

Chapter One

1.0 Introduction

1.1 Background of the Study

Terrorism is one of the elements of contemporary global studies. Its inclusion is perhaps Due to current global outlook and impact of terrorism on both national and world economy. The United States of America (U.S.A) state department on June 4, 2014 remarked; that terrorism has become a global and international issue not a domestic problem of any sovereign state. It explains while it should be given ultimate international and collection attention. The collective fight against terrorism and terrorist organisations became highlighted after September 9, 2011 terrorist attacks on world Trade organisations (WTO) and pentagon all in the united state of America. The attack in populate known as 911 attack on the U.S.A.

Back home (in Nigeria) terrorist activities have gained momentum since 2009 when the group known as Boko Haram first came to limelight. Since the advent of Boko Haram, Nigeria's foreign policy has been broadened in certain regards, especially as it concerns her immediate neighbours. Initially, in the words of labor, C.K (2003) Boko Haram was looked upon as a mere political dissenting voice and an Islamic insurgence. The delineation has since changed and seen as otherwise.

The Boko Haram group is not the only clan destined group in Nigeria. According to Tunde F.K (2010) Nigeria has before the emergent of Boko Haram other terror leashing groups. The likes of movement for the Actualization of sovereign state of Biafra (MASSOB) movement of the Emancipation of Ogoni people and other that operate without fixed locations. They operate occasional by application of threat or force, causing damages to lives and properties to great embarrassing of the government.

However, it is the coming into existence of Boko Haram and the large scale terror it perpetuates that attracted not just foreign attention but involvement of great power in blaring a solution to Boko Haram havocs. The immediate neighbours of Nigeria, *Republic of Cameroun, Benin, Chad, and Equatorial Guine;* how have a joint military operation/command to tackle the terrorist group known as Boko Haram. No doubt, the efforts of Nigeria to contain terrorism in general and Boko Haram in particular have given rise to a new perception of her concept of collective security in the African continent. She now according to Nigeria military authorizes looks beyond West Africa in her contemporary combat plans. This study therefore, wants to examine the consequences of terrorism in Nigeria African relations in terms of horizon especially as it affects her immediate

neighbours.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

Though Nigerian foreign policy thrust has since independence been Afro-centric, the emphasis has been on West Africa. Ogunchya, I.S and Amzat, J (2008) say Nigeria Afro-centrism is highlighted in West Africa as her activity Area. The likes of otumba, A (2013) contends that Nigeria hegemony is suitable in terms of west Africa because it has narrow vision of the entire Africa.

It is on the basis of these claims that we want to evaluate the new Nigeria-African policy in terms of scope since the emergent of Boko Haram.

1.3 Objective of the Study

The general objective of this study is to assess Nigeria's foreign policy towards her immediate neighbours in her fight against terrorism. However the specific objectives are:

1. To determine whether or not Nigeria perception of collective security in Africa has changed with emergent of Boko Haram.
2. To ascertain the role expected of Nigerian neighbours in her fight against terrorism.

1.4 Research Questions

In carry out the evaluation; the following research questions are posed.

1. What is Nigeria perception of collective security in Africa before and after the emergent of Boko Hara in the country?
2. What role is expected of Nigeria neighbours in curbing or curtailing Boko Haram activities of similar group?

1.5 Hypotheses

The following hypotheses were formulated to glued derailment from the focus of the study:

1. Nigeria perception of collective security before the advent of Boko Haram has not changed.
2. Nigeria neighbours have significant role in the fight against Boko Haram and terrorism in Nigeria.

1.6 Significance of the Study

This study when successfully completed will be significant in both theoretical and empirical dimensions in theoretical regard, it will obviously add to the already existing knowledge in the field of conflict management severity and specifically in management of insurgency and terrorism related crises it will examine and analyze issues relating to cause, fighting and prevention of insurgency and terrorism. It will expose impediments and

hindrances in managing terrorism especially international aspects. It will show the relevance of international terrorism to external relations and global politics.

In empirical dimension the study will benefit; the general public, experts in conflict management students, Administrators, political scientists and international relations perceptual. Sovereign states and policy makers will immensely benefit from the outcome of this study.

1.7 Scope and Limitations

1.7.1 Scope of the Study

This work is intended to evaluate effects of terrorism on Nigeria foreign policy as it concerns her immediate. It covers Nigeria perception of collective security in the light of Boko Haram insurgency and the expected role of Nigeria neighbours in her demoting challenges in handling BOKO Haram.

1.7.2 Limitations of the Study

The researcher had a number of constraints in the course of this study, first, a lot of confidentially were tied to Boko Haram issues. Officials who have direct responsibility to deal with Boko Haram claim not to have permission to speak on the present of war against Boko Haram. Second there are limited publications on the subject Mather of insurgence and

Boko Haram in particular and terrorism in general. Third, the clandestine nature of Boko Haram terrorism group poses a difficult study.

However, the reports of media and those of Nigerian Army spokes man coupled with those of national orientation agency reduced the problem of data gartering initially experienced by the researcher verified internet information was helpful too. The researcher was able to convince officials that suspected the researcher and the mission of the work that no harm was meant.

1.8 Definition of Terms

Terrorism: Refers to any form of premeditated act of violence carried out by clandestine organization or group with the aim of embarrassing the government of the day. Terrorism is perpetuated by people/group that have feeling of unjust treatment and terrorists do not discriminate their targets.

Foreign Policy: This is an aspect of public policy that is carefully articulated to score as a guide to government in her relations with the external world (sovereign state and non-state actor in international relations, of a country's policy of a sort.

Neighbours: This refers to people community countries or similar enclaves with human beings that share immediate environment. In this work, Nigeria's neighbours are sister state that share borders with her.

Nigeria: This is geo-political expression that came to be in 1914 through the amalgamation of what is to be known as Northern and Southern protectorates and the colony of Lagos. It is made up of currently thirty-six states and the federal capital territory. The former capital was Lagos and it currently has six(6) geo-political zones, namely, North East, North West, North central West, South West South East.

Chapter Two

2.0 Review of Related Literature

The researcher in this section of the study examines the views and opinions of experts which include; authors, professionals foreign and public policy analysts and others in the field of foreign policy and conflict management.

The review is carried out under the following headings and sub-headings:

- Concept of foreign policy.
- Concept of Terrorism.
- History of Nigeria's policy.

- Nigerian Afrocentric foreign policy.
- Origin of Boko Haram.
- Membership Boko Haram sect.
- National interest.
- Nigeria's National interest.

2.1 Concept of Foreign Policy

The evolution of Nigeria's foreign cannot be understood without first knowing what is foreign policy, however like many concepts in international relations, the term has been given a plethora of definitions. This is as a result of the differing theoretical frameworks from which the subject is approached. According to Frankel (1967) foreign policy consists of decisions and actions which involve to some appreciable extent, relations between one state and others" Leggs and Morrson (1971) see the term as "as set of explicit objectives with regards to the world beyond the borders of a given social unit and a set of strategies and tactics designed to achieve those objectives. It implies the perception of a need to influence the behaviour of other states or international organisations. The aim is to ensure that such states or organizations maintain a particular pattern of behaviour if such behaviour helps the influencing state in achieving her

national objectives or to alter such behaviour by initiating a new set of policies. Shittau, K. (2010), defines foreign policy as a strategy or planned course of actions developed by the decision makers of a country aimed at manipulating the international community in order to achieve certain national interests. According to Obuoforibo; "In general terms, Foreign Policy is viewed as a blueprint for a pursuit of a cause of action of a country towards other countries. It explains the relations between one country and other countries or actors in international system". In other words, Foreign Policy is a detailed plan of how a country intends to engage or engages other countries or actors within the international community (Obuoforibo, 2012:33). Oshuntokun (1987), sees the concept as the strategy of defending a nation's national interest through diplomacy. When diplomacy fails the same interest may be defended through war and the force of arms. In sum, we want to define foreign policy as the techniques and strategies states adopt in achieving, promoting, projecting and defending their national interests within the international community.

From the above views of these scholars in foreign policy we want to tease out the following points about foreign policy of any nation first foreign policy is a tool with which a state obtains, promotes and defends her national interests. Secondly, it is aimed at influencing or manipulating

(if you like) the behaviour of other actors within the international community to behave in a particular way that will help the influencing states achieve her national objectives. Thirdly, foreign policy may be proactive and as well reactive. That is, it can be a product of rigorous planning aimed at achieving a particular objective(s) or can be a reaction to the policy of other countries or what is happening within the international environment. Fourthly, flowing from the above, the foreign policy of a state need not be static but dynamic. That is, it should change with changes in the environment. For instance if the circumstances that gave rise to a particular policy no longer exist, then that policy has to change. To give an example, at independence one of Nigeria's foreign policies was decolonization in Africa and dismantling of Apartheid. So now that these issues are no more, the policy has to change to give way for other current issues. Again before September, 11, 2001 and 2009 terrorism was not a big issue in the world and Nigeria respectively. But now that it is big issue, one would expect Nigerian foreign policy to change to reflect this reality. Finally as Anyaele in Shittau, K. (2010) put it, foreign policy is a reflection of domestic policy, it is the promotion of national interest at the international level. This shall form the focus of the next section.

2.2 Concept of Terrorism

The term terrorism is no difficult to define, in part because the term has evolved and in part because it is associated with an activity as designed to be subjective (Obi, 1999). The problem of definition is compounded by the fact that terrorism has become a fad word used promiscuously and often applied to variety of acts of violence that are not strictly terrorism. The term is generally pejorative. Some governments label as terrorism all violent acts committed by their political opponents e.g. Gaddafi in the early wake of rebel insurgent, in Libya when he said he was clamping down on terrorists affiliated to the Al-Qaida, while antigovernment extremists frequently claim to be the victims of government terror. This difficulty has led to the dictum that "one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter". Generally speaking, the targets of terrorists are not the victims who are killed or injured in the attack, but rather, the government. Although scholars can disagree over whether particular actions constitute terrorism, there are certain aspects of the concept that are fundamental. Firstly, terrorism always has a political nature. It involves the commission of outrageous act designed to precipitate political change. Secondly, terrorism is distinguished because of its non-state character and thus, for the minimum, terrorism has the following characteristics: a fundamental political nature, the surprise use of violence against seemingly random

targets, and the targeting of the innocent by non-state actor (Obi, 1999).

Grenshaw (1981) posited that:

If we focus on terrorism directed against governments for the purpose of political change, we are considering the premeditated use or threat of symbolic low-level violence by conspiratorial organizations. Terrorist violence communicates a political message; its ends go beyond damaging an enemy's material resources. The victims or objects of the terrorist attack have little intrinsic value to the terrorist groups but represent a larger human audience whose reaction the terrorist seek.

Terrorism involves illegal acts of violence by groups with political aims, or interest beyond politics, to strike fear or induce sympathy to a political (ideological) cause, which may not necessarily result in the secure of political power (Obi 1999:132). Terrorists perform clandestine activities, destroying lives and properties in order to elicit sympathy for self-determination or intimidate political adversaries. Such acts of violence include; sabotage, assassinations, hijacking of planes, suicide bombings etc. Terrorists use bloody methods to pursue their objectives. Though it contravenes both local and international laws, the use of terror in some

country have forced some governments to seek negotiated agreements to end conflict. Such are the cases in Somalia, Coted "voire, Sudan, Liberia and so on. As opposed to mass uprising or spontaneous violence, "Terrorism is clandestine violence organized by small groups. Terrorism is highly intentional or purposeful violence. It is not spontaneous or unplanned."(Crenshaw: 143-144) For example, the four simultaneous hijacking of September 11, 2001 revealed a vast, complex and highly organized conspiracy. Because terrorism aims to arouse or intimidate civilian audiences more than reduce an opponent's military effectiveness, "Victims are representative and symbolic. Their usefulness to the terrorist lies in the regard society has for them". (Grenshaw, 1981:143)

The US Department of State defines terrorism as "premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience. The term international terrorism means terrorism involving citizens or the territory of more than one country. The term "Terrorist Group" means any group practicing or that has significant subgroups that practice, international terrorism". (US Department of State, 2000) Further, The International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism sponsored by the United Nations defines terrorism as "an act intended to

cause death or serious bodily injury to any person not actively involved in armed conflict in order to intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an international organization to do or abstain from doing any act". (United Nations International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, Dec. 9, 1999) From the foregoing we wish to define the term as any form of premeditated violence clandestinely carried out by sub- groups and targeted against civilians and military personnel at a time when there is no war; with the aim of achieving political goals.

2.3 History of Nigerian Foreign Policy

The foundation of Nigeria foreign policy was modelled from that of Great Britain (Ayah, 2000:54). The way this British legacy shaped events in pre-independence, post independence and contemporary Nigeria is vital to understanding foreign policy development and practices in Nigeria foreign affairs office establishment of relevance in-satisfactions, economic relations, ethnic and religious matters were all influenced by colonial authorities (Nwokedi in Ate and Allinternwa, 1992) reports that Nigeria's century-old colonial relationship with Britain has an enduring impact on the formulation and practice of Nigerian foreign policy According to Nwokedi one could say that Nigeria foreign policy began in 1960 when, she became independent but the influence still 1960s when the aftermath of the Nigerian

civil war and her role as a hegemony in Africa were obvious.

According to Stittu (2011) Nigeria after the civil war saw the need not to take the task of her survival as a sovereign state for granted. Britain and some other countries she trusted did not assist her as demanded France was ever arming the secessionist East via Gabon and cote d' Ivoire, hence the compelling need to have friendly government in neighbouring African states Onurah T.C (2008) attributed the establishment of ECOWAS and similar regional institutions as a direct consequence of the Nigerian civil war.

2.4 Nigeria Afro-centric foreign policy

The foreign policy of any nation is the external projection of some of the domestic policies of a country that may have relevance in such arena. The idea of Africa as the centre piece of Nigeria's foreign policy is premised on the understanding that Nigeria's engagement in the international system will be looked at on global plat form, but with emphasis on Africa. As opined by Hon. Aja wachukwu, "charity begins at home and therefore any Nigeria foreign policy that does not take into consideration." This enunciation is the philosophical origin of afro-centrism in Nigeria's foreign policy though; it was however the Adedeji report that conined of Africa as the centre piece.

The issue that gave practical expression to this Africa centeredness was the remnants of colonialism on the continent, apartheid in South Africa. Liberation wars, ideological and proxy conflicts among others, outside these politically pressing factors, the issue of a shared racial universe of cultural neighbourhood of shared historical experience and the ideas of pan-Africanism further lubricated the wheels of this foreign policy conceptualization. Indeed, in the pursuit of Africa-centered foreign policy premised on racial and socio-cultural affinity of Africans, Nigeria was carrying out an exercise in anthropological diplomacy.

Under the framework of an Africa-centered foreign policy, Nigeria got involved deeply in decolonization struggles in Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, and anti-apartheid struggle in south Africa and the process earning for itself the appellation frontline nation, even though she was geographically removed from the theatre of the struggle which was in southern African region. Nigeria is central to the formation of ECOWAS, has contained the breakdown of social order in Liberia, sierra-Leona etc. through its world acknowledges peacekeeping expertise, and has provided economic life wire, less economically resourceful countries. Since this phraseology appeared on the Nigeria's foreign policy scene, it has continued to reproduce itself, like ever recurring mathematical decimal. The

foreign policy elite and political leadership of successive government seems to be carried away by its philosophical allure rather than its rational ideation. In this sense, therefore, considerations of economic benefits, continental political leadership, national interests and military partnerships and strategic engagements are scarified on the altar of good neighbourliness and psychological gratification.

Nigeria wants to present an image of big Brother image before the other African countries.

In spite of the image financial expenditures and massive loss of human and material resources in Liberian and Sierra Leone war, Nigeria has not been able to reap any economic benefits. To date, one cannot tell one single Nigeria Company involved in the post-conflict reconstruction activities going on in these two countries. What major economic niche has Nigeria carved for she in these post conflicts countries there is hardly anything one can point finger to wards. Yet, the Africa-centeredness framework has continued to maintain a stronghold on foreign policy of Nigeria.

Nigeria commitment to a radical afro-centric policy is seen as a product of psychological belief in and concurrence with what Nnamdi Azikiwe called Nigeria's historic mission in Africa and its manifest destiny

to rule and dominate the continent. Long before its independence and the economic /oil boom of the early 1970s which catapulted Nigeria to an enviable economic height in Africa, its leader have always believed that the country was pre-ordained to play an important and leading role in African Affairs.

This notion did not just germinate in the minds of Nigeria's : it was also believed and validated by the members of the international community who saw Nigeria as being capable of making a difference the world on account of its vast potential. Similarly, it has been argued that from independence Nigeria's foreign policy has fashioned to meet the requirement for political stability and development in Africa, and this perhaps explains why barely one month after the country's independence, one of its first effort was the dispatch of Nigerian troops to the Congo for peacekeeping. It is important to add, however, that the amalgam of this potential and leadership aspirations of Nigeria's past and present leaders, to at large extent have helped in sustaining and securing the continuing pursuit of this course.

In the light of the above, a tabular illustration of Nigeria's involvement in peacekeeping and conflict resolution in Africa under the auspices of ECOWAS, AU and UN summarize Nigeria's commitment of this Africa-

centered ideology.

NIGERIA'S PARTICIPATION IN GLOBAL PEACE MISSION, 1960-2011

COUNTRY	CODE NAME	OPERATIONS	START DATE	END DATE
Congo	ONUC	UN Operation in the Congo	July 1960	June 1964
West New Guinea	UNSF	UN security force in est. New Guinea	Oct.1962	April 1963
Chad		OAU peacekeeping force, Chad	1979	1982
Angola	UNAVEMI	UN Angola verification mission	January 1989	June1991
Liberia	UNOMIL	UN observer mission in Liberia	Sep.1991	Sep.1970
Mozambique	ONUMOZ	UN operation in Mozambique	Dec.1992	Dec.1994
Rwanda	UNAMIR	UN assistance mission for Rwanda	Oct.1993	March 1996
Chad/Libya	UNAMIR	UN Aouzou strip observer group	May 1994	June 1994
Angola	UNAVEM 111	UN Angola verification mission	Feb.1995	June 1997
Sierra-Leone		ECOMOG Task Force in sierra-Leone	1997	1999
Sierra-Leone	UNAMSIL	UN Mission in Sierra-Leone	Oct.1999	Dec.1995
Congo	MONUC	UN Org. mission in DRC	Nov.199	June 2010
Liberia	UNMIL	UN Mission in Liberia	Sept.2003	2012
Sudan	AMIS	African Mission in Darfur	2004	2008
Sudan	UNAMID	AU-UN Hybrid operation in Darfur	July 2007	2008

Sudan	UNMIS	Un Mission in Sudan	March2005	July2011
Chad	MINURCAT	UN Mission in CAR and Chad	Sept.2007	Dec.2010
South Sudan	UNMISS	UN Mission in the Rep. of South Sudan	July 2011	2012

SOURCE: Compiled with reference from the list of the United Nations Peace Keeping Operations from 1942-2012: <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/operationslist.pdf>

2.5 Origin of Boko Haram

Before colonization and subsequent annexation into the British Empire, the Bornu Empire ruled the territory where Boko Haram is currently active. It was a sovereign sultanate run according to the principles of the Constitution of Medina, with a majority Kanuri Muslim population. The Bornu Sultanate emerged after the overthrow of the Kanem-Bornu Empire ruled by the Saifawa dynasty for over 2000 years. The Bornu Sultanate of the Kanuri is distinct from the Sokoto Caliphate of the Hausa/Fulani established in 1802 by the military conquest of Usman dan Fodio. Both the Bornu Sultanate and Sokoto Caliphate came under control of the British in 1903. However, due to activities of early Christian missionaries who used Western education as a tool for evangelism, it is viewed with suspicion by the local population. Increased dissatisfaction gave rise to many fundamentalists among the Kanuri and other peoples of North-East Nigeria.

One of the most famous of such fundamentalists was Mohammed Marwa, also known as Maitatsine, who was at the height of his notoriety during the 1970s and 1980s. He was sent into exile by the Nigerian authorities; he refused to believe Mohammed was the Prophet and instigated riots in the country which resulted in the deaths of thousands of people. Some analysts view Boko Haram as an extension of the Maitatsine riots. In 1995, the group was said to be operating under the name Shabaab, Muslim Youth Organisation with Mallam Lawal as the leader. When Lawal left to continue his education, Mohammed Yusuf took over leadership of the group. Yusuf's leadership allegedly opened the group to political influence and popularity. Yusuf officially founded the group in 2002 in the city of Maiduguri with the aim of establishing a Sharia government in Borno State under former Governor Ali Modu Sheriff. (In the year 2002 Ali Modu Sheriff was not a governor then; he was a senator.) He established a religious complex that included a mosque and a school where many poor families from across Nigeria and from neighboring countries enrolled their children. The centre had ulterior political goals and soon it was also working as a recruiting ground for future jihadis to fight the state. The group includes members who come from neighbouring Chad and Niger and speak only Arabic. In 2004 the complex was relocated to Yusuf's home state of Yobe

in the village Kanamma near the Niger border.

Human Rights Watch researcher Eric Guttschuss told IRIN News that Yusuf successfully attracted followers from unemployed youth "by speaking out against police and political corruption."Abdulkarim Mohammed, a researcher on Boko Haram, added that violent uprisings in Nigeria are ultimately due to "the fallout of frustration with corruption and the attendant social malaise of poverty and unemployment."

The group conducted its operations more or less peacefully during the first seven years of its existence that changed in 2009 when the Nigerian government launched an investigation into the group's activities following reports that its members were arming themselves. Prior to that, the government reportedly repeatedly ignored warnings about the increasingly militant character of the organization, including that of a military officer. When the government came into action, several members of the group were arrested in Bauchi, sparking deadly clashes with Nigerian security forces which led to the deaths of an estimated 700 people. During the fighting with the security forces Boko Haram fighters reportedly "used fuel-laden motorcycles" and "bows with poison arrows" to attack a police station. The group's founder and then leader Mohammed Yusuf was killed during this time while in police custody After Yusuf's killing, a new leader

emerged whose identity was not known at the time. After the killing of M. Yusuf, the group carried out its first terrorist attack in Borno in January 2011. It resulted in the killing of four people. Since then, the violence has only escalated in terms of both frequency and intensity. In January 2012, Abubakar Shekau, a former deputy to Yusuf, appeared in a video posted on YouTube. According to Reuters, Shekau took control of the group after Yusuf's death in 2009. Authorities had previously believed that Shekau died during the violence in *2009*. By early *2012*, the group was responsible for over 900 deaths. In June 2012, the group claimed to be responsible for the suicide bombings of three churches in the Northern Nigerian state of Kaduna, killing more than 50 people (Solomon, 2012). The medley of approaches adopted by the government towards curtailing the activities of the sect appears not to have worked (Solomon, 2012). There has been a reported case whereby our immediate neighbours not only serve as haven for these insurgents but also give them assistance (Vanguard newspapers, May 10, 2014). In the next section, we shall focus our attention to the relationship between Nigeria and her immediate neighbours and the role of France in that relationship. We shall attempt to show how these have hampered Nigeria's foreign policy in relation to the current wave of terrorist activities in the country.

2.6 Membership of Boko Haram Sect

In discussing the membership of Boko Haram Sect, emphasis should be laid on the belief of Islam as a religion. Boko Haram is basically Islamic terrorism reserved for Nigerians alone. This is also considering the strategic location of the Boko Haram Islamic sect based in Kanama village in Yobe state, which is the boarder of Nigeria and Niger republic. Considering the porous nature of Nigerians border, the bulk of the sects member include terrorists who are drawn from other neighboring Islamic states such as Chad and Niger republic.

As earlier noted, Islamic terrorism and its fight is perceived by the actors and its fans as a vast curse. And as such, it is a collective duty for all. For instance, an Islamic fanatic may be born in a country, then go to fight in a third country and take refuge in a forth country, their traditional believe is that Jihad is permanent global and not linked with a specific territory.

The membership and environment of members of the Boko Haram Sect is the same thing as other terrorist operations in the world. On this account, instruction, recruitment and membership is synonymous to this issue. For instance, social networks such as facebook and twitter have social pages for friends and followers. The Boko Haram sect has seven (7) face book accounts with different members. (The Nation June 6 2011).

In the beginning of 21st century, a worldwide network of hundred terrorist coach emerged that inspire, train, educate and recruit young members to engage in jihad against the west and its disciples.

(Mohammed 2009:20). Basically, the membership of the Boko Haram Islamic sect constitutes mostly individuals who have migrated from the neighboring countries.

What these recruits tend to have in common besides their urbanity, their cosmopolitan backgrounds, their education, their facility with languages, and their computer skills is displacement. Those who joined the Jihad did so in a country other than the one in which they were reared. They are many individuals from Niger, Chad, Benin and other neighboring states of who reside in the country without being noticed as aliens. Despite their accomplishment, they had little or no standing in the host societies they lived.

Membership of Boko Haram Sect is mainly drawn from university and secondary school dropouts. The widespread of the membership and its militant instruct have been responsible for its spontaneous strikes across the northern regions. In Maiduguri, where their headquarters is cited, the gun battles have been terrific and fierce. The age bracket of these members is not restricted to any age limit. But the active members fall

between the ages of 16 – 30 years. While the leaders and instructors are older ranging from 30 – 60 years.

One of the predominant features about the members of the Boko Haram sect is that they wear long beard and beads, and the red and black scarf. Discussing the membership of the Boko Haram sect, it is important that we understand the activities of sleeper cells around the world. These groups of individuals are trained. They liberate just as any normal individual. The important thing about their instructions to act considering the new form of attack in the country, it is possible that the sects membership comprises of foreigners. To substantiate this postulation, a United States diplomatic cable from 2009 obtained wiki leaks and provided to Reuter by a third party said a veteran Chadian extremist with “limited ties to al-Qaeda associates” had visited north eastern Nigeria and may be planning an attack.

Similarly to this is a letter claiming to be from Boko Haram which was sent to a local newspaper saying that members have returned this month (June) from Somalia after being trained “by brethren who made the interim government ungovernable”, an apparent reference to Somalia’s al-Qaeda linked al-Shababa-Islamist.

Insurgents Daily Sun authoritatively reveal that Late Yusuf never knew

his father in real sense of it; he was raised by father's friend Mohammed Fugu Alhaji, who later became his In-law. It was the father in-law that relocated him and other members of the family to Maiduguri where the gospel of Boko Haram ideology spread like wild fire. In fact, in the early stage of the group, he was able to attract membership from the families of high and mighty in Borno and Yobe states. In fact at a point, one of the sons of a former secretary of the state government (SSG) in one of the states in the North-East region was a member of this group.

By implication, the members of the group do not require any special qualification to enable them become members. The sect functions on ideology.

2.6.1 Ideology of Boko Haram

The Boko Haram Islamic sect is just like any other terrorist sleeper cell operating around the world based on ideology, the similar attribute that these groups such as Al-Qaeda share can be described as anti-westernism just as the al-Qaeda attacks on America are not motivated by a religiously inspired hatred of America culture or religion but by the belief that US foreign policy has oppressed, killed or otherwise harmed Muslims in the middle east condensed in the phrase. They hate us for what we do, not who we are" (Abony, 2006:27).

This can also be deduced in determining the ideology stands of the Boko Haram Islamic sect in Nigeria. The group ideology is based on its radical oppositions to the group education. Based in Maiduguri capital, of Borno state, the followers include former university lecturers and students in other northern states including Kano, Yobe, Sokoto, Bauchi, so well as illiterate, jobless youths. Boko Haram means “western education is sinful” and all other westernized way of life is condemned by the group. This sums up the ideology of the group. It is geared towards establishing a state denied of any western orientation. The ideologies of the group as earlier mentioned as anti-western can also be better understood by its quest for the declaration of Sharia law in the 12 Northern states in the country. This implies that the ideology of this group is based on the complete Islamic orientation in the Northern part of the country.

As a radical group with a very striking ideology some of these members resigned their jobs as lecturers and then joined the sect. This is in conjunction to the ideology of “say no to westernization” tyrannically this perceived ideology of the sect has been bewildering the entire nation especially those who have been following the recent happenings. The late leader of the group Ustaz Yusuf, who should be in his mid thirties has considerable private wealth and properties which are made by the west, but

his followers who came from diverse ethnic background in the predominantly Muslim north said he was also educated in Iran.

Members of the sect pray in separate mosque in cities including Maiduguri, Kano and Sokoto states. Anybody who does not follow their strict ideology either Muslim or Christian is considered an infidel. The group also believes that wives are scared being that should not be seen by anybody except their husbands. That sect discouraged its members from engaging in any western oriented jobs. Instead they were encouraged to take up any manual job, such as hawking, weaving, pastoral farming, shoe mending etc. most Muslims and Islamic scholars believe that the doctrines of Boko Haram is different from the teachings of Islam. These people argue that the western education we acquire now is in-line with Islam and that Islam is to obey contributed authorities and the sharia law. West African Islam is overwhelming modest and the sects ideology is not supported by the Nigerian Muslim population, the largest is sub-Saharan Africa.

Experts in the study of origins of words and how they have twice at their current form and meaning known as "Etymologist" described Boko Haram as a term emanating from the Hausa word "Boko" which means "Animist" western or otherwise non-Islamic education", whereas the Arabia

word Haram could be metaphorically attributed to mean “Sin” which in other words, literally connotes “forbidden”.

The above etymological illustration summarizes the ideology of the sect. with the ideology tacitly opposing not only western education but western culture and modern science as well. The group according to an interview in 2009 with the BBC, late Yusuf noted that the ideologies of the sect are contrary to the belief that the world is sphere. Based on the ideology, the sect advocates that this belief should be strongly rejected in its totality.

Similarly, the Boko Haram sects ideology strongly opposes the theory of evolution also known as Darwinism theory, the theory which was developed by 19th century British naturalist Charles Darwin, which has it that specie of living things originate, evolve and survive through natural selection in response to environmental forces. This is strongly contented by the Boko Haram Islamic sect and this maintains their position and ideology.

In the same contention, the group strongly disagrees with the fact that the rain comes from water evaporated by the sun. in conclusion about the ideology of Boko Haram sect making particular reference to what constitutes Islamic terrorism, which the Boko Haram has been identified as

one its inherent ideologies have been the assertion that western politics and society are actively anti – Islamic or as it sometime describe waging war against Islam.

2.7 National Interest

According to Ojo and Sessay (1980:58), the national interest is perhaps one of the most controversial concepts in international relations. They attributed this view to three factors. First, the concept has been and continues to be the subject of various interpretations/misinterpretations by both analysts and practitioners. Second and closely related to the first point, is the abuse of the concept particularly by politicians and decision-makers all over the world. Third, the concept is not easily susceptible to analysis. Finally there is as at now no universally acceptable single definition of what the national interest of a state means. The term means different things to deferent people. Some people even deny that there is anything like national interest, instead stating that it is whatever the ruling elite say it is, that it is.(Ojo & Sessay, 1980). Mongenthau (1989) sees national interest as an aim to promote a nation’s image, prestige and respect both at home and abroad. Adeniran in Ojo and Sessay (1980) has this to say about national interest:

When statesmen and bureaucrats are expected or are required to act in the national interest...what is meant is that they are being called upon to take action on issues that would improve the political situation, the economic and social well-being, the health and culture of the people as well as their political survival. They are being used to take action that will improve the lot of the people rather than pursue policies that will subject the pole to domination by other countries... policies which are likely to make them unable to stand among other nations.

Again Chandra in Ake (1982) has identified what constitutes national interest as: national security, political independence, territorial integrity, promotion of economic interests of nations and world peace. And as Ibijola and Opeyemi (2013) posited, "in formulating foreign policy objectives, every state makes an analytic distinction between interests which are critical to its very existence and those that are not. This first group is called vital interest while the second group is called secondary interest". These objectives are also referred to as the state's national interest.

Ojo and Sessay (1980) also divided national interest into three categories. In this they agreed with Ibijola and Opeyemi (2013) that we

have vital and secondary interest, but they also added a third one they called general or complementary interests” (Ojo and Sessay (1980:62). According to Robinson in Ojo and Sessay (1980) “general interests are that which a state can apply to a larger geographical area, to a larger number of nations or in several specific fields” ie economics, trade, disarmament or navigation. To this list we want to include terrorism. General interests are interests most of which cannot be achieved by any one state alone. States need the co-operation of other states for their fulfillment. For instance the issue of terrorism requires the co-operation of the concern of the more than one state working together to eradicate or contain. In this work the researcher is on vital national interests which we shall define as those things that are germane to the survival of any nation and her citizenry and for which she is willingly to send her soldiers to kill and die for.

2.7.1 Nigeria’s National Interest

Akinyemi (1987) posits “Nigeria’s national interest can therefore be identified as predicated on the nation’s military, economic, political and social security. Anything that will enhance the capacity of Nigerians to defend their national security must be seen as being in the national interest. Anything that will promote Nigeria’s economic growth and development is in the national interest. Anything that will make Nigeria politically stable is

in the national interest. Conversely anything that will make Nigeria militarily insecure, that will militate against the country's growth and development and which will make it politically unstable is against the national interest"

From the above, it means that if Nigeria's security interest should be better served by maintaining silence over certain international developments, so be it. This has put a lie to the impression being given in certain quarters that Nigeria's voice must necessarily be heard on all issues involving western powers. Nigeria should be forceful on any issue as dictated by her national interests but not on sentiment. Former Foreign Affairs Minister, Sule Lamido stated Nigeria's national interest as: the protection of the sovereign and territorial integrity of the Nigerian state; the promotion of the economic and social well-being of Nigerians; the enhancement of Nigeria's image and status in the world at large; the promotion of unity as well as the total political, economic, social and cultural liberation of our country and Africa; the promotion of the rights of the black people and others under colonial domination; the promotion of international co-operation, conducive to the consolidation of world peace and security; mutual respect and friendship among all peoples among the states; redressing the imbalance in the international power structures that has tended to frustrate the legitimate aspirations of developing countries;

the promotion of world peace based on the principles of freedom, mutual respect and equality of all persons of the world. (Ibijola & Opeyemi, 2013). Over the decades since independence in 1960, this objective which also constitutes our national interests have remain largely unchanged. However, different regimes have adopted different methods in achieving them. But there are some that should be expunged. For instance the one that talks about colonial domination, long after African states have got independence. What should rather concern us now should be issues of democracy, human rights, good governance, terrorism, etc which current issues are.

According to Oshuntokun (1987), “our national interest are external cohesion, national unity, the creation of a happy and egalitarian society, the location of a state where career is open to talents and where there is employment for those who want to work and where there are the traditional freedoms of speech, political association, religion and equality before the law, coupled with this is the defence of the humanity and rights of all black men through deliberate action and policies”

Obasanjo (1976) in Agreen (2010), defined Nigeria"s National interest as consisting of four components namely, the creation of a suitable political and economic environment in Africa and the world at large which will facilitate the defense of the territorial integrity of African states; the

promotion of equality and self-reliance in Africa and the World; defense of social justice and human dignity of the Blackman; and the defense and promotion of world peace. Aluko (1981) sees Nigeria's National interest as including these six components arranged in order of importance and priority. Self-preservation of the country, defense and maintenance of the country's independence, economic and social well-being of the people, defense, preservation and promotion of its values especially democratic values; enhancement of the country's standing and status in the world capitals in Africa and promotion of world peace. According to him, the first three are the core national interest and they are not compromised irrespective of the administration.

2.7.2 Nigeria's National Interest and the Problem of Terrorism

According to (Okoro, 2010), the theory of Nigeria's foreign policy has often been explained by Nigerian diplomats and scholars in terms of four "concentric circles" of national interest. The innermost circle represents Nigeria's own security, independence and prosperity and is centered on its immediate neighbours of Benin, Cameroon, Chad and Niger; The second circle revolves around Nigeria's relation with its West African neighbours; the third circle focuses on continental African issues of peace development and democratization; and the fourth circle involves Nigeria's relation with

organizations, in situations and states outside Africa.

Vogt (1981), identified three concentric circles theory of Nigeria foreign policy trust to include. (i) A military strategic dimension (ii). An economic dimension and (iii) a political dimension. This concentric circle theory (CCT) was founded as a methodology of delimiting and prioritizing Nigeria's national defense. It was to provide effective defense within the West African sub-region (Agreen 2010). The first circle involves the defense of the territorial boundaries of Nigeria and the contiguous states. Under this model, the defence and security of Nigeria and her immediate neighbours was to take pre-eminence over that of the entire continent. Simply put, it is in this order-Nigeria, West Africa especially the contiguous states and then Africa. Another major foreign policy of the Nigerian State since independence was that of „*Afro-centricism*“ the Afro-centric foreign policy trust was emphasized by Jaja Wachukwu (1961) when he stated:

our foreign policy is based on three basic pillars; the concept that Nigeria is an African nation; it is part and parcel of the continent of Africa and therefore it is so completely involved in anything that pertains to that continent... we are independent in everything, but neutral in nothing that affects the destiny of Africa....The peace of Africa is the peace of Nigeria,

its tribulations are our tribulations and we cannot be indifferent to its future (Dele, 2002).

To further emphasize on the importance of an Afro-centric foreign policy he also stated that , “charity begins at home and therefore any Nigeria foreign policy that does not take into consideration the peculiar position of Africa is unrealistic” (Pine, 2011).

These pronouncements formed the philosophical underpinnings of Afro-centrism in Nigeria foreign policy. However, it was the Adedeji Report that coined the concept “Africa as centre-piece” (Pine, 2011). Under the framework of this, policy Nigeria got involved in the decolonisation struggles in several countries in Africa including, Namibia, Angola, Mozambique and anti-apartheid in South Africa, Rhodesia now Zimbabwe, which earned it the sobriquet a “frontline state”, even as she was geographical very far from Southern Africa. (Pine 2011; Shitta 2010;Ibijola & Opeyemi, 2013). Nigeria also got involved in a number of peace keeping operations within the continent, in places like, Congo, Somatia, Sudan, Liberia, Sierraloen in which she spent billions of dollars and lost hundreds of lives, to mention but a few. (Pine 2011, Shitta 2010). Nigeria was also instrumental to the founding of ECOWAS, OAU (now AU) and ECOMOG. Consequently, as Obuoforibo noted “Nigeria made its borders open for

West African Nations to enter freely to reside and work in accordance with the tenets of ECOWAS Protocol on the free movement of nationals, as well as goods and services”(Obuoforibo, 2011:74).

From the above, we can see that Nigeria’s foreign policy since Independence has been centered on Africa. However, this posturing has drawn flaks from scholars and critics. These criticisms are borne out of the fact that Nigeria over years had continued to squander scarce resources in the name of peace-keeping operations and earning for it the title „grant of Africa“ while her citizens are suffering at home. More than that, apart from the fact that Nigeria do not gain anything in return for her efforts, these beneficiary countries do not appreciate these efforts.

For instance (Ibijola and Opeyemi, 2013), queried “how many of these countries that benefited from Nigeria rare generosity appreciate the nation’s sacrifices? The case of South Africa comes to mind here.... Nigeria stood for South Africa when it mattered most, yet Nigerians living in South Africa have been victims of xenophobia attacks in recent years”.

Prof Bolaji Akinyemi, Nigeria’s former foreign Affairs minister also showed his disapproval for Nigeria’s altruistic policy towards Africa when he said “Nigeria played a leading role in restoring peace to countries like Liberia and Sierraleon after years of civil wars, this adventure cost Nigeria

billions of dollars. However, since this countries return to the part of peace, nations that did not make such sacrifices have been busy since the wars ended exploring economic opportunities”; (Ibijola & Opeyemi, 2013).

Ademola (2001) in Agreeen (2010) has also wondered why Nigeria would still have Africa as the area of her foreign policy thrust in this era of globalization and called for a review of the policy in line with current global realities. Other scholars also criticized the idealistic policies of non-alignment rather than the aggressive pursuit of her national interest like the great powers which are guided by economic interest in their diplomatic transactions. For instance, China is opposed to the Security Council intervention in Dartur, Sudan because of the oil and other raw materials they obtain from the Sudanese government (Agreen, 2010). It is perhaps in an attempt to correct these imbalances that the Nigerian state came up with the concept of economic diplomacy where the major target is on the economic well being of the country. And the regimes of Obasanjo, Yara-Adua and Goodluck Jonathan came up with concept of Citizen Diplomacy which is targeted at the well being of the citizen (Pine, 2011). As stated in the introductory section, the focus of this paper is on how Nigeria should drive her foreign policies towards her immediate neighbours of Benin Republic, Cameroun, Niger, Chad and Equatorial Guinea in her current

challenges of terrorism. Following from the four concentric circles of national interest" as mentioned above our immediate neighbours are supposed to form the innermost core or the nucleus of our security consideration and arrangement. This is predicated on the understanding that one's own security is closely linked to the security of her immediate neighbours. But unfortunately one has not seen this in the foreign policy of the country towards these countries. Simply put, Nigeria as the „big brother" as she calls herself should initiate a security policy that will link her to her immediate neighbours. This is the only way our own security can be guaranteed. As Oshuntokun (1987), rightly observed;

Africa of course would always remain the focus of our foreign policy but the strategy presently being pursued is the wrong one. Our future, I am afraid to say is not in ECOWAS but in a brand new organisation created around Nigeria and a constellation of surrounding neighbouring states of Benin, Niger, Cameroun and eventually Chad. This is the natural organisation.....that should have been created instead of the amorphous organisation called ECOWAS".

2.8 Gap in Literature

After the review of relevant past works in the subject matter of

Nigerian foreign policy and her foreign policy thrust of “African as the center-piece of her foreign policy, we did not find adequate explanations for Nigeria concentration on West Africa in her implementations of Africa-centre foreign policy and her selective attitude in collective security in Africa. On the account of this gap, this study will strive to provide empirical explanations on why West Africa is the ‘activity area’ of Nigerian African Policy especially as it affects issue of collective security. The study will strive to ascertain the role of Nigerian’s immediate neighbours in the fight against Boko Haram and the new trend in the perception of Nigeria regarding collective security.

Chapter Three

3.0 Methodology And Theoretical Framework

3.1 Research Design

There are a number of research designs or plans employed in carrying out research works. The kind of design to be used is usually a function of the nature of the study. Hence we have; experimental design, survey design, historical/desk-top design among others.

The design chosen for the study of Terrorism and foreign policy of Nigeria towards her immediate neighbours is desk-top/historical design. Historical design according to Robby, F. O. (2007) investigates historical documents, looks at evidences of participants and assembles official and other

credible documents that support or oppose the subject matter of investigation.

3.2 Method of Data Collection

As a convention in historical design secondary data collection method dominates our data generation approaches. In other word we generated most of the data for this via secondary sources. However, we had the opportunity to talk in some two occasions to policy makers in foreign affairs military in camera.

Government publications, official releases from military authorities via its spokes man, internet probing and analysis of experts were employed in data/information generations.

3.3 Analytical Tool

The date and information generated in the course of this research were analyzed by method of “contents analysis”. Ojo, A (2012) explains content analysis as a method in which words or even documents are studied and analyzed carefully with the view to assign meanings to them. So the generated data information and by contents analysis approach carried analysis of the data / information generated which in turn led to conclusion and recommendations.

3.4 Theoretical Framework

Among appropriate theories in discussing international relations among neighbours in a conflict situation, the researcher adopted structural-functional theoretical approach as explanatory framework for the study. The structural-functional approach has come to politics as an off-shoot or derivative of system theory. It provides a new dimension to the study of politics interaction. Traditionally the main basis of classification has been the distribution of power among the members of the political system. The problem becomes how to describe and account for the internal structure of the political systems. This is because political scientists have characterized structures and distinguished them using variety of concepts and tools. Initially or formerly functional analysis was based on principles of separation powers. But modern form of structural-functionalism is derived from anthropological and sociological theories.

The chief proponents of structural-functional approach include; Malinowski and Radcliffe Brown, Talcott Parsons, Robert K Merton and Mario Lery. These scholars differ substantially in concepts of system and function, but they have all emphasized that the ability to explain and predict in the social sciences is enhanced when we think of social structures and institutions as performing functions in systems. Political scientists have borrowed this approach from the sociologists and anthropologists to

explain what political structures perform and what basic functions in the political systems are. It is essentially useful in the study of comparative politics. This is because political scientists are concerned with the phenomenon of systems maintenances and regulations.

3.4.1 Tenets of structural-functionalism

Hara Das and Chouldbury (1997:39) identified four main assumptions of structural-functional approach. They are:

1. All systems have structure which can be identified. The elements of these structures perform functions within the system, which have meaning only in terms of the system. They are dependent on the system as an activity entity for the existence. They are also dependent on the each other for their activities.
2. Society is a single inter-connected system each element performing a specific function. The interaction among the components is necessary for the maintenance of the equilibrium.
3. The different parts of the society are inter-related and tensions are resolved with mutual help.
4. The broad aims or principles underlying a social structure can be identified. The basic principle of this theory is that every system has some structures which perform some functions that are necessary

for the survival of the system itself, and this revolves around certain concepts, structure and functions.

The term structure is defined according to Das and Chouldbury (1997:40) as a pattern implying an observable informing in terms of which an action (or operation) takes place. It is a particular arrangement of something in parts linked together. By structure in politics, we the observable activities which make up the politic`al system Almond and Powell). The structure of society consists two parts: the objective socio-economic base and the subjective attitudinal or cultural patterns which aer prevalent among the members of the political system. Structure is composed of rules, while functions deal with the consequences involving objectives as well as processes of the patterns of actions. Structures refer to those arrangements within the system which perform the functions (Hara Das and Chouldbury, 1997).

Functions may be defined as any condition resulting from the operation of a unit. In the case of social science the unit is usually a system of action involving a set of one or more persons (actors). A function is the objective consequences of a pattern of action for the system.

3.4.2 Theoretical Application of the Structural Functionalism to Terrorism and Foreign Policy of Nigeria towards her immediate Neighbours

Since foreign policy of sovereign state refers to her external relations with other states and non-state actors, insurgence in Nigeria obviously impacts on her foreign policy especially as it concerns Nigeria's immediate neighbours. Apply structural-functionalism to the prevailing situations in Nigeria (Boko Haram terrorist actions) and her African-policy, it can be seen that a meaningful fight against Boko Haram calls for collective actions with her immediate neighbours. Infact, Nigeria and the states it shares borders with are now seen as a society with political and defense relations among other forms of relationships. The enclave (states bordering Nigeria). Nigeria

Inclusive has taken the nature of a political society while the collective efforts including joint military operations new intelligent gathering and other collective arrangement in curtailing the spread of Boko Haram activities is seen as structure.

By the recent decision of Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, Niger and to work as unit or society underscores the fact that a society is a system whose part cannot function in isolation. The different parts of the environment define by Nigeria and her immediate neighbours cannot stand and survive without co-operation of the rest parts or the units, members of the larger group (society).

Chapter Four

4.0 Data Analysis/Testing Of Hypotheses

4.1 The Role Expected of Nigerian Neighbours in the Fight Against Boko Haram Terrorist Sect by Nigeria

This role assessment will be carried out under the following headings: Funding, membership, training, military operations and assistance.

4.1.1 Funding

It has been practically difficult to ascertain the source of the funds that the Boko Haram uses in running its creation. But just like every Islamic extremist, the Boko Haram attracts international Islamic sympathizers. These similar cells which believe in the sects' ideology always, tend to support the activities of other sect around the world.

However, considering the new sophistication that has been adopted by the group, it is rumored that some influential citizens from all walks of life not necessarily the political and economic bourgeoisie sponsor the activities of this group, though behind the scene. Based on this, it is also possible that some politicians may likely hide under the canopy of the Boko Haram to pursue their various political ends. If this is the case, then such politicians are supposed to provide not only funds but also logistic assistance. This is similar to the murders which have been said to be

committed by these sects most of them take the posture of political killings so one can argue from this angle that the political class can also, seek the services of the Boko Haram Islamic sect, lets recall that in 2005 when the late leader of the group was first arrested it appeared on the national daily (Punch Newspaper 07 June, 2005, sun newspaper 10 June 2005) that his release was facilitated by a notable political gladiator in the corridors of the people democratic party (P D P). Considering the technicality and fragile nature of the democracy in Nigeria and the crisis engulfed by the Boko Haram Sect, the name of the so called political big shot was never mentioned neither did it surface anywhere in public discussion. The much that was heard about it is that the politician hails from the north central and also contested in the presidential election.

Although, similar trace which contradicts the political class and the funding of the Boko Haram is understood from the fact that Late Leader Yusuf Mohammed was a regular visitor to Abuja, the security outfits to be precise this was before the group stated its violent activity. Ustaz we understood control a reasonable wealth despite the condemnation of western style of life and its products. Also according to the secessionists, (A school of thought that attributed terrorism to the tactics of the insurgents to dislodge the incumbents and ascend to political power

themselves), Boko Haram is being funded and sponsored by top politicians in the north-eastern states of Borno and Yobe during the buildup of the 2003 general elections. Later other top politicians in other parts of the northern Nigeria began to patronize the group through budgetary allocations and monthly disbursement of huge sums of money, provision of training grounds on the many mountains scattered in the northern parts or region as well as protection against arrests by the federal government.

In evaluating the funding of this group, it is pertinent to understand that the members of this group were mandated to pay dues of the range of one naira per day. The implication is that they raised up to (N5,000) everyday because the group had more than five thousand (5,000) members. Ustaz himself, the leader of the group coveted more than 5,000 members. These individuals included people from different works of life, mostly were university lecturers, who resigned their vocation, transferred all their life savings to the group and also businessmen who hawk in the street and strictly commit their profits to the growth of the sect.

A suspected sponsor and financier of the sect according to Daily sun is Alhaji Foi, he was also given summary execution in Maiduguri. He is a major member and fund raiser of the group. His execution took place at the state police command headquarters in Maiduguri. Fois death came 24

hours after Yusuf was killed. Curiously, Foi was a commissioner of religious affairs during the first tenure of former governor, Ali Modu Sherrif. Before then, he had served twice as chairman of Kogga local council. He was said to be wealthy and was arrested in his farm by the operatives of the operation flush II, led by its commander Col. Ben Ohanatu, where he allegedly camped women suspected to be wives of sect members.

The late commissioner was not the only person funding the Boko Haram sect, it was said that he was allegedly using his connections in the state to provide shelter for the fundamentalists.

Another source of raising funds by the group is from the perceived possibility that the group has international connections. Though this has not been fully established apart from the group coming out publicly to declare that it has received training from terrorist groups notably at Al Qaeda and Al-sha bah which is a section at al-Qaeda in Somalia. The point been raised here is that the group control a reasonable amount of wealth. Most of these capitals are sourced from their sponsors. The regime in the Middle East oil proceeds and other radical elements, It is possible for the Boko Haram sect to have received training in manpower and logistics from this group (Al – Qaeda) the issue becoming glaring that this same group may have a hand in funding it, fellow radical element in Nigeria and

elsewhere in sister states of Africa especially Nigeria's immediate neighbours.

Apart from funds from/by fellow terrorist sleeper cell around the world some governments especially in the Middle East is alleged to be sponsoring terrorism. If that is the case, Boko Haram might have benefited from such magnanimous gesture.

Invariably, this led to the inauguration of the Nigerian financial intelligent unit (NFIU) when it was founded out that terrorist group in the country such as Boko Haram might be receiving fund from outside the country. The (NFIU) was mandated to checkmate money laundering and funding of organization from outside the country.

Though it is a difficult task to establish specifically who does or who does not fund the activities of this group. The basic elements are Islamic fundamentalism; most groups and individuals may sympathize with the ideology of this sect and will from time to time throw in their weight behind the activities, financially. From this funding discussion it can be seen that one of the roles of Nigerian neighbours is to carry out intelligence gathering on Boko Haram funding in order to ensure that their territories are not used for fund transfers. The activities of the local and international financial institutions are put into serious checks.

4.1.2 Membership

In discussing the membership of Boko Haram Sect, emphasis should be laid on the belief of Islam as a religion. Boko Haram is basically Islamic terrorism reserved for Nigerians alone. This is also considering the strategic location of the Boko Haram Islamic sect based in Kanama village in Yobe state, which is the boarder of Nigeria and Niger republic. Considering the porous nature of Nigerians border, the bulk of the sects member include terrorists who are drawn from other neighboring Islamic states such as Chad and Niger republic.

As earlier noted, Islamic terrorism and its fight is perceived by the actors and its fans as a vast curse. And as such, it is a collective duty for all. For instance, an Islamic fanatic may be born in a country, then go to fight in a third country and take refuge in a forth country, their traditional believe is that Jihad is permanent global and not linked with a specific territory.

The membership and environment of members of the Boko Haram Sect is the same thing as other terrorist operations in the world. On this account, instruction, recruitment and membership is synonymous to this issue. For instance, social networks such as facebook and twitter have social pages for friends and followers. The Boko Haram sect has seven (7) face book accounts with different members. (The Nation June 6 2011).

In the beginning of 21st century, a worldwide network of hundred terrorist coach emerged that inspire, train, educate and recruit young members to engage in jihad against the west and its disciples.

(Mohammed 2009:20). Basically, the membership of the Boko Haram Islamic sect constitutes mostly individuals who have migrated from the neighboring countries.

What these recruits tend to have in common besides their urbanity, their cosmopolitan backgrounds, their education, their facility with languages, and their computer skills is displacement. Those who joined the Jihad did so in a country other than the one in which they were reared. They are many individuals from Niger, Chad, Benin and other neighboring states of who reside in the country without being noticed as aliens. Despite their accomplishment, they had little or no standing in the host societies they lived.

Membership of Boko Haram Sect is mainly drawn from university and secondary school dropouts. The widespread of the membership and its militant instruct have been responsible for its spontaneous strikes across the northern regions. In Maiduguri, where their headquarters is cited, the gun battles have been terrific and fierce. The age bracket of these members is not restricted to any age limit. But the active members fall

between the ages of 16 – 30 years. While the leaders and instructors are older ranging from 30 – 60 years.

One of the predominant features about the members of the Boko Haram sect is that they wear long beard and beads, and the red and black scarf. Discussing the membership of the Boko Haram sect, it is important that we understand the activities of sleeper cells around the world. These groups of individuals are trained. They liberate just as any normal individual. The important thing about their instructions to act considering the new form of attack in the country, it is possible that the sect's membership comprises of foreigners. To substantiate this postulation, a United States diplomatic cable from 2009 obtained wiki leaks and provided to Reuter by a third party said a veteran Chadian extremist with "limited ties to al-Qaeda associates" had visited north eastern Nigeria and may be planning an attack.

Similarly to this is a letter claiming to be from Boko Haram which was sent to a local newspaper saying that members have returned this month (June) from Somalia after being trained "by brethren who made the interim government ungovernable", an apparent reference to Somalia's al-Qaeda linked al-Shababa-Islamist.

It can be seen that the earlier perception of Boko Hara originating

from Nigeria or being purring a Nigerian affair or constituting members from Nigeria May not be correct after all. The membership of the sect is wide and is evident from the spate of activities of the group across Nigerian borders.

It is therefore necessary and imperative that to curtail the Boko Haram activities in Nigeria and beyond their high need for a corroborative effects by Nigeria and her neighbours, especially the immediate ones such; Cameroon, Chad, Niger, Benin and equatorial guinea .the kind of collective security being referred will reduce membership and recruitment of Boko Haram and wakening the group strength.

Trainings: The sister states of Africa irrespective of the sub-regional location have been on red alert to ensure that military or Para-military trainings do not take place in their territories. According military authorizes in both Nigeria and Cameroon, the two nations have resolved never to allow further victories to any terrorist group(s). It needs to stop all clandestine training the two countries and other vital locations. Intelligence networks all African states were highlighted. Formations of regional joint military operations were agreed by Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Benin. The group has since come into force with a Nigeria commander. The observations since coming into effect of the group are that incessant

attacks have reduced humanitarian problems occasioned by terrorist operations have equally gone down and refugees and internal displaced persons(IDP) in Nigeria Cameroon and other places affected by Boko Haram insurgence have dropped significantly. Indeed actions taken against clandestine trainings by terrorist groups are largely responsible for reduction in terrorist attacks/operations.

4.1.3 Military Operations

Over the years, the most preferred options in tackling insurgence or terrorist organization is military confrontation. Nigeria just like every government that tries to exhibit or show its capability to protect the Lives and property of its citizens has to encourage its successive governments to adopt military confrontation in tackling terrorism through the establishment of Joint Task Force (JTF) and declaration of state of emergency. Subsequently in the year 2000, the Olusegun Obasanjo government launched a military expedition at Odi in Bayelsa State to quell the menace of the militants.

In 2007, it then set up a joint military and police task force (JTF) to battle the militants in River State. The same military action has been at play in the Boko Haram crisis since 2009, although not as enforced in the Olusegun Obasanjo"s regime of 2000, that is to say that president

Goodluck's administration needs the Obasanjo's administration orientation in fighting Boko Haram terrorists starting from a repeat of what happened in Odi in Bayelsa where Obasanjo government launched a military expedition.

It is of paramount importance to note that the adoption of this option is not only derived on the fact that most governments and leaders of the world see or rather regard terrorists as criminals who must be brought to book and penalized but also because the general principle of non-negotiation with terrorists state that:

The government should not engage in dialogue and negotiation with group which are actively engaged in promoting, committing, or supporting terrorism. To do so only lends the terrorists publicity, status and worst of all, a spurious respectability (wilkson 1981).

According to Vanguard Newspaper (June 17,2011) the federal government has directed the immediate establishment of a special joint military Task Force specifically to tackle the Boko Haram.

The task force to be headed by a major General of the Armored Corps could comprise the Nigerian Army, Nigerian Navy, Nigerian Air force, Nigeria police force, defense intelligence Agency and the Department of state security, S.S.S (NBF News 2012).

Already Vanguard gathered that about 200 operatives of the S.S.S arrived Maiduguri, 300 officers of the Nigeria Airforce, 300 officers of the Nigerian Navy and 500 soldiers of the Army with their force commander, are deployed for action. It was gathered that at the end of the day, Nigerian Army would have two battalions of soldiers in place, the Nigeria police will deploy 1,500 officers, and S.S.S would have 500 operatives, the Airforce 680 officers while the Nigeria Navy will have 750 officers deployed.

Director, Army public relations Brigadia General Rafael Isa, told vanguard there were plans to support operations there, but said he could not confirm if the troops had been deployed. It could be recalled that the Inspector General of police, made an operational visit to maduguri, the Borno state capital, where he received 10 Armored Personnel carriers donated by the state government to the police to fight Boko Haram menace.

The joint security Task force has commenced deployment to the conflict zone with its headquarters at Maidduguri, which is the centrally located capital of Borno state, and the force commander of the JSTF is a senior officer of the Armored Corps, Major General Jack Okechukwu Nwaogbo. Maiduguri already plays host of the headquarters garrison of the 21 Armored Brigades, a formation that has earned for itself a reputation for toughness, which is expected to actively support the operations of the ad-

hoc JSTF (Daily trust April 2, 2012).

Going by the recent development in the country in the area of declaring state of emergency in Maiduguri of Borno state, Yobe state, Adamawa state etc. it is now very clear and obvious that the federal government cannot curb these menace in exclusion of the military, that is the only available avenue that will proffer solution to the non-going Boko Haram crisis. The position of the military here cannot be over looked or neglected and its importance cannot be over emphasized.

The position of the military is not just killing the perpetrators of these acts, but in making adequate efforts which will end the seeming chaotic situation in the country.

Soldiers from Lagos, part of an expected 1,000 reinforcements sent to Adamawa state to fight Boko Haram Islamists, with 23rd Armored Brigade, Yola May 20, 2013. It has been less than 10 days since the Nigerian military began what it calls a "massive" offensive against Boko Haram, the extremist Islamists militant group that claims ties to Al-Qaeda and recently captured portions of the country's northeast.

While military officials claim to have killed dozens of its fighters and arrested hundreds of its members, destroying their encampments and retaking at least five districts since the campaign began, none of the

information is verifiable. With phone lines down and roads blocked, no independent observers are present along the front lines and some aid workers fled the region after an attack the previous Saturday.

Hussaini Abdul, head of the anti-poverty organization Aid in Abuja, saying the military's information blackout is meant to achieve two aims. One is the possible constraint the communications of the insurgents groups but its also to disallow the public from accessing such information that can be used to put pressure on the military. "He said," so if there are issues of right violations; if there are cases of killing of innocent people and all those things, if people get to know it, we report in the media it will put pressure on them. And the military will typically see it as distraction.

Renowned for its peacekeeping successes across Africa, the Nigerian military, some experts say, possesses the weaponry and man power to beat back the insurgency. But faced with a battle unlike any it has fought past successes abroad may not translate to victory at home. Although the military released a statement on Friday saying no civilians have been killed in the conflict, and nine of 12 women and children had been rescued from Boko Haram kidnappers, Amnesty international issued a report on Thursday saying that the military has a history of rights violations. In recent weeks, the rights group saying, it has received reports

of arbitrary arrests and soldiers dumping bodies at morgues.

According to Abdul, the Nigerian military has not fought a guerilla war since the country's civil war in the 1960s, and only recently saw Boko Haram take form of an enemy it was well prepared to defeat. They are trained to fight territorial battles says Abdul, explaining that Boko Haram's recent military style attacks and seizures of northern districts compelled the military's aggressive response. "They are not trained to fight with the guerillas, so when those terrorist began to emerge personally, I think they were excited about it, they could go to the games reserve and drop bombs and disperse the training centers. They could go to borders, cordon the areas, and arrest everybody." While the military appears poised to beat back the insurgency, political analysis against and former university of Nigeria researcher Nkwachukwu Orji says, Boko Haram has a history of appearing to succumb to defeat only to return stronger, better armed and more violent. "They are going to fight to reclaim those territories that Boko Haram already controls he said. "And when what happens to Boko Haram is that they will definitely find their way and escape to Niger, to Cameroon, distant places for some time and watch what will happen after the six months emergency (rule)".

When the battle is won, Orji says, the military will be able to force

Boko Haram to participate in peace talks which in the past, the group has rejected the military says it has faced fierce resistance in its offensive against Islamist insurgents who are armed with weapons from Libya.

Nigerian soldiers arrived in Yola as they continued their offensive to drive out Boko Haram militants from the area. Nigeria's military has been involved in heavy fighting with Islamist insurgents armed with sophisticated weapons from Libya as it steps up an offensive aimed at flushing out Boko Haram from its north eastern bases.

"They have been putting up fierce resistance and they are very well-armed with weapons from Libya", a senior military official told the Guardian, adding that most of the militants who have waged a four-year battle to create an Islamist state have scattered across the regions semi-desert borders.

A renewed military campaign, including aerial bombardments of Boko Haram training camps in three remote states which were put under emergency rule has led to the capture of almost 200 militants and the death of dozens in a week, according to the military. In one raid, an helicopter gunship was hit by anti-aircraft and anti-tank fire, a military source said.

In a sign of increase concerns about jihadist movements jumping

borders, Nigeria has also asked neighboring Niger for military support as it seeks to police 870 miles of shared desert borders. With phone lines cut off across most of the three north-eastern states as advancing soldiers try to prevent the militants from warning of approaching raids, residents fleeing across porous borders also risks destabilizing a region already reeling from a separate Islamist insurgency in Mali.

“It is only by the grace of soldiers and by virtue of my position I was able to leave the city. All the entry point to and from (Borno state capital) Maiduguri are blocked by the military but they let me through”, said Suleiman, a civil servant who quit the city at the epicenter of the insurgency with his family of four. Outside the city walls, he said, trucks carrying food and market produce were lined up awaiting entrance.

“We have been used to seeing soldiers and checkpoints for the past two years in Maiduguri but it is having a real impact on the economic activity,” he added. In Maiduguri, where militants are deeply enmeshed in the population, soldiers carrying out house to house searches after placing 24-hour curfew in some neighborhoods, discovered stock piles of weapons including rocket propelled grenades, a defense spokesperson said.

“Life has still not returned to normal in these areas, shops aren’t open. People are just sitting at home scared and sweating” said Amina, a

secretary in the 202 neighborhood. They arrested a lot of people here in operations in the night” Nigeria military already assisting a west African-led force in Mali, has asked for help from Niger. We currently have military operations under way in Nigeria in three federal states to combat terrorism and we could live to Nigeria’s support in the common fight against these terrorist” said Nurudeen Muhammed, Nigeria’s Minister of state for foreign affairs. He did not specify what kind of military co-operation that might mean.

4.1.4 Niger’s Military Assistance Against Boko Haram

Nigeria has asked its northern neighbor, Niger for help in an offensive against Boko Haram insurgents, as West African state try to co-operate against a spread of Islamist Violence. An insurgence source in Niger said security had been tightened along the thinly populated border and military police were searching vehicles for Boko Haram fighters who might be fleeing the past week’s onslaught on their bases in Nigeria.

A Nigerian minister delivered a request for assistance late Monday May 20, 2013, in the Niger capital Niamey, but gave no detail on what Niger role may be. The success of Al Qaeda associates in seizing a swathe of Mali last year prompted West African leaders to co-operate more against militants seeking an Islamic emirate.

Nigeria and Niger signed a mutual defense pact in October 2012 and soldiers from Niger, as well as Chad, joined Nigeria forces in an assault on Boko Haram fighters last month in the shores of Lake Chad. Nigerian lawmakers from both houses passed motorist approving emergency powers granted to the military.

Nigeria's military offensive against Boko Haram strongholds this week has left at least 21 insurgents dead, an official said. The attack on Sambisa forest Reserve, one of the strongholds of the Islamic sect/militants, began on Thursday 24 May, 2013.

Troops shelled the area with cannons, killing dozens of insurgents, though there was no independent confirmation of the casualties, the Associated press reported. Director of Defense Information Brigadier – General Chris Olukolade Confirmed that co-operated offenses against militant camps across all three states are ongoing, with several already taken over or destroy in northern and central Borno, the heart of the insurrection.

The operation is expected to last as long as it takes to achieve the objectives, he told Global post on Friday May 25, 2013, adding that the number of wounded or killed has not yet been determined. Anti-tank guns, vehicles and other equipment have also been captured, Olukolade said in a

late press release, military personnel are guarding international borders to prevent “escape or infiltration by insurgents”, he added.

“civilians who hide Boko Haram terrorist (BHT) will put themselves in danger as acting against the public and national interests”, said Major General Mobolaji Koleoso, chief of civil military Affairs, in a press conference in the Nigerian capital Abuja. President Goodluck Jonathan who issued an emergency decree in the area, said that the Boko Haram violence could no longer be treated as military or criminality, but now amounted to a “declaration of war”.

4.2 Nigeria Current Perception of Collective Security in Africa Continent

Nigeria operates afro-centric foreign policy. This implies that Africa is the focus of her foreign policy. And successive regimes since Nigeria independence have maintained Africa as the centre of Nigerian foreign policy. However, the activity Area” is Nigerian African policy has been West Africa. By Africa as the activity area” of Nigerian foreign policy, Ojo, F. B (2013) contends that most of the Nigeria-African policy is centre in West Africa. To some people of likes of Ojo have even asked that the term Africa as the centre piece” of Nigerian foreign policy be change to West Africa as the centre piece of Nigerian foreign policy since her commitment in West African sub-region is great than those of the rest of Africa put to together.

To buttress this claim Tompson A.A(2011) highlighted the commitment of Nigerian government in sister West Africa countries of the cases of resolution of Liberia Sierra Leone, Ivory Coast, Mali, and a host of others were mentioned. A lot of human and material resources were reportedly committed in those crises resolution by Nigerian Government. It was noted by Oporu B.C (2000) that contemporary Africa would not have recognized Nigeria as African-centered in foreign policy Nation but for its role in West Africa. He remarked that outside her involvement in Congo in 1962, that Niger and a few other sees collective security in Africa as limited to West Africa. She does even pay much attention to her non-West African immediate neighbours.

In

In any case, this study has noticed a sharp change in Nigeria perception of collective security in Africa continent. This new trend can be seen in the recent efforts in collective terms by Nigeria with her immediate neighbours in contain terrorism (Boko Haram offensive). The neighbours in collective fight arrangement with Nigeria as identified in this study include: Republic of Cameroon, Benin, Chad, Niger, Equatorial Guinea. In the past experts such as Garba M. (2006) and Faith I.A (2009) believe that Nigeria has two major reasons for not applying collective security in broad terms. First, they claim that Nigeria sees West Africa as special or home because it belongs

to that sub-region. Second she is careful always dealing with Arab world including those of Africa (North Africa) and has reservations relating to liberate sub-regions with Apartheid back group. So while playing hegemonic role in Africa, Nigeria is careful not to attract political stiff opposition within the Africa continent. Third she was more at home in dealing with West Africa non-colonels of Great Britain than those of other sub-regions.

4.2.1 Constraints on Nigeria's Foreign Policy in Relation to her Immediate Neighbours

Nigeria's relationship towards her immediate neighbours since the formal termination of colonial rule in the sub-region has not been particularly cordial. It has been marked by "mutual suspicions, distrust and outright alienation" (Ate and Akinterinna, 1992). This is compounded by the neo-colonial connections of France to many of these countries. (Ate1992). Even though, Nigeria with her huge population and natural resources enjoys an overwhelming military superiority over its five immediate neighbours put together, in terms of size and armament, which ought to have been translated into a more self-confident posture in the sub-region, this is not the case (Imobighe in Ate and Akinterinna, 1992). In terms of policy formulations and responses to threats from her immediate neighbours,

Nigeria still shows palpable signs of timidity and low self esteem (Ate 1992). However, this obvious frosty relationship between Nigeria and her neighbours to us is ironic, given the linguistic, cultural and ancestral relationships that exist between these countries. For instance the old Oyo Empire which included the kingdom of Dahomey extended into the present day republics of Benin and Togo (world encyclopedia; Friedmann, 1969). Kanem Bornu Empire extended into the Republic of Chad; a sizeable part of Niger Republic was part of the Sokoto caliphate; while the present southern Cameroun was part of Eastern and Northern Nigeria. (Friedmann 1969 in Ate 1992). The present day Adamawa people in Adamawa State in North East Nigeria still have a strong cultural and ancestral affinity with Cameroun to the point that the Lamido of Adamawa at the just concluded National conference threatened to lead his people to Cameroun if Nigeria does not get it right this time. (Vanguard Newspapers March 26,2014).

One issue that has exacerbated this tension between Nigeria and her contiguous neighbours is frequent boundary crisis. This according to Ade Ajayi & Crowther (1972) is due to the indiscriminate way and manner in which Africa was delimited by the Europeans at Berlin in 1885 without given regard to Ethno – religious, linguistic and ancestral affiliations. This is made worse by the wholesale acceptance of these artificial boundaries

by African states as shown in the OAU Charter. Again cold war tension between the East and the West also exerted pressures between Nigeria and her neighbours, as African states were not allowed to form their own security/military networks but tied to the apron strings of their colonial masters. Thirdly and most importantly is the hegemonic presence of France within the sub-region. France, the erstwhile colonial master of these countries has a strong tie with them. The significance of all these is that it ensured continuous colonial linkage which undermined national and regional security perspective. According to Ate (1992), this situation made it difficult for Nigeria and her immediate neighbours to reconcile their security interests. The French regimes of de Gaulle successfully prevented the idea of a customs Union championed by Olympio of Togo. While the government of France under Pompidou encouraged the formation of a Francophone West African community (CEAO) in order to frustrate the initial attempt at the founding of ECOWAS in mid 1973 (Ate and Akinterinwa 1992). France, for strategic, economic and other interests has subtly implanted the fear in Francophone West Africa that given Nigeria's pre-eminence in the power configuration of the sub-region, she cannot but be a predator, a dominator of domestic market, in short a sub-imperialist (Oloruntimehin, 1988 in Ate & Akinterinwa, 1992). This has made these

countries to suspect most of Nigeria's actions no matter how well-intentioned they may be. Therefore any Nigerian policy targeted at these five neighbours has to take into consideration French interests. As we have noted before in the work based on the works of various scholars: (Vogt, 1987; James 1987; Oshuntokun, 1992; Ate & Akinterinwa, 1992), Nigeria is seriously threatened by the activities of her immediate neighbours who are mostly Franco-phone countries. The bilateral military, political and economic agreements between France and her erstwhile colonial states are largely attributed to the frequency with which these countries infringe on the sovereignty of Nigeria (Omede, 2006). Furthermore the experiences of the Nigerian civil war, various incidents of religious disturbances instigated from outside (Niger and Chad) and refugee problems are other sources of tension between Nigeria and her immediate neighbours. Land and sea borders disputes e.g Cameroun is also another source of the frosty relationship between Nigeria and her immediate neighbours. This relationship has made Nigeria's foreign policy makers to be „confused“, „naive“ and timid in terms of policy formulation and implementation towards these neighbours. (Ate & Afinterinwa, 1992). Other scholars have described the country's foreign policy as being too idealistic, lacking in focus, and bereft of a realistic theoretical frame work and being out of

harmony with modern challenges and therefore called for a review. (Pine 2011; Ibijola & Opeyemi, 2013; Olusanya & Akindele, 1990; Adebajo & Mustapha 2008; Agreen 2010).

Again scholars have also expressed the need for Nigeria to adopt a foreign policy measure that will focus on how her national interest can be better served. That Nigeria should not be blinded by her „Afro-centric“ foreign policy and act on sentiment on matters regarding any African country; that we should only act when we have a common interest with any country (Akinyemi,1987). For instance Oshuntokun (1989) posits “being on the same continent with some caucasians like the Arabs and the White South Africans does not mean that we have common interests...our interests and those of the Arabs do not necessarily cohere “He thus advocated for a strong tie between Nigeria and our immediate neighbours. This position shall be focus of this section. It is our considered opinion that for Nigeria to successfully contain the menace of terrorism within her borders there is urgent need for her to forge a strong security tie with her contiguous neighbours. This is imperative given the fact that according to research, nationals of our immediate neighbours have been fingered in the spate of crisis rocking the country (Solomon, 2012). According to the research, the Nigerian police revealed in January 2012 that out of 200

suspects of terror arrested over the Kano attacks, 160 were Chadians. Also in another attack by the insurgents a Nigerien was reported to be among the insurgents (Solomon, 2012). The case of Chad is particularly instructive. Chad is a fertile ground for breeding insurgents, as no government has been able to bring the whole of the country under its control in the last 50 years. Large swathes of the country have been and are still under the control of rebel leaders and the central government has been unable to change the situation for years.

Apart from Nigeria, Chad shares borders with at least four countries that are struggling with insurgency namely: Central African Republic, Sudan, Libya and Cameroon. Thus, according to an official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Chad is a rebel country where terrorists are trained and equipped. Security sources revealed that many of Boko Haram members and commanders are Chadians most of who have lived in Borno State and adjoining parts of the country and are familiar with states in the North-east. (Tell Magazine November 3, 2014). Furthermore, former Senate President Dr. Iyorchia Ayu was reported to have stated at the 5th convocation lecture of the Adekunle Ajasin University that “the oil wealth beneath the Chad Basin is fanning the embers of insurgency in the country because of prominent businessmen and politicians in both Nigeria and

Chad in association with French companies have invested heavily in oil exploration and exploitation. They are the principal financiers of and arms suppliers to Boko Haram. The group's destabilization of the Northern part of Nigeria benefits these investors because it delays exploration and production on the Nigerian side of Lake Chad."

The Lake Chad basin is estimated to have a reserve of 2.32 billion barrels of oil and 14.65 billion cubic feet of natural gas. The oil and gas flows underground across the countries sharing the Lake Chad basin. Nigeria, Chad, Niger and Cameroun using 3D drilling Chad is not only tapping oil from its territories but also from Nigeria to push up its production levels. Boko Haram is made up of Nigerians and a large member of Chadians from the Chadian provinces of Lac and Hadjer Lamis provinces that share a long border with North- Eastern Nigeria around the Lake Chad region. Boko Haram has so far not attacked any territory in Chad but has a cluster of bases in Chad from where it launches its terrorist activities in Nigeria. President Idris Deby of Chad is said to have cordial relations with the insurgents. (Nwamu, 2014: Leadership Newspaper, Nov 10, 2014).

In the same research, the Nigerian Ambassador to Chad Amb, Omaki was reported as "saying that all manner of people from different parts of Africa

(some of which have witnessed extreme religious and political strives) melt into Chad. From there they then find their way into neighbouring countries. So Chad is of strategic importance to Nigeria and I think we should re-evaluate our relationship on that basis on the fact that this country is a major corridor between Nigeria and other countries in Africa".(Solomon, 2012).

Further, newspaper reports have also indicated that these insurgents have been getting cross-border assistance from Cameroun, Niger, Chad, Mali etc (Vanguard newspaper, May 10, 2014). Solomon (2012) also revealed that Boko Haram and other roughish groups usually use our borders to smuggle in arms and their foreign collaborators because they provide them with easier option to convey their weapons of mass destruction. The unmanned miles of desert also provide the insurgents the ideal base for the training of their members without fear of detection or arrest. And after conducting raids and attacks these insurgents disappeared into these neighbouring countries (Vanguard Newspapers May 10, 2014). Coupled with this fact is the unwillingness of our neighbours to collaborate with Nigeria in the fight against terrorism. It is in the light of this that one would want to commend the Nigerian government for getting France to summon her Franco-phone neighbour countries to Paris for a

security summit. (Voice of Nigeria May 22, 2014) That move though belated was very strategic for the reasons we have stated elsewhere in this work. But it bears repeating that France has a strong tie with her former colonies in the sub-region and it may have been an uphill task for Nigeria to get their co-operation without her (France) involvement; given the many years the Nigerian authorities have allowed the tension -soaked relationship between her and her neighbours to fester.

As we stated before in this work, Nigeria's relationship with her immediate neighbours had not been particularly cordial even though nearly all of them had benefited from Nigeria's diplomatic benevolence -for example Nigeria supplies power to Niger, gave the Republic of Benin 2.5m US Dollars to pay outstanding workers salaries in 1989(Nwokedi in Ate & Akinterinwa, 1992). To us Nigeria should take a greater part of the blame. Nigeria had failed to assert herself where it mattered most, thus allowing smaller courtiers we have helped to treat us with disdain. In the words of Bolaji Akinyemi, former Nigeria's external Affairs minister: "The truth of the matter is that relatively rich and powerful states are usually envied and not loved.... Nigeria is not necessarily going to be loved, even by those states which are beneficiaries of our assistance. What we shall demand is not love but respect. Respect for what we are and respect for what we stand

for. And this will be achieved by the vigorous pursuit of policies which will in effect, blunt the challenges to Nigeria"s national interests". (Akinyemi,1987).

Nigeria had in the past bungled opportunities she had to forge a strong security ties with her contiguous neighbours. For instance Obayuwana (2014), revealed that Nigeria jettisoned a 30 -year old frame work for neighbourhood security co-operation between her and Republic of Benin, Ghana & Togo signed in December 1984. (This agreement was meant in part to deal with security challenges that may arise from countries sharing common borders, which on that account might be vulnerable to external destabilizing force (Guardian Newspapers May 05, 2014). He also averred that instead of Nigeria with a history of porous borders to extend the mechanism to other countries like Chad, Cameroun and Niger, it curiously allowed the arrangement to go moribund. For Nigeria to be able to contain terrorism within her territory and the sub-region, she needs to revamp her foreign policy towards these countries. She must of necessity be interested in the goings-on within those her neighbours for it are not a coincidence that Maiduguri the hot bed of the terrorist activities in Nigeria shares boundary with Chad and Cameroun. She needs to adopt a realistic foreign policy. In the concluding section we shall elucidate on the new

policy framework Nigeria should adopt in this era of terrorism.

Chapter Five

5.0 Summary, Conclusion and Recommendations

5.1 Summary

This study on “Terrorism and foreign policy of Nigeria Towards her Immediate Neighbours” has revealed a lot about Nigeria-Africa policy. From our investigations, Nigeria foreign policy is largely Afro-centric, but has greater emphasis on West Africa sub-region. This sub-region is regarded as her “Activity Area”. The work revealed that Nigeria though has Africa as the centre-piece of her foreign policy, her focus in collective security issues before the advent of Boko Haram terrorist group was on West Africa.

Nigeria master mined the formation and use of a military wing of Economic community of West Africa (ECOWAS) known as ECOMUG. By deploying ECOMUG in the resolution of crises in West African sub-region, Nigeria underscores the importance of collective security approach in international relations. But she did not extend the strategy of collective security to other African states including her immediate neighbours the much she did within West Africa.

However the perception of Nigeria foreign policy in terms of

collective security has suddenly changed as a result of Boko Haram insurgence. It was noted that Nigeria has gone into military joint operations with Cameroon and some other sister states of Africa beyond her sub-region of West Africa. Such multi-national defense/military relations have in no small measures helped to aid operational success by federal Republic of Nigeria in her fight against Boko Hara sect. Nigerian has equally made huge resource commitments in both material and human regards on broad African collective security project recently though Nigeria military has not been defeated in its war against Boko Hara, we discovered that her current level of success is unequalled. This military and humanitarian achievements can be attributed to co-operations from the sister African states and the aid from some great powers such as France, the united stated of America (U.S.A) and others. In terms of humanitarian aid and services, Nigerian neighbours such as Cameroon, Niger and the rest of them have played significant role. The study showed that some internal displaced persons (IDP) from Nigeria are current staying in Cameroon, besides it was revealed also that Nigeria and haring high level co-operations in area of intelligence gathering and suvererence regarding illegal and irregular recruitments and training of youths by militant groups. Finally it was revealed

that collective security, broadly practiced discourages terrorism and

trans–border crimes. And Nigeria has changed her perception on collective security and thus has seen the need for non-discriminatory role in collective security issues.

5.2 Conclusion

On the bases of this research finding, we conclude that, foreign policy of Nigeria has recently observed dynamism as appropriate. It has accommodated a change in her African policy by allowing broader application of collective security in African states and affairs. Nigeria's neighbours, especially those of her immediate domain have role to play in the fight against Boko Haram.

It is equally part of our conclusion based on this work that international co-operations especially those involving Nigeria immediate neighbours has yielded greater success in curtailing the activities of Boko Hara sect in Nigeria and beyond her borders. Finally, we infer that contemporary African events, including terrorism, are compelling Nigeria to re-view her African policy in such a way that other Africa states, irrespective of the sub-region of origin will be accommodated.

5.3 Recommendations

Having concluded this study, we make bold to offer the

following recommendations:

- (1) That the federal Republic of Nigeria (FRN) should Endeavour to establish military bases in all the African countries sharing borders with it. Such actions have helped united state of American (USA) in her foreign policy.
- (2) That Nigeria spending in collective security at the Africa level should be equitably spread among African states sub-regional partitioning notwithstanding.
- (3) That Nigeria afro-centric policy be reveled to reflect the realities of contemporary African events.
- (4) That Nigeria foreign policy in contemporary Africa should be pro-active. This will enable effective intelligence gathering that will detect problems before they emerge.
- (5) That border security by Nigeria should be over hauled in a way that it will meet the current regime "change" project. By this one is advocating corruption free borders.
- (6) That Nigerian diplomats should be allowed significant role on security matters. Nigeria missions abroad should have effective propaganda machinery and intelligence units.
- (7) That regular meetings between the president of the federal Republic

of Nigeria and service chiefs should be held. This measure will improve account ability in military security and border issues without leakages.

- (8) That morale of “fighting force” whether at national or international level should be made high. It must be ensured that they are given enhanced packages in pay and allowances. Their family should be looked after by the military authorities while the operations lasted or in case of fallen or deceased.

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