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# THINKERS JOURNAL

**A PUBLICATION OF THE FACULTY OF ARTS  
GODFREY OKOYE UNIVERSITY, ENUGU.**

VOL. 1. NO. 1, July. 2019.

ISSN: Maiden Issue

Thinkers Journal

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Printed by:

**ARISE AND SHINE PRINTING PRESS**

08067561837, 08066671534

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## **COUNTER – INSURGENCY/TERRORISM AS A DESIGNATE MILITARY OPERATION: IDEA VERSUS PROFESSIONALISM**

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### **Abstract**

*Overtime, human nature have continued to create and pose complex challenges to the security of individuals, groups, states, nations and regions. National policies and global actions have continued to hatch disillusionment and frustration, which breed conventional dissent and ultimate formation and branding in suicidal inclinations. In the 21<sup>st</sup> century, insurgency has meandered beyond national boundaries to employ the lethal ally of terror, just as the ever increasing weight of global insecurity have forced states to evolve from mere conventional tactics in warfare to classical sophistication and precise annihilation of proven targets. Insurgents are propelled by their deep beliefs and veritable baptism (indoctrination) which convincingly prepare and project them to launch terror infernos, while professional soldiers are motivated by civic mission to contain them. The aim of this study is to scrutinize and evaluate the challenges of professional compliance to order, value and rules of engagement when faced with unfettered terror organizations. Considering the fast changing global political and operational landscapes, stateless actors and international terror organizations have seriously debased the concept of strategic deterrence. National armies are faced with the conflict of ideas, and the vagaries of law, morality and defeat, which appear to favour the terrorists. To turn the tide, professional military high command must tactfully, though with discipline weaken the groups vulnerable areas. This brings into purview, the personality, psyche and experience of*



*military leaders vis a vis military ethos in relation to fostering and facilitating military efficiency. Again, how does the issue of ruses of war and international laws of engagement affect military operations. Deeply ambiguous as these terrorists try to be, avoiding defeat as a technical strategy, theirs is a long drawn war, ever ready to pay the ultimate price to obtain divine bliss. Methodically, the study was dimensionally eclectic, sequel to the abundance of primary and secondary information. Against all odds, the military must be professionally ready to exhibit order, gallantry, perseverance, bonding to give hope to Liberal democracy*

**Key Words:** Indoctrination, Professionalism, International Ruses of war, Leadership.

## INTRODUCTION

Nations, states, regions, groups and individuals have made insurgency and terrorism not only a global brand, but a necessary corollary of human existence, through diverse actions and inactions. Government policies have continued to globally breed and hatch disillusionment, frustration and conventional dissent amongst a large global populace. Organized oppositional resurgence and effective tenacity found unity, determination, blind faith, formation cohesion and feet in indoctrination, whereby entrenched regimes could be overthrown, and dominant world powers put on the defensive. Suicidal instincts for voicing dissent has proved to be a rewarding tactics that has helped Islamic fundamentalists and extremists not only to clandestinely stand tall and enjoy global recognition, but to equally challenge and defeat well equipped professional armies effectively. Security analysts, military formation researchers and strategists have remained challenged and perplexed at this development. Here lies the need to succinctly examine the inherent problems existing in the military high command, including the important lifeline which has continued to empower and sustain these terrorist organizations. Where to for, indoctrination, and abject disregard of values held sacrosanct by liberal democracies – the sanctity of life (civilian and soldier).

Undoubtedly, the many complexities of the 21<sup>st</sup> century have on the one hand accentuated global interconnectedness, and on the other hand, its myriad of problems. Even as one fights for whatever purpose he is convinced on, the object of the struggle is to defeat the opponent. The

5<sup>th</sup> generational campaigns of today's terrorists, surprisingly bequeaths to them abundant glory even in defeat. When the mundane or the ethereal is evoked and remains a significant foundation of the objective of a struggle or a mission, normal human judgment stands beguiled. A deliberate strategy of today's terrorist groups is to achieve victory through avoiding defeat, escalate the cost and course of the conflict, hence institutionalizing themselves and psychologically weakening their adversaries. However, any modern army with designate target of defeating, containing and neutralizing such insurgent terrorist organizations within its national boundaries, must be driven by professional ethics, law, morality, and completely avoid conflict of ideas.

Again, military successes must stem from the efficiency and effectiveness of its high command (leadership), logistics, communication and intelligence, finance, health and motivation. Since terrorists are simply fighting wars of attrition by appearing to be strategically operating from many sides simultaneously, to distract them from those many sides simultaneously should be the new asymmetry of the military.

## **DEFINITION**

### **International Terrorism**

Terrorism in whichever perspective it is referred has become a persistent and nasty reality in global politics. To some extent, its definition appears as elusive as its possible solution. However, the United States Information Services, defines International Terrorism as any 'politically motivated violence perpetrated against non combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents.'<sup>1</sup>One shortfall of this traditional definition is its focus on groups, and its exclusion of individual (lone wolf) terrorist activity – 'philosophically but not organizationally aligned with any group which has recently risen in frequency and visibility'<sup>2</sup>. Be that as it may, Rourke and Boyer tabulated in four steps, a bold attempt at defining international terrorism as:

*A form of political violence that is carried out by individuals, by non-governmental organizations or by relatively small groups of covert government agents that specifically targets civilians and that uses clandestine*

*attack methods such as car bombs and hijacked airliners.<sup>3</sup>*

According to this definition, terrorism relies exclusively on the power to hurt some people, in order to create fear in others; it targets civilians, facilities or systems on which civilians rely. Rourke and Boyer goes further to explain that;

*The objective of terrorism is not the people they kill or physical material they destroy ... instead (their target) is the emotions of those who see or read about that act of violence and become afraid.<sup>4</sup>*

In this seemingly saga of arriving at a conceptualized definition of what could pass in definition as international terrorism, one should equally not lose sight of the fact that what could be termed as terrorism to some, could appear to others as legitimate. In practicing international terrorism, intent is important and in it lies ideology, personal conviction and or selfish aims in dire need of intimidation, injury or killing civilians with the aim of coercing either government, international feeling, and understanding or support. As a prolifically-acceptable tactic, it is poignant to note that it could be intra-national, state or transnational. Terrorism by non state actors, is primarily the weapon of the politically weak or frustrated-those who are (or believe themselves to be) unable to exert their grievances through conventional, political or military means. As an asymmetric form of conflict, it confers coercive power with many advantages over conventional military force, at a fraction of the cost. Sequel to its secretive nature, size and organizational capability, it often offers opponents no clear chances of defence or deterrence.

In the midst of the existing confusion about a generally accepted definition of international terrorism, the United Nations Organization concluded international terrorism to be:

*An anxiety – inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi) clandestine individual, group or state actors for idiosyncratic, criminal or political reasons, whereby –in contrast to assassinations – the direct targets of violence are not the main targets.<sup>5</sup>*

Regardless of from whatever parlance International Terrorism is viewed, whether as a crime or ‘holy duty’ or as inexcusable

abomination, it is quite realistic to conclude that it is not far from the use of terror by state and non –state political structures as a means to attain their political objectives, through peoples’ intimidation, psychological and social destabilization; the elimination of resistance from power, organizations, and the creation of appropriate conditions for the manipulation of the country’s policies, and the behavior of the people. Consequently, one could rightly posit that international terrorism, “... in complicity and symbiosis with the media, modifies and manages global process”,<sup>6</sup> propelled by specific ideologies to achieve cause and mission.

## INSURGENCY

Insurgency is as old as human history. Simply put, this means an attempt to take control of a country by force’.<sup>7</sup> The art of revolt has transcended from primitive societies to the 21<sup>st</sup> century world, from mere hamlets to more advanced nation –states. The enigmatic transition and sophisticated operational attributes acquired over time has not only puzzled political analysts, but has succeeded in keeping sovereign authorities anxious, nervous and agitated. It must be observed that the dimensional capabilities of any insurgency depends on a number of factors: its propelling ideal or goal, structural organization, the nature and reaction of its operational terrain (geo-politics), relative stability in financial support and dynamic strategies over vision and mission. The very nature of insurgency tends to cause its practitioners to become extremely security conscious, if not out rightly paranoid.<sup>8</sup> History has often identified guerilla tactics as a veritable tool of insurgency, however, mobility is only part of the equation. In other words, according to Lawrence, insurgents must have:

*... a safe haven, a sure retreat into an element which the (enemy cannot) enter. An unassailable base guarded bit merely from attack, but from the fear of it. It must have a disciplined army of occupation too small to fulfill the doctrine of acreage; a friendly population, not actively friendly, but sympathetic to the point of not betraying rebel movements to the enemy; must possess the qualities of speed and endurance, ubiquity and independence of arteries of supply.<sup>9</sup>*

Without degenerating deeper into the operational manipulations of insurgency as an irregular warfare, it must be noted that the conceptual

and geographical importance of sanctuaries to the eventual sustenance of insurgency cannot be questioned. Granted mobility, security (in the form of denying targets to the enemy), time and doctrine (the idea to convert every subject to friendliness), victory, according to Lawrence 'will rest with the insurgents, for the algebraical factors are in the end decisive, and against them, perfections of means and spirit struggle quite in vain'.<sup>10</sup> At this juncture, one must point out the all important nexus logistically existing between geopolitical landscape, economy, information and military technological advancements as integral condiments that sustain insurgency.

### **THE MILITARY**

This refers to the armed forces of any sovereign country, though specifically the Army, the Air force and Naval personnel. They are saddled with the onerous responsibility of defending the nation from internal and external aggression.<sup>11</sup> The military revolve and subsists on definite formation, strict compliance to order and roles, devoid of discretionary ambiguities. The ability to be firm, extend and enforce conformity and obedience from the leadership down the ranks has patented the military with specific cardinal ethos, which facilitates efficiency. In conformity with professional etiquette, officers and men of the military officially vow be ready to pay the 'ultimate price' with their lives in the defence of their country. Tasks to the military emanate either as constitutional fallouts or as designate operations requiring immediate and tactful attention. Moreover, it must be stated that just as the maintenance of the independence and sovereignty of any nation rests on the military, the subsistence of widespread insecurity, terror infernos and insurgency within such an enclave equally begs for their extraordinary rendition. Perhaps, one may not overlook the fact that for any military force to be certified fit and viable, it must be in tune with updated formation, logistics, equipment, information and tact. Just as size may not determine strength, excessive armoury may end up being deceptive and a disadvantage.

Soldiers form the several units of the military. The same way leadership is hierarchical, order and conformity follows suit. From recruitment to training (formation) and commissioning, the control of units in any military organization is determined by the rank, whether in the Army, the Air force or the Navy. Designate orders and command flow from the President (Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces), while

existing ethics/norms remain definite to ensure thoroughness. The military are settled in barracks, which relatively secludes them from the civilian populace. However, during operations and warfare, they could be deployed and quartered in makeshift areas, as the case maybe.

## REFLECTIONS

### A. Insurgency/Terrorism

But one may have to stop and ask these questions: what makes international terrorism thick? What actually propels it and bequeaths more apostles to it across the globe? Why has it dared to withstand powerful armies? Answers to these and more are needed to aid and strengthen any anti-insurgency/terror operations, most especially by the military.

Terrorism rides on the back of insurgency, hence insurgency is a habitat, which cooks and serves hot menu as its end products. However, insurgency may not thrive without its heart (power house) in the same way a human being may not thrive when heart failure occurs. Insurgency redirect's the brain to strengthen the heart, hence completely aids rearranging thought pattern. When such is accomplished through the process of indoctrination, victims graduate as terrorists. This pathophysiology emboldens them to carryout designated tasks even at ultimate costs. In tandem with the realities of this development, this study is of the view that a deeper understanding of indoctrination would create an important preamble towards de-clouding insurgency and terrorism.

In the affairs of man, religion has passed through acceptance to devaluement and rejection. Just as mobility has to emerge, primordialism deemed it necessary to retire religion. Religious identity in its dogmatism, is not only appealing and compelling for mobilization, but manipulative, hence could easily aid indoctrination, more so in today's global political equation. Religion diminishes and breaks ethno-cultural, language, class and colour boundaries, offering a veritable cushioned alternative retreat to troubled minds, thereby providing a parlance for group identification. Indoctrination relies on religious 'fault-finding' tool to provide the *rai-son d 'etre* for myopic reasoning, utter condemnation and incipient abhorrence.

Either by fate or plan, globally, out of all the world's religions, **militant Islam** has continued to occupy the centre stage of violence and

insurgency. The toll on material and human resources on daily basis is huge. Nature abhors vacuum; in so far as those who are meant to maintain law and order and provide people's basic needs in the society are found wanting in their duties, criminality and insurgency will always cease the opportunity to put nations at risk. The ensuring lawlessness breeds and legitimizes fundamentalism, an order in anarchy, strewn and inviolably edified through indoctrination.

A clearer understanding of indoctrination must stem from getting the correct meaning of doctrine. Doctrine relate to issues of life, death, purpose of life and ideas about rights and wrong,<sup>12</sup> hence the ethereal. Any attempt or process by which such thought or designated ideals are infused into human thoughts and action, through normative dogma or fanatical ecstasy, is simply indoctrination. Smooth and penetrating language could be applied through carefully selected sounds, language and method, all aimed at creating an imagery of doctrinal euphoria. The continuous infusion of such 'rolling' ideals and beliefs, over some time be-clouds normalcy in thought-sequence, hence evoking understanding, involvement and acquiescence. This level of adherence graduates one to an object which could be 'weaponised' with warheads (designated targets and assignments) hence human ballistic missiles. The most important target during course of indoctrination is the blatant ignoramus of the followers or masses, the 'reeds of the desert', the *Almajiri* and *talakawa*.

Amongst the rest, religious indoctrination is the strongest, easily exploited, and most dangerous. Detailed information, stories, requirements and specifications abound in the Holy books which spur theological justifications and motivations in support of apocalyptic violence. When indoctrination goes through the stages of recruitment, proselytization, training, education, motivation, mentors apply manuals and sermons. In so doing, the dejected and malleable are attracted, exposed and packaged as groups or group. Such a group is essentially impossible to deter, since their belief lies in the higher power guiding and guarding them, or else receive a blissful reward at death.

Incidental negative turning points in the micro and macro lives of individuals could very well serve as the realistic referral imagery by which mentors take advantage of, to brainwash gullible adherents into robots. Though sequenced, indoctrination is progressive, and may

demand financial remunerations. The failures to national governments, lawlessness of weak states creates vacuum for conformity and compromise on national disorder, corruption and impunity. Religious zealots, fundamentalists and extremists exploit this gap to manipulate victim's thought and action sequence. It should be noted that, just as adherents could be strictly attuned to orderly followership, they could equally be formatted to be violent, hence fuelling their **violence quotient**. Taking laws into their own hands could pass as spiritual legitimacy, while killing other people would be justified. On the other hand, indoctrination could serve as a dangerous outlet to bottled-up grievances and frustrations, leading to conflict and extremism. Life-course perspectives, personal or individual failures are likely to find a strong portal to blame.

Perhaps, resurgent Islam wouldn't have been provided more fuel in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, if American military adventurism and Proxy wars wasn't exposed in Libya, Iraq, Afghanistan, Yemen and Syria. What of the open support granted to Israel against *Hamas* militants in the re-occurring Gaza – Israeli face off. Countries like Iran appear to be experts in tactically switching from intimidation to flowery conciliation. Such intrigues and diplomatic shrewdness have always removed the steam from imminent American desired solvent, which is often served hot. Moreover, in Yazbeck's view, Islamists have made effective use of established religious writings where Christians and Jews were treated as 'the West' and 'Westernization as an insidious scheme to undermine Islam'<sup>13</sup>.

What of the complexity to an already conspiratory global view that 'nothing of substance happens unless supported by Washington, London and the Oil Cartels, or backed by powerful lobbies and king makers in the West'.<sup>14</sup> Ayotallah Khomeini often admonished his followers that 'blame goes to those who do nothing to uproot injustice by opposing the oppressor (*mostakbar*). He went on to caution Muslims that Economics is for donkeys (idiots),<sup>15</sup> and 'revolution was not about the price of water melons'.<sup>16</sup> The quantum of global destruction emanating from the rendition of Apocalyptic and Dominion theologies, (waahabi and saalafi) including unguided eschatology are growing by the day. When people are apt to act melancholically, driven by the near-future belief in the cataclysmic confrontation between the forces of



good and evil, and reminded of the heavenly bliss that await martyrdom, death is glorified.

While fulfilling a so called divine prophetic plan, adherents are made to believe that violence is morally acceptable hence religion helps create and provide the delicate parlance between ‘we’ and ‘them’. Cynicists would often see some religious doctrines as atavistic and repressive, more so where there is an admixture of tradition and religion. In Christianity, Pentecostalism though fuming is still contained within national borders, while fundamentalism in Islam is running amok nationally and trans-nationally. Terrorism and insurgency as of today, operates on the crucible of indoctrination, and unfortunately it is a sad sequel that the war on terrorism is, of all wars, the one most dependant on wining the heart and minds of people. Since militant Islam is more or les the culprit in the present day global insurgency and low intensity conflicts within sovereign entities, posing any solution to this trend must start from understanding the basic component of the Islamic religion *vis a vis* the adherents. Understanding the *Sharia* and its relationship with the *Ummah*, would expose clearly the structure and the ideas behind the prosecution of the 5<sup>th</sup> Generation Wars (5GW) of the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

In the history of humanity, religion has continued to play a vital and virile role. It has either positively or negatively transformed and influenced societies, national and global decisions. It may not out-rightly be identified within the genetical composition of Arabs *per se* to be easier raw materials for indoctrination. Howbeit that the notion that ‘Muslims of every nation, regardless of status or exposure are easy preys to indoctrination’,<sup>17</sup> is proved to be true? A little insight into certain specifications in both the Hadith and Koran could help to evaluate this view. The ideology of totalitarian global Islamisation is made and deemed supreme through individual or state *Sharia* financing, violent and financial jihads (*Al jihad bi-al-mal*). Such is the individual obligatory demand of Islam until the lands are purified from the pollution of unbelievers and infidels.<sup>18</sup>

In today’s world, one thing is clear; communism has failed, followed by the ambiguously beneficial capitalist phenomenon of globalization. ‘The **fault line** according to Barnett is rapidly shifting from the gap between the rich and poor to the ‘non-integrating gap’ widening

between those who accept or reject modernity'.<sup>19</sup> While elucidating further, Robb opined that Chronic conflicts here and there, repressive and unfocused leadership are routinely patenting social disharmony, poverty and disease thereby incubating the next generation of insurgents and terrorists.<sup>20</sup>

Amongst many Muslims in the Muslim world, it is a popular belief that 'some Muslim leaders, most especially certain regimes in the Middle East have abandoned real Islam, hence it is time to adopt the Islamic solution (*Hal al-Islam*)'.<sup>21</sup> The present scenario developing in the Middle East lays credence to the power of indoctrination in feeding insurgency and terrorism. In the words of Obama, the United States underestimated the power of the Islamic group **ISIS** which exploited the power vacuum in Iraq to emerge and control large areas in Syria and Iraq.<sup>22</sup> Consequently, extremist ideologies spread through social media and schools have drawn many foreigners the world over as volunteers fighting for the Islamic State. One must remark at this juncture that fighting radical **ISIS** is not the major problem, rather the bottom line is the indoctrinating effect of these fighters back home in their different countries, after the war. **ISIS** may have been lost the physical war, but not yet the philosophical and subtle arc, which is more dangerous.

Fully convinced that justice should be restored through jihad or martyrdom, achieving such through warfare or suicide bombing could only appear an easier opportunity to step into the 'promised grandeur of paradise', hence the fundamentalist concept of jihad differs from regular warfare. Resurgent Islam encourages fighting rather than compromising. Consequently, the emergent jihad could erode national and ethnic boundaries, steered by the theory of 'just war'. That is why the West Africa Sub region (Nigeria, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Ivory Coast, Burkina Faso, and Ghana) are sitting currently on a ring of fire, with the Fulani menace and atrocities.

At this juncture, it is poignant to note that the Quran didn't mince words when it demanded of good Muslims to strive for Allah's cause with their wealth and lives, and more importantly, self-sacrificing. Abundance of human raw materials for suicide bombing are easily harnessed from the majority of ignorant lower echelon of every society. Younger boys, girls, physically-challenged and widows of slain fighters are religiously instructed and motivated to 'honorably' enter the heavenly bliss as one of *Allahs* 'generals', rather than die a pauper. In

most cases, families of such suicide bombers receive accolades and recognition from the *Ummah*, on successful accomplishment of such task. However, one may have to caution that total submission may not be achieved in all followers at any given time. Aligning to this view, Qaqa, a suspected member of the dreaded *Boko Haram* terrorists in Nigeria, recently arrested by security agents, submitted that:

*Suicide bombers were chosen among sect members by their leader, and once a person was chosen, he had no option but to carry out the assignment. Once handpicked, it is death either way; if you refuse, you would be killed on the orders of the leadership. So many prefer the suicide bomber option far away from their wives and children.*<sup>23</sup>

Prisons, whether in the West, Middle East or Africa, have continued to act as viable incubators for radical Islam and terrorist ideology.<sup>24</sup> Fully convinced that Western Christianity has failed them in life, such get easily converted to Islam, which they embrace easily, being a protest religion. Freed from incarceration, such people are often exposed to further information and recruitment through the internet and incipient indoctrination under extremists and zealots, who graduate them with the *Al-Barka* (a blessing, source of protection against enemies and demons, ensuring success, political, physical and spiritual longevity and fulfillment). The ‘potency’ of such blessing is not in doubt to such people, after all, in Nigeria, it is a strange truism that even many highly placed government officials, including security personnel tend to rely more on the esoteric incantations and charms of sorcerers, man of God, marabouts and clerics instead of scientific-backed conventional security system.

Indoctrinated adherents/armed groups fight in utter defence of their belief, while ‘patriotic’ domestic security professionals defend with some reservations and limitations. It is quite amazing the extent to which indoctrination could take people. Terrorists never give up, until their goals are achieved, they continue to be inspired by their martyrs. Of particular mention is the response which the Underwear bomber, Umar Farouk Abdul Mutallab who was to blow up a US bound Detroit airliner on Christmas day, 2009 made, on hearing his life jail conviction; ‘that Bin Laden and other Al Qaeda leaders who have been killed are alive and shall be victorious by God’s grace, and promised

that terrorists attacks would continue until Jews are driven out of Paletine.<sup>25</sup> One spectacular observation is the ‘godhead’ position which sect or group leaders occupy in the lives of adherents, consequently, their wishes and denunciations are strictly kept to devoid of any iota of individual reasoning, feelings and contributions, after all, they are ‘divinely gifted and chosen’.

### **B. Military Leadership**

The military is a formal, disciplined and professional organization with set standards values and defined roles for members. The provision of national security (internal and external) remains their onerous responsibility. The strength of any nation’s military, helps to streamline that sovereignty’s pedigree as an actor in local and international politics.

However, the strength and effectiveness of any military completely depend on its leadership. Issues of leadership is therefore very germane in underscoring stability as a group and successful campaigns in designate operations. Leadership theorists have moved from mere traits, situational interaction, intelligence, functional behavior, power, vision, values and charisma into **transactional** and **transformational** leadership attributes. Transactional leadership style deals with exchange between followers and leaders which would ensure that both followers and leader’s expectations are fulfilled. As long as the leader’s and follower’s expectations are met, rewards are given, hence rules, procedures and standards remain the essentials.<sup>26</sup> On the other hand, Bass and Piggio went further to explain that transformational leaders continuously invest on the development of themselves and others, through motivation, inspiration and assisted encouragements to achieve set goals. From the foregoing neither transactional nor transformational leadership attributes may appear viable, considering the complex and complicated challenges which the military are exposed to in today’s global arena.

One may have to step back into 1999, when a major attempt was made at crystallizing the many identified leadership dimensions into five major personality themes, hence – Extraversion, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Neuroticism and Openness to experience. As a personality trait, extraversion relates to how open a military officer should be on matters regarding military details, while agreeableness

determines his social relationship including subordinate compromises with his peers. Undoubtedly, conscientiousness is important in any project in that this trait and ability would enable the leader to be focused, grow, 'but ...still committed to cultural and group pursuits'.<sup>28</sup> Neuroticism from all indications appears to be the most worrisome and problematic trait, if proper evaluation is to be made on trending human pathology and psyche. Convincing evidence and information have shown and proved how serious most successful national armies take and tackle this issue of neuroticism.

The personality of a military leader includes his physical and mental status, though one must admit that the latter drives the former. The very essence includes his impulsive and temperamental level, vision and sustenance of pressure in extreme conditions. Understanding the personality of the leader is pivotal to successful military execution of tasks, stability and growth. On the other hand, split personality encourages neuroticism, hence the leader may lack – definition, charisma, circumstantial flexibility and command power, in carrying out operations since he may find it difficult differentiating realism from ideals. Infact, leadership anatomy simply determines group or unit dynamics in the military. When neurotic challenges appear to be (out of control), escape mechanisms redirect such personalities to drugs and external inducements. Conflict of ideas would never help professionalism as embodied in the military. Openness to experience allows and encourages the leader to be dynamic.

### **C. Counter-Insurgency/Terrorism: Constraints**

The most important part of any military operation is to establish and maintain tact, communication, reinforcement, control and follow up details. However, this study must acknowledge the emanent complexities and unfolding distortions differentiating military assignments in conventional war fare *vis a vis* blatant insurgency and terrorism. A global glance at this scenario would showcase a geo-strategic overview of the depredations of international terrorism from Afghanistan to the Middle East, North Africa to East, Western and Southern Africa. The mixture of hybrid maneuvers and tactics, the unreserved deployment and application of heavy weapons, artilleries and lethal weapons, absolute lack of regimentation and identification symbols, including their ability to meander into local civilian populations, have to a larger exterior contributed to their invincibility.

Research has shown that international terrorists have a vision and mission, and theirs is to exploit all possible channels of communication and supply in order to remain relevant.

Once **fear** is removed from their arsenal, their value is downgraded, hence the choice of targets, the timing of attacks, and the media leverage they attract in return. Fear is subjective, hence it decapitates the mind. The first constraint in accomplishing successful military campaigns against die hard terrorists is fear.

Prosecutors of the 5<sup>th</sup> generation wars rely on latest information gadgets, including signal patterns and icons in use over the ages to challenge the C3I model of military Comms<sup>29</sup>. Usually, delineation of terrorist havens and positions may appear difficult for the military to accomplish, before launching an attack, in order to avoid or reduce civilian casualties; such proposed offensives may be differed or even staved off, hence aiding the terrorists. Quite unlike guerilla tactics, terrorists of the 21<sup>st</sup> century cultivate their sanctuaries completely within local populations, though sustaining highly volatile, tactile and robust units (sedentary units); hence constraining overt military operations.

This brings into preview the all important international humanitarian law on war and armed conflicts: *jus in bello* (a body of laws specifically designed to constrain the waging of war) is actually determined by *jus ad bellum* (legal assessment of recourse to war, and hence limits to the act of war).<sup>30</sup> The overriding principles embodied in these laws are those of **military necessity** and **humanity**. Since 1949 Geneva conventions on armed conflicts, compiled with the rising reactions concerning what rules of armed conflict that should govern states located in their own territories so that their conflict is humanely prosecuted, either internationally or internally in the proper sense. In consonance with this great demand, the international committee of the Red Cross through the auspices of the United Nations in 2005 published a comprehensive study on 'Customary international Humanitarian law'. At this juncture, it is poignant to note that heavy emphasis was placed on the phenomenon of asymmetrical warfare, alleged ideological or religious character of the war, depiction of the adversary as a barbarian, hostilities carried out as a technical operation from long distance (bomber operating from high altitudes, long-range missile), or involving

in a guerilla-type war, tactics that expose the civilian population to enhanced risk<sup>31</sup>. Today, the authorities of the International Human Rights group are legally on the prowl, streamlining sovereignties to legitimately prosecute and contain insurgency and terrorism determined to erode them. Abiding by the ruses of war, automatically introduces the nagging issue of terms or rules of engagement. For one thing, it would be a sheer miracle, if all members of a nation's military were simply law abiding, having been sufficiently updated through orientation and discipline to abide. Yet another could be sheer ignorance of the rules and violations of the humanitarian law. On the part of the military, both officers and men have a way of being docked in the International Court of Justice on a charge of 'crimes against humanity'. This is a serious constraint as long as the adversary applies sustained indiscriminate attacks on the state.

One may not overlook the issue of state media, whose activities may make or mar a designated military campaign. Events prior to, during, and after such operations as seen and reported through the binoculars of the media, encourage, build, deter or destroy effective units in the army. Information Bureau in the military remain on a slippery pedestal of news blackout, vetting and blatant exposure. Today, international terror groups gainfully stride and thrive on the media, who are lawfully permitted to play and broadcast their messages of fear to the civilian population on the one hand, and that of re-energizing and re-invigorating the sect members on the other hand. It is simply one message, but two achievements or targets, and it remains a constraint to successful military operations.

This study could list other constraints as poverty of motivation, paucity of adequate military intelligence, equipments and logistics, including the all important factor of queried leadership. Attempts of several developed foreign nations at obtaining certain units of highly efficient military force, which could be relied on for delicate, timely and dangerous missions, led to the emergence of elite or Delta forces. In their motivation, which encompasses material, psychological and physical endowments, they are always ready to defend the national cause ultimately, through their **sting operations**. Again, designate operations headed by leaders of military units remain a far cry. In battling the *Boko Haram* elements in Nigeria's North-East for many years now, the Nigerian army has manifested raw strength with great

lack of ideas and strategic engagement, creating comfortable spaces for conflict entrepreneurs to continue benefitting.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

Through insurgency and terrorism, the weak battles the strong, hence creating crisis and destruction to existing standards of development, and threatening the survival of liberal democracies. Though dwelling on proper military assignment or operation, this study is apt to inform and create an insight to both the military as a highly professional group and the civil populace as the main targets of terror infernos.

Crisis management and damage control plan as of military necessity should not completely be carried out devoid of national attention and interest, at least in consonance with the dictates of ideal democracy. From all intents and purposes, insurgency and terrorism as being depicted by *ISIL* in the Middle East, *Al Shabab* in Somalia and *Boko Haram* in Nigeria, to mention but a few, could be defeated and contained overtime, if both the military and the civilian population remain focused on their separate, but intertwined tasks. Designate military operations, as ongoing in the desserts of Syria and Iraq, including the North Eastern states of Nigeria, across Niger, Chad and Cameroon borders, elicit symbiotic contributions and response from both the army, the air force and the civilians. Since terrorists strike at values held sacrosanct by democracies – Sanctity of life (civilian and soldiers), accountability, the importance of government truth among others; defeating and containing terrorism must start with striking on factors favouring such armed groups – accountability, protection of leaders, patron support, weapons/food supplies source, including their sanctuaries. These are their vulnerable targets.

The infantry, encompassing covert and overt forces, light and heavily armored units, should lead anti-terror operations, squarely guided by intelligence scientifically gathered, but in most cases locally confirmed. Confirming or garnering adequate information may degenerate into sifting unobtrusive intelligence. Insurgents and terrorists do not live in the atmosphere. The same way they need and fish on the civilian population for information; the army should. Though equitable military – civilian relationship is encouraged, the military should be cautious of the civilian population, amongst whom are Internally Displaced People (IDP). They could be ‘time bombs waiting to explode’. A determined



military asymmetry could liaise with raw military intelligence and send specific, disguised pseudosurgical personnel's after the leadership high command for information and possible extermination of terror leaders and their charismatic assistants. Such operations could not only be deadly, but could take time to culture membership, acceptance, planning and execution. Drone technology, loaded with guided bombs though costly, could provide an easier option. Be that as it may, it should be noted that the unpredictability and unclear art of human intelligence would always outsmart the world's best military intelligence computers and spy Comms. In the midst of operations, sustained shooting and bombardment from specific positions over a long period of time should be necessarily avoided.

On the other hand, direct military operations on the field should to the barest minimum aim at avoiding enormous collateral damage on civilian populations, hence guided missiles and Drone attacks should come as a last resort, when the advantage out-weighs the anticipated losses. Terrorists capitalize on any mistake which though targeted on them, ends up injuring the public. Public sentiments and emotions could reinvigorate indoctrinated and undecided minds as to the truism in their cause. Nigeria's 'Drop zone' has been the *Sambisa* forest, hence heavy artillery could be diligently put to use there, while motorized compact units could operate simultaneously from many sides. Captured and confirmed terrorists may or may not be directly useful, since decoding the organizational arrangements of insurgent sects may prove confusing. Their 'cells' and networking structure appear complex, hence intriguing even to certain categories of members. Their interlocking groups include – drug traffickers, religious zealots, food vendors, bank personnel, IT specialists, kidnapping gangs, toll and ransom collectors.

Technology alone cannot fight the 21<sup>st</sup> century unconventional wars, since according to Melinger, it is a warfare of exhaustion, attrition, annihilation and paralysis.<sup>32</sup> Standardized format of military fiat in the execution of operations is definitely seriously challenged, in that terror groups circumvent drawn out conventional wars in the fields, but rather prefer the streets, markets, schools, churches, mosques, television view centres, football fields among others. Hence reliance on sophisticated intelligence systems, information architecture, unmanned systems and combined force, operations during campaigns against terror groups may

end as a 'high sounding nothing'. In tandem with this line of thought, Liotta suggested thus:

*The paradigm for many future battlegrounds however, will draw on ambiguity and chaos rather than on battlefield predominance in that the best guarantee of success to the terrorists in their chaos strategy comes when they have brought chaos to their enemy without battlefield engagement.*<sup>33</sup>

At first, the eco-terrorists of the Niger Delta exposed the Nigerian military to linkages of the 21<sup>st</sup> century warfare – creeks, waterways, thick and rainforest vegetation, where armed pundits could easily strike, meander and melt away. Here, strapped up and remote - controlled bombs were put to advantageous use by the insurgents. Up in the arid fields of the North East, this un-urban experience continues in the form of environmental stress. The introduction and application of Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) have added to the chaotic situation on the streets. Being an insurgent strategy, the people's faith in the government in striving to protect them continues to wane.

This study and its various tactical recommendations couldn't have come at any other better time than now when intelligence realities on the ground show that cumulatively, the Nigerian army, sequel to its state of professional anome, is steadily loosing its anti-terror operations against the ISIS backed *Boko Haram* element in Nigeria's North-East. A proactive militray force should only prefer offensive operations mostly, but could strategize more on noctural operations. On no account should it allow the enemy any knowledge of 'achilles heel', sustained by individual or parochial interest. Issues of conspiracy, ethno-religious polarizations and premodial stereotypes not only creates havoc to the operational modicum of military retinue, but breeds complacency, sabotage, sell out, collaboration and negligence. These cumulately lead to dessertion, un-bonding and abandonment of formations by soldiers. Repeated aerial operations and bombardness alone cannot win battles, hence, putting boots on the ground, steered by loccal vigilante and militia should not be over-looked. A professional army that lacks patriotism cannot go far since it's the hallmark of all military operations: moreover, that which relies solely on propaganda, should always be ready with falacious excuses at the end.

The global emergent identity of trans-national terrorism of the 21<sup>st</sup> century is sustained on a bloodline of indoctrination with extremist ideologies. Sufficit to say that as long as such trending crucible is growing in leaps and bounds by the day, any viable counter terror package must not do without collateral propaganda. Anti-insurgent operations remain mostly deleterious on economic and human capital, considering its long drawn out tangled and intricate contours. Withdrawal at any point devoid of proactive plans or backup is completely dangerous, regardless of ones power quotient or status. Practical example can be seen from the contemporary depredations of the US against the *Taliban* in Afghanistan.

It is only the convincing tenacity of patriotism driven by experienced professionalism and dynamism that could neutralize the destructive and distabilising firew power of terror infernos. Unfortunately, the few galant and dedicated infantry end up demotivated by the unbecoming reactions and responses of most of their compromised commanders and companions.

Soldiers detailed and designated against insurgent and terror groups should have perseverance and patience as one of their key motivating weapons. Quick action and quick results are highly deceptive. Creveld was prescient when he beckoned on troops engaged in such operations 'to better prepare for the unexpected and not the expected'. He went on to analyse this with due reference to the American failures in fast, precise and overwhelming conflict resolutions in Vietnam, Bosnia, Iraq, Somalia and Afghanistan.<sup>34</sup>

The 21<sup>st</sup> century soldier must be reconfigured with the present ambiguities, hence when faced with a designate operation, he would perform his civic duty with an ambit of common sense and professionalism, knowing fully well that his adversary, deeply indoctrinated as he is, fights with all his person, hence possessing the capability to self organize and reconstitute after being struck, within a short period. In the same way, beautiful paraphernalia alone cannot make a soldier, a sturdy fortress may not actually be as strong as it looks. The physiology of military leadership involved in such conflicts must be interrogated. Since the rose flower opens at the cost of its life, leaders of military units should manifest and encourage '**Bonding**' or '**Closework**' as a strategy. According to Larry K. Smith, this enables the

units deployed to be in and act cohesively against a common enemy, rather than long distance and precision-guided engagements.<sup>35</sup> One could view the advantages of closework in the cooperative efforts existing amongst the Iranians, Iraqi, Syrian and the Western special units, directed at containing *ISIL* advances in Iraq and Syria. Recently, the Nigerian leadership engaged in deliberate efforts at stabilizing and reawakening the West African Multinational Force, involving troops from Niger, Nigeria, Chad, Cameroun and even Mali. Closework brings strength and versatility, especially – across the borders, since the cankerworm is a transnational problem. The operation is not that of the military alone. Sovereign governments and the military must move from rhetorics to performance; from the creation of awareness, education and the correction of misinformation on the part of the citizenry to the reconfiguration of military training and professionalism. People oriented policies still have some grounds against fallacious doctrines. Timely sessions of negotiations and dialogue should be strategically initiated by the government, to allow the soldiers time and opportunity for assessment, re-planning, and even feeling the pulse of the terrorists.

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