**AN ASSESSMENT OF NIGERIA’S FOREIGN POLICY UNDER THE ADMINISTRATION GOODLUCK JONATHAN IN RELATION**

**WITH ECOWAS**

**By**

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**U14/MSS/IRE/008**

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**ENUGU STATE.**

**JULY, 2018.**

**TITLE PAGE**

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**FAULTY OF MANAGEMENT AND SOCIAL SCIENCES,**

**GODFREY OKOYE UNIVERSITY,**

**UGWUOMU – NIKE, ENUGU.**

**ENUGU STATE.**

**IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE**

**REQUIREMENTS FOR THE AWARD OF THE**

**BACHELOR OF SCIENCE (B.SC), DEGREE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS.**

**JULY, 2018.**

**DECLARATION**

I hereby declare that the project entitled **“**An Assessment Of Nigeria’s Foreign Policy Under The Administration Goodluck Jonathan In Relation With ECOWAS” was written by Ogu, Stella Ihunanyachi, with the registration number U14/MSS/IRE/008, a bona fide student of the department of International Relations, Godfrey Okoye University, Ugwuomu Nike Enugu, for the award of Bachelor of Science (B.Sc), Degree in International Relations, under the guidance and supervision of Mr. W.O. Okonkwo. During the 2017/2018 academic session.

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**APPROVAL PAGE**

This research project was examined, read and approved by the under-signed, as having met the requirements for the award of the Bachelor of Science (B.Sc) Degree International Relations.

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**DEDICATION**

To Almighty God, family and friends.

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The credit for the actualization of this complete work goes to numerous persons who have made invaluable contribution toward its success, even though time and space constraint would not permit me to list all their names.

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***Abstract***

*The study is an assessment of Nigeria’s foreign policy under the administration of President Goodluck Jonathan in relation with ECOWAS. This work is necessitated on the premise that no state in the modern times can avoid involvement in international affairs, and this involvement must be systematic and based on certain principles. The objective of this work was to determine if Nigeria’s policy under the period in view had significant impact on Nigerian global image. Data for this study was obtained from secondary sources; the expose facto research design was adopted while the qualitative descriptive method was adopted to analyze data. The concentric circles theory formed a framework of analysis. The research unfolded findings that Nigerian foreign policy under Jonathan’s administration had less positive impact on Nigeria’s global image; internal challenges were responsible for poor implementation of policies. The study recommended the re-implementation of Nigeria’s vital interest, which involves the security of lives and properties, protection of her society and defense of independence. Nigerians in Diaspora must be recognized and encouraged because they play a permanent role in advancing the foreign policies of the country.*

**CHAPTER ONE**

**INTRODUCTION**

**1.1 Background of the Study**

All states have some kind of relations with one another. No state in the modern times can avoid the involvement in the international affairs, and this involvement must be systematic and based on certain principles. In other words, states have to behave with one another in a particular manner. The framing of the foreign policy is, therefore, an essential activity of a modern state, for a state without foreign policy is like a ship without rider which may drift aimlessly and may be swept away by a storm of current events. What a state intends to do is defined by its interests; what is actually able to achieve is a function of its military and economic capability as well as the quality of its diplomacy. The history of Nigerian foreign policy since 1960 has constantly been changing, though the principles guiding her foreign relations remain the same (Gambari, 1989). Nigerian leaders are largely responsible for these unstable external relations. Apparantly, Nigeria’s foreign policy is deeply rooted in Africa with strategic emphasis on political and economic cooperation, peaceful dispute resolution, and global nonalignment (Gambari, 1989). Nigerian leaders also have their attention fixed on the successful implementation of these principles. However, the influence of individual personality on Nigeria’s relations with other countries cannot be totally ignored as different leaders adopt different styles in conducting external relations.

Examining the personality of the leader both at the theoretical and practical levels is therefore important to the understanding of Nigeria’s foreign policy. This is largely due to the fact that critical historical analysis revealed that the country’s foreign policy is synonymous to personality of the leader on board at any given time. However, it is important to accentuate that Nigeria’s foreign policy started at moderate level since independence in 1960. This may be largely due to smooth power relinquishing that occurred between Nigeria and the then colonial master (Britain). The crux of the matter remains that, there was nothing in the pattern and traditions of Nigerian foreign policy from independence to the emergence of Sani Abacha as Head of state to suggest that the country would become a pariah state in the international system. Even the speech of the Prime Minister, Tafawa Balewa on Independence Day October 1, 1960 seemed to indicate that Nigeria was properly focused and her mind set firmly directed at the goal of her foreign policy. He declared thus;

I have indeed very confident that, based on the happy experience of a successful partnership our future relations with the United Kingdom will be more cordial than ever, bound together as we shall be in the common wealth by a common allegiance to her majesty Queen Elizabeth whom we proudly acclaim as Queen of Nigeria (hence) we are grateful to the British Officers who we have known, first as masters and then as leaders and finally as partners but always as friends (Balewa, 1960:26).

Immediately after, on October 7, 1960, Nigeria registered herself as the 99th member of the United Nations thereby becoming a recognized member of the international community. By her resources and even size, Nigeria was at the fore-front of Africa, providing with others, the necessary leadership and to fight the clutches of colonialism, neo-colonialism, underdevelopment, poverty, famine and racial discrimination. In fairness, some leaders gave the nation its right of place.

President Olusegun Obasanjo, at inauguration in May, 1999, inherited a nation with a battered image and without credibility externally. In his determination to regain Nigeria’s lost glory and re-integrate it into the civilized world, he engaged in a deft shuttle diplomacy across the major capitals of the globe. It is in view of the above imperative that the study is set to examine the gains and challenges of Obasanjo’s administration on Nigeria foreign policy in the 21st century.

President Good luck Jonathan following his victory in the 2011 elections, before the anxious 100 days in office, directed presidential advisory council on international relations (PACIR) to coordinate the reforming of Nigeria's foreign policy to be investment oriented. Coupled with his interactive forum with Nigerians abroad during his foreign visits, the president asked the nation's foreign policy experts, seasoned diplomats, professionals and intelligentsia to chart a new way for the future without discarding the past.

**1.2 Statement of the Problem**

Relations between Nigeria and other state and non–state actors in international politics from 1999 onward were based on democratic principles. The tit-for-tat diplomacy of late Gen. Sani Abacha, de facto President of Nigeria from 1993 to 1998 had greatly damaged the image of Nigeria. The government was accused of human rights abuses and was repeatedly condemned by the U.S. State Department. There were break in relationship with many countries with threats of economic sanctions from others. Apart from this, the government was characterized by an inconsistent foreign policy which made Nigeria a scorn in the comity of nations.

The goal of every foreign policy is to establish and maintain a cordial relationship with other nations as well as to build a good image for a nation and meet its national or domestic interest. This invariably means that foreign policy is important in formulating, maintaining and sustaining a nation's good image. The Jonathan administration, like many other administrations in Nigeria has never lacked good foreign policies. The problem of Nigeria's foreign policy that is affecting the country's image is not in formulation, but in implementation [Nwankwo O (2013)].

In response to this, the research work therefore aims at assessing Nigerian foreign policy under President Goodluck Jonathan's administration from 2011-2015. The research will also find out the extent of implementation of the foreign policy issues that President Jonathan focused on to implement.

**1.3 Research questions**

1. Did Nigeria’s Foreign Policy under Goodluck Jonathan regime have any positive impact on Nigerian’s image globally?
2. How has ECOWAS enhanced Nigerian’s economic development?
3. What were the challenges of implementation of Nigeria's foreign policy Under Goodluck Jonathan's administration?

**1.4 Objectives of the study**

This study has both broad and specific objectives. The broad objective of this study is to evaluate Nigeria’s foreign policy under the administration of President Goodluck Jonathan 2011 to 2015, in relation with Ecowas. However, the specific objectives are as follows:

1. To determine if Nigeria’s [**Foreign**](https://www.omicsonline.org/searchresult.php?keyword=foreign)Policy under President Goodluck Jonathan regime had any implication on Nigeria's global image.
2. To examine how ECOWAS enhanced Nigerian’s economic development.
3. **To ascertain** the challenges of implementation of Nigeria's foreign policy Under Goodluck Jonathan's administration

**1.5 Scope of the Study**

This study focuses on Nigeria’s foreign policy under the administration of President Goodluck Jonathan 2011 to 2015, in relation with its achievements with the regional body of Ecowas. It looks at the influence of personality on the conduct of foreign policy. Other areas which this study covers include the domestic factors that influenced the foreign policy of Goodluck Jonathan. Moreover, the key achievements of Goodluck Jonathan foreign policy as regards domestic economic growth, political stability, regional security, and international participation are covered in this research. However, the research will be limited to the foreign policy implementations of President Goodluck Jonathan and does not intend to provide a biography of the man nor do a comprehensive study of all his political activities in Nigeria.

**1.6 Limitations of the Study**

In producing a work like this, the problem that confronted the researcher was not the scarcity of materials, but its availability. More so, this research work is contemporary and politically sensitive. The researcher therefore was confronted with the problem of interpretation of the actions of President Goodluck Jonathan as some of the policies initiated are still an on-ongoing process. Time and funds served as serious impediments to this research.

**1.7 Significance of the Study**

This study has theoretical and practical significance. Theoretically, it will add to already existing knowledge in the field of foreign relations and related fields. Practically;

1. It will be useful to scholars’ especially diplomatic historians, political scientists, economists and international relations experts in their research. Diplomats like ambassadors, high commissioners and staffers of foreign ministries will benefit from the work
2. The study will be of paramount importance to decision makers and the would-be diplomats for it traces the historical development of Nigeria foreign policy since 1960.
3. It will help to re-affirm the bold attempt made by the democratic governments under various administrations, especially that of Goodluck Jonathan.
4. This research work will help in providing information on the domestic factors that influenced Nigeria’s foreign policy under President Goodluck Jonathan from 2011 to 2015.
5. The political and military class will learn, through this study, the need for them to be patriotic.

**1.8 Hypotheses**

Based on the research questions and objectives of the study, the following hypotheses were formed.

1. Nigeria’s Foreign Policy under Goodluck Jonathan’s regime impacted positively on Nigerian’s global image.
2. Ecowas has positively enhanced Nigerians economic development.
3. Nigeria's foreign policy Under Goodluck Jonathan's administration suffered poor implementation.

**CHAPTER TWO**

**REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE**

This section is an examination of past works of other authors, analysts expressed in past projects and textbooks. The examination will be done under the following headings and sub-headings.

1. **Conceptual Clarification**

Foreign Policy

National Interest

National Development

1. **Historical Review of Nigeria’s Foreign Policy**

First Republic

Second Republic

Military Rule

Fourth Republic (Olusegun Obasanjo)

Yar’Adua/Jonathan Administration (2007-2014)

Domestic Factors Influencing Nigeria’s Foreign Policy

Nexus between Foreign Policy, International Image and National Transformation

Gap in Literature

**Foreign Policy**

Foreign policy is defined by Goldstein and Pevehouse (2011:103) as the “strategies that government use to guide their actions in the international arena…they spell out the objectives which state leaders have decided to pursue in a given relationship or situation”.

Carlsnaes (2008:335) approached the definition of foreign policy in a more detailed form. He argued that it:

…consists of those actions which, expressed in the form of explicitly stated goals, commitments and/or directives, and pursued by governmental representatives acting on behalf of their sovereign communities, are directed toward objectives, conditions and actors – both governmental and non-governmental – which they want to affect and which lie beyond their territorial legitimacy.

This implies that, for countries to relate effectively with one another, foreign policy must be well defined, well thought out, and must possess direction. Hence, Adeniran (1982:185) infers that foreign policy can best be understood through an explanation of what it actually is. Foreign policy, according to him consists of three elements. One is the „overall orientation and policy intentions‟ of a particular country toward another. The second element is the „objective‟ that a country seeks to achieve in her relations or dealings with other countries. The third element of foreign policy is the „means‟ for achieving that particular goal or objectives.

According toLegg and Morrison (1971) “foreign policy is a set of explicit objectives with regard to the world beyond the borders of a given social unit and a set of strategies and tactics designed to achieve those objectives”. This understanding subscribes to the designation of plans and clear cut strategies for actualization of those plans. It is idealist because it fails to take cognizance of the contingencies in the international system in terms of the unpredictability of behaviors of international actors.

Another conceptualization of foreign policy emerged from the obvious shortcoming of the above view. This view was well articulated by Vital (1968). To him, “foreign policy implies rather a field of related but distinct actions and issues in which there neither is nor can be foreign policy”. According to his thesis, the realities of states‟ behavior entail decisions and policies being formulated in a disjointed fashion, largely in response to immediate pressures and events, in a number of separate structures and issue areas. Thus, Frankel’s (1964 and 1975) conception of foreign policy “as a dynamic process of interaction between the changing domestic demands and the changing external circumstances” is apt in the light of occurrences in contemporary global political order.

Ade-Ibijola (2013:565) simply defined Nigerian foreign policy as the driving factor behind Nigeria’sinteraction with other nations of the world. He further summed it as the declared intentions of a state. This conception of foreign policy can simply be reconstructed to read as the declared intentions of a state in relation to other states.

**National Interest**

Ajayi (2004) observed that national interest is characterized with inconsistency. People do hide under the cover of national interest to project and protect their own individual or group interest. In a situation such as this, national interest does have a negative contribution to national development. But, where the interest of the people is generally projected and protected national interest can then contribute meaningfully and positively to national development.

**National Development**

The term national development is used to refer to a state of maturity which characterizes a nation-state. This maturity results from the interplay of modern political, economic and social forces and processes which transform diverse people, shaping a common geographical area, from acceptance and allegiance to and participation in a transitional policy to the acceptance and creations of and participation in a modern nation-state (Amadu, 2015).

**HISTORICAL REVIEW OF NIGERIA’S FOREIGN POLICY**

Nigeria’s image crisis has historical foundation and dynamics (Ajayi, 2005:50). This section becomes relevant as it explores Nigeria’simage since 1960 in order to identify the highlights and turning points in Nigeria’simage and foreign policy.

**First Republic**

Tafawa Balewa, through his pioneering foreign policy anchored on Afrocentricism, was able to lay the foundation for Nigeria’sroles and influences in international politics which; ultimately helped to give a credible image for the country in the comity of nations (Ajayi, 2005). The expulsion of apartheid South Africa, breaking of ties with France and participation in the Non-aligned movement rang positive bells towards Nigeria’simage abroad (Folarin, 2013:21). **Second Republic**

The expelling of illegal aliens from Nigeria, in the guise of national interest, was an action that was indeed inimical to the country’s development. Over two to three million illegal immigrants were given fourteen days to leave the country. This action alone created a bad image for Nigeria abroad (Lukpata, 2013:65). Thus, Shagari’s administration was described as inhumane, callous and irresponsible. It did incalculable damage to Nigeria’sreputation and standing among the Great Powers and the developing world.

This action was so disappointing that even the opposition parties and senior officials in the Ministry of External Affairs were frustrated because most of their efforts in building a positive image for Nigeria had gone down the drain as a result (Abegunrin, 2003:107). Nigeria also lost her reputation in this period as a frontline state fighting against the apartheid in South Africa because the administration was not as active and concerned as the previous administrations (Folarin, 2013:22).

The manner in which the management of Nigeria’s presence in international organizations was organized, appeared very appalling and had made null the efforts that previous administrations had exerted to making the Nigerian image a good one on a regional and sub-regional scale (Garuba, 2008:8).

**Military Rule**

The civil war of 1967-1970, and the discovery of oil conditioned the Gowon era to a large extent. However, Nigeria was still active in the international system as evident in the recognition of China, the formation of ECOWAS, Niger Basin Commission and the Chad Basin Commission (Folarin, 2013:22). Nigeria’sefforts under Gowon against apartheid, crimes against humanity, anti-colonial and anti-racial policies were indeed commendable (Ajayi, 2005:52). The Murtala/Obasanjo regime was radical against colonialism and racism. Nigeria, under their administrations engaged in a large number of peace keeping missions and was more alert to issues of injustice mostly in Africa by promoting the causes of freedom fighters and Pan Africanism (Ajayi, 2005:52; Garuba, 2008:6). Generally, under their administrations, the country’s image can be said to have been very favorable.

The Buhari-Idiagbon regime made efforts at restoring the battered image of Nigeria after Shagari’s tenure by ushering in an anti-drug and anti-corruption policy to brighten the country’s image (Folarin, 2013:22). This regime was able to gain direction in tackling the country’s economic problems and debt incurred by Shagari’s administration. The regime was credited in 1984 for having paid promptly for all imports with foreign exchange earned by the nation and did not borrow from any international financial institution. This factor was able to re-establish Nigeria’simage in the foreign market (Ali, 2013:3).

Babangida’s regime started by claiming that, it was an offshoot of the Murtala social revolution that was later intensified by Buhari, but it instead rubbished their efforts by reinstating dismissed officials and returning all that were confiscated, deported Keeling from Nigeria, a Financial Times journalist for investigating and reporting on the Gulf War oil windfall corruption (Ojukwu and Shopeju, 2010:19). Emordi (2008:6 in Ali, 2013:5) stated that “Babangida‟sadministration institutionalized corruption as if it was a cardinal state policy”. This compounded the moral image of the country as a very corrupt country. Prospective investors found it hard to do business in the country, because of the bribes and kickbacks to the bureaucrats. The lack of credibility in the transition programme and the eventual annulment of the June 12, 1993 elections increased the downward plunge of the country’s credibility owing to the fact that international observers deemed the elections to be the most peaceful and fairest elections ever conducted in Nigeria. The regime was also acclaimed to have had disregard for human rights and was autocratic in his approach (Ajayi, 2005:52).

The height of the decline in Nigeria’s international image occurred during the late General Abacha regime. He disbanded all democratic institutions, assassinated a number of pro-democracy activists, and killed opponents and protesters. He had complete disregard for human rights and the opinion of the international community (Folarin, 2013:22). Things got worse with the execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa and his eight Ogoni kinsmen in November 1995, which put his regime at odds with the world, particularly the United Nations, the European Union and the Commonwealth. The Commonwealth in particular, outrightly suspended Nigeria from its membership because it considered all of Abacha„s conduct a gross violation of its 1991 Harare Declaration of Commonwealth Principles (Josiah, 2008 in Folarin, 2013:23) The administration initiated some measures to curb corruption like the War Against Indiscipline and Corruption (WAIC), but this was an irony in itself as his government itself was characterized by general mismanagement, “corruption of monumental dimension” (Emma, 2009 in Chukwuemeka, Bartholomew and Ugwu, 2012:71). The level of corruption was so much that it led to the ostracising of Nigeria from the comity of nations, and Nigeria became a pariah state. His administration almost emptied the government‟s treasury and after his death, over $600 million and £75 million pounds were recovered from his family (Chukwuemeka, Bartholomew and Ugwu, 2012:71).

**Fourth Republic (Olusegun Obasanjo)**

President Olusegun Obasanjo, at inauguration in May, 1999, inherited a nation with a battered image and without credibility externally. He made efforts to build the country’s image and re-integrate Nigeria into the world while regaining her lost glory through shuttle diplomacy. Under his leadership, Nigeriaassumed leadership of several international organizations like the ECOWAS, African Union (AU) and G77. Nigeria also hosted several international summits including those of the Commonwealth Heads of State and Government and the AU in 2004, the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) in 2005, and ECOWAS since 1999. The country had also hosted the All Africa Games in 2004. Obasanjo had been the guest of honour to the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) in May 2004. All these showed that the international community had begun to have confidence again in Nigeria (Ajayi, 2005).

Nigeria was able to recover most of the stolen funds in foreign banks located in Belgium, Switzerland, Britain, America and Germany. He held periodic meetings with the Nigerians in the countries that he visited from time to time in order to discuss issues of common interest and update them on government policies, as well as possible ways they can help move the country forward. He helped Nigeria regain her lost status of being the hub of air and sea transportation in Africa which was severely affected during the Abacha regime. Nigeria in this period also played a frontline role in the relations between the G8 and other developed countries. She also played a central role in the formation of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM). Obasanjo, through a US-contracted military outfit, restructured the Nigerian Military Professionals Resource Incorporation (MPRI) (Garuba, 2008:15-16).

Obasanjo’s tenure recorded remarkable achievements in the areas of peace and security. There were active engagements in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Darfur (Sudan), where it sent peacekeeping troops; the country has also held peace talks between the Sudanese government and the warring factions in Abuja. The government had equally demonstrated efforts on the restoration of peace in Liberia and Sierra Leone. In Liberia, it sponsored Nigeria‟s former leader General Abdulsalami Abubakar through ECOWAS to lead the peace process that got Charles Taylor to relinquish power, while it facilitated the second track of peace and reconciliation in Sierra Leone, in collaboration with ECOWAS and its member-states (Garuba, 2008:17). Obasanjo‟s government also championed projects such as Gulf of Guinea Commission, attempted to strengthen bilateral relations with Cameroun with which it settled the long dispute over Bakassi through the Nigeria-Cameroun Border Commission and the Republic of Benin with which it tried to address issues of cross-border crimes (Garuba, 2008:17-18). The country and her leadership enjoyed accommodation and tolerance by the international community but the ordinary citizens are often made to suffer personality pillage, inhumane treatments and abuse of fundamental human rights at embassies and off-shore. Nigeria‟s image crisis at the level of individual Nigerians, rather than the state, is yet to be resolved despite the president‟s shuttle diplomacy. Other issues which engender and sustain such image problem externally include internal insecurity, poor infrastructural base, perpetration of financial crimes and lack of organization and discipline. As much as these may be perceived as internal problems, stating these internal challenges is important because foreign policy is a reflection of domestic policies externally (Ajayi, 2005:57).

**Yar’Adua/Jonathan Administration (2007-2014)**

The election that brought President Yar‟Adua into power was reported by international observers as being flawed. The European Union specifically criticized the 2007 elections as being seriously faulty and did not meet the required international standards. This issue contributed to a decline in the country’s image. The democratic credibility of the country had become questionable as a result (Yagboyaju, 2011:99). At the time President Yar‟Adua came into office, it was worthy of note that his health had been severely threatened. While he was trying to manage his ill-health, Yar‟Adua made no provisions for the Vice President to act in his absence. Thus:

The consequence was that the ship of the Nigerian state was sailing rudderless on the international waters of foreign policy… Without functional institutions and without a leader, Nigeria’sforeign relations and indeed the State of Nigeria also went into coma when Yar‟Adua went into coma in Saudi Arabian hospital. Nigeria failed to show up at important international meetings, lost many positions in multilateral associations, forsook obligations, and foundherself in a situation where many of her allies started wondering what had gone wrong with Nigeria (Nwankwo, 2013:215).

More than external challenges, it is the internal challenges that are dampening Nigeria‟s attainment of great power status which Vision 20:2020 envisages. Key internal challenges include poor governance, insecurity of lives and property, irregular power supply, low quality public service delivery and rating of the nation‟s educational institutions; poor capacity to innovate; the unimpressive quality of its democracy and the inability to build consensus and resolve conflicts. More specifically, the insurgency in the North, the collapse of public education, growing unemployment, oil dependent economy, dilapidated economic infrastructure among others are major issues that deserve attention, if not radical government intervention (Olutokun, 2013; Okere, 2012 in Nwankwo, 2013:218).

It has become very obvious that crime and corruption are the bane of Nigeria‟s development. The current Boko Haram insurgency in the north-eastern part of the country speaks volume. These social problems, no doubt, have battered the country‟s image. Many foreign companies have had to withdraw their operations from Nigeria because of crime, corruption and insecurity. For those that managed to stay, doing business in the country has become very expensive. Therefore, there is urgent need for a holistic effort by the government, corporate bodies and individuals to stamp out the evils of insecurity, crime and corruption so that the country is relatively safe for both Nigerians and foreigners (Ajaebili, 2011:218). Internationally, the pervasive corruption in Nigeria has tarnished the image of the country and has resulted in foreign nationals exercising extreme caution in entering into business transactions with Nigerians, thereby weakening the economic sector (Chukwuemeka, Bartholomew and Ugwu, 2012:68). The Jonathan administration, like many other administrations in Nigeria has never lacked in good policies. The problem of Nigeria’s foreign policy that is affecting the country’s image is not in formulation, but in implementation (Nwankwo, 2013:220).

**Regional Analysis**

**Asia**

The search for a new role for Nigeria in world affairs involved a region by region review of its foreign policy with a view to redefining its national interests and foreign policy objectives. The main focus of this review should be on its bilateral relations with certain regional economic and military powers that have emerged in recent years. In Asia, the dominant economic and military powers are China and India. China is the second largest economy in the world after the US. It is believed it will overtake the US in the next two decades. It has the largest horde of foreign reserves in the world, and it is forging new economic relationships with Africa. It is the country of the future. Nigeria should seek to expand its existing economic ties with China.

The same situation applies to India, now the third largest economy in the world. Unlike the western powers, these two countries do not have a past colonial record in Africa. Their interest in Africa is mainly commercial, not strategic. They only seek new markets and access to Africa’s rich natural resources, particularly its oil. It is crucial for Nigeria to strengthen its economic ties with these two countries to our mutual benefit. The President should early enough embark on a trade mission to these two countries to promote direct investments by them in Nigeria.

**The US and the EU**

Nigeria still has strong economic and political ties with the western powers, particularly the US and the EU. These ties should be maintained and improved upon. Together, these countries account for over 60 per cent of direct foreign investment in Nigeria. But their share of Nigeria’s foreign trade has been falling steadily over the years. The US no longer buys Nigeria’s crude oil. But it offers through its AGOA programme the largest foreign market to non-oil exports from Nigeria. Besides, the US has strong military and strategic ties with Nigeria. It has provided some military assistance to Nigeria in its counter terrorism war. Recently, there have been some minor strains between the two countries caused by the decision of the PDP Federal Government to review the existing defence agreement for the training of the Nigerian military by the US Defence Department. The President should move quickly to restore frayed relations with the Trump administration, which fell out completely with the Jonathan Obama administration over massive public corruption in Nigeria. So far, President Obama failed to pay an official visit to Nigeria. He had visited Kenya, Ghana, South Africa and Tanzania.

In the EU, Nigeria’s focus should be on Germany, the strongest economy in the EU, and on France, mainly for strategic considerations. Nigeria’s foreign trade with both Germany and France has remained stable in recent years. There have been a lot of foreign investments in Nigeria from these two countries in the fields of communications and manufacturing.

With regard to the UK, relations with Nigeria have been normal. But the old traditional Commonwealth ties with Britain have grown weaker over the years. The UK is now an EU country, and while it is important to maintain good economic ties with her, the UK no longer has the economic clout to offer Nigeria any significant assistance. Its overall aid to Africa has been falling in recent years.

**The Middle East**

Nigeria has no real strategic interests in the Middle East. It should steer a middle course in the ongoing conflicts in the region, except that it should support the idea of a two states’ solution in resolving the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians. The wider conflict in the region should be completely avoided. On the issue of the Iran nuclear programme, Nigeria should support the ongoing negotiations between Iran and the Western powers.

**A Critical Analysis of Africa as Centerpiece of Nigeria’s Foreign Policy**

Nation-states all over the world design and implement foreign policies in order to guide their external relations as well as protect, promote and defend their vital national interests in areas such as defense of territorial integrity, the promotion of economic, military, strategic and diplomatic interests and whatever a country might consider as its vital national interest. It is therefore naturally expected that Nigeria’s foreign policy ought to be fundamentally guided by her national interest which should ordinarily serve to either justify or repudiate the nation’s action or inaction in the international relations. Since the first republic, Nigeria’s foreign policy had been largely Afro-centric in posture. In an official statement just before independence, on August 20, 1960, Prime Minister Tafawa Balewa at the Federal House of Assembly stated that Nigeria was, “adopting clear and practical policies with regard to Africa; it will be our aim to assist any country to find solution to its problem.” Similarly, one significant event that took place under late General Ironsi’s regime was the June 1966 Ambassadors’ Conference held in Lagos to re-examine the premises and directions of Nigeria’s foreign policy. Among many other things, the conference re-dedicated Nigeria to the total emancipation of all African territories still under colonial tutelage and racial discrimination.

This position was further reinforced when General Ironsi stated that, “in the whole sphere of external relations, the Government attaches greatest importance to our African policy” (Al-Hassan, 2008). It is under the above foreign policy directions, among others, that Nigeria ventured in to the complex theatre of international relations. This position could be appreciated when we consider the fact that successive regimes in Nigeria accorded significant attention to Africa as the centre-piece of Nigerian foreign policy. However, a cursory look at the various engagements made by Nigeria towards an African agenda in areas such peace keeping missions, decolonization of the continent as well as other bilateral and multilateral aid she rendered in the continent, would to a very large extent show that the omnibus nature of the principle of African centeredness in the Nigerian foreign policy does not appear to be well aligned to the country’s national interests or has not served the national interest in a commensurate measure. Nigeria has been in the forefront in the establishment and sustaining various continental and regional organizations. For instance, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) established on May 25, 1963, was primarily aimed at achieving two important objectives, namely: to ensure the quick decolonization of the remaining colonies in Africa and secondly to facilitate the rapid socio-economic growth and development of African states. In this respect, Nigeria did a lot in ensuring the implementation of the primary objectives upon which OAU was founded. For instance, in 1975, Nigeria granted the sum of N 13.5 million and military assistance to Angola’s MPLA and also enlisted diplomatic support for the Angolan government within the O.A.U.; this had greatly accorded recognition to the Angolan government by many African states who were hitherto unwilling to give such recognition. In the case of Angola, Nigerian won but at what cost? And in whose interest? Is it in the national interest of Nigeria? Well we have to turn to the man who was at the centre of all this for an answer. According to Joe Garba Nigeria’s External Affairs Commissioner then; Now, here was twenty million dollars in cash going to Angola without even a discussion of what Nigeria might gain, or even what uses it would be put to. Some might argue that to think of a quid pro quo from a country fighting for survival verges on the immoral, but two years later, no one could pin down a ‘normal’ Angola to any firm bilateral economic agreement (Garba, 1991). This might be seen as a case of acting before thinking, which Nigeria’s diplomacy over the years has been for. How can a nation where over half of its citizens are living below the poverty line continue to waste resources on ‘gifts’ and ‘grants’ to ‘needy’ countries, without thinking about her own needy citizens or the benefits to her. In fact, in international politics there is no free dinner, every ‘favor’ done ideally is targeted at a future benefit. But on the obverse, the Angolan case was clearly a mere thinking of pride, about being the ‘giant of Africa’ and about being the big brother. Despite all Nigeria did for Angola, Nigeria’s name was conspicuously absent from the list of countries that Angola paid tribute for assisting them in their independence struggle in their first appearance at the OAU Summit in Mauritius in July 1976. To cap it all, after Murtala’s death, it took Angola the whole of three weeks to express their condolence over the death of their benefactor. “When eventually the message did arrive from Angola, only its first three sentences made any reference to our tragic loss. The remainder contained another shopping list” (Garba, 1991). Also, Nigeria tried so very hard, but quite unsuccessfully to conclude an agreement with the Angolan government to allow Nigerian trawlers fish off the Angolan coast. Despite the numerous delegations that went for this agreement, their discussions were inconclusive. Later, the Angolans granted the Russians exclusive fishing right in the coast. In this consideration Joe Garba had asked thus: What, after all did Nigeria gain? High visibility in the international community; an awakening of our government officials as to what serious lobbying involved; and rallying a large percentage of our population to an international cause. But in bilateral terms which are, after all, the core of relations between states, we gave and gave to Angola, and in return got nothing. Nigeria’s deep involvement in African affairs, a pursuit that had cost the country huge financial and human resources could be seen from other endeavours undertaken by the country in other African states. Nigeria’s involvement in the ECOWAS military intervention group, ECOMOG, is a near example.

As desirable as it was to bring peace and stability to the West African sub-region, the venture had cost the nation enormous financial recourses and unspecified number of troops who lost their lives. Also, Nigeria lost about 44 soldiers in a ghastly motor accident along Gombe-Potiskum road in 2009. It could be recalled that the soldiers were just back from peace-keeping operations in Darfur. What a national tragedy in an attempt to keep peace in a sister African country. The above scenario was succinctly captured by Ambassador F. George who stated that, “The historic contributions of Nigeria to regional peace missions in Liberia and Sierra-Leon which cost the country the whooping sum US$ 10 billion, not to mention the gallant men and women of Nigerian Armed Forces who paid the supreme sacrifice in the cause of peace, are hardly acknowledged by the international community”. He further emphasized that this does include the sum of about US$ 90 billion that Nigeria single-handedly incurred in the OAU Peace Keeping Force that was deployed to Chad in 1980s. This is in addition to the sum of US$ 800 million Nigeria Trust Fund established under African Development Bank, ADB, to assist African countries obtain soft loan to execute vital projects (George, 1990, cited in Al-Hassan, 2008).

**Nigeria’s Foreign Policy Today**

The foreign policy of any nation is the external projection of some of the domestic policies of that country that may have relevance in such arena. Both domestic and foreign policies of a country are interrelated, or perhaps more accurately stated, are more inter-penetrated. It is thus appropriately defined as:

… a country’s response to the world outside or beyond its own frontiers or boundaries. That response may be friendly or aggressive, causal or intense, simple or complex, but it is always there. It comprises many elements – Diplomatic, Military, Trade, Economics, Social, Cultural, Educational, Sporting etc, and it varies in form and focus according to the circumstance. Some countries can at different times be friends or enemies or valued allies, with a relatively long or short period of time. For example Nigeria broke diplomatic relations with Cote d’ Ivoire, Gabon, Tanzania and Zambia, during the Nigerian civil war (1967-1970), because they recognized and traded with Biafra; the breakaway Eastern Region of Nigerian. But the relationship was restored at the end of the war. Besides, the policy of non-recognition of the apartheid regime of South Africa by Nigeria changed with the installation of a black majority rule by the African National Congress (ANC) country. The point to keep in mind is that whatever forms it takes, some response to the outside world is always there. In effect, every country must have a foreign policy in order to live and survive as an independent body in the complex, sometime dangerous, world we live in today (Chibundu, 2003:1).

Essentially therefore, countries all over the world design and implement foreign policies in order to guide their external relations as well as protect, promote and defend their vital national interests. This could be in areas like defense of territorial integrity, the promotion of economic, military, strategic and diplomatic interests and whatever a country might consider as its vital national interest. It is therefore naturally expected that Nigeria’s foreign policy ought to be fundamentally guided by her national interest which should ordinarily serve to either justify or repudiate the nation’s action or inaction in international relations.

From the quotation above, it should be understood that a county’s foreign policy should be dynamic enough to respond to the challenges that might be taking place in the world which are outside its territorial confines. Indeed the dictum in international relations is summed up by the saying that, “*there is no permanent friend but permanent interest*” (Yaqub, 2004:125). Thus, it is the interest of a country and its relation with the other states that should dictate from time to time, who the “friend” or the “enemy” is or should be. Put differently, a country that defines a particular countries or a group of countries to be its permanent friend(s) or enemy(s) may actually be jeopardizing its vital interest, as such, countries can easily take it for granted that they (it) can do what they (it) like(s) regardless of the adverse effect of the action taken on the so called friend. The morality of his point is that a country defined as friends can find it convenient to act adversely on its friend’s best interest in a certain circumstance and therefore, should never be accorded such a preeminent treatment, no matter the ideology and or cultural affinity or political compatibility existing between them.

However, a cursory look at the various engagements made by Nigeria towards an African agenda in areas such peace keeping missions (Okoye, (1997), decolonization of the continent as well as other  bilateral and multilateral aid she rendered in the continent Onyeisi, (2011:226), would to a very large extent, show that the omnibus nature of the principle of African centeredness in Nigerian foreign policy does not appear to be well aligned to the country’s national interests or has not served the national interest in a commensurate measure.

**Ties with multilateral financial institutions**

For the foreseeable future, Nigeria will need foreign capital and investments in its still fragile economy. Already, it is looking to the World Bank and the IMF as sources of funding for its woeful infrastructure. We should maintain good relations with the two multilateral financial institutions while rejecting advice from them that is not in our long term economic interests. However, we should pay more attention to the AfDB (the African Development Bank) as a possible additional source of future borrowing for infrastructure development.

**Domestic Factors Influencing Nigeria’s Foreign Policy**

Nigeria’s 57 years (1960-2017) as an independent country have been characterized by two main phases of either authoritarian military rule or democratic transitional civilian rule, with all the attendant characteristics which has impacted the country’s foreign policy. Within this framework, three major domestic factors can be identified as being the key determinants in Nigeria’s foreign policy formulation: first, the country’s ravaged and weak economy; second, the personality and character of Nigeria’s leaders and their perceptions of how to nurse and revive the economy; and third, the issue of ethno-religious diversity in a federal context, which more often than not makes consensus on national issues difficult to achieve (Rosemary, 2005). While other domestic factors such as historical traditions, domestic environmental factors, organized vested interests and public opinion have impacted on Nigeria’s foreign policy, it can be said that the three major factors identified above are more decisive in the Nigerian context.

Other domestic factors that drive Nigeria’s foreign relations are the roles played by the key institutions in the country. Specifically, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs and the Presidential Advisory Council on International Relations are the major institutions concerned with Nigeria’s foreign policy formulation. Between 1999 and 2007, information technology, democratic system of government, diplomacy, economic restructuring, intelligence gathering, defense engagement, humanitarian operations and military expenditures were among the factors driving Nigeria’s foreign policy (Rosemary, 2005). Moreover, Nigeria’s foreign policy potential is clearly based on its demographic size of over 160 million people, its multiethnic population, its vast oil reserves and its reservoir of highly skilled and educated people, national income, gross national product, energy consumption and political stability also shaped the foreign policy formulation of Nigeria.

An examination of the domestic constraints on Nigeria’s foreign policy reveals the ways in which the country’s foreign policy has been characterized by reactive and uncoordinated policies. Since the 1999, the Nigerian state has had to contend with multiple crises including the fall in global oil prices, communal violence and religious-based violence. Many of these conflicts have erupted over issues such as contested boundaries and sharing of resources, other conflicts have also involved matters relating to “settlers” versus “indigenes” or “oil producing communities” versus “oil multinationals,” all of which have fueled instability and led to a questioning of a national Nigerian identity (Rosemary, 2005).

Lastly, the role that oil plays in Nigeria’s foreign policy cannot be underestimated. Oil lies at the heart of policy formulation in Nigeria. To that extend, the country described as the world’s eighth largest oil- producer (Rosemary, 2005).

**NEXUS BETWEEN FOREIGN POLICY, INTERNATIONAL IMAGE AND NATIONAL TRANSFORMATION**

From the above analysis, we have observed with keen interest, the complex relationships between foreign policy, international image and national transformation as they affect Nigeria. It is evident that foreign policy, when conceived as the way a country relates with its external environment, has serious implications for the country’s international image. In other words, foreign relations invariably dictate how foreigners are received and treated by host countries. On the other hand, the feed-back mechanism embedded in the foreign policy formulation and implementation process can help to drive national transformation. Hence, the earlier allusion by Ate (2012) that national economic transformation is the prioritization of foreign policy and diversification of resources on cultivating special bilateral and multilateral relationships that are considered critical to the realization of the strategic vision of development becomes apt. In essence, the critical linkage between domestic processes (politics, economics, social, cultural, religion and so on) and the external situation towards which foreign policy is focused provide an illumination into how foreign policy, when carefully articulated can promote a country’s international image and foster its national transformation. Adelusi and Oluwashakin (2014:135) had argued that the linkage between domestic processes and external relations provides a specific context which identifies the extent to which specific issues can positively or negatively exert influence on achievement of a given policy.

Foreign policy constitutes a force for positive international image, indeed, a force for positive change, which should be maximally harnessed for national development and transformation. It therefore, suffices to mention that an engagement of a robust foreign policy position invariably promotes international respectability among the comity of nations and positively affects a country’s national transformation agenda.

**The Problem With Nigeria’s Foreign Policy**

It seems that there is an apparent disconnect between national interest and Nigeria-African relations. It is apparent that the nation is doing too much in the African continent without corresponding positive outcome.  This phenomenon had attracted several comments by commentators on Nigeria’s external relations. For instance, a policy and economic affairs analyst, Dr. Obadiah Mailafiya, while commenting on Nigerian’s foreign policy framework, graphically captures the above scenario when he noted that:

the centerpiece of any country’s foreign policy ought to be that country itself if it seriously considers itself a rational actor on the world stage…Every single action shall be adjudged  by how much it advances our national power and influence and how much it advances our interests, objectives, and purposes.

Similarly, another international relations expert, Professor Inno Ukaeje, while commenting on Nigerian foreign policy noted that “Our false generosity abroad and penury at home are proof that we are pretending to be what we are not,… in reality, we have been overstretching ourselves”. Akinboye, (2013) in his *Beautiful Abroad but Ugly at Home* also emphasized and corroborated Ukaeje’s fears. One seem to agree with the above assertions taking into consideration the enormous  funds the nation expend in trying to solve various problems in Africa while internally, almost all the sectors in the country are yearning for massive injection of funds. The standard of living on the other hand has been grossly low. Although Nigeria is rich in strategic mineral resources, through which the nation earned excessive wealth with which it fund several activities towards solving other African problems, the scale of such expenditure greatly hurts our domestic aspirations. It is obvious that the various leaders in the different administrations and regimes have not been able to set their priorities right.

**Leadership and Nigerian Foreign Policy**

At this juncture, the parts played by the poor or nonexistent institutions of leadership in the various administrations, in most cases, have been identified as one of the reasons for the inconsistencies in policy formulations and implementation in Nigeria. (Okpokpo, 1999); Abati (1999) and others like Akinboye (2013: 39-42) gives an interesting and complete overview of the influence of a weak and corrupt institution of leadership and the part it plays in influencing Nigeria’s foreign policy image abroad and in the process of formulating and implementing the same in Nigeria. They rightly noted that Nigerian leaders have been extraordinarily naive by restricting its foreign policy to Africa as its cornerstone (Guardian Newspaper, 1999). It was a laudable goal before the 1990s, but its evolution is needed for Nigeria to meet the needs of today’s diplomacy as we move into the next millennium. ‘Africa as the centrepiece of Nigeria’s foreign policy’ no longer suffices; a broader perspective is necessary. Nigerian leader’s needs to endeavour to take current trends in internationals relations, diplomacy, globalization, human rights, and democracy into consideration in determining what her foreign policies should be.

This was the price Nigerians had to pay for the support of dictatorial African states. Now, we are a democracy and we have to speak out and stand tall within the international community. We no longer have to beg for support from other military dictatorships for limited gains within African diplomatic circles. (Okpokpo, 1999).

Africa alone should no longer be the one and only reason for the existence of a foreign policy in Nigeria. None of the important international diplomatic actors, such as the USA, France and Great Britain built their foreign policy only on one pillar. Nigeria shouldn’t be an exception if it wants to play a role in current high level diplomatic circles.

Another example worthy of note is the lethal blow which the Babangida’s administration gave to the image of Nigerians abroad and it’s foreign policy in particular - in an era when every country, in particular the G7 and most OECD countries had made democracy, good governance, and human rights essential determining elements in international politics and in their relations with developing countries when he annulled that June 12th elections without any cogent reasons. This era was known to have heralded the beginning of Nigeria's misunderstanding with the international community notably the USA, Canada, the Commonwealth countries, and the European Union.

**Actors in Nigeria’s Foreign Policy**

The policy actors in this immense task are both internal and external to the foreign ministry. Although it is primarily a foreign ministry affair, it should be mentioned that internal actors such as the president, the foreign minister, ambassadors and embassies abroad, the press and the business community are all active players in the foreign policy formulation process. The role and place of our embassies should be redefined. A dynamic and performance-oriented foreign policy leaves no room for amateurism as was the case in the past. Our ambassadors and embassies should sit up and live up to national expectations. Nigeria’s foreign policy has to produce results for the country and its citizens. The training programme for our diplomats should be reviewed to give them the necessary knowledge to practise the art and science of diplomacy because they are at the frontline of our foreign policy.

Our vital national interests have to be redefined. Does Africa still represent the cornerstone of our foreign policy when we have more respect from other countries than we get from African nations despite our whole-hearted commitment to them? If the answer to the question is yes, what are the benefits we get from this Afrocentric choice? If the response is no, then we should reorient our foreign policy towards more profitable ventures like economic, scientific, cultural and technical cooperation with more advanced countries including Asia.

**Literature Gap**

Foreign policy, when conceived as the way a country relates with its external environment, has serious implications for the country’s international image. Despite the attempts by these researchers in trying to explain the relevance and challenges of foreign policy, extant literature in this study have not been able to adequately emphasize on the lacuna between policy formulation, policy implementation and policy outcome. A well articulated policy may mean well for the nation, but may on the contrary, become detrimental to the nation after implementation because of the roles played by key institutions in the country. . This study therefore attempts to address this gap in literature.

**CHAPTER THREE**

**THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY**

**3.1 Theoretical Framework**

Nigeria’s foreign policy and engagements under the leadership of President Goodluck Jonathan could be explained using the four “Concentric Circles” of national interest.

Hence this study adopts Concentric Circles Theory as a framework of analysis. The major idea underpinning the Concentric Circles Theory was to provide effective defense necessities within the West Africa’s Sub region (Akinboye 1993).

According to the theory, the first circle represents Nigeria’s own security, independence and prosperity and is centered on its immediate neighbor-states that are contiguous, which could constitute a basis for the defense of West Africa. At this level, the theory advocates a foreign policy of re- assessment, self-appraisal and defense of Nigeria’s strategic interest before West Africa and then the continent. The second circle takes into consideration the strategic interest of the states in the West African sub region or Nigerian involvement on continental African neighbors. The third circle involves foreign policy involvement on continental Africa issues of peace, development and democratization; and the fourth circle involves Nigeria’s relations with organizations, institutions and state outside Africa (Gambari, 1989).

This article is premised on the four circles to evaluate Nigeria’s foreign policy and engagements under the civilian administration of President Goodluck Jonathan in the Fourth Republic. Nigeria’s role expectations at different “concentric circles” of her foreign policy have generated multiple role perceptions, thus leading to unintended role conflict.

**3.2 Research Design**

A design has been defined as a plan or structure of any aspect of the research procedure, such a plan will be realized in the selection of the most appropriate concepts, hypothesis, analytical paradigms, specific sampling techniques, instruments and tools of data collection, test for the hypothesis and also the most effective format to present research report (Anikpo 1986).

Accordingly, a research design is the structuring of investigation aimed at identifying variables and their relationship on one another (Asika 1991). This study adopted the expose facto research design, due to the fact that there were no experiments involved in this study. In addition, the expose facto research design is adopted in this study because the facts observed in this study involve events that have taken place already; it gives clear explanations to foreign policy and how the regional body has reacted to the sustenance of foreign policy

Expose facto research design is based on events that have taken place and that data are already in existence, it is therefore, a systematic, empirical study in which the researcher does not in any way control or manipulate independent variables because the situation for study already exist or has already taken place.(Kowakzyk 2015,Asika 1991).

**3.3 Method of Data Collection**

According to Coten and Manion (1980) method refers to the range of approach used in research to gather data which are to be used as a basis for inference and interpretation, for explanation and prediction. However, the word method can be referred to as those techniques associated with the scientific model such as eliciting responses to predetermined questions, recording measurements, describing phenomena and performing experiments (Obasi 1999).

For the purpose of this study, the method of data collection employed is qualitative method. The qualitative method of data collection mainly involve the use of secondary sources of data, this is because, secondary sources of data involve the use of existing data collected for the purposes of prior study in other to pursue a research interest which is distinct from that of the original work, this may be a new research question or an alternative perspective on the original question (Hindes, Vogel and Clerk-Stiffen 1997, Szabo and Strang 1997). Basically, secondary sources of data include data that has already been collected and recorded by someone else and readily available from other sources like the internet, textbooks, magazines, journals etc (Johnston 2014, Tran Thi ut 2013). The secondary sources of data employed in this work include information from textbooks, journal, magazines, internet materials, seminars, debates and seminar publications

**3.4 Method of Data Analysis**

Data analysis can be defined as the breaking down and ordering of collection of information obtained through research (Asika 1991). The qualitative descriptive analysis is applied in this study; it connotes the summary of the information generated in the research. In most case, the description may make use of some qualitative information, but in most cases, it does not make use of qualitative information (Asika 1991). Bogdan and Biklen(1982) noted that it involves working with data, organizing it, breaking it into manageable units, synthesizing it, searching for patterns, discovering what is important and what is to be learned and deciding what you will tell others. More so, the descriptive qualitative analysis is used in this research because it summarizes the information generated in the research. Also, it further searches for trends and patterns of association and relationships among the variables collected without the use of frequency distribution, measures of central tendency and measures of dispersion.

**CHAPTER FOUR**

**4.1 Positive Impacts of Nigeria’s** [**Foreign**](https://www.omicsonline.org/searchresult.php?keyword=foreign)**Policy under President Good luck Jonathan.**

For every objective or goal, it is imperative to define means and plans intended for the achievement of the specified objective. In the same vein, Akinterinwa (2014) averred that, “strategy and technique may be likened to two inseparable sides of a foreign policy coin” (p. 255). He further explained that, “…a technique…is a method adopted to achieve a specific objective”, while “a strategy on the other hand is generally considered as a long-term plan, comprising various integral components and designed to ensure the achievement of a broad set of goals” (p. 255). This is not to say that techniques and strategies are mutually exclusive. In fact, Akinterinwa (2014) opines that some of the listed foreign policy objectives in the Nigerian constitution can be regarded both as strategies and techniques.

Bola Akinterinwa, Director General of the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (NIIA) wrote a whole chapter on Nigeria’s Foreign Policy Strategies and Technique in The Jonathan Presidency published in 2014 by University Press of America. The first technique employed by the Jonathan administration in pursuance of economic diplomacy was the overhaul of the Foreign Service. The emergence of civilian rule ushered in corruption of meritocracy hitherto practiced in the Foreign Service. With the aim of ensuring expertise and experience in Nigeria’s foreign missions, Ashiru made efforts to reverse the politicization of positions within the Foreign Ministry. The new set of envoys would be no less than career diplomats or professional diplomats, of whom Ashiru was a paragon, having spent decades in service of the MFA. Having said that, it would not be enough to simply be a veteran in the field of diplomacy as “only officers with the requisite experience in certain experience in certain regions and skills relevant in the emerging economic trends of such regions are appointed and posted to such places” (Akinterinwa, 2014, p. 268).

In addition, the role of Nigerian diplomats abroad primarily, is to advertise Nigeria as investment friendly so as to improve trade, secure investments, – particularly FDI, which is a driving force for economic development – and ultimately promote economic cooperation. To fulfill economic diplomacy, the MFA has moreover been charged with the training of diplomats in the fields of finance and commerce. Kudos should be given to the president, and Ambassador Olugbenga Ashiru. They have encouraged the appointments of career diplomats to Ambassadorial posts, and reduced the number of political appointees. 56 of the 88 candidates who were nominated by Jonathan for senate approval were professional diplomats. Appointments are now mostly based on merit, qualifications and suitably than on political ties and affiliations. This undoubtedly is a feather in the cap of the Jonathan administration.

The second technique is forging of partnership with specialized institutions and government bodies. The MFA would partner with relevant institutions like the NIIA, the Institute of Peace and Conflict Resolution and the Presidential Advisory Council on International Relations (PAC-IR) to hold “participatory processes, such as conferences, briefings, seminars, lectures, and topical discussions” to strengthen the foundation on which foreign policies are formed and to aid in achieving the overall objective of the MFA (Akinterinwa, 2014, p. 269). This partnership involves a critical assessment of Nigeria’s foreign policy formulation and implementation. The benefit of such a partnership can be seen in the foreign policy recommendations made at the seminar for the review of Nigeria’s foreign policy that was held in August 2011 at the behest of the President. There is absolutely no reason for Jonathan's administration to take special pride in this. Partnership with specialized institutions is not a novel or unique idea. It has been a necessity of every government's foreign policy. The ministry of foreign affairs cannot work in isolation. It has always sought the help, advice and assistant of specialized institutions and government agencies, such as the Nigerian Institute of International affairs, and the others listed above. This has never been the problem. The issue is actually implementing the suggested policies and taking the advice of these specialized institutions. This present administration has not particularly shown it is any different from the previous administrations in this regard. Many times, the recommendations and advice of these specialized institutions are often not implemented on time, or disregarded totally.

Capitalizing on strategic partnerships is the third technique in utilization. The realization of economic diplomacy partly depends on deepening of ties with countries which we have trade relations, marketing indigenous goods and encouraging other economies to invest in the various industries.

The fourth technique is collaboration with the Organized Private Sector (OPS). The government increasingly seeks the viewpoint of the OPS in attaining its foreign policy objectives. Again, this technique isn’t entirely novel as the Babangida administration tried a similar practice “where the business class and the government rubbed minds after the budget” and the opinions of the former group were taken into consideration in policymaking (Omoh, 2011). The OPS often serve as advisor or consultant to the government and Foreign Service. In other words, the OPS give insight into government’s economic initiatives and policies. The Nigerian Association of Chambers and Commerce, Industry, Mines and Agriculture (NACCIMA); Nigerian Association of Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (NASME); Manufacturers Association of Nigeria (MAN); Nigerian Employers Consultative Association (NECA); and the Nigerian Association of Small-Scale Industries (NASSI) are all representative bodies of the OPS. These formally recognized bodies are in positions to identify strategic opportunities, and their input is invaluable.

At least 4 million Nigerians live outside of the country, and as such their contribution to Nigeria could be significant. The penultimate technique of the economic diplomacy is to mobilize the Nigerian Diasporas community to support development in Nigeria. Akinterinwa (2014) writes, “the official estimates about the amount of money sent back annually by expatriate Nigerians range from $10 billion to $20 billion” (p. 285). Nigerian diaspora communities have been set up to raise awareness about issues concerning Nigeria; encourage the return of compatriots home where they can contribute to development, and to make investments in Nigeria.

The final and major strategy employed by the Jonathan administration to ensure the success of economic diplomacy is known as the Transformation Agenda. As earlier stated, a state’s foreign policy is an extension of its domestic policy. The Transformation Agenda is a comprehensive initiative launched by the Nigerian government to address Nigeria’s economic underdevelopment, as well as review the role of the legislature and the judiciary within a period of four years (2011-2015). Chaired by President Jonathan himself, and coordinated by the Former Minister of Finance, Dr, Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, the Transformation Agenda covers the following key sectors: “job creation, education, health, power, transportation, Niger Delta, labour and productivity, foreign policy and economic diplomacy, legislature, governance, judiciary and justice delivery, public expenditure management, and information and communication and technology (ICT)” (Gyong, 2012).

The facilitation of trade and commerce by diplomats and ambassadors is again stressed in the Agenda. In addition, the appointment of Iweala, a reputable Economist, clearly illustrated the main thrust of the agenda; the economy. So far, the administration has not recorded much in the way of success of the lofty aims of the agenda. Internal challenges constitute more of a problem to sustaining the vision of our foreign policy. The purpose of the transformation agenda is rendered useless with the problems of poor governance and mismanagement of funds. Corruption in the public service is also a major contributing factor. Femi Otedola, a member of the Economy Management Team was involved in a bribery scandal. This reflects very negatively on President Goodluck Jonathan and the transformation agenda as a whole. Undoubtedly, former President Jonathan scored some positive points. Privatization of the power sector remains a glowing achievement of his administration. However, on the whole, it has to be said that the foreign policy techniques employed under President Goodluck Jonathan regime had positive impact on Nigeria's global image.

**4.2 ECOWAS has positively enhanced Nigerians economic development.**

Some quarters feel that Nigeria does not need ECOWAS, at least in the short-term.  The feeling is prevalent that what Nigeria basically derives from ECOWAS are the headaches of massive illegal alien immigration, rampant smuggling and large financial obligations, especially for peace-keeping.

However, in spite of such “inconveniences,” there is no doubt that it is in Nigeria's enlightened self-interest to be fully supportive of the ECOWAS venture.  Sooner, rather than later, Nigeria will need a regional framework and market for its burgeoning economy.  Therefore, it is only prudent to lay the foundation for that projected enhanced economic interaction now, whatever its immediate costs.  
**Trade :** A key need for ECOWAS derives from the “artificial” nature of national boundaries in West Africa, bequeathed by colonial demarcation.  Given the “colours” of colonialism, Anglophone Nigeria was hermetically sealed-off from Francophone West Africa, and both were impregnable to Lusophone West Africa.  Investment patterns were skewed to colonial requirements.  In this regard, a higher premium was placed on the production of cash crops, as opposed to food crops.

Only 2% of total ECOWAS exports and 3% of total imports are within the region.  This marginal trade itself is largely zonal; meaning that the Anglophone countries trade with each other, and the Francophone with each other.  Moreover, a substantial proportion of this low-level sub-regional trade is actually no more than the trans-shipment of non-ECOWAS goods.  And the picture becomes even more depressing when it is recognised that over 60% of intra-West African exports is represented by Nigerian oil alone.  However, Nigeria's export to the ECOWAS region, which averaged about 7 percent of its total exports between 2001 and 2006, plummeted to 2.3 percent in 2010.  The share of other ECOWAS countries in Nigeria's imports also dropped from 4.4 percent in 2001 to less than 0.5 percent in 2010.

In spite of these adverse developments, ECOWAS remains necessary as a means of reversing the trade incongruities of West Africa, and to ensure that the countries of the sub-region trade and interact economically more with their neighbours than with the far more remote European states.  In other words, ECOWAS remains an ambitious attempt to change the inherited colonial map of West Africa through the process of economic cooperation and integration.

Trade liberalisation and the elimination of differences in customs tariffs against outside countries by ECOWAS countries is also likely to militate against the incidence of smuggling within the sub-region.  Various estimates already indicate that smuggling (unofficial trade) more than trebles the level of official trade.  Inevitably, smuggling in West Africa is highly concentrated in Nigeria given its relative economic advantages, with Cotonou providing a key entry point for goods, including cars, cigarettes, champagne and lace fabrics.  A successful ECOWAS promises, therefore, to stem the high annual loss of tax revenue to the Nigerian government through smuggling.

**Industrial cooperation :**The share of manufacturing in Nigeria's total exports to the ECOWAS region climbed from 1 percent in 2001 to 5.4 percent in 2010.  ECOWAS promotes greater efficiency in Nigerian industries through the creation of an enlarged market.  Industries producing for a large and geographically diverse markets tend to locate in areas best-suited to optimum production efficiency.  Within ECOWAS, this gives Nigeria a decided advantage given the country's relatively high degree of infrastructural development, and skilled manpower vis-à-vis its francophone neighbours.

Within this ECOWAS framework, Nigeria has profited from investments in economic ventures in neighbouring states.  Some of these include iron-ore mining in Benin, uranium in Niger, petro-chemicals in Senegal and cement and sugar projects in Benin.  There are also a number of joint economic commissions set up between Nigeria and several ECOWAS member-states.

To underwrite such joint-ventures, as well as attract funds for their finance, ECOWAS has set up a Fund for Cooperation, Compensation and Development.  This is used to finance all kinds of industrial projects, compensate losses due to trade liberalisation, guarantee foreign investment and help mobilise internal and external investment for industrial investment.  In this regard, ECOWAS has attained full recognition as a credit-worthy organisation in its own right, qualifying for the extension of lines of credit from Europe and such multilateral organisations as the European Development Fund and the European Investment Bank.    
**Transport and Telecommunication:** West African countries are poor in infrastructural development.  Apart from Nigeria and Cote d'Ivoire, there is only the most rudimentary transport system between and within the sub-region.  In the colonial era, the building of roads, railways and ports were not intended to link the different parts of the sub-region, but to facilitate the extraction of resources to Europe.  Indeed, it used to be that in order to make a telephone call from Lagos to Cotonou, for instance, it had to be transmitted first to London and then to Paris and finally to Cotonou.

The international telecoms revolution has addressed some of these problems.  Nevertheless, it is clear that substantial and co-ordinated public investment in infrastructure in ECOWAS is the prerequisite of Nigeria's medium-term interest in the sub-regional market.  The ECOWAS agenda has a long way to go.  This includes the construction of a Trans-West African Highway network part of which would run from Lagos to Dakar.  The ECOWAS Fund has underwritten loans for the construction of bridges, including the Mono Bridge from Lagos to Lome and the Manor River Bridge in Liberia.

Drawing from Hogan and Kaiser’s what we know about leadership (2005), Oviasogie & Shodipo (2013, p.196) explain that, “the traits of good leaders include good decision making ability, vision, charisma and competence.” They also paraphrased Byman & Pollack (2001) arguing, “the goals, abilities and foibles of individuals are vital to the intentions, capabilities as well as strategies of the state” (p. 196). It is in light of this that the progress and or shortcomings of Nigeria’s foreign policy and the strategies and techniques that attend it,must at least in part, be attributed to President Jonathan. On the one hand, the foreign policy strategies and techniques are a testament to the President’s intelligence and good intentions, while his manner of execution on the other hand, shines him in a contrary light. The exhaustive recommendations resulting from the assistance of his many aides and collaboration with technocrats attest to President Jonathan’s thoroughness, vision and direction.

The company the President keeps, however, is worrisome. Serving in his administration and affiliated to him were the likes of Farouk Lawan, a parliamentarian seen collecting bribe on tape, and his former boss and Governor Diepreye Alamieyeseigha, “convicted of money laundering in 2007, after admitting massive embezzlement of state funds” (PM News, 2013). Such leadership does not inspire confidence, and even more inimical to Nigeria’s development is the impunity enjoyed by elite criminals. Alamieyeseigha received a presidential pardon, which fetched Nigeria backlash from the United States (PM news, 2013). Farouk Lawan, despite his arraignment, retained his position in the House of Representatives.

More so, while several ex-governors, ministers and commissioners have been arraigned, not a single one has been brought to justice since 1999 (Kolawole, 2014). These incidents tarnished the country’s image and portrayed President Jonathan as a promoter of corruption. Cognizant that this is a democracy, and due process is paramount, the President was supposed to ensure that justice was meted out accordingly without overstepping, even if a public office holder is the subject. It is his responsibility to see to it that he has credible individuals in his government.

As demonstrated in the immediate aftermath of the kidnapping of schoolgirls in Chibok, Borno, Jonathan exhibited a dangerous degree of passivity. There is an old proverb about silence being tantamount to consent and so the President’s inaction was translated as a lack of regard for Nigerians’ lives. To say and do nothing about the abductions for over two weeks shows neither compassion nor competence nor good decision making ability. Oviasogie & Shodipo (2013, pp. 196-197) posit, “… effective foreign and domestic policy aimed at all round transformation can be influenced by the personality make up and decision making style of the leader.” It has hitherto been established that foreign policy reflects domestic policy.

Therefore, this recount of President Jonathan’s behaviour towards domestic events is to highlight that his manifested strengths and weaknesses can be transposed to the foreign scene. The manner in which the President manages foreign relations will almost invariably be the same as the way he handles home affairs as explicated.

**4.3 Challenges in implementing the Nigeria's Foreign policy under Goodluck Jonathan's administration.**

Foreign Direct Investment into Nigeria in 2011, when Jonathan took office, increased from $6.5 billion in the previous year to $8.9 billion (Umejei, 2014). However, the figure has since been plummeting. In 2012 and 2013, FDI was $7 billion and $5.5 billion respectively (Umejei, 2014). The Jonathan administration observed that “lack of continuity, consistency and commitment (3Cs) to agreed policies, programmes and projects…” is the reason why growth and development of the Nigerian economy does not correspond with “the overall welfare of Nigerian citizens, rising unemployment, inequality and poverty” (Akinterinwa, 2014, p. 275). We know the administration has not changed its policies between 2011 and now, but perhaps its level of commitment has diminished, and it is not consistent in its efforts. Contributing to the decline of investments is the situation of insecurity and instability in the country. Attempts to mobilize the diaspora community to either return to Nigeria or make investments in the economy have come to naught.

The prevalence of unemployment, corruption and insecurity is discouraging. Expatriates are unconvinced that Nigeria has anything to offer them. Even the Federal Government’s claim of diversifying into agriculture has been exaggerated. Kolawole (2014) reported that former Minister of Agriculture, Adamu Bello cited information from the websites of the Central Bank of Nigeria and the National Bureau of Statistics proving that agricultural growth has, as a matter of fact, slumped under the current Minister, Dr. Akinwumi Adesina.The Transformation Agenda was drawn up for the purpose of rectifying the problems hindering development in Nigeria yet Gyong (2012) articulated – in A Social Analysis of The Transformation Agenda of President Goodluck Ebele Jonathan – what he considers to be “Challenges to the Attainment of the Transformation Agenda” (p. 107).

The challenges – some of which remain unattended to – include inadequate funding, lack of cooperation between public servants and political office holders. Another is untrustworthy leadership as can be seen in the person of Femi Otedola, a man who was allegedly complicit in bribery and is now a member of the Economic Management Team of the Agenda (Gyong, 2012, p. 108). Again, insecurity: destruction of lives and property is a great encumbrance to the achievement of the Transformation Agenda. In clear and succinct sentences, Akinterinwa (2014) argues that, “the most persistent problem that has impeded an effective utilization of Nigeria’s foreign policy techniques and the successful realization of its foreign policy strategies is political. People’s perception of the Nigerian political structure is negative due to the numerous revelations of financial mismanagement and misappropriation of public funds. Weak and ineffective governance structures and lack of transparency and accountability have had a detrimental impact on the socioeconomic development of Nigeria” (Akinterinwa, 2014, p. 287).

In what could be described as a vicious cycle, it seems the issues, which the Transformation Agenda seeks to address, serve as a serious impediment to the realization of the Agenda, to national development, and consequently, Nigeria’s foreign policy approach. The extant Agenda was drawn up to resolve the problems of mismanagement of funds, corruption of the legal system, subpar governance, lack of power and skilled labour, however these very problems are obstacles to the realization of the Transformation Agenda.In fact, most of Nigeria’s ills arise as a result of venality and profiteering. Corruption is the root cause of Nigeria’s underdevelopment therefore an anti-graft war must be fiercely fought to the very end. Only then will the ensuing problems start to abate, and Nigeria’s national development and foreign policy initiatives yield positive results.

**CHAPTER FIVE**

**Summary, Conclusion and Recommendations**

**5.1 Summary**

The findings of the study show that:

1. Internal challenges were responsible for dampening Nigeria's attainment of positive international image and national transformation. Some of these challenges include leadership crisis, corruption, insurgency, irregular power supply, low quality public service delivery and rating of the nation's educational institutions amongst others.
2. The study revealed the importance of public relations in a nation which is to establish, maintain and sustain a favorable image for that country.
3. Foreign policies of Goodluck Jonathan aligned with national interest of the country, but suffered poor implementation.
4. There is a difference between policy implementation and policy outcome.
5. A nation that is challenged with corruption in governance, insecurity of lives and properties, and bad governance cannot do well in the global arena of nations

**5.2 Conclusion**

This study gathered that Nigeria's Foreign Policy under Goodluck Jonathan's administration had no significant role in boosting the global image of Nigeria. Therefore, it was concluded that the foreign policies established by Goodluck Jonathan's administration had a near negative impact and implication on the global image of Nigeria as clearly stated before.

**5.3 Recommendations.**

Based on the findings from the data collected, the following recommendations have been made:

1. A major reorganization of the Foreign Service such that positions of the Ambassadors and other key positions will no longer be politicized. Only career diplomats and practitioners who understand the nuances of international relations and global politics should be appointed into those sensitive positions and offices.
2. The present administration should holistically address the economic challenges confronting the nation because a good foreign policy initiative is needed to ensure a robust and good international image which invariably leads to national development.
3. The economy needs to be at tunes with the realities of globalizations, as such, the economic diplomacy of the present administration needs to be directed towards addressing contemporary challenges in the society.
4. The place of Nigerians in Diaspora towards nation building in the new world order should be recognized, encourages and emphasized. This is because they have a prominent role in advancing the foreign policy of the country, as such; they ought to be given adequate diplomatic attention.
5. The federal government must ensure that recruitment into the ministry of Foreign Affairs should hence forth be based on merit alone, because in other for the image of a country to be effectively boosted, public relations have a significant role to play.
6. Special trainings in international relations at the Masters level and in other related areas should be encouraged as this will further equip and arm the officers with all they need to properly discharge their duties.
7. Effective public relations practitioners should be integrated into government especially in the case of international relations in order to effectively boost the image of the country abroad.
8. There is the need for a strong strategic plan and long term projection of the nation’s foreign policy posture with a view to fashioning out a roadmap for Nigeria’s diplomacy.
9. Nigeria’s foreign policy in contemporary context must be premised solely on national interest with emphasis on national security and welfare, regional and global peace, as well as robust multilateral diplomacy that is tailored along strong strategic partnership with friendly states in the global arena.

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