

EFFECT OF INSECURITY MANAGEMENT ON THE NIGERIAN ECONOMY AND DEVELOPMENT

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Abstract

The alarming level of insecurity in Nigeria has increased the crime rate and terrorists attacks in different parts of the country, leaving unpalatable consequences for the nation's economy and *the continued security challenges in Nigeria and had drawn attention from scholars, practitioners, international communities and the federal government who had attempted to give solutions to forestall the growing occurrence of insurgency, Insecurity, corruption, killings, bombings, kidnapping, armed robbery and operations. Variety of economic challenges has hampered the growth of management and sustainability of the economic development in Nigeria in recent times. This study titled effect of insecurity management on the Nigerian economy, (2016 -2019), seeks to determine the effect of security challenges on the Nigerian Economy and Development. Descriptive statistics. Data was generated through questionnaires, primary and secondary sources of data were employed. The finding showed that insecurity challenges have negative and significant effect on the Nigerian economy and development. The paper recommend that federal and state government should continue to reinforce efforts in the fight against insurgency so that a safe environment will be created and activities will be carries out without any fear of uncertainty.*

Keywords: Insecurity, Management, Nigerian Economy and Development.

Introduction

Recently, Nigeria has witnessed an unprecedented level of insecurity. This has threatened national security and has prompted huge allocation of the national budget to security (Achumba and Akpor 2013). The 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria specifically states that "The security and welfare of the people shall be the primary purpose of government". Unfortunately, government on this constitutional responsibility has failed to provide a secured and safe environment for lives, properties and the conduct of business and economic activities.

Polices aimed at strengthening public governance and fighting corruption has flourished in Africa with the discovery of the relationship between institution underdevelopment, inefficient polices and political instability. Beginning from 2000, a number of African countries have created simultaneous anti-corruption polices to join the global dynamics. Anti-corruption agencies can take on a wide variety of forms, the organization for economic cooperation and development (OECD), multi-purpose agencies with laws enforcement powers, law enforcement intuitions and preventive, policy development and co-ordination institutions. Issues related to security challenges and how it affects the performance of Nigerian economy and development have over the years elicited several agitations regarding its source and awful consciences of socio-economic development of the county. The economic landscape in Nigeria as stated by Akindiyo (2014), has

been shattered by the prevalent twin evil of violence and crime. The failure of the successive administration in Nigeria to adequately address issues of unemployment, poverty and unequal distribution of wealth among ethnic nationalities, decisively resulted to agitation anger and violent crimes against the Nigerian state by some groups and individual. Akindiyo (2014) and Otto and Ukpere (2012), since the advent of the present democratic dispensation, raw forms of violence such as militancy, kidnapping for ransom, bombing innocent people, pipeline vandalization, armed robbery and destruction of government properties.

According to Omoyibo and Akpomera (2013), security is a concept that is prior to the state, and the state exists in order to provide that concept. Gleditsch and Theisen (2016) state that national security covers crucial dimensions, viz: Food security, Community security, Economic security, Personal security, Environmental security, Health security, Poetical security. In all parts of Nigeria, ethno-religious conflicts have assumed alarming rates. It has occurred in places like Shagamu (Ogun State), Lagos, Abia, Kano, Bauchi, Nassarawa, Jos, Taraba, Ebonyi and Enugu State respectively. These ethno-religious identities have become disintegrative and destructive social elements threatening the peace, stability and security in Nigeria (Eme and Onyishi, 2011).

Kidnapping in the South-East Zone of Nigeria

Kidnapping as a social problem is the act of illegally taking somebody away and keeping him as a prisoner in order to get money or something in return for releasing him. The history of kidnapping in the South-East zone of Nigeria could be traced to hostilities, conflicts and violence in the Niger Delta region. In the South-East zone, especially in Abia and Imo States, kidnapping activities were mainly targeted at prominent indigenes and residents of these states. This situation was pervasive shortly after the 2007 general elections in Nigeria. This is partly because, the youths that were used as political thugs by politicians during the 2007 general elections in these states subsequently engaged in kidnapping as means of livelihood after the elections. Indeed, confession by those apprehended indicated that some politicians in these states supplied guns to youths for the purpose of rigging the 2007 general elections. Unfortunately these guns were not retrieved at the end of the elections. Consequently, kidnapping later turned to profitable business mostly among the youths in Abia, Imo, Ebonyi and other states in the zone. Thus, the increasing rate of kidnapping activities in Abia State, particularly in Aba metropolis, resulted in several foiled attempts to kidnap the Abia State Governor, Chief Theodore Orji in 2008. Thus, from 2007 to 2010, several prominent men in Aba and its environs were kidnapped for ransom. This adversely affected the economy of Abia State as many businessmen and manufacturing companies relocated to other states like Enugu and Anambra. Also, this pathetic situation got to a crescendo, when school children were kidnapped in Aba in 2010. The activities of the Boko Haram group constitute serious security challenges in the contemporary Nigerian state. The activities of members of this group have raised critical questions among investors on the safety of their investments in Nigeria. It has also threatened the existence and survival of many businesses in Nigeria especially in the northern part of the country. This ranges from killing of innocent Nigerians, raping of women, bombing of major cities and police stations in the northern part of Nigeria, particularly, Borno, Kano, Bauchi, Niger, Yobe, Adamawa, Abuja, among others. Terrorism is a global phenomenon and it is ravaging the whole world. “The premeditated use or threat of use of violence by an individual or group to cause fear, destruction or death, especially against unarmed targets, property or infrastructure in a state, intended to compel those in authority to respond to the demands and expectations of the individual or group behind such violent acts” (Nwagboso 2012).

Weak Security system - This result from inadequate equipment for the security arm of government, both in weaponry and training (Achumba et al. 2013). This is in addition to poor attitudinal and behavioural disposition of security personnel. In many cases, security personnel assigned to deal with given security situations lack the expertise and equipment to handle the situations in a way to prevent them from occurring. And even when these exist, some personnel get influenced by ethnic, religious or communal sentiment and are easily swallowed by their personal interest to serve their people, rather than the nation. Thus, instead of being national watch dogs and defending national interest and values, and protecting people from harm by criminals, they soon become saboteurs of government effort, by supporting and fuelling insecurity through either leaking vital security information or aiding and abetting criminals to acquire weapons or to escape the long arm of the law (Achumba and Akpor 2013).

Unemployment/Poverty- As a result of the high level of unemployment and poverty among Nigerians, especially the youths, they are adversely attracted to violent crime (Adagba, Ugwu, and Eme 2012). Corruption is the antithesis of progress and development as it creates political instability, social unrest and crime infested environment, it breeds inefficiency, incompetence, mediocrity, unethical values and other bas instincts in man such as greed, avarice and rapacity. Corruption is so entrenched in Nigeria that it has become a household word and all factors of the economy are caught in corruption web, such that Nigeria ranked among the top ten most corrupt nations in the world (Ewetan, 2013). Corruption and injustice in Nigeria must be totally eliminated. Nepotism and a culture of impunity must also be eschewed from our national psyche and life.

Insecurity Situation and Socio-Economic Development in Nigeria.

After fifty three years of nationhood Nigeria still ranks among the poorest countries in the world, also ranks low in all socio economic indicators such as life expectancy, death rate, access to water, poverty rate, mortality rate, and crime rate, and still carries the tag of a developing economy. Nigeria is a classic illustration of an oxymoron, a poor country in the midst of abundant human and natural resources. This scenario has contributed to security challenges that have bedeviled the country since independence till now with grave consequences for socio-economic development. There is no nation that can achieve socio-economic development in an environment of socio and physical insecurity. The increasing challenge of insecurity in Nigeria has also been linked to failure of leadership to deliver good governance, and secure the welfare of persons on the principles of freedom, equality, and justice. The ruling elites in Nigeria in both the military and democratic dispensation are dependent, parasitic, and very corrupt in nature, and mal-administration (Ali, 2013).

In March 2014, United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Ms. Navi Pillay, stated that Nigeria was “currently facing its most daunting set of challenges for decades.” The country is split between Muslims and Christians, with an area called the middle belt edging the predominately Muslim north and Christian south. Ten percent of the country follows indigenous sects, constituting over 174 million people, and close to 350 ethnic groups speak 250 languages. The country is also divided along economic lines. As of February 2014, CFR recorded poverty levels at 72 percent in the north, starkly contrasting the 27 percent in the south and 35 percent in the Niger Delta. These divisions and inequalities, and the existence of vulnerable peoples, alongside ongoing battles against insurgent groups and high levels of corruption, have contributed to the

current security crisis in Nigeria. Human Rights Watch (HRW) and the CFR Nigeria Security Tracker purport that over 25,000 people have been killed in the country since 1999, and events since the start of 2014 have reached unprecedented levels. In April 2014, Amnesty International published a briefing expressing concern over actions by both Boko Haram, the Nigerian militant Islamist group, and the Nigerian state security forces that may constitute “war crimes” and “crimes against humanity,” urging the immediate investigation of violations of international humanitarian law. The Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect (GCR2P) also warned of the gravity of such acts, stating, “Indiscriminate violence heightens the risk of further mass atrocities, including possible crimes against humanity.”

National Security

Security is the ability of a state to maintain law and order among its citizen Nwama, (2015). The internal security of Nigeria has become a very big challenge in recent times. Internal conflicts, including religious, ethnic and economic, have had debilitating effects on the economy, most notably by scaring investors from certain parts of the country. Even though insecurity of lives and properties had become noticeable following the civil war and the subsequent military regimes which directly intensified urban violence, the recent upsurge of violence and insurgency in the country heightens the need to comprehensively address the persistent causes of social tension as a risk factor to Nigeria as an investment destination. Ezeoba, (2011).

Corruption

Nigeria ranks highly in the Corruption Perception Index. This has implication for investment and FDI flows into the country. Previous anti-corruption policies implemented in Nigeria have been targeted at enforcement measures rather than addressing the root causes. The root causes of corruption in Nigeria have been identified to include social insecurity and over-centralization of resources at the centre. Even though there are suitable laws and viable institutions to fight corruption in Nigeria, the greatest challenge is in formulating a strategic plan of action to deal with the root causes.

Targeted violence, increased lawlessness, escalating sectarian tensions, the state’s inability to protect, and its military’s own contribution to human rights violations, has raised significant alarm as to whether the international community is bearing witness to mass atrocity crimes – or could in the near future. In May 2014, one month after Boko Haram’s abduction and continued detention of 276 schoolgirls, the International Criminal Court Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, said that crimes committed by Boko Haram fell within the jurisdiction of the Court, which has authority over cases of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide.

Inter-communal & Political Unrest

Jos, the capital of Nigeria’s North-Central Plateau State, is located in the middle belt. The middle belt has areas on each side of it comprised of distinct, majority religious identities. Between 17 to 20 January 2010. Muslim-Christian tensions turned violent in Jos, with at least 400 people killed and 18,000 displaced before the military restored order. According to a statement issued by Nigerian Civil Society on the crisis, by 19 January, “the incident had escalated into mass violence, in which residents from different communities in the city systematically attacked one another.”

Media reports indicated that hate messages transmitted through cell phones incited individuals to such attacks. In response, Human Rights Watch (HRW) stated, “This is not the first outbreak of deadly violence in Jos, but the government has shockingly failed to hold anyone accountable.” Reports by HRW also surfaced accusing the Nigerian military and police units of responding to the violence with excessive force against civilians.

On 7 March 2010, HRW reported a massacre south of Jos that left at least 200 Christian villagers dead. The International Crisis Group recorded two other attacks on villages by Muslim Fulani gangs the same day that were in “apparent retaliation for January violence,” raising the day’s death count to 500, mostly Christian women and children. Such events led the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect (GCR2P) to suggest that these atrocities may “rise to the level of crimes against humanity.” The unrest persists in the region. HRW’s World Report 2013 addressed further episodes of inter-communal violence in the Plateau and Kaduna States of the middle belt. Over 360 people were killed in 2012 in these locations, with victims “hacked to death, shot, and burned alive – in many cases simply based on their ethnic or religious identity.” The report also mentioned discriminatory state and local policies towards “non-indigenes” people, which “continue to exacerbate inter-communal tensions and perpetuate ethnic-based divisions.” On 16 March 2014, Fulani Muslim herders attacked three Christian villages and killed more than 100 civilians in Kano. The New York Times reported that middle belt violence is typically separate from Boko Haram activity (refer to Section III), but “analysts say there is a risk that the insurgents will try to stoke the conflict in central Nigeria.” While recorded attacks have been linked to specific ethno-religious groups, an NPR article warned of attributing this violence to religious or ethnic hatreds, explaining that social, economic and political factors underpin the area’s cycles of violence.

Boko Haram

The group originated in 2002, in the capital of Nigeria’s northeastern Borno state, Maiduguri, under the leadership of Islamist cleric Mohammed Yusef. It is commonly referred to as Boko Haram, which colloquially translates to ‘Western education is sin.’ According to CFR, and with “aims to establish a fully Islamic state in Nigeria,” Yusef’s followers consisted predominately of individuals from the impoverished north: Islamic students, clerics, and the unemployed. Prior to 2009, the small group of Islamists openly challenged the state with impassioned speeches. Kyari Mohammed, in ‘The Message and Methods of Boko Haram,’ explains it was not until July 2009 that the group moved from this “*dawah* (proselytisation) phase to violent armed struggle.” Yusuf was summarily executed while in police custody, and following this development, the group not only grew more radicalized, but it also broke into factions. Abubakar Shekau is the current leader of the militant group.

Regarding the methods of violence utilized in this new phase, Boko Haram has adopted targeted assassinations, suicide bombings, and hostage-taking, with an increasingly global reach. Since the middle of 2010, the group has targeted media outlets, journalists and schools, as well as kidnapped both locals and foreigners. The group’s strength and resilience has succeeded in posing a significant threat to the government. CFR highlights that, “Boko Haram fighters often are, indeed, better armed and equipped than the government’s forces.” Crisis Group furthers that wealthy politicians and businessmen funded the group in the past, before, as a former member of Nigeria’s

State Security Service (SSS) puts it, “they lost control of it.” Nevertheless, Boko Haram’s political ties have allegedly continued.

July 2009 – December 2013

In July 2009, following an alleged disagreement with police forces, 14 Boko Haram members were shot in a joint military and police operation. The military suppressed the group’s reprisal revolts in six northern states, with the crackdown leaving over 800 dead, the majority of which were sect members and civilians. Attacks continued, culminating in the 30 July 2009 execution of Yusuf in custody. From August 2011–June 2012 Boko Haram violence significantly escalated, with the suicide bombing of a UN building, and multiple attacks on security facilities, banks, and churches, resulting in high numbers of civilian casualties. In October 2012, Human Rights Watch released a report accusing Boko Haram’s “widespread and systematic murder and persecution” as likely amounting to “crimes against humanity.” The second Boko Haram instigated ‘State of Emergency’ was declared in Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa states, May 2013, and from June October 2013 multiple confrontations between Boko Haram and state forces resulted in hundreds of deaths. In September 2013, Boko Haram was suspected of an attack on a college that killed 40 students. Crisis Group then reported in December 2013 that 200 insurgents, dressed in military uniform, coordinated an attack on state military targets in Maiduguri, and later that month, several hundred fighters attacked military barracks outside Bama.

January - May 2014

In early 2014, the frequency and scale of Boko Haram attacks, mainly targeting civilians, increased significantly. In February, the group killed at least 59 people, when they opened fire at a high school in Yobe State. In March, at least 75 people were killed in Maiduguri blasts, attributed to Boko Haram. In April, Boko Haram gunmen abducted 276 schoolgirls from their dormitory in northeastern Borno state, merely hours after more than 70 people were killed in a bomb attack near Abuja. In May, three separate attacks, a Boko Haram assault on the town of Gamboru Ngala on the Cameroon border (at least 336 deaths), a car bombing in Jos (at least 118 deaths), and an attack on a military base in Yobe State (49 deaths) killed more than 500. Throughout June and July at least another 2,000 casualties were recorded in multiple attacks, among which was the Gwoza massacre killing at least 200, mostly Christian, in several villages in Borno State and a series of attacks in the Middle Belt of Nigeria, killing around 171 people. Until the end of 2014 at least another 6,000 deaths were recorded as a result of continuous violence. In early January the deadliest single massacre to date was recorded as a series of mass killings were carried out by Boko Haram militants, destroying the entire town of Baga in north-east Nigeria, killing as many as 2,000 people. Boko Haram now controls up to 70% of Borno State, which has been most affected by the insurgency. The cumulative death toll varies according to sources, ranging from 7,500 deaths in 2014 according to the Nigerian Social Violence Project (John Hopkins University Africa Program) to 18,000 according to the Nigeria Security Tracker (Council on Foreign Relations). Furthermore, cumulative deaths since the start of the insurgency range from 11,121 to 33,000.

By **March** 2018, two main insurgent factions were still active, and continued to wage an insurgency campaign against the government: The followers of Abubakar Shekau (Boko Haram) operated mainly in southern Borno State, while the faction of Abu Musab al-Barnawi (ISWAP) was mostly located around Lake Chad.

On 26 April 2018, Boko Haram bombers killed at least four civilians in the outskirts of Maiduguri, the largest city in Borno State. A subsequent gun battle and tear gas launched by security forces repelled the attackers, but left two officers wounded and several others injured.

On 15 July 2018, hundreds of Nigerian soldiers went missing after ISWAP forces led by Abu Musab al-Barnawi overran a Nigerian army base in the northeastern part of Nigeria. Less than 100 Nigerian soldiers returned after the attack, the attack came 24 hours after ISIL ambushed a military convoy in the neighboring Borno state. The attack on the base resulted in a battle that lasted over an hour, it is unknown if there were any casualties in the assault, a local pro-government militia said the military had sustained some casualties, this attack marks Boko Haram's first major gain since 2015.



On 8 September 2018, ISWAP fighters managed to capture the town of Gudumbali in central Borno, marking their first major gain in nearly two years. The next day, ISIL's West Africa Province released a video showing footage from combat with the Nigerian Army in the area. In late December 2018, ISWAP launched another offensive and captured Baga in northeastern Borno State.

2019

Further information: Barnawi's ISWAP launched a major offensive in **January 2019**, attacking several Nigerian military bases, including those at Magumeri and Gajiram. Insurgents also overran and destroyed the refugee town of Rann near the border to Cameroon, displacing its inhabitants yet again. The destruction of Rann was initially attributed to ISWAP, but Shekau's Boko Haram later claimed responsibility

Cost of Insecurity to Nigerians and the Nigerian Economy

On the Global Terrorism Index Rankings in 2017, Nigeria ranked 1st in Africa and 3rd globally, largely due to the activities of Boko Haram and herdsmen attacks.¹⁴ At least 15 out of Nigeria's 36 states are currently experiencing violence and upheaval from these two groups. Boko Haram operates predominantly in the north eastern part of the country (and is also active in Chad, Niger and northern Cameroon). The herdsmen predominately attack in the southern region of the country. These violent events exist alongside south-south clashes among rival cults and militant attacks targeted at crude oil facilities. The 15 states high-lighted in the map are mainly agrarian economies, representing approximately 47% of Nigeria's total land mass and 32.5% of its GDP.¹⁵ Insecurity in these regions disrupts economic activity, particularly agricultural activities, and slows aggregate out-put growth in the economy. Meanwhile, Nigeria's Chief of Army Staff, Tukur Buratai, has estimated that the economic impact of Boko Haram activities in the north east has cost the country N274.5bn (\$9bn), with the loss of agricultural production put at N107bn (\$3.5bn).¹⁶ This loss to agricultural production might have explained the reason for the decline in Nigeria's total output of commodities such as cowpea, wheat and groundnut which are predominantly produced in the north east. As of 2016, the output levels of these key agricultural commodities were below 2010 levels.



SOURCE: TRADINGECONOMICS.COM | TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL

Nigeria is the 144 least corrupt nation out of 175 countries, according to the 2018 Corruption Perceptions Index reported by Transparency International. Corruption Rank in Nigeria averaged 121.48 from 1996 until 2018, reaching an all-time high of 152 in 2005 and a record low of 52 in 1997.

Nigeria Business	Last	Previous	Highest	Lowest	Unit	
Business Confidence	28.20	22.10	41.10	-29.00	Index Points	[+]
Industrial Production	11.50	-11.00	20.10	-20.40	percent	[+]
Manufacturing Production	0.20	-1.70	24.60	-7.00	percent	[+]


Nigeria Business	Last	Previous	Highest	Lowest	Unit	
Internet Speed	3853.93	4129.28	4129.28	348.64	KBps	[+]
IP Addresses	209207.00	194830.00	244394.00	29604.00	IP	[+]
Leading Economic Index	45.90	45.50	53.00	45.50	percent	[+]
Manufacturing Pmi	57.70	57.40	61.10	41.90		[+]
Crude Oil Rigs	14.00	14.00	20.00	3.00		[+]
Ease of Doing Business	146.00	145.00	170.00	120.00		[+]
Corruption Index	27.00	27.00	28.00	6.90	Points	[+]
Corruption Rank	144.00	148.00	152.00	52.00		[+]
Changes In Inventories	178909.34	172276.89	178909.34	32488.05	NGN Million	[+]
Competitiveness Index	47.53	48.04	48.04	3.37	Points	[+]
Competitiveness Rank	115.00	112.00	127.00	94.00		[+]
Composite Pmi	55.50	53.60	59.10	46.30		[+]
Capacity Utilization	55.00	54.60	60.50	48.50	percent	[+]
Services Pmi	58.70	58.50	62.30	41.00		[+]
Mining Production	28.00	-20.70	48.20	-34.10	percent	[+]

Nigeria Corruption Rank

The Corruption Perceptions Index ranks countries and territories based on how corrupt their public sector is perceived to be. A country or territory's rank indicates its position relative to the other countries and territories in the index. This page provides the latest reported value for Nigeria Corruption Rank plus previous releases, historical high and low, short-term forecast and long-term prediction, economic calendar, survey consensus and news. Nigeria Corruption Rank - actual data, historical chart and calendar of releases -updated on May of 2019.

Actual	Previous	Highest	Lowest	Dates	Unit	Frequency
144.00	148.00	152.00	52.00	1996 – 2018		Yearly

Export Data API



Source: *Trading Economics.com National Bureau of Statistics Nigeria*

Free Global Peace Index (GPI, 2019). Global Peace Ranking. Institute for Economic and Peace, Retrieved from Wikipedia, the encyclopedia

The annual inflation rate in Nigeria increased to 11.37 percent in April 2019 from 11.25 percent in the prior month. It is the highest inflation rate since January, amid a surge in food prices. Inflation Rate in Nigeria averaged 12.45 percent from 1996 until 2019, reaching an all-time high of 47.56 percent in January of 1996 and a record low of -2.49 percent in January of 2000.

Nigeria GDP Growth Slows to 1.9% in Q1

The economy of Nigeria expanded 1.9 percent year-on-year in the first quarter of 2018, easing from an upwardly revised 2.1 percent growth in the previous period. It is the fourth consecutive quarter of expansion, as the oil sector continued to rise while the non-oil output growth slowed.


The oil sector grew 14.7 percent year-on-year in the first quarter of 2018, accelerating from 11.2 percent expansion in the prior period. The country produced 2.0 million barrels of crude oil per day, up from 1.75 mbpd in the same period a year earlier. As a result, the oil sector accounted for 9.6 percent of the GDP compared to 8.5 percent a year ago.

The non-oil sector advanced 0.7 percent, after increasing 1.5 percent in the prior period.

Growth eased for: agriculture (3.0 percent compared to 4.2 percent in Q4 2017); transportation and storage (14.5 percent compared to 16.6 percent); food and accommodation services (0.3

percent compared to 0.8 percent); electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply (4.9 percent compared to 16.0 percent) and arts, entertainment and recreation (0.3 percent compared to 3.5 percent). Additionally, output contracted for construction (-1.5 percent compared to 4.1 percent) and internal trade (-2.6 percent compared to 2.1 percent). Also, production dropped further for public administration (-1.7 percent compared to -0.5 percent) and real estate activities (-9.4 percent compared to -5.9 percent) and continued to fall for social services (-0.4 percent). On the other hand, output increased at a faster pace for financial and insurance (13.3 percent compared to 0.2 percent); manufacturing (3.4 percent compared to 0.1 percent); mining and quarrying (14.9 percent compared to 10.7 percent) and water supply, sewerage, waste management and remediation (11.6 percent compared to 1.2 percent). In addition, production rebounded for information and telecommunication (1.6 percent compared to -1.5 percent) and education (0.5 percent compared to -1.0 percent).

On a quarterly basis, the economy shrank 13.4 percent, after expanding 4.7 percent in the previous quarter.



SOURCE: TRADINGECONOMICS.COM | CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA

The conflict in Nigeria is an example of a state's inability to protect civilians from organized killings conducted by a non-state insurgency group. Boko Haram has extended its influence and ideology beyond the country's borders its own movement has been building in Niger, Chad, and Cameroon, and it has been linked to armed groups operating in Mali such as Ansar Dine, AQIM, and MUJAO. Furthermore, the violence has caused a severe refugee crisis, with 3.2 million Nigerians forced to flee their homes. Approximately 1.6 million are internally displaced, while another 1.6 million are refugees seeking safety in neighboring countries such as Chad, Cameroon and Niger.

Previous national elections in 2011 resulted in over eight hundred deaths, creating a volatile environment that allowed Boko Haram to gain greater influence. Many northern Nigerians view

President Jonathan's presidency as illegitimate, arguing that he disregarded a power-rotation agreement that would have ensured a Muslim president. The Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) postponed mid-February elections to March 28th 2015, citing security reasons. According to security officials, the delay would provide the military with more time to secure areas currently under control by Boko Haram. A legitimate electoral process and a peaceful aftermath are critical, as a repetition of the violence that ensued following the last election could provide an opportunity for Boko Haram to gain more power. Thus, the following weeks will prove pivotal as the Multinational Joint Task Force and the Nigerian Army launch their offensive against Boko Haram.

As the inter-communal violence, political unrest, and corruption demonstrate, Boko Haram attacks are not the only issue facing the country, and many analysts suggest that the government's counter-insurgency actions will continue to fail for reasons beyond that of being outgunned. Nigerian analyst Chris Ngwodo suggests Boko Haram "is an effect and not a cause; it is a symptom of decades of failed government and elite delinquency finally ripening into social chaos." The crisis in Nigeria has rapidly become a complex national, regional, and global issue, requiring a comprehensive response if action to protect populations is to be effective.

As for the impact of the herdsman attacks, there have been media reports that farms have been destroyed, crops have been lost and the incentive to plant again in these areas has declined. These effects could translate to deepening poverty and food in-security. Insecurity results in damage to critical infrastructure such as schools, hospitals and bridges. Boko Haram has carried out suicide bombing attacks on schools, markets and car parks among other places.¹⁸ While these attacks continue, more of Nigeria's infrastructure is poised for destruction.

Furthermore, insecurity has displaced about 1.96 million people resulting in extreme pressures on those who have been displaced and on the federal and state governments that must provide humanitarian assistance. According to the Minister of State for Budget and National Planning, Zainab Ahmed, the federal government and the six north-east states spent \$6.4bn on interventions and humanitarian service in 2016 and 2017. This translates to an average of \$3.2bn per annum. It also represents about 8% of combined spending by the federal and state governments in the country. Governments have also had to sustain this expenditure amid unemployment and other infrastructural challenges that require huge fiscal spending.

Given these huge economic costs of insecurity, the Nigerian defense sector is likely being underfunded. This is reflected in low staff strength, weak surveillance system, and a paucity of arms and ammunitions. According to the Institute for Economics and Peace, Nigeria had a relatively small military and private security sector in 2016. The organization noted that there are 219 police officers for every 100,000 Nigerians, significantly below both the global median of 300, and the sub-Saharan Africa average of 268.21 Similarly, Boko Haram especially has been alleged to possess more sophisticated arms than the Nigerian military. Indeed, the paltry \$8 per capita spending on defense has made containing insecurity operations more difficult. By comparison, Germany, with a population of 83 million people, spent an equivalent of \$44bn on its defense sector in 2017, amounting to a per capita amount of \$530. As of 2017, the country was ranked the world's 16th most peaceful country on the Global Peace Index. In Asia, Japan - a country with population of about 127 million - expects to spend \$46.5bn on defense in 2018. This

translates to \$366 per head. The country is ranked as the world's 10th most peaceful country on the Global Peace Index, compared to Nigeria's ranking of 149th. On the Global Terrorism Index, the country is ranked 54th, better than Nigeria's 3rd position.

Within the continent, Botswana, Africa's most peaceful country, appropriates the second largest share of its total spending to defense. In 2018, the country is projected to spend P2.78 billion pulas (\$294mn) on de-fense.²⁵ Given a population of about 2.25 million people, the country would spend approximately \$130 per capita on security. Also noteworthy, Botswana's police ranked the best in Africa on the World Internal and Security Police Index, while Nigeria's police ranked the worst.

Conclusion

Nigeria needs in-creased defense spending (albeit with a close monitoring on spending to avoid mismanagement) to enhance the country's arms and ammunitions, increases its number of armed personnel and train them efficiently. Higher recurrent spending in form of improved salaries may also boost motivation and improve performance amongst security personnel. Together, both a stronger arsenal and motivated defense personnel could do a lot more to contain insecurity. However, should the government decide to sustain its relatively low defense spending in the country, the impact of the defense sector to combat insecurity is poised to be limited and the continued negative impacts on the economy, infrastructure and Nigeria's population are set to persist.

Nigeria's security concerns and threat perception emanated from many quarters. Over the years, the inability of the government to address the root causes of dissatisfaction, anger and agitation among various groups in the country resulted to serious security challenges confronting the contemporary Nigerian state. This ugly situation has not only denied the Nigerian government enormous revenues, but also led to serious problems such as unemployment, infrastructural decay, poor health status, and poor image of Nigeria at regional and global scene, low participation of investors in Nigeria's economic development, relocation of existing investors to peaceful states in Nigeria, among others. These problems are traceable to internal security challenges in Nigeria occasioned by the activities of militias in Niger Delta region, kidnapping in the South-East, the Islamic extremists in Jos crisis, Boko Haram group, armed robbery in many parts of the country, bunkering of Nigeria's oil outlets by saboteurs, among others. In consideration of the consequences of these challenges on the economy of the Nigerian state and to save the country from the brink of total collapse, the need for good governance, justice, equity, and tolerance among ethnic nationalities as well as religious groups in Nigeria, is advocated and should be rigorously pursued by both the government and the Nigerian people.

Recommendations

1. The federal government should formulate and effectively implement policies and programmes capable of addressing the root causes of insecurity in Nigeria such as poverty, unemployment, environmental degradation, dearth of infrastructural facilities, uneven development, among others.
2. The government should be more proactive in the implementation of Amnesty programme designed for former Niger Delta militants to avoid a situation where these repentant militants would go back to the regions and resume their hostilities against the government, oil companies and the residents of the area.
3. The federal government should re-organize the country's intelligence system and build a capable and more proactive security apparatus in Nigeria. This will add more values in checking incessant bombings, robbery, kidnapping and violent crimes/crises by hoodlums all over Nigeria.
4. The government should include Peace Studies and Security Management in school curriculum at primary, secondary and tertiary levels in Nigeria. This will enable the Nigerian youths to appreciate the importance of peace and security in a secular state like Nigeria.
5. The federal government should phase out the National Poverty Eradication Programme (NAPEP) and establish a more viable and result-oriented agency capable of addressing the problem of abject poverty among large population of Nigerians, particularly those residing in the rural areas.
6. The government should resuscitate the National Directorate of Employment (NDE) and reposition agricultural sector so as to play active role in job creation for Nigerian youths.
7. There is the need for collective security arrangement by federal, state and local governments in Nigeria. This arrangement should produce a committee at village, community, local, state and federal level with the responsibility of providing sensitive security information for security agencies at their areas of operation. This will ultimately assist in identifying criminals, their sponsors and hideouts in Nigeria.
8. The federal, state and local government should be more committed to enhance the quality and standard of education in Nigeria. The three levels of government in Nigeria should collaborate to ensure free education at all levels. This will reduce the spate of ignorance among the youths who engage in numerous violent crimes against the government and the citizens.
9. The Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), should work assiduously to ensure that free, fair and credible elections are conducted. This will enable Nigerians vote only those that could bring about good governance and effective delivery of dividend of democracy to them. The election of credible candidates into public offices would ultimately reduce poverty among the people and the rate of agitation, anger, violent crimes and youth restiveness in Nigeria.

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