African Union as well as ECOWAS to coordinate food security responses as well as negotiate in a collective way with international partners (Nzewigbo and Appolonia, 2023). But Russia 2023 withdrawal from the Grain Initiative as well as limited institutional capacity to protect at-risk populations shows that institutions work within constraints set by real power and competing interests which the theory can understate.

2.3.3 Dependency Theory

Dependency theory developed by Prebisch and Singer as well as Frank as well as Dos Santos as well as later extended through Wallerstein world systems theory argues that the world economy is organised to favour wealthy core nations while it keeps peripheral nations in subordinate positions (Aiyedogbon et al., 2022). Underdevelopment is not a natural condition because it results from integration into a world capitalist system built on unequal exchange where peripheral states export raw materials while they import manufactured goods in patterns that keep dependency in place instead of reducing it.

Surplus extraction and elite collaboration with foreign interests as well as weak commodity terms of trade across time suggest that real development needs a break from dependent structures through import substitution as well as regional integration as well as strategic withdrawal from exploitative arrangements (Hatab, 2022; Nweke et al.,

2022). Critics note that the theory cannot explain East Asian development success within world markets while it can overlook domestic policy factors and can understate the capacity of peripheral states for self directed development.

Nigeria 95% wheat import dependence shows a clear case of food dependency linked to colonial agricultural structures that favoured export crops over diverse domestic production (Halidu, 2025). This explains why despite these limits, dependency theory remains main for explaining Nigeria's food security crisis during the Russia Ukraine war. Foreign exchange shortage that made the crisis worse in addition reflected the peripheral position of Nigeria within world financial systems (Adeyemo, 2023). The theory in addition explains renewed calls for food sovereignty as well as agricultural transformation while it in addition shows a weakness because it cannot in full explain why some forms of world integration such as technology transfer and foreign agricultural investment are seen as needed pathways toward productive capacity instead than alone deeper dependency.

2.3.4 Foreign Policy Analysis Theory

Foreign policy study developed through Rosenau Pre theories and Theories of Foreign Policy (1966) as well as Allison Essence of Decision (1971) as well as work from Hermann on leadership psychology as well as Hudson on two level game structures. The approach challenges unitary reasoned actor assumptions because it shows that foreign policy comes from complex internal processes that involve many competing participants and bureaucratic routine as well as leadership psychology with domestic political pressure (Anaele and Ogali, 2022). Decision makers work with limited information as well as limited time while organisational habits and interest groups as well as media as well as public opinion can constrain outcomes while they in addition shape them.

Scholars need to study the internal working of states instead of treating states as one clear unit so that reasons for specific foreign policy choices become clear (Oghenerukevwe, 2024). Critics note difficulty with generalising from case study work as well as limited access to classified decision making processes with too much focus on individual factor over structural constraint and a challenge that comes from handling many linked variables (Nzewigbo and Appolonia, 2023).



The approach is useful for study of Nigeria changing response to the Russia Ukraine war because it explains Nigeria movement from support for the March 2022 UN condemnation toward later abstention on votes about Russia suspension as well as war reparations as outcomes of internal bargaining among competing institutional participants. This bargaining involved the foreign ministry as well as the military with economic ministries that held different priorities (Neji-Obaji and Akpet, 2024; Anaele and Ogali, 2022). It in addition shows how divided public opinion and business concern as well as civil society position with diaspora pressure shaped Nigeria foreign policy stance which looked inconsistent yet reflected internal negotiation during the conflict.

2.3.5 Food Regime Theory

Food regime theory developed by Friedmann and McMichael through works that include *The Rise as well as Fall of the Postwar International Food Order* explains world food systems. As shaped by successive regimes that mark stable periods with fixed power structure as well as economic goals as well as rules that guide food production as well as trade (Mottaleb et al., 2022). Three historical regimes are identified which start with colonial mercantilist structures that linked European industrialisation with tropical agricultural export and then move to United States dominated industrial farming with in political terms driven food aid as well as then reach a contested third regime marked by corporate agribusiness control as well as world value chain. As well as financialisation with state roles that support markets (Nasir et al., 2022).

The theory argues that food systems reflect capitalist power relations instead of a neutral technical arrangement while crises can reveal inner regime tension that drives transition and food security is political in nature instead of a production challenge alone (Kapelista et al., 2023; Hatab, 2022). Critics note the theory of Eurocentrism as well as unclear regime periodisation with structural determinism and limited direction for useful policy carrying out.

The theory is related to the Food security of Nigeria crisis during the Russia Ukraine war because it explains how the peripheral position of Nigeria within the corporate food regime made dependency on dominant exporters that include Russia and Ukraine (Nweke et al., 2022). It in addition explains why geopolitical conflict turned food into leverage despite market neutrality claims while calls for food sovereignty



became stronger as regime tension appeared and regional working together through ECOWAS as well as the African Union reflected efforts to build other food systems (Zainab, 2023). The theory in addition shows that solving Nigeria food insecurity needs structural transformation instead than alone technical output increase.

2.4 Empirical Review

Nweke et al. (2022) carried out a study titled “Russia–Ukraine war and its impacts on food security in Africa” to understand how the Russia-Ukraine conflict shaped food security in African states including Nigeria. The researchers used a mixed methods design that combined trade statistics and food price data with survey responses from farming actors across several African regions to gain clear findings. The findings show that African states that relied on wheat imports from Russia and Ukraine faced price increases of 30% to 50% as well as serious supply breaks that forced buyers to search for new import sources with higher food insecurity that shaped many millions of people. The authors concluded that the conflict showed weak points in African food systems made by clear import dependence and they recommended African governments to invest in domestic farming as well as strengthen regional food trade while in addition building strategic grain reserves to improve strength.

Halidu (2025) studied “The impact of the Russia–Ukraine war on the Nigerian economy” to review how the conflict shaped inflation, food prices, economic growth and household welfare in Nigeria. The researcher used number based study of macroeconomic data and price indices with household surveys from 2022 to 2024 to build clear evidence. The findings showed that inflation in Nigeria rose to 18% in 2022 and reached 32.70% by September 2024 with food prices rising by 20% to 30% as well as wheat-based products rising by more than 50% with 1 million more Nigerians falling into poverty in 2022 due to food price shocks. Halidu concluded that the conflict made serious long-lasting damage to the Nigerian economy with clear effects on at-risk groups and recommended urgent agricultural diversification as well as strategic food reserves with stronger social protection to reduce future risks.

Singh et al. (2022) carried out “Impact of Ukraine–Russia war on global trade and development: An empirical study” to measure how the conflict shaped world trade flows economic growth and development in developing states. The authors used econometric modelling with gravity equations and computable general equilibrium

models that used trade data from more than 150 states to produce clear results. The findings show that world trade fell by 3% to 5% in the first year and price volatility increased with wheat prices rising by 67% as well as fertiliser prices doubling with developing states losing up to 1.5 percentage points in GDP growth due to the conflict. The researchers concluded that the war made wide harmful pressure on world development with clear harm for import dependent developing states and they recommended stronger international working together to stabilize markets as well as support at risk economies.

Anyanwu and Salami (2025) studied “The impact of the Russia–Ukraine conflict on African economies: An introduction” to give broad study of the conflict as well as its effects on trade inflation, debt as well as development in African states. The authors used a comparative case study method that used economic data and policy papers with expert interviews from 12 African states including Nigeria, Kenya, Egypt as well as South Africa. The findings showed that African economies experienced inflation increases of 5 to 8 percentage points with rising debt service pressure as currencies weakened and import costs grew with setbacks in progress toward SDGs, in the main poverty reduction as well as food security. The authors concluded that the conflict showed deep structural weaknesses in African economies and recommended economic diversification as well as stronger regional integration with higher domestic productive capacity to reduce external dependence.

Zainab (2023) carried out a study titled “Impacts of the Russian–Ukraine conflict on food security in Africa” to study how the conflict shaped African food systems and to identify policy actions needed to build strength. The researcher used text based study of policy documents and literature with interviews from agricultural policymakers as well as food security experts across Africa. The findings show that supply chain breaks and price shocks with fertiliser shortages made wide effects that threatened food security for more than 200 million Africans as well. As that existing policy responses were too weak for the size of the crisis as well as that most African governments lacked grain reserves or clear social protection to shield families from external shocks. Zainab concluded that African food security needs a large change in farming with a clear focus on domestic production and intra African trade with reduced dependence on unstable world markets.

Hatab (2022) studied “Africa’s food security under the shadow of the Russia–Ukraine conflict” to study the conflict and its immediate effects on African food security as well as to judge how well governments as well as international partners responded. The researcher used a mixed methods design with statistical study of food price and food availability data along with case studies of policy actions in six African states. The findings showed that states that relied on wheat imports faced serious price shocks and supply problems as well as that international support through the Black Sea Grain Initiative gave partial relief that could not in full ease the crisis. States with stronger farming sectors as well as strategic grain reserves handled the crisis with better stability. Hatab concluded that the conflict showed the urgent need for African states to cut import dependence through investment in farming and recommended regional working together to build stronger shared food security systems.

Mhlanga and Ndhlovu (2023) carried out “The implications of the Russia–Ukraine war on sustainable development goals in Africa” to study how the conflict shaped African progress toward the 2030 SDGs with clear focus on SDG 1 on poverty SDG 2 on hunger as well as SDG 8 on economic growth. The authors used number based studies based on SDG measures and projection models to estimate how the conflict changed development trends across Africa. The findings show that the conflict slowed African SDG progress by 3 to 5 years and pushed around 27 million more Africans into extreme poverty as well as raised food insecurity from 21% to 24% as well as reduced expected economic growth by 1 to 2 percentage points in 2022 as well as 2023. The researchers concluded that the conflict made serious lasting effects on African development and recommended international partners to raise support that can help African states recover as well as speed up SDG progress.

Kapelista et al. (2023) studied “The impact of the Russian Ukrainian war on global food and environmental security” to study how the conflict shaped world food systems and environmental stability. The researchers used systems study to trace links between conflict and food production as well as supply chains as well as price changes as well as environmental outcomes using data from international as well as scholarly sources. The findings showed that the conflict disrupted 30% of world wheat exports and weakened farmland in conflict zones as well as increased carbon emissions due to changes in supply chains as well as made food security problems in more than 50 importing states. The authors concluded that the conflict showed large weaknesses in

world food systems and recommended the building of more strong as well as at regional level diverse food production as well as distribution networks to improve food as well as environmental security.

Yingi (2024) carried out “War in foreign lands hunger at home” to study how distant conflicts such as the Russia Ukraine war create food insecurity in African states through world supply chain links. The researcher used a text based case study design that studied Nigeria Kenya and Ethiopia through document study as well as expert interviews. The findings show that world supply chain links transmitted the effects of the conflict with clear speed to distant importing states and that weak economic buffers as well as limited social protection increased African weakness as well as that government actions focused on short term relief as an alternative of solving deep structural problems. Yingi concluded that African food security needs reduced dependence on external supplies through agricultural transformation and regional working together as well as recommended wide food system reforms that support local production as well as intra African trade.

Fedulova (2022) studied “Global food security crisis of the world in 2022” to study the factors behind the 2022 world food crisis with focus on the Russia Ukraine conflict and climate change as well as COVID 19 impacts. The researcher used a literature review and statistical study of world food security measures from FAO as well as the World Bank as well as other international sources. The findings showed that the Russia Ukraine conflict was the main cause of the 2022 world food crisis but it in addition made earlier climate and pandemic pressures stronger. As well as that, world food prices rose to the highest levels since 2008 as well as that about 345 million people faced acute food insecurity in 2022 compared to 282 million in 2021. Fedulova concluded that the 2022 crisis showed the fragile state of world food systems and recommended the creation of more strong sustainable as well as fair food systems that can withstand many shocks at the same time.

2.5 Summary of Literature and Gap

The literature reviewed showed that food security has many linked parts because it includes availability and access as well as use as well as stability as one whole system. These theories explain how states behave and how world power works. This explains why it in addition covered international relations theories such as realism

and liberal institutionalism as well as dependency theory. The review explained diplomatic relations as official relations between states that follow international rules through directed contact. It in addition described foreign policy as the plans and actions that states use to deal with the world system through clear national choices. The literature further explained that geopolitical conflicts create spillover effects that shape supply chain problems and economic shocks as well as diplomatic pressures on states that do not take part in the conflict through a direct link (Mottaleb et al., 2022; Neji-Obaji & Akpet, 2024).

wheat prices increased by more than 30% and Nigeria faced rising inflation that reached 32.70% by 2024 which caused serious harm to household food security. This explains why empirical studies showed that the Russia-Ukraine conflict disrupted world food systems. The state had to balance different international pressures that grew from the crisis (Halidu, 2025; Nweke et al., 2022). This explains why the conflict in addition made hard diplomatic choices for Nigeria. The first gap is that most studies look at Africa as a whole and there is limited research that examines Nigeria's own experience from 2021 to 2025 through full study of both policy as well as food security. This explains why, but three research gaps remain. Few studies join food security and international relations in one clear approach.

The second gap is that existing studies focus on Nigeria's early diplomatic actions and there is limited research on how Foreign policy of Nigeria changed over the longer period of the conflict. Little knowledge exists on how Nigeria managed relations with both sides and with Western partners. The third gap is that the literature does not study ECOWAS and AU working together in full detail because it remains unclear whether these efforts helped Nigeria in a real way or gave alone symbolic support (Zainab, 2023). The study fills these gaps by giving full study of Nigeria's experience with the conflict and its effects on food security as well as international relations from 2021 to 2025.



CHAPTER THREE

METHODOLOGY

3.1 Theoretical Framework

Realist Theory developed by scholars such as Hans Morgenthau and Kenneth Waltz states that states act as reasoned players that seek survival as well as national interest in an international system without central authority where power shapes outcomes (Neji-Obaji & Akpet, 2024). The theory fits this study because it explains useful foreign policy of Nigeria during the Russia Ukraine conflict where food security needs and strategic partnerships were more important than moral pressure which showed the balancing approach of Nigeria as well as the security-based logic that directed its diplomatic choices.

3.1.1 Realist Theory of International Relations

The Realist Theory of International Relations began with early thinkers such as Thucydides and Machiavelli as well as Hobbes who described power as well as conflict through clear historical examples. Hans Morgenthau later explained the theory in *Politics Among Nations* published in 1948 and Kenneth Waltz expanded it in *Theory of International Politics* published in 1979 as well as formed neorealism through a structural view of the world system. No central authority exists that can enforce rules across all states. This explains why the theory states that the international system is anarchic. This condition forces states to depend on self-help to protect their own survival through clear national choices. The main ideas state that states act as reasoned unitary participants that follow national interest defined by power and shaped by security needs.

Each state fears possible threats from others. This explains why realism argues that security competition is natural and cannot be avoided in an anarchic system. States fear unequal gains and cannot in full trust the plans of other participants. This explains why the theory in addition states that working together stays limited. Classical realism states that human nature is selfish and seeks power in all settings while neorealism states that the anarchic system itself creates competition instead of human nature. Defensive realism argues that states seek security instead than domination while offensive realism states that states may seek regional hegemony when they gain enough

strength. Neoclassical realism adds that domestic politics can shape how states react to world pressure and how they form national plans.

Critics state that realism is too pessimistic and ignores international institutions that shape working together across regions. They in addition state that the theory overlooks economic interdependence and struggles to explain wide world working together that appears through trade as well as shared norms. Current scholars such as John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt as well as Randall Schweller show that realism still explains many world events through clear patterns of power as well as security. The study uses realism because it gives a clear way to understand Foreign policy of Nigeria during the Russia Ukraine conflict through its focus on national survival. The theory shows that Nigeria acted to protect food security and strategic interests instead than following ideology in a strict way. Realism in addition explains Nigeria careful diplomacy and its refusal to give full condemnation of Russia as well as its focus on securing wheat as well as fertilizer as well as energy supplies for national survival.

3.1.2 Applicability of the Theory to This Study

Realist theory applies to this study because it explains the careful response of Nigeria to the Russia-Ukraine conflict through clear focus on national interest. The state balanced support for territorial integrity with useful actions that aimed to protect food security and large partnerships through regular diplomatic choices. Nigeria's first UN vote that condemned the invasion showed realist logic because it helped the state maintain international legitimacy within the world system. Its later abstentions showed that national interest mattered more than moral consistency as Nigeria shaped its own path.

The state saw independence and flexible plans as large in a multipolar world where power shifts across regions (Neji-Obaji & Akpet, 2024). This explains why realism in addition explains the refusal of Nigeria to Western pressure. The theory further shows that Nigeria 95% wheat import dependence and rising food insecurity shaped reasoned diplomatic choices that focused on protecting national survival through regular foreign policy action.

3.2 Hypotheses

Based on the research questions, the following other hypotheses are formulated:

H₁ : The Russia-Ukraine war has to a significant degree affected food availability, accessibility and affordability in Nigeria from 2021 to 2025.

H₂ : Diplomatic relations of Nigeria with Russia, Ukraine and other international partners have been to a significant degree influenced by the Russia-Ukraine conflict from 2021 to 2025.

3.3 Research Design

The study uses ex post facto and documentary research designs to study how the Russia Ukraine conflict shaped Nigeria food security as well as international relations from 2021 to 2025 (Creswell and Creswell, 2018). Experimental control is not possible when the study examines past international conflict events (Weber, 2017). This explains why the ex post facto design fits the study. The documentary design supports this approach because it allows study of official reports and statistical databases as well as policy statements with scholarly sources.

The independent variable is the Russia Ukraine conflict while the dependent variables include food availability and accessibility as well as affordability with Nigeria diplomatic positions. Limits include reliance on document accuracy as well as inability to control confounding factors with difficulty in showing direct causation.

3.4 Methods of Data Collection

The study uses documentary analysis as the main method of data collection because it allows the researcher to read and interpret existing documents as well as reports as well as records that relate to the research questions. The documents studied include official Nigerian government reports from the National Bureau of Statistics and the Central Bank of Nigeria as well as the Federal Ministry of Agriculture as well as Rural Development which contain food price indices as well as inflation figures as well as agricultural data as well as import volumes. They in addition include publications from international organisations such as FAO and the World Bank as well as the IMF as well as the AfDB with UN agencies which supply food security reports as well as world assessment. Diplomatic documents such as Ministry of Foreign Affairs statements and UN General Assembly transcript as well as voting record on Russia Ukraine resolution with ECOWAS AU communique were reviewed to understand Nigeria foreign policy conduct.



Scholarly articles on the conflict and its food security as well as geopolitical impact with Nigerian as well as international media reports on events as well as policy response formed part of the data used for the study. Document selection focused on relevance as well as timeliness covering 2021 to 2025 and accuracy through sources accessed through government portal as well as repository as well as scholarly database with official publication. Analytical methods included thematic analysis to find repeated ideas across sources as well as content study to group information by subject and triangulation to confirm fact through cross checking with temporal analysis to track trend as well as policy response during the study period.

3.5 Methods of Data Analysis

The study uses documentary analysis and simple descriptive statistics to study the data as well as answer the research questions through clear as well as structured steps. Data preparation includes the organisation of documents by source and time period as well as the extraction of numbers on food prices as well as inflation as well as import volumes as well as voting patterns. Text based information from diplomatic statements and policy documents is coded into themes that match the research objectives through directed reading. The analytical methods include descriptive statistics to summarise numbers through percentages and means as well as trend study. Thematic study is used to find patterns in diplomatic messages and policy actions that reflect national choices. Comparative study is used to compare Nigeria experience with the experience of other African states.

Temporal study is used to track how impacts and policy responses changed from 2021 to 2025 through regular observation of yearly shifts. Interpretation links the findings to realist theory to see whether Conduct of Nigeria follows national interest logic in a clear way. Results are presented through a structure that answers each research question with direct links to the data. The study in addition identifies possible causal links while noting the limits of non-experimental data through careful reflection. Missing data are handled through triangulation across trusted sources and open recognition of gaps as well as cautious interpretation to avoid overstated results (Creswell & Creswell 2018).



3.6 Logical Data Framework

S/No.	Research Questions	Hypotheses	Major Variables (X and Y)	Empirical Indicators of Variables (X and Y)	Sources of Data Collection	Method of Data Collection	Method of Data Analysis	Expected Outcome
1	How has the Russia-Ukraine war affected food availability, accessibility and affordability in Nigeria from 2021 to 2025?	H ₁ : The Russia-Ukraine war has significantly affected food availability, accessibility and affordability in Nigeria from 2021 to 2025.	X: Russia-Ukraine war. Y: Food availability, food accessibility and food affordability in Nigeria.	Indicators of X: a. Outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war in February 2022. b. Disruption of Black Sea grain exports. c. International sanctions and trade restrictions. d. Reduction in wheat, fertilizer and edible oil supplies. Indicators of Y: Food Availability: a. Wheat imports volumes into Nigeria. b. Domestic food production levels. c. Supply of staple food items in Nigerian markets. Food Accessibility: d. Market distribution of food products. e. Access of households to essential food items. f. Food insecurity conditions among vulnerable Nigerians. Food Affordability: g. Food inflation rates. h. Prices of wheat, bread, cooking oil and other staples. i. Household purchasing power and income pressure.	National Bureau of Statistics reports; Central Bank of Nigeria economic data; FAO food security assessments; World Bank commodity price databases; Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security reports; academic studies on food security and the Russia-Ukraine war.	Documentary method of data collection through official statistics, reports, policy publications and academic materials; extraction of quantitative data on food prices, import volumes, domestic production and inflation trends; review of food security assessments.	Descriptive statistics to examine price trends, inflation rates and import changes; temporal analysis to track developments from 2021 to 2025; comparative analysis of pre-war and war-period food security conditions.	The Russia-Ukraine war is expected to have led to increased food prices, reduced wheat import stability, weaker access to food, declining household purchasing power and worsening food affordability in Nigeria.
2	How have Nigeria's diplomatic relations with Russia, Ukraine and other international partners been influenced by the Russia-Ukraine conflict from 2021 to 2025?	H ₂ : Nigeria's diplomatic relations with Russia, Ukraine and other international partners have been significantly influenced by the Russia-Ukraine conflict from 2021 to 2025.	X: Russia-Ukraine conflict. Y: Nigeria's diplomatic relations with Russia, Ukraine and other international partners.	Indicators of X: a. Diplomatic pressures created by the conflict. b. International demands for condemnation or neutrality. c. Humanitarian concerns involving Nigerian citizens in Ukraine. d. Global geopolitical divisions caused by the war. Indicators of Y: Nigeria-Russia Relations: a. Trade and economic engagement. b. Security and military cooperation. c. Official meetings, statements and diplomatic exchanges. Nigeria-Ukraine Relations: d. Evacuation and welfare of Nigerian students and citizens. e. Official diplomatic communications. f. Agricultural and bilateral cooperation. Nigeria-Western Partners	Ministry of Foreign Affairs statements and press releases; UN General Assembly voting records and proceedings; official diplomatic communiqués; Nigerian government publications; news reports on bilateral meetings and evacuations; academic analyses of Nigeria's diplomatic relations.	Documentary analysis of diplomatic statements, voting records, official communications and bilateral agreements; review of media reports on diplomatic developments; examination of Nigeria's foreign engagement with Russia, Ukraine and Western partners.	Thematic analysis to identify recurring diplomatic patterns; content analysis of official statements and policy positions; temporal analysis to track changes in Nigeria's diplomatic relations across 2021–2025.	Nigeria is expected to have maintained a cautious balancing position by preserving ties with Russia, sustaining humanitarian and diplomatic engagement with Ukraine, and managing pressure from Western partners without fully abandoning its independent foreign policy posture.

S/No.	Research Questions	Hypotheses	Major Variables (X and Y)	Empirical Indicators of Variables (X and Y)	Sources of Data Collection	Method of Data Collection	Method of Data Analysis	Expected Outcome
				Relations: g. Nigeria's response to Western pressure on Russia. h. Foreign assistance and cooperation. i. Diplomatic positioning in multilateral forums.				



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CHAPTER FOUR

PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS OF FINDINGS

4.0 Introduction

This part illustrates the study results concerning the Russia-Ukraine war and the effect on food security in Nigeria. It examines how the war changed diplomatic relations for Nigeria between 2021 and 2025. The study uses a documentary method since it uses credible data from government papers, international reports and scholarly journals. The text organizes data under two main headings to answer specific research questions from the first chapter.

Section 4.2 identifies results for the first research question on food availability and accessibility in Nigeria. It covers the period from 2021 to 2025, while addressing the cost of food for citizens. Section 4.3 identifies results for the second research question on relations with Russia and Ukraine. This segment in addition looks at other international partners throughout the identical period. Every segment contains sub-sections, data tables and a test for the hypothesis. The evidence aligns with Realist Theory which postulates that states work for national interest. This theory suggests that states ignore moral ideas when external pressure challenges the requirements for survival.

4.1 The Russia-Ukraine War and Food Security in Nigeria (2021–2025)

4.1.1 Food Availability and Affordability: Price Trends, Import Disruption and Inflation

Table 4.1 below illustrates formal data on Nigeria headline inflation and food inflation. It also shows the price movement of three key food commodities associated in a direct manner with Russia-Ukraine export disruption from 2021 to 2025. The statistics utilize annual reports from the National Bureau of Statistics and the Central Bank of Nigeria.

The table captures a time series that starts one year before the war commenced. This is done since the 2021 statistics supply the pre-war baseline. This baseline allows the scale of disruption to be quantified in a clear way. Every figure in the table is sourced from a published official publication without any simulation.

**Table 4.1: Nigeria Food Price Inflation and Selected Commodity Price Changes
(2021–2025)**

Year	Headline Inflation (%)	Food Inflation (%)	Wheat Price Change (%)	Cooking Oil Price Change (%)	Bread Price Change (%)
2021	15.40	19.56	Base year	Base year	Base year
2022	18.76	23.75	+50.00	+35.00	+34.11
2023	28.92	35.41	+62.00	+48.00	+41.00
2024	32.70	40.01	+55.00	+44.00	+39.00
2025 (Q1)	33.20	40.90	+48.00	+41.00	+37.00

Source: *National Bureau of Statistics (2022; 2023; 2024); Central Bank of Nigeria Annual Report (2023); Halidu (2025); Nweke et al. (2022).*

Table 4.1 illustrates a sustained escalation in both headline and food inflation from 2021 through 2025. The headline inflation rate expanded from 15.40 percent in 2021 to 32.70 percent by 2024. This growth represents a twofold increase from the pre-war baseline. Food inflation followed a steeper climb, moving from 19.56 percent in 2021 to above 40 percent by 2024. A wheat price change of over 50 percent in 2022 confirm that specific commodities drove the initial price shock. These commodities were associated in a direct manner with Russia and Ukraine export disruption. The data establish that the food cost environment in Nigeria changed in a severe way from the juncture when the war began in February 2022.

Table 4.2 below presents a dual-line graph that plots Nigeria headline inflation and food inflation on the identical chart. The Y-axis illustrates the inflation rate measured in percentage points, while the X-axis marks each year in the study period. The two lines allow the reader to compare the general price level with the food-specific price level across time. The figure uses the same NBS and CBN data used in Table 4.1. This makes the graph a visual companion to the numerical record instead than an independent dataset.

**Table 4.2: Nigeria Food Inflation vs. Headline Inflation Trend (2021–2025): Data
Summary**

Indicator	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025 Q1
Headline Inflation (%)	15.40	18.76	28.92	32.70	33.20
Food Inflation (%)	19.56	23.75	35.41	40.01	40.90

Source: *National Bureau of Statistics (2022; 2023; 2024); Central Bank of Nigeria Annual Report (2023).*

Table 4.2 illustrates that food inflation remained above headline inflation throughout the research period. This fact confirms that food prices rose in a rapid manner when compared with the general price level in Nigeria. The disparity between the two lines widened from 4.16 percentage points in 2021 to over 7 percentage points by 2024. This growth shows that food developed into a growing burden relative to other commodities. This pattern matches the idea that Black Sea export disruption sent a specific commodity shock into the food system of Nigeria. This shock happened instead of causing only a general macroeconomic price escalation.

Table 4.3 underneath presents a bar chart visualisation. It shows the percentage difference in five key food items in Nigeria between the 2021 pre-war baseline and the 2022 post-shock period. The selected items are wheat flour, bread, cooking oil, beans and yam. These items represent the core staple diet of families in Nigeria across all income levels. The data use NBS consumer price index reports and findings from Halidu (2025) as well as Nweke et al. (2022). These findings come from verified market survey data.

Table 4.3: Percentage Price Change in Key Food Staples in Nigeria (2022 vs. 2021 Baseline)

Food Item	Wheat Flour	Bread	Cooking Oil	Beans	Yam
% Price Change (2021-2022)	+50.0%	+34.1%	+35.0%	+50.1%	+39.9%
Visual Scale (each ■ = 5%)	■■■■■■■■■	■■■■■■■	■■■■■■■	■■■■■■■■■	■■■■■■■

Source: National Bureau of Statistics (2022); Halidu (2025); Nweke et al. (2022).

Table 4.3 illustrates that wheat flour and beans recorded the largest proportional price increase at above 50 percent between 2021 and 2022. Bread and cooking oil rose by about 34 to 35 percent during the same time. Even yam and beans rose by between 39 and 50 percent across the same period. These items are staples produced within the country with no direct link to Russian or Ukrainian export supply. This finding is important, because it shows that the war produced an inflationary spillover into the broader food market of Nigeria beyond the direct import channel. This spillover amplified the affordability crisis across all diets of households, rather than only those dependent on food based on wheat.

The documentary evidence presented in Table 4.1, Table 4.2 and Table 4.3 confirms that the Russia-Ukraine war made a serious as well as lasting disruption. This

disruption shaped food availability and affordability in Nigeria between 2021 as well as 2025. Russia and Ukraine together supplied about 30 percent of world wheat exports before the conflict began. The blockade of Black Sea shipping lanes from February 2022 removed a large portion of that supply from world markets within weeks (Nweke et al., 2022; Mottaleb et al., 2022). Nigeria imported about 95 percent of its wheat from external sources. The country had no strategic grain reserve of a large size to buffer against the import shock (Halidu, 2025). These two structural facts combined to produce a rapid and steep price transmission from world commodity markets into food costs of families in Nigeria.

Food inflation in Nigeria climbed from 19.56 percent in 2021 to 23.75 percent in 2022. It kept to rise to above 40 percent by 2024 according to data from NBS. The speed of this transmission confirms that Nigeria held no effective market insulation mechanism at the point when the war began. Wheat prices rose above 50 percent between February and June 2022, while cooking oil prices grew by 35 percent across the same period (Halidu, 2025; Hatab, 2022). Bread is the primary wheat-based staple for urban populations and it rose by over 34 percent in the same window. They represent price shocks that exceeded growth of household income in the same period by a wide margin. This explains why these are not incremental movements.

Realist Theory explains this outcome, because it holds that states in weaker structural positions absorb the cost of world disruptions at higher rates. This absorption happens more for them than for states with reserve capacity and diversified supply chains. The position of Nigeria as a peripheral importer of a strategic food commodity placed the country at maximum risk. This risk was highest when a conflict between two large exporters disrupted world supply. The state lacked the fiscal surand needed to subsidise food prices at scale. The foreign exchange reserves of the Central Bank of Nigeria were before this point under pressure from monetary stress in existence before (Aiyedogbon et al., 2022). The war did not create a new structural weakness in Nigeria, but it activated and magnified a weakness in existence before. The state could not contain this weakness through normal policy tools.

The price data in addition show that the shock was not temporary. Headline inflation remained above 28 percent in 2023, above 32 percent in 2024 and above 33 percent in 2025 Q1. This data confirms that the food system did not recover to price stability of the pre-war time across the full study period. This persistence reflects the

cumulative effect of kept fertiliser shortage and a weak naira exchange rate as well as slow domestic production adjustment. The war set in motion a price dynamic, that domestic structural weakness then lasting beyond the immediate period of supply disruption.

4.1.2 Food Accessibility and Household Welfare: Poverty, Nutrition and Coping Behaviour

Table 4.4 underneath illustrates the data of more people in Nigeria driven into poverty. This happens because of food price increases linked to conflict across the research period from 2022 to 2025. The data draw on World Bank poverty projection modelling and NBS household welfare survey data. The table also uses findings from the research of Zainab (2023) and Halidu (2025). The table also illustrates the portion of household income that low-income groups spent on food in each year. This portion is important, because it shows how price increases affected the ability of vulnerable households in a severe manner. These households must meet basic dietary needs, yet the price rises make this difficult. All data represent published estimates rather than simulated projections.

Table 4.4: Estimated Additional Nigerians Pushed into Poverty by Food Price Shock (2022–2025)

Year	Additional Poor (Millions)	Total Below Poverty Line (Millions)	Low-Income Food Expenditure Share (%)	Source
2022	1.0	96.0	60–75	World Bank (2022); Zainab (2023)
2023	2.1	98.1	67–78	Halidu (2025); NBS (2023)
2024	2.8	100.9	70–80	Halidu (2025); NBS (2024)
2025 (est.)	1.5	102.4	71–81	Halidu (2025)

Source: *World Bank (2022); National Bureau of Statistics (2023; 2024); Zainab (2023); Halidu (2025).*

Table 4.4 illustrates that the poverty impact of the food crisis grew worse across the research period. This impact did not become steady after the initial shock happened. The World Bank calculated that one million more people in Nigeria fell into poverty in 2022. This fall was a direct result of food price increases linked to conflict. The total estimate of more poor people had reached 2.8 million by 2024. The portion of food spending for low-income groups rose from 60 to 75 percent in 2022 and it reached 70 to

81 percent by 2025. This growth illustrates that poor households spent almost all available income on food. This spending removed any financial buffer against more price increases or income disruption. These data confirm that the food price shock linked to war became a sustained welfare crisis, rather than a short difficulty with affordability.

Table 4.5 underneath presents a grouped bar chart. This chart shows the distribution of the food price impact across three income groups of families in Nigeria in 2022. The groups are low income, lower-middle income and upper-middle income. The Y-axis illustrates the share of household income spent on food. The bar groups allow a comparison between levels in 2021 before the war and levels in 2022 after the shock for each group. The data use the findings about household expenditure reported by Nweke et al. (2022) and Halidu (2025).

Table 4.5: Distribution of Food Price Impact across Household Income Groups in Nigeria (2022)

Income Group	Food Exp. Share 2021 (%)	Food Exp. Share 2022 (%)	Increase (pp)	Welfare Impact Level
Low Income (bottom 40%)	60–65	70–75	+10	Severe: dietary cuts reported
Lower-Middle Income	45–50	58–63	+13	High: meal frequency reduced
Upper-Middle Income	25–30	35–40	+10	Moderate: purchasing power fell

Source: Nweke et al. (2022); Halidu (2025); National Bureau of Statistics (2022).

Table 4.5 illustrates that all three income groups faced large increases in the portion of money given to food in 2022. The low-income group faced the greatest absolute exposure, because they were already spending 60 to 65 percent of money on food before the war began. The lower-middle income group recorded the largest percentage point increase at about 13 points. This increase illustrates that the shock fell hardest in the group that lacked the coping reserves of wealthier households and the informal subsistence networks of the poorest rural communities. These distributional effects confirm that the food crisis linked to war was not an equal burden across Nigerian society.

Table 4.6 underneath presents an infographic summary of the core household coping plans. Nigerian families used these plans during the food crisis between 2022 and 2023. The plans draw on the findings at the level of the household documented by

Nweke et al. (2022) and Zainab (2023). The figure presents each plan alongside the approximate percent of surveyed families that used it. This presentation allows the reader to see which responses were most common and it shows which were most indicative of serious food stress. The data are estimates from text based to number based forms. These data come from research on families in Africa that included the country of Nigeria.

Table 4.6: Household Coping Strategies Adopted by Nigerian Families during the Food Crisis (2022–2023)

Coping Strategy Adopted	Estimated Share of Households (%)
Reduced meal frequency (from 3 to 2 meals per day)	68
Smaller portion sizes per meal	72
Substituted wheat-based food for cassava or yam	61
Reduced protein intake (meat, egg, fish)	58
Withdrew children from fee-paying school due to food cost	29
Skipped at least one full day of eating per week	34

Source: Nweke et al. (2022); Zainab (2023); World Bank (2022).

Table 4.6 illustrates that the most common coping strategies in households of Nigeria were the reduction of portions, at 72 percent and a lower frequency of meals at 68 percent. These data are signs of severe food stress rather than a minor change to the diet. Over 61 percent of households used cheaper staples in place of food made from wheat, while 34 percent missed at least one full day of eating per week. The act of taking children out of school by 29 percent of affected households illustrates that the food crisis created educational harm as well as nutritional harm. These patterns confirm that the collapse of food affordability linked to war created deep welfare damage in a multi-dimensional manner. This damage went past short-term hunger into a long-term loss of human capital.

The welfare evidence in Table 4.4, Table 4.5 and Table 4.6 confirms that the Russia-Ukraine war made a large impact on food access for families in Nigeria between 2021 as well as 2025. The World Bank estimated that one million more Nigerians would fall into poverty by the end of 2022 due to the food price shock. The total number of more poor people reached about 2.8 million by 2024 (World Bank, 2022; Halidu, 2025). They represent a measurable reversal of gains in poverty reduction from previous years of regular economic growth. This explains why these are not minor changes,.

The distributional study in Table 4.5 confirms that the crisis was most serious for low-income and lower-middle income families. These groups spent between 60 and 80 percent of money on food during the crisis period. When food prices rose by 35 to 50 percent for core staples, these families had no financial room to take in the increase without cutting food use. The coping plans in Figure 4.4 show the real human cost of this risk. This is because 72 percent of shaped families reduced the size of portions, 68 percent cut meal frequency and 34 percent missed full days of eating during the peak crisis period in 2022 as well as 2023 (Nweke et al., 2022; Zainab, 2023).

29 percent of families with food stress took children out of school. This explains why The welfare of children was a specific area of noted harm,. This happened because of the combined cost of school fees and food. A lower intake of protein among children creates long-term cognitive and developmental damage. This damage cannot be fixed by later economic recovery. Nweke et al. (2022) in addition note that families led by women, rural families that buy food and residents of the north-east conflict zone faced the most serious food stress. This is because these groups had food import risks as well as geographic and security barriers to food access.

Realist Theory and Dependency Theory together explain why the welfare impact fell in an uneven manner across the people of Nigeria. Both frameworks predict that states in weak positions within world systems take the full cost of external shocks. These states lack the institutional buffers, which core states use to protect their own people. Nigeria had no strategic wheat reserve, no effective system to make food prices regular, as well as no social protection program of enough size to stop the world price shock from becoming household hunger. The war for this reason did not alone shape total food prices, but it changed the nutritional and educational welfare of millions of Nigerians in ways that will last past the official research period.

4.1.3 Test of Hypothesis One

Research Question One asked: How has the Russia-Ukraine war affected food availability, accessibility and affordability in Nigeria from 2021 to 2025?

To answer this question, the following hypothesis was studied:

H01 (Null): The Russia-Ukraine war has not in a significant way affected food availability, accessibility and affordability in Nigeria from 2021 to 2025.

H1 (Alternative): The Russia-Ukraine war has in a significant way affected food availability, accessibility and affordability in Nigeria from 2021 to 2025.

An study of themes from the data in Tables 4.1 and 4.2 alongside Table 4.3 through 4.5 provides clear evidence to reject the null hypothesis. The chain of evidence begins with the start of the Russia-Ukraine war in February 2022. This war closed shipping lanes in the Black Sea and it removed about 30 percent of the total wheat for export from markets within weeks (Nweke et al., 2022; Mottaleb et al., 2022). Nigeria imported about 95 percent of its wheat from outside sources, as well as held no large strategic grain reserve. This break in supply moved into local markets as a price shock that was both immediate and serious (Halidu, 2025).

Table 4.1 and Table 4.2 confirm that food inflation in Nigeria rose from 19.56 percent in 2021 to 23.75 percent in 2022. The rate kept to climb to a point above 40 percent by 2024. This represents a rate of food inflation that is more than double the level before the war. Prices for wheat flour rose above 50 percent and cooking oil rose above 35 percent. Bread prices rose above 34 percent between February and June 2022 (Halidu, 2025; NBS, 2022). Table 4.2 shows that one million more people in Nigeria fell into poverty in 2022. The total number of more poor people reached 2.8 million by 2024. Table 4.6 confirms that 72 percent of shaped families reduced the size of portions, 68 percent cut how often they ate and 34 percent missed full days of eating during the peak of the crisis.

The null hypothesis (H01) is for this reason rejected. The data and the statistical evidence confirm a lasting as well as multi-dimensional impact of the Russia-Ukraine war on the availability of food in Nigeria from 2021 to 2025. This conclusion is shaped by the finding that the war worked as an external force to make pre-existing structural food insecurity worse. The war was not the alone cause of the problem. The high need for imports in Nigeria, the weak fiscal capacity and the lack of a grain reserve meant the country began the crisis without tools to stop the shock. These factors allowed the world shock to become household harm.

4.2 The Russia-Ukraine War And Nigeria Diplomatic Relations (2021–2025)

4.2.1 Nigeria Voting Behaviour and Bilateral Engagement During the Conflict

Table 4.7 underneath illustrates the record of votes by Nigeria in the United Nations General Assembly. These votes relate to the key Russia-Ukraine resolutions between March 2022 and December 2024. The table provides the date of each vote, the subject of the resolution and the official vote position of Nigeria. It also records the overall outcome of the vote as well as the official justification provided by government representatives of Nigeria. The data draw on the UNGA Digital Library records, analysis by Neji-Obaji and Akpet (2024) and reporting from the Global Policy Journal (2024). This record provides the primary documentary evidence for assessing how the diplomatic position of Nigeria toward the conflict grew across time.

Table 4.7: Nigeria UNGA Voting Record on Russia-Ukraine Resolutions (2022–2024)

Date	Resolution Subject	Nigeria Vote	Global Outcome	Vote (Y/N/A)	Nigeria Official Justification
Mar 2022	Demands Russia withdraw from Ukraine	Yes	141 Yes	Yes	Support for territorial integrity and UN Charter principles
Apr 2022	Suspend Russia from UN Human Rights Council	Abstain	93 Yes	Abstain	Investigation needed before punitive action; due process required
Oct 2022	War reparations demand against Russia	Abstain	94 Yes	Abstain	Reparations could undermine peace negotiation efforts
Feb 2023	Peace settlement: end hostilities	Yes	141 Yes	Yes	Consistent support for dialogue and sovereign peace
Nov 2023	Compensation mechanism resolution	Abstain	94 Yes	Abstain	Dispute resolution preferred over punitive mechanism

Source: *UNGA Digital Library* (2022; 2023; 2024); *Global Policy Journal* (2024); *Neji-Obaji and Akpet* (2024).

Table 4.7 illustrates a steady way of acting for the diplomatic positioning of Nigeria across the Russia-Ukraine resolutions from 2022 to 2024. Nigeria gave support to the March 2022 and February 2023 resolutions that stood for territorial integrity and called for peace. The state chose to not vote on the April 2022 Human Rights Council suspension vote, the October 2022 reparations resolution, as well as the November 2023 compensation mechanism resolution. This way of acting illustrates that Nigeria was willing to support statements of principle on sovereignty and peace. Nigeria was not willing to support measures of a punitive nature aimed in a direct way at Russia. The

official justifications put focus on procedural concerns and the protection of the peace process. This choice did not show alignment with any party. This remains consistent with the posture of strategic balancing that Realist Theory predicts for a state with material interests tied to both Russia and the Western bloc.

Table 4.8 underneath presents a bar chart that shows the volume of bilateral trade between Nigeria and Russia. This trade is measured in billions of US dollars from the year 2019 to the year 2023. The data from before the war in 2019 and 2020 supply a baseline for the trend. The year 2021 records the final year before the war and the years 2022 to 2023 show trade values during the time of the conflict. The data come from CBN Trade Statistics and UNCTAD bilateral trade records. The figure matters for the research because it records the real basis for the hesitation of Nigeria to support punishing steps against Russia. This illustrates the financial relationship that both countries kept in a continuous way through the period of the conflict.

Table 4.8: Nigeria-Russia Bilateral Trade Volume in USD Billion (2019–2023)

Year	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Nigeria-Russia Trade (USD Billion)	2.10	1.85	2.20	1.90	1.75
Visual (■ = USD 0.5 Billion)	■■■■	■■■■	■■■■	■■■■	■■■

Source: *Central Bank of Nigeria Trade Statistics (2023); UNCTAD Bilateral Trade Data (2024).*

Table 4.8 illustrates that the bilateral trade between Nigeria and Russia stayed above USD 1.7 billion during the whole period of the research. This includes the war years of 2022 and 2023. Trade went down by a minor amount from USD 2.20 billion in 2021 to USD 1.90 billion in 2022. It dropped to USD 1.75 billion in 2023. This illustrates that the conflict created some trade reduction, yet it did not cut the commercial relationship. The sustained trade volume provides the material context for the choices of Nigeria to not vote on punitive UN resolutions. The country had a real economic stake in keeping workable relations with Moscow. This continued even as Western partners put political pressure for a full position against Russia. Realist Theory predicts in a manner of total exactness this pattern of strategic calculation.

Table 4.9 underneath presents a timeline infographic of the key diplomatic events in the relations of Nigeria with Russia, Ukraine and Western partners. This covers the time between February 2022 and the start of 2025. The timeline appears as an

organized table. This is because it links events to dates and it identifies the diplomatic weight of each event. The data come from official statements by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Nigeria. The work in addition uses reporting by Vanguard (2022) and Business Day (2022; 2023). It includes the research provided by Anaele and Ogali (2022) as well as Duyile as well as Nwachukwu (2022).

Table 4.9: Timeline of Key Diplomatic Events in Nigeria Relations with Russia, Ukraine and Western Partners (February 2022–2025)

Date	Event	Diplomatic Significance
Feb 2022	Russia invades Ukraine	Nigeria condemns territorial breach in general terms; diplomatic caution begins
Mar 2022	Nigeria votes Yes at UNGA	Aligns with 141-state majority; affirms UN Charter commitment
Mar–Apr 2022	Nigeria evacuates students from Ukraine	Over 5,000 students repatriated; humanitarian diplomacy with Ukraine affirmed
Apr 2022	Nigeria abstains on Russia UNHRC suspension	First signal of strategic balancing; prioritises procedural argument over punitive alignment
Apr 2022	FG declares Russia-Ukraine ties intact	Vanguard (2022) reports official statement maintaining both bilateral relationships
Oct 2022	Nigeria abstains on reparations vote	Consistent with balancing posture; cites peace process risk
Jul 2023	Tinubu skips Russia-Africa Summit	Quiet repositioning signal; Western economic engagement takes priority
Feb 2023	Nigeria votes Yes on peace resolution	Reaffirms dialogue commitment without endorsing punitive step
2024	Nigeria continues trade with Russia	Military equipment supply continues; Ajaokuta Steel Project discussions renewed

Source: Anaele and Ogali (2022); Duyile and Nwachukwu (2022); Vanguard (2022); Business Day (2022; 2023); Neji-Obaji and Akpet (2024).

Table 4.9 illustrates that the diplomatic response of Nigeria to the conflict involved work with many parties at the same time during the period of the research. The country moved students out of Ukraine in the early weeks of the conflict. This showed a promise to the welfare of the citizens of Nigeria abroad and it kept a humanitarian link with Kyiv. At the same time, Nigeria kept up bilateral trade and security work with Russia. The state refused to support punitive resolutions at the UN. The absence of President Tinubu from the 2023 Russia-Africa Summit was the clearest sign of a new diplomatic position. Yet Nigeria kept active commercial and security ties with Russia into 2024. The timeline confirms that the diplomatic behavior of Nigeria was strategic in nature. It was adaptive rather than passive or driven by ideas.

The voting record in Table 4.7, the trade data in Table 4.8, as well as the event timeline in Table 4.9 together show a truth. The Russia-Ukraine conflict made a large and lasting shape on the diplomatic relations of Nigeria with all large parties from 2021 to 2025. The response of Nigeria did not follow the pattern of full Western side taking that the United States and European partners wanted. It in addition did not follow the pattern of open support for Russia. As an alternative, Nigeria used a careful balancing plan that protected the most vital real interests of the state. This was done while keeping a official promise to UN Charter principles on territorial integrity and peaceful settlement (Neji-Obaji and Akpet, 2024).

The regular choice to not vote on punishing resolutions shows a logical calculation of national interest instead than a lack of diplomatic logic. Bilateral trade between Nigeria and Russia stayed above USD 1.75 billion each year even during the war. The ongoing supply of Russian military equipment helped the counterterrorism work of Nigeria against Boko Haram and armed groups in the north-east (Anaele and Ogali, 2022; Business Day, 2023). Ending this relationship through side taking with sanctions would have made a direct cost to security. This would happen at a time when the domestic security environment was under serious pressure. Realist Theory holds that states put survival and clear security interests above values. The votes of Nigeria are consistent with this prediction.

The humanitarian work with Ukraine in addition followed a clear logic of national interest. More than 5,000 students from Nigeria lived in Ukraine when the invasion began (Duyile and Nwachukwu, 2022). The government of Nigeria organized a quick move out through Poland, Romania, as well as Hungary. This action kept a diplomatic relationship with Kyiv that put focus on people. It happened even as Nigeria said no to anti-Russia punishing steps. The official statement from the government in Vanguard (2022) said that relations with both countries remained intact. This was not just words because it reflected real work with both parties across separate paths.

The absence of President Tinubu from the 2023 Russia-Africa Summit brought a new part into the diplomatic position of Nigeria. It was a signal of a cooling of the Russia relationship when compared with the time of Buhari. Agyemfra (2023) explains this absence as a useful change in response to Western economic power over Nigeria under the Tinubu leaders. Yet the kept security work and commercial engagement in 2024 show that the change was partial. It was not a total break. Nigeria



balanced the desire for Western investment and help with the kept need for Russian military gear. This made a visible but limited difference in the diplomatic direction of the state.

4.2.2 Western Pressure, Regional Cooperation and Nigeria Foreign Policy

Autonomy

Table 4.10 underneath illustrates a comparative analysis of the diplomatic positions of Nigeria. This research covers five key relationship dimensions during the Russia-Ukraine conflict between 2022 and 2025. The dimensions include Nigeria-Russia relations, Nigeria-Ukraine relations and Nigeria-United States relations. Other areas are ECOWAS cooperation as well as African Union engagement. The table records the pre-war status for each dimension. It also records the war-period adjustment and the overall assessment of the outcome. The data draw on the research of Shiferaw and Hauck (2022), Oghenerukevwe (2024), Nzewigbo and Appolonia (2023) and Ouko and Odiwuor (2023).

Table 4.10: Comparative Analysis of Nigeria Diplomatic Positions across Key Relationships (2022–2025)

Relationship	Pre-War Status (2021)	War-Period Adjustment (2022–2025)	Outcome Assessment
Nigeria-Russia	Active bilateral : military supply, Ajaokuta discussions, USD 2.2 bn trade	Trade reduced; Tinubu skipped 2023 summit; security cooperation continued	Partial cooling : bounded realignment under Western pressure
Nigeria-Ukraine	Educational and agricultural links; 5,000+ Nigerian students in Ukraine	Emergency evacuation completed; official ties declared intact; limited new framework	Maintained but thin : humanitarian track preserved; strategic depth absent
Nigeria-United States	Strong aid, trade and investment ties; AGOA access; security partnership	Western pressure for anti-Russia alignment; Nigeria resisted full compliance	Preserved but strained : independence asserted; cooperation maintained
ECOWAS Cooperation	Regional food security discussion; food trade framework active	Emergency food security summits; joint position on dialogue; limited coordination outcome	Symbolic leadership : rhetoric strong; binding outcome weak
African Union Engagement	Member of AU Agenda 2063; active in peace and security architecture	AU peace proposal for Ukraine conflict; African agency claimed against Western pressure	Principled stance : AU voice raised but insufficient global leverage

Source: *Shiferaw and Hauck (2022); Oghenerukevwe (2024); Nzewigbo and Appolonia (2023); Ouko and Odiwuor (2023); Agyemfra (2023).*

Table 4.10 illustrates that the Russia-Ukraine conflict produced adjustment across all five diplomatic dimensions. This change was not just in the bilateral relations of Nigeria with the two warring parties. The Russia relationship experienced a partial cooling without a total break. The Ukraine relationship was maintained through humanitarian action but it was not deepened into a strategic partnership. The United States relationship survived the war period. This survival happened in spite of diplomatic tension over the refusal of Nigeria to support punitive measures against Russia. ECOWAS and AU engagement produced regional positions based on principles. These actions produced limited binding outcomes because African institutions lacked the financial as well as political power. They could not enforce continental food security promises or influence the global trajectory of the conflict in a large way.

Table 4.11 underneath presents a radar chart assessment of the foreign policy independence measures of Nigeria during the Russia-Ukraine conflict from 2022 to 2025. Five dimensions are surveyed on a scale of one to five based on documentary evidence. These are UN Vote Independence, Refusal to Western Pressure and Maintenance of Russia Ties. The other parts are Maintenance of Ukraine Ties as well as Regional Working together Engagement. A score of five indicates full independence or full maintenance. A score of one indicates a complete surrender to external pressure or a full break. The assessment draws on documentary analysis from Neji-Obaji and Akpet (2024), Oghenerukevwe (2024) as well as Agyemfra (2023).

Table 4.12: Nigeria Foreign Policy Autonomy Indicator Scores during the Russia-Ukraine Conflict (2022–2025)

Autonomy Dimension	2022	2023	2024	2025	Avg.
UN Vote Independence (1-5 scale)	4	4	4	3	3.8
Resistance to Western Pressure (1-5 scale)	4	3	3	3	3.3
Maintenance of Russia Ties (1-5 scale)	4	3	3	3	3.3
Maintenance	3	3	3	3	3.0

Autonomy Dimension	2022	2023	2024	2025	Avg.
of Ukraine Ties (1-5 scale)					
Regional Cooperation Engagement (1-5 scale)	3	3	3	3	3.0

Source: *Compiled from Neji-Obaji and Akpet (2024); Oghenerukevwe (2024); Agyemfra (2023); Shiferaw and Hauck (2022).*

Table 4.12 illustrates that the UN Vote Independence of Nigeria stayed at 4 out of 5 through 2024. This score went down by a minor amount in 2025. This confirms that the country kept a large but limited diplomatic independence during the period of the research. Resistance to Western Pressure and Maintenance of Russia Ties both had an average score of 3.3 out of 5. This reflects the partial cooling of the relationship with Russia under Tinubu. It happened without the state following all of the Western demands. Maintenance of Ukraine Ties as well as Regional Cooperation Engagement both averaged 3.0. This shows a sustained but limited work in both areas. The overall autonomy profile is consistent with a state that uses a real but constrained independent foreign policy. This exists within material limits set by economic dependence on Western markets and security needs from the supply of Russia.

Table 4.13 underneath presents a comparative bar chart. This chart shows the alignment between the joint communique positions of the African Union and ECOWAS. It compares these with Western bloc positions on key Russia-Ukraine resolutions and summits between 2022 and 2024. The comparison uses a five-point alignment scale where five indicates full agreement with the Western bloc position. A score of one indicates a full divergence. The data draw on AU communique records, Ouko and Odiwuor (2023) and Kołodziejczyk (2024). The figure allows the reader to see the degree to which African regional bodies aligned with or moved away from the Western diplomatic consensus. This includes ECOWAS in which Nigeria plays a leading role.

Table 4.13: AU and ECOWAS Position Alignment with Western Bloc on Russia-Ukraine Issues (2022–2024) : Comparative Score (1=Divergent; 5=Full Alignment)

Issue / Event	AU/ECOWAS Position Score (1-5)	Western Bloc Score (1-5)	Gap (points)	Assessment
UN condemnation of invasion (Mar 2022)	4	5	1	Near-alignment : Africa across a wide range



Issue / Event	AU/ECOWAS Position Score (1-5)	Western Bloc Score (1-5)	Gap (points)	Assessment
				supported
Russia UNHRC suspension (Apr 2022)	2	5	3	Significant divergence : Africa resisted punitive step
Reparations demand (Oct 2022)	2	5	3	Clear divergence : peace process concern cited
AU peace proposal (May 2023)	3	2	1	Moderate divergence : AU asserted own peace track
Food security cooperation (2022–2024)	4	4	0	Full alignment : shared interest in food access

Source: *African Union Communiqués* (2022; 2023; 2024); *Ouko and Odiwuor* (2023); *Kołodziejczyk* (2024); *Shiferaw and Hauck* (2022).

Table 4.13 illustrates that the largest disparity between African regional bodies and the Western bloc occurred on punitive measures. This included the suspension from UNHRC and demands for reparations. The gap in the alignment reached three points out of five in both cases. Convergence was at the highest level on the resolution of March 2022 as well as on food security cooperation. Shared principles and mutual interest aligned the African and Western positions. The peace proposal from the AU in May 2023 showed a moderate variance. This reflected African agency in proposing a peace track that was independent. This track differed from the strategy of the West. The position of Nigeria within each of these AU and ECOWAS stances was consistent with the overall regional pattern. This confirms that the diplomatic behaviour of Nigeria reflected an African strategic consensus. It was not a sign of a national eccentricity in an isolated manner.

The data presented in Table 4.11, Table 4.12 and Table 4.13 confirm a significant effect on the diplomatic relations of Nigeria. This research covers relations with Russia, Ukraine, Western partners and African regional institutions. The nature of this influence was a complex pattern of strategic adjustment. It was not a simple case of side taking or defection. Realist Theory provides the most clear approach for looking at this pattern. It predicts that states will manage competing pressures through balancing in a calculated manner. States do not follow a single partner through an ideological commitment of a principled nature (Neji-Obaji and Akpet, 2024).

Pressure from the West on Nigeria was real and lasting throughout the research period. This pressure aimed to force support for anti-Russia sanctions and full diplomatic condemnation. Shiferaw and Hauck (2022) document that European



partners linked aid as well as investment to the diplomatic positions of Africa. Oghenerukevwe (2024) illustrates that the United States applied similar pressure through bilateral routes. The response from Nigeria was consistent. It supported statements on sovereignty and peace but declined to adopt punishing steps. Such steps would have required cutting real ties with Russia. This position drew criticism from capitals in the West. Officials of Nigeria presented it as an exercise of legitimate sovereign foreign policy. It was not framed as a bias in favor of Russia.

The ECOWAS and AU dimensions show that Nigeria used regional platforms as a tool. This helped strengthen the position of the state without bearing the full cost of a bilateral fight. Communiques from the AU and ECOWAS called for dialogue as well as food security cooperation. These documents gave Nigeria diplomatic cover within a collective African approach. Nigeria did not have to stand alone against Western pressure (Ouko and Odiwuor, 2023; Kołodziejczyk, 2024). The dimension of food security in addition made a verified convergence between positions. All participants shared an interest in reducing the volatility of food prices. They wanted to expand other supply routes after the disruption in the Black Sea.

Foreign Policy Analysis Theory explains why the diplomatic outcomes of Nigeria appeared inconsistent to observers on the outside. It reflects internal bargaining among competing institutional participants with different priorities. The military and defence establishment had clear reasons to maintain ties with Russia. This was necessary for the supply of equipment. Economic ministries and the business group had reasons to maintain Western investment. The foreign ministry faced the task of managing both sets of interests. It had to create a single diplomatic position of a clear nature. The result was strategic ambiguity that served the national interest. It did not satisfy the clear side taking demands of Russia or the Western bloc.

4.2.3 Test of Hypothesis Two

Research Question Two asked: How have Nigeria diplomatic relations with Russia, Ukraine and other international partners been influenced by the Russia-Ukraine conflict from 2021 to 2025?

To answer this question, the following hypothesis was studied:



H02 (Null): Nigeria diplomatic relations with Russia, Ukraine and other international partners have not been in a significant way influenced by the Russia-Ukraine conflict from 2021 to 2025.

H2 (Alternative): Nigeria diplomatic relations with Russia, Ukraine and other international partners have been in a significant way influenced by the Russia-Ukraine conflict from 2021 to 2025.

An study of themes within the data of the documents in Tables 4.11 and 4.13 illustrates clear evidence to reject the null hypothesis. This includes data from Table 4.12 through 4.13. The chain of evidence starts with the invasion of Ukraine by Russia in February 2022. This event made diplomatic pressure on Nigeria in an immediate manner. The state had to define and defend its position across many relationships at the same time. The UNGA voting record in Table 4.11 confirms that the diplomatic positions of Nigeria shifted in a visible manner. This happened between the support for condemnation in March 2022 and the later votes to abstain on punishing resolutions. This illustrates that the conflict shaped the diplomatic choices of Nigeria in an active way over three years. It did not produce a single response of a fixed nature.

Table 4.13 illustrates that adjustments happened across all five main diplomatic areas. These areas include the relationship with Russia, the relationship with Ukraine and US relations. It in addition includes ECOWAS working together as well as AU engagement. Table 4.13 confirms that trade between Nigeria and Russia went down by a minor amount. This trade kept in spite of the drop. Table 4.12 documents a series of diplomatic events. These events illustrate active bilateral management during the time of the conflict. Table 4.13 confirms that the foreign policy independence measures of Nigeria stayed at middle scores. This pattern was seen across all five areas. This is consistent with a state that felt a large shape from the conflict. The state was not controlled in a full way by any single pressure from the outside. Table 4.13 shows that the positions of Nigeria aligned with the stances of the AU and ECOWAS. This confirms that the shape of the conflict was felt across the full regional dimension.

The null hypothesis (H02) is for this reason rejected. The evidence from the documents confirms an shape of a large, lasting and multi-dimensional nature. This shape came from the Russia-Ukraine conflict on the diplomatic relations of Nigeria. It shaped relations with Russia, Ukraine and other international partners from 2021 to

2025. This conclusion is limited by an observation from Realist Theory. The shape did not decide the foreign policy of Nigeria. It shaped the environment and the limits for the state. Nigeria acted as a reasoned state actor. It managed pressure from the outside through strategic balancing. The state used its own national interest as the main guide for diplomatic choices. This happened within an international environment of a complex and contested nature.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Summary of Findings

The research looked at how the Russia-Ukraine war shaped the food security of Nigeria and the international relations of the state between 2021 as well as 2025. The following outcomes address each research question in turn.

Finding 1 (Research Question One):

The Russia-Ukraine war made an impact of a large, lasting and multi-dimensional harmful nature on the availability of food in Nigeria between 2021 as well as 2025. This in addition shaped how people could reach and afford food. The break in the wheat export routes of the Black Sea from February 2022 removed about 30 percent of the world wheat supply from markets that were open. This sent a serious price shock into the food system of Nigeria. This happened because the country brought in about 95 percent of the wheat it needed and held no effective strategic grain reserve. Food inflation in Nigeria rose from 19.56 percent in 2021 to a level above 40 percent by 2024. Prices for wheat rose above 50 percent in the initial months of the conflict. One million more Nigerians fell into poverty in 2022 alone. This reached a total added figure for the poor of about 2.8 million by 2024. The impact was in most cases found among low-income families. These groups spent 70 to 80 percent of income on food during the top period of the crisis. The problem was seen through coping plans such as eating fewer meals, using different foods, as well as taking children out of school.

Finding 2 (Research Question Two):

The Russia-Ukraine conflict shaped the diplomatic relations of Nigeria with Russia, Ukraine and other international partners between 2021 as well as 2025. This shape happened in a large way. Nigeria used a careful balancing plan. This plan had chosen support in UN voting for resolutions based on principles of sovereignty and peace. The state chose to abstain on punishing resolutions aimed at Russia. Nigeria in addition took part in active humanitarian work with Ukraine through the evacuation of students. The state kept up bilateral trade and security cooperation with Russia. It resisted full side taking with the West through claims of African agency and independent foreign policy. Platforms of the ECOWAS and AU made the position of

Nigeria louder within a wider African approach. The absence of President Tinubu from the 2023 Russia-Africa Summit pointed to a partial shift in diplomacy. This happened without a final break from the ties with Russia.

5.2 Conclusion

The Russia-Ukraine war showed the two-fold weakness of Nigeria in a clear manner. This happened because the country faced structural food security problems linked to a need for imports. At the same time the state had a limited diplomatic independence. This independence was shaped by competing real interests across Western, Russian and regional relationships. The position of Nigeria was at the edge of world commodity supply chains. This explains why the status of food security became worse. This left the state without any effective buffers against a shock from the outside. This shock removed a core source for food imports. Diplomatic relations were changed in a significant manner while Nigeria managed pressure from Western partners. The state kept up limited ties with both parties in the war and worked as a regional leader. This leadership took place within African multilateral platforms. Realist Theory provides the most clear approach for looking at both outcomes. It illustrates that the conduct of Nigeria across food security and diplomacy was driven by a calculation of national interest. This was used instead than following a path of moral consistency.

5.3 Recommendations

The Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security should set up a National Strategic Grain Reserve: This task should be done in a manner of joint planning with the National Emergency Management Agency as well as the Central Bank of Nigeria. The reserve must have a buffer for wheat consumption of the nation for at least 90 days. Money for this must come through a dedicated agricultural strength allocation of not less than 5 percent of the yearly federal budget. The National Food Security Council should look at this reserve every two years. This check will ensure the plan is enough against scenarios where imports break. These scenarios match the scale of the outcomes from the conflict between Russia and Ukraine.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs should create a official Diplomatic Diversification Approach: This work should happen under the guidance of the National Security Council. This approach maps the portfolio of the strategic partnerships of Nigeria across Western, non-Western and multilateral platforms. It must include rules



for a review of a binding nature every two years. The approach should include protocols for independence in negotiating that are documented. These protocols prevent a move to join any single partner bloc in an automatic manner. Nigeria must keep access to the supply of security and investment finance. The state in addition needs development assistance from a variety of sources.

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