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## **Impact of Accountability and Transparency in National Development in the Nigerian Economy**

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### ***Abstract***

*The essence of this paper is to examine the impact of accountability and transparency in the national development in the Nigerian economy. The paper presents the trends in National development in the context of accountability and transparency in Nigerian economy. Descriptive survey research design was adopted. The population of the study consist of the employees of two Universities in Enugu state. Godfrey Okoye University and Enugu State University (ESUT). Stratified random sampling was used to select 140 respondents from the aforementioned universities. The research instrument was the questionnaire while the research data were analyzed using descriptive and inferential statistics. Research findings reveal that poor accountability and lack of transparency have hindered on the development of the nation. The paper recommend that leaders should promote a more transparent administration around the world, likewise, the need for private sector and civil society involvement in improving public sector transparency and accountability.*

### **Introduction**

Transparency is nowadays considered as a key tool of good governance and a prerequisite to any democratic regime. According to Joseph E. Stiglitz, (2017) judicious use of transparency has the power to create a virtuous circle where legitimacy, citizens' participation and trust could together lead to a dynamic political change (Worthy, 2010). Reforms aimed at promoting a more transparent administration are therefore supported by most governments around the world (Erkkilä, 2012). In spite of this global praise for transparency, practitioners and scholars still hold different definitions of the term. Some of them focus their attention on access to information, more specifically on Freedom of Information (FOI) laws (Michener, 2011), while others are concerned with the issue of new technologies and particularly e-government (Bertot 2010). Some scholars prefer to concentrate on the effects of transparency, which is supposed to generate greater trust, more participation, and a more efficient administration (Pasquier, 2014) and less corruption (Kolstad and Wiig, 2009).

Historically, transparency developed into a political, legal and moral project at the time of the French revolution (Baume, 2013). It is brandished as a counter-power to the absolute monarchy, a system based exclusively on secrecy and arbitrariness. In this sense, notions of publicity and public

opinion are promoted by supporters of transparency (Münch, 2011). Famous philosophers of the time such as Rousseau, Kant and Bentham expressed their support for transparency. This vision is in line with inexorable progress leading to the triumph of the rule of law, as opposed to despotism (Guizot, 1822). Since the time of these early reflections, transparency has taken on the status of a myth that is fascinating in the eyes of many societies (Chevallier, 1988). More recently, the widespread interest in the term has raised many questions about how to tackle transparency conceptually (Hood, 2007). First of all, transparency and accountability push governments to adopt a more open functioning, making them vulnerable to public scrutiny.

Bauhr and Nasiritousi (2012) thus understand transparency as “the release of information that is relevant for evaluating institutions”. Like many other contemporary attempts to define the concept, these authors have a top-down perspective, bringing transparency closer to the notion of disclosure. However, other scholars insist on the citizens’ point of view, highlighting the fact that both the administration and the citizens are part of the process. Taking this perspective, Cotterrell (2000) affirms that “transparency as a process involves not just availability of information, but active participation in acquiring, distributing and creating knowledge”. Keeping this aspect in mind, Meijer (2013) and Grimmelikhuijsen and Welch (2012) have proposed one of the most recent and exhaustive definitions of transparency, which takes into account both state-citizens relations and the notion of evaluation mentioned above. They state that “transparency is the availability of information about an organisation or actor allowing external actors to monitor the internal workings or performance”. Transparency would therefore include both the state’s and the public’s perspectives on the release of and access to information (active and passive transparency), the participation of citizens in the process, and consequently their capacity to evaluate the functioning of the authorities. In terms of frameworks, several have already been suggested to measure transparency.

### **Attributes of Transparency.**

Transparency is composed of four different dimensions: institutional (mission and operations), Political (information on political representatives), financial (budget and solvency) and service Delivery (performance of governments). For Heald (2012), transparency includes five attributes:

1. Discipline of the released information;
2. The information needs to be comprehensive;
3. There must be a link between capacity issues and structuring political incentives;
4. There must be an independent scrutiny capacity;
5. Finally, public audit plays a crucial role in the case of public expenditure.

In the same vein, systematic and timely release of data, an effective role for the legislature, and civil society are key elements according to Van Dooren et al. (2012). Meijer et al., 2015, propose a distinction between the administrative and political realms.

In terms of politics, the framework focuses on democracy (participation), the constitutional state (laws) and the learning process (public debates). The administrative side includes efficiency, integrity (corruption) and resilience (risk management). Rawlins (2008) builds his own framework using four variables: participation, substantial information, accountability and secrecy (as a reverse variable). Moreover, Kaufmann and Bellver (2005) have built an index in order to compare the level of transparency among states. In terms of applied research, a Ph.D. thesis has explored the

relationship between transparency and trust through an experiment (Grimmelikhuijsen, 2012). Three items are especially relevant for the author: transparency of decision-making, policies, and outcomes of policies. All items are divided into three elements: completeness, content and usability of the information. In spite of the general praise for transparency, the concept also has limits, from both theoretical and practical points of view. In theory, a philosophical debate sets those who conceive transparency as an intrinsic value against those who wonder about the ethical limits of the process. If transparency is indeed presented as the opposite of the secret, is it not also a form of indecency and indiscretion (Bredin, 2001). From a practical perspective, it is sometimes suggested that full transparency may lead to unintended consequences (Roberts, 2009). In this sense, it may create a “culture of suspicion, low morale and professional cynicism” (O’Neill, 2002).

### **Accountability**

Accountability is one of several concepts that have long been central to the theory and practice of public administration (Chan and Rosenbloom, 2010). The concept is conventionally taken as the central problem in the Anglo-American public administration literature (Hood, 2010). Anyone studying accountability will soon discover that it can mean many different things to many different people (Behn, 2001) and is sometimes even used as a synonym of transparency. Indeed, despite the growing regularity with which this term is used, its meaning remains elusive (Koppell, 2005). Either seen as a virtue or a mechanism, depending on administrative traditions and academic perceptions, accountability can be studied by means of various approaches, as O’Kelly and Dubnick (2014) underline such as principal-agent theory (mechanism), institutionalist theories (function), social or cultural psychology (behaviour) or moral theory (relationship).

Historically, the term accountability is attached to the notion of “accounting” and “answering” (Bovens, 2007). The accounting approach goes far back, to Hammurabi, King of Babylon in 2000 B.C. When he decided to create a legal code, Hammurabi had already thought about controlling the ones chosen to represent the state and to manage its assets (Bird, 1973; in Gray and Jenkins, 1993). The answering approach can be traced back to ancient Greece, where the representatives of public authorities were called by the polis to give accounts on public places. Today’s notion of accountability no longer conveys the stuffy image of bookkeeping and financial administration, but holds strong promises of fair and equitable governance (Bovens, 2007).

Hood (2010), defines accountability as the duty of an individual or organisation to answer in some way about how they have conducted their affairs. In this case, accountability is based on the idea of power transmission and delegation and always consists of at least three stages or elements (Bovens, 2007):

1. The actor is obliged to inform the forum about his or her conduct (information phase);
2. The forum can question the adequacy of the information or the legitimacy of the conduct (Debating phase);
3. The forum may pass judgment on the conduct of the actor (consequences phase).

This relationship approach from Bovens (2007) limits the ever-expanding sense of the concept. Although some authors have taken another road to analyse and assess, Bovens’ classification (2007) followed by Lindberg’s (2013) have chosen to separate accountability types by the source of control, the nature of the forum, the nature of the actor, the nature of the obligation, the strength of control and the direction of the mechanisms. These classifications have evolved over the years starting with four exclusive categories in the case of Romzek and Dubnick (1987) and going to

fifteen non-exclusive categories in the case of Bovens (2007) or twelve exclusive categories in the case of Lindberg (2013). These classifications offer a way to conceptualise accountability in the light of specific parameters. However, they merely provide practitioners with theoretical foundations to work on and are useless for managing stakeholders efficiently. Some new conceptions such as “market accountability” (Bode et al., 2015) have also emerged over the years in an attempt to grasp what accountability really means for public services today.

Accountability, like transparency, even if widely applauded, contains its own theoretical and practical limits. On the theoretical side, accountability is often attached as a technical part to a contract describing the obligations of both parties (Sinclair, 1995). The reality is nevertheless not so rational and accountability in general discourse is not as structured as the wording of contracts would suggest. The fact that accountability contains a narrative part transforms an account depending on the narrator (Butler, 2005; Hines, 1988; Schweiker, 1993). A narrator is also considered as incapable of accounting for every action he performs because some are unknown even to himself (Messner, 2009). On the practical side, accountability practices may lead to problems of efficiency (Halachmi, 2002), lack of innovation (Dubnick and Frederickson, 2011) or contradictory objectives (Christensen and Lægreid, 2014).

### **Linking the two concepts**

Accountability and transparency are of growing importance in contemporary governance. The academic literature has broadly studied the two concepts separately, defining and redefining them, putting them into various frameworks, and sometimes mistakenly using them as synonyms. Curiously, the relationship between the two concepts has been studied only by a few scholars with preliminary approaches. This theoretical article focuses on both concepts, attempting first to describe them, taking into account the various evolutions in the literature and recent developments, and also the first attempts to link the two concepts. In order to show a new approach linking the concepts, theoretical situations in which the concepts are linked are portrayed, demonstrating the need to reconsider the relationship between transparency and accountability. Consequently, a new framework amending the most recent approaches is presented, theoretically delimited and exemplified through practical cases.

In the early 20th century, transparency and accountability were not automatically linked. Regarding transparency, Louis Brandeis (1913) (later an associate justice of the US Supreme Court) is frequently quoted in both general and academic literature for his opinion that “sunlight is said to be the best disinfectant; electric lights the most efficient policeman” (Brandeis, 1913). But at the time, Brandeis’ chief preoccupation was opaque practices in the banking and finance sectors and heavy industry, and he was not primarily concerned with the lack of accountability of democratic government (Kosack and Fung, 2014). Today, however, transparency and accountability are used together repeatedly (Sasaki, 2010; Khagram et al., 2013; Truman, 2007). Taking a normative point of view, the two concepts are often associated with each other because nobody stands against them (Bovens, 2007). They are considered essential pillars of good governance, as shown in practice. For instance, the mission of the Transparency and Accountability Initiative (TAI), launched and carried out by the eponymous organisation, is summed up in these words: “T/A Initiative is a donor collaborative committed to strengthening

democracy and development through empowering citizens to hold their governing institutions to account”.

From a conceptual point of view, transparency may reinforce so-called “horizontal” accountability, which means accountability from the administration towards citizens and other stakeholders. It follows a growing trend towards “horizontalization” in government, in which administrations have opened up and moved closer to citizens (Michels and Meijer, 2008). Transparency thus plays a supporting role in strengthening this type of accountability. It also produces indirect effects on “vertical” accountability in the hierarchy between organisations, elected representatives and the government. Through their access to data, citizens can be aware of administrative practices and denounce dysfunctions. They thus have an opportunity to send signals to the authorities concerned and activate the vertical accountability chain. (2012), vertical transparency, particularly when applied downwards (citizens can control administrative decisions and processes), following the principal-agent principle, is Accountability-focused. In this sense, rulers are accountable for their stewardship to those ruled. When going upwards, on the other hand, vertical transparency is more concerned with managerial issues. Heald goes on to say that the timing of transparency also affects accountability. Transparency in retrospect, as opposed to transparency in real time, closes the accountability window after a certain period of time, therefore making it less intrusive for a reporting organisation.

Transparency and accountability are thus involved in an ambivalent relationship, and one cannot postulate a positive association in all cases at this stage (Hood, 2010). In the literature on the matter, the link between transparency and accountability is tackled in different ways. Nevertheless, a common issue stands out: the supposed effects of transparency on accountability are more often evoked than observed empirically (Meijer, 2014; Hale, 2008). Although greater transparency should generate greater accountability (Armstrong, 2005; Fox, 2007), it seems particularly difficult to prove that it does without taking other factors into account (Auld and Gulbrandsen, 2010). A consensus seems however to exist regarding the nature of the link. In most articles, authors treat transparency as a dimension of accountability (Bovens, 2007; Koppell, 2005). In contrast, some others, such as Gray (1992) tend to favour a relationship in which the development of accountability increases the transparency of organisations.

According to Mulgan (2012), open government practices and FOI laws represent crucial prerequisites for any accountable institutions – or forums concerned by these political and legal measures. Following Bovens’ approach, transparency appears to be a necessary but insufficient condition of accountability. The relationship between both concepts encounters at least two major challenges. One is the implication that information is not only disclosed, but also processed well and fully understood. The other is that transparency rarely leads to consequences for institutions or administrations which disclose information. Thus, limiting accountability to a simple function of answerability (the capacity of the administration to give an answer) without providing for sanctions in case of reprehensible behaviour may diminish the controlling power of accounting agencies (Schedler, 1999b). However, several authors do not include consequences (i.e. sanctions) in their definition of accountability, arguing that they do not necessarily covariate (Bartolini, 1999). Three scholars have studied the relationship between transparency and accountability in greater detail. In the first existing theoretical perspective described in this article, Fox (2007)

argues that one should first determine what kind of transparency and accountability is at stake. He identifies two different degrees of transparency (opaque and clear).

Going beyond disclosure of information, production of such information on the behaviour of an actor calls for an answer from the latter, who becomes accountable: “the capacity to produce answers permits the construction of the right to accountability” (Fox, 2007). Therefore, clearer transparency and softer accountability provoke a phenomenon of institutional answerability. According to him, this is where the theoretical link between the two concepts lies, as he claims that “clear transparency is a form of soft accountability”. Based on these theoretical divisions, he describes three categories:

1. Dissemination and access to information: In this case, accountability is not solicited and the relationship remains in the transparency sphere (opaque and clear);
2. Institutional “answerability”: In this case transparency is clear and a relation with soft accountability is established;
3. Sanctions, compensation and/or remediation: In this case, transparency is not solicited and the relation remains in the accountability sphere. Fox’s framework (2007).

The second author to have addressed the question more specifically is Hood (2010). In his view, three types of relations between transparency and accountability can be identified. In the first, called “Siamese twins”, he notes that most documents, especially normative ones, make no distinction between the two concepts. Since transparency and accountability are most often treated together as pillars of good governance. The second type is called “matching parts.” In this kind of relationship, transparency and accountability work hand in hand, contributing together to good governance, but are in principle considered separable. Finally, the third possible combination – the “awkward couple” assumes that there are tensions between the two concepts. This is especially relevant with regard to content, as pointed out by O’Neill (2006). She argues that disclosed datasets are not always understandable to the reader. Therefore, the nature of the information published has an influence on the behaviour of an agent and on how he can effectively be held accountable. Several theoretical frameworks (or worldviews) are then presented by Hood (2010), enabling us to determine the nature of the relationship, based on the three types mentioned above. Perspectives on transparency and accountability, adapted from Hood (2010).

The last author dealing with the relation is Meijer (2014). In his book chapter on transparency in the Oxford Handbook of Public Accountability, he starts by saying that the instrumental value of transparency is most often connected with accountability, acting as a prerequisite for the information phase of any accountability process. To challenge the commonly held view that transparency facilitates accountability, he proposes three directions and draws eight lessons from his analysis on the link between the two concepts on transparency and accountability, adapted from Meijer (2014). In the context of public administration, we make a fundamental distinction between compromising and sensitive information, because the latter mostly involves critical information, such as national interests, and is not usually available through FOI laws. According to the Oxford dictionary, to compromise means “to bring (somebody / something / yourself) into danger or under suspicion”. Compromising information includes of course reputation issues, but there may be no consequences in terms of accountability, in the sense that people to be held into account have no responsibility.

Compromising information is information contained in data and documents released by the administration that brings it under suspicion, or causes political embarrassment, and may place it in a position of weakness in relation to its citizens. As explained above, the content of information seems to play a role in the relationship between accountability and transparency. Indeed, in some situations, simple access to information is sufficient to provoke some sanctions (without going through an answerability phase). The framework presented below integrates the content of information as a new parameter that differentiates and refines situations and also takes into account the redefinition of both transparency and accountability. The original categories put forward by Fox (2007) have been modified to obtain a deeper analysis of the relationship, leading to the creation of the following categories:

1. Dissemination and responsibility: This category involves only active transparency, which implies that the administration's responsibility is a form of implicit answerability. No specific examples of this situation have been provided because it concerns the release of official documents by a public entity. This form of active transparency is used to communicate non-compromising information to a wide audience and does not entail any kind of accountability of the public organisation other than the responsibility of disclosing the information.
2. Institutional processes: Involves passive transparency and accountability in the form of answerability. No specific examples of this situation have been provided because it concerns any instance of the use of a transparency law for which a public entity has to be answerable, without creating any enforcement in the case of accountability. Being non-compromising, the information unveiled has merely provoked comments and explanations.
3. Access to information and sanctions: Involves passive transparency and accountability in the form of enforcement. The content of information is compromising. An example of this situation was given above through the SECO case. Transparency and accountability are here combined to produce good governance, in a situation described by Hood (2010) as predominant in the literature, because it is appealing to both academics and practitioners.
4. Disclosure and remediation: Involves active transparency and accountability in the form of internal answerability and enforcement. The content of information is compromising. In this case, the temporal sequence is modified and accountability happens before transparency. This situation has been exemplified above through the INSIEME case, in which the problem was solved internally, before informing the public.

Based on this new framework, one may also question the relevance of the cases provided by the authors in the model developed by Hood (2010). First of all, according to the "Siamese twins" scenario, transparency and accountability are not separable and can be used as quasi-synonyms. This kind of relationship echoes the first category described in the framework above, called dissemination and responsibility. In this case, disclosure of information and accountability are considered almost equivalent, as "transparency in the sense of openness is itself a way of answering for the conduct of an individual or organization" (Hood, 2010). In the same vein, the second category of the new approach presented above, labelled institutional processes, also rests on the fact that both concepts are interpreted as one thing.

However, as Hood (2010) notes, the two concepts can always be separated. On the one hand, there can be some sort of transparency without accountability, as mentioned by Meierhenrich (2008)

regarding the case of the former apartheid regime in South Africa, and also in other authoritarian states (Heald and Hood, 2006). In these cases, dissemination of information can create low expectations in terms of good governance, as a government claims to be transparent but cannot be held accountable to the bulk of the population. At the same time, transparency without accountability may also lead to high expectations of good governance, as information shared by the government has been approved by the parliament and may be subject to public scrutiny in any case. On the other hand, there can also be some kind of accountability without full transparency. According to Hood (2010), most civil servants are primarily answerable to ministers, without general disclosure to the world at large. Moreover, accountability is not necessarily disabled if information is only available after the event. At the same time, this way of resolving a case draws criticism about the democratic aspects of the process. As mentioned in the first part of this article, transparency and democracy seem to work hand in hand, transparency having gradually come to be considered as consubstantial to any democratic regime (Florini, 2004). In this sense, the situation described above provokes legitimate reactions. In the “matching parts” scenario, Hood (2010) explains that accountability and transparency are separable, but need to be associated in order to produce good governance. This view, often implicit in the literature, is appealing to both academics and practitioners. Philosophically, such a perspective is in accordance with the English philosopher Jeremy Bentham’s views on publicity (Bentham, 2001). He believed that public accounts make corrupt dealings more likely to be exposed, which will in turn have an effect on the behaviour of individuals. Even though Hood’s “matching parts” interpretation (2010) is subject to criticism, especially because of the idealistic combination of the two concepts, this situation occurs in reality.

Turning to Meijer’s (2014) analysis, some lessons drawn by the author match with the categories created in the new framework presented in this article. For instance, he argues that “proactive transparency has limited value for accountability”. This lesson can be applied to the first category, where dissemination actually implies no such form of soft or hard accountability according to Fox’s (2007) terminology, but an implicit form of answerability in which responsibility is assumed through the proactive disclosure of information. For this reason, Meijer (2014) affirms that accountability is limited, because governmental bodies are able to communicate what they want to and in the way they want to, maintaining a large margin of maneuvers. Although FOI laws potentially allow citizens to explore the nature of information in detail, secrecy prevails in certain sectors, especially where security issues are involved.

Following previous studies from Roberts (2006), this assessment leads Meijer (2014) to say that transparency is limited and not applicable in practice to all domains of government activity. Consideration of the SECO case shows that not only does it come close to Hood’s (2010) “matching parts” approach, but is also related to Meijer’s (2014) two first lessons, which assume that citizen and media accountability can be attained through transparency (even though media accountability is much more often a reality than citizen accountability). The involvement of two Swiss newspapers in the disclosure of compromising information, following a request via the Ltrans, tends to prove this Meijer’s (2014) argument.

According to Meijer (2014) REF, media accountability may also lead to political accountability, in the sense that the media can work as “fire alarms.” The case is not addressed in this paper, as whistleblowing acts are excluded from the definition used here. However, we do agree that such

acts can lead to remediation or sanctions. The most famous example provided by Meijer (2014) is the notorious Watergate scandal, but one could think of many more examples where the media have played the role of fire alarms, characterizing Meijer's "indirect route". It would be interesting and certainly relevant to test whether there is a relationship between the nature of the information revealed and the type of accountability applied in the case of forced transparency. Finally, one of the main ideas exposed espoused by Meijer (2014) does not conflict with the framework developed above, as examples have shown that media accountability is way more frequent than citizen accountability. On the contrary, it fits with the categories created, especially "access to information" and "sanctions," when FOI laws are used. Moreover, Meijer (2014) goes on to say that conditions under which transparency and accountability are combined matter the most, supporting our view that both concepts are interrelated in different schemes and should be carefully studied according to the issues addressed. He also briefly mentions the impact on government (direct or indirect), confirming the need and the relevance of the new variable introduced (the content of information).

## **Conclusion**

Despite the fact that transparency and accountability have been widely studied, defined and placed into various frameworks, their relationship is still difficult to establish and theoretically grasp. The attempts of Fox (2007), Hood (2010) and Meijer (2014) have revealed themselves to be first stepping stones towards a better understanding of a very complex phenomenon that can be approached from various angles. In this paper, the three frameworks have been commented and partially modified according to new criteria. Taking into account the limits of the concepts, the framework produced in this article has attempted to take into account the various aspects described by the three authors while enriching it with new theoretical and practical insights. Following a selected review of literature and the introduction of a new parameter, the content of information we have been able to demonstrate the flaws in the existing models and exemplify them with diverse cases, inspired by both recent and older studies. Focusing on the new framework designed in this article, it becomes apparent that introducing this new variable leads to a more refined and precise analysis of the relationship between transparency and accountability. The introduction of additional parameters could also lead to new classifications. Other factors, either internal or external, can have a potential influence on the framework and transform it significantly. Such factors include the political system, as expressed in the book chapter by Warren (2014) or the article by G lineau (2007). For instance, political accountability differs among parliamentary and presidential systems. In other words, transparency and accountability can vary according to the prevailing political regime. Warren only checks, and this may affect the relationship between the two concepts. The political context may also exert an influence, depending on the timing. If people working in the administration are facing a forthcoming election, their behaviour may change, leading to the release of information or sanctions that would not necessarily happen under other circumstances.

Finally, the degree of citizens' trust can also affect accountability, showing that transparency is not the only factor impacting the level of accountability (Greiling, 2014). Trust may thus be considered as a variable affecting the relationship between transparency and accountability. Moreover, Fox (2007) also mentions in his article that potential shame of organisations, due to the rise of transparency, may reduce the need for accountability. This last argument deals with anticipated transparency and reputational issues. All these factors could improve the framework

presented above and lead to promising research. Consequently, it is clear that alternative frameworks, based on other definitions of transparency and accountability or other parameters of differentiation, do exist and may undermine the amendments and progress made in this article. Bearing in mind that this article deals only with certain specific cases, it would be interesting to broaden the field of analysis and try to apply this new approach to other cases in different countries and contexts. However, cultural and contextual differences would appear to make aiming for universal definitions and measures of the concepts extremely difficult. We would like to emphasize here the fact that there is a necessity to systematically examine how both concepts interact, at least as a first step beyond the normative point of view which positively associates transparency and accountability at all times, as exemplified by the SECO case in our study. This reminds us that such cases do exist, but are not representative of all situations where both concepts are combined.

By general consensus, accountability ideally involves both answerability, the responsibility of duty-bearers to provide information and justification about their actions and enforceability, the possibility of penalties or consequences for failing to answer accountability claims. In fact, much of what we call accountability reflects only the weaker category, answerability. While citizen-led or public initiatives often involve 'soft' peer or reputational pressure, they rarely involve strong enforceability. Accountability in the sense of answerability necessarily implies the answerers sharing information with those to whom they are answerable. Therefore Government developing or third World countries need to embrace the concept of developmental state" which is associated with the leading role played by the government in Japan, East Asia, and Latin America in the post-World War II era. Their respective governments pursued a series of policies, including good accountability, transparency, tariff protection, subsidies, and other types of controls aimed at developing selected productive sectors of economic activity.

### **Recommendation for National Development**

Developing countries need to have strong leaders across all sectors. The national leaders of these countries need to, as a matter of urgency, begin to invest heavily and think deeply about such issues as illiteracy, the lack of communication and infrastructure, traditional agrarian structure, the traditional attitude of the population and low division of labour with a view to changing them for better.

The government and private institution should adopt a transformational leadership style that will encourage and promote transparency and good accountability.

The organization or universities should be seen from the innovative point of view in order to encourage creativity, reflecting transparency and accountability in day to day spheres of life to promote good governance.

Creating an enabling environment for the teemed youth will help bring out their best potential for national development and economic growth.

Leaders should carry out their activities in manner that will allow their organizations continue to exist and prosper after them by applying a sense of sustainability all the time through transparency and accountability.

Accountability, transparency, competence, performance, and integrity should be the fundamental criteria for endorsing appointments into leadership or governance position.

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