THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE MANAGEMENT OF DAFUR CONFLICTS

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BEING A RESEARCH PROJECT SUBMITTED TO THE UNDERGRADUATE SCHOOL IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENT FOR THE AWARD OF B.SC DEGREE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS.

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DECLARATION

I hereby declare that the project entitiled “THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE MANAGEMENT OF DAFUR CONFLICTS” submitted by me to Godfrey Okoye University, Enugu State, in partial fulfilment of the requirement for the award of the degree of B.Sc in International Relations Department is a record bona-fide project work carried out under the guidance of Okonkwo, W.O

I further declare that the work reported to this project has not been submitted and will not be submitted either in part or in full, for the award of any other degree or diploma in this university or any other university

Sign……………………………….

Date…………………………….

**APPROVAL PAGE**

This study “THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE MANAGEMENT OF DAFUR CONFLICTS” I kasie Lilian Chukwuobasi met the regulations governing the award of Bachelor of Science Degree in International Relations of Godfrey Okoye University, Enugu and is approved for its contribution to knowledge and literary presentation.

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DEDICATION

To my mum, my super woman.

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I wish to first and foremost thank the Almighty God for his strength, grace and mercy in accomplishing this research.

All that we know is a sum total of what we have learnt from all who have taught us, either directly or indirectly. I am forever indebted to the countless outstanding men and women who by their commitment and dedication to becoming the best they could be, have inspired me to do the same. In this wise I wish to sincerely thank my project Advisor, Okonkwo, W.O and a host of others who space would not permit me to mention.

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ABBREVIATIONS

AU - African Union

AMISOM - African Union Mission in Somalia

CAR - Central African Republic

DPKO - Department of Peacekeeping Operations

DRC - Democratic Republic of Congo

ECOMOG - Economic Community of West African

States Monitoring Group

ECOWAS - Economic Community of West African States

EU - European Union

GA - General Assembly

IDPs - Internally Displaced Persons

NGOs - Non Governmental Organisations

OAU - Organization of African Unity

PKO - Peace-Keeping Operation

SC - Security Council

SG - Secretary General

UNAMID- United Nations Mission in Dafur

UNSG- United Nations Secretary General

Abstract

More than 60 peace operations have deployed in Africa since 2000, including multiple African-led or hybrid African Union/United Nations initiatives. The frequency of these deployments underscores the ongoing importance of these operations in the playbook of regional and multilateral bodies to prevent conflict, protect civilians, and enforce ceasefires and peace agreements.

The study presents a critical review of the concept of the mechanism of United Nations operations, as one of the emergent post-Cold War peacekeeping trends. The operation has had it positive effects in some aspects and has also recorded failures in some areas and this failures are not unrelated to the various challenges that the operations of the United nations have faced in Darfur in the curse of carrying out its mandate .The paper concludes that lessons should be learned from the experiences with the Darfur operation, for future operations, while giving recommendations for further effectiveness of the peacekeeping operations.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

**1.1 Background of Study**

The United Nations Security Council authorizes peace operations by an affirmative vote of nine of the fifteen members without a veto from the five permanent members: the United States, China, France, Russia, the UK. The Security Council has authorized more than sixty peace operations in the years since the Cold War.

The United Nationsdeploys peacekeeping forces to prevent or contain fighting; stabilize post-conflict zones; help implement peace accords; and assist democratic transitions. To achieve those goals, the United Nations outlines the following peace-building activities:

• Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of ex-combatants;

• Landmine removal and associated activities;

• Rule-of-law related activities;

• Human rights protection and promotion;

• Electoral assistance;

• Support for the restoration of state authority; and

• Promotion of social and economic recovery and development.

The United Nations generally follows three principles for deploying peacekeepers:

• Main parties to the conflict must consent;

• Peacekeepers should remain impartial but not neutral; and

• Peacekeepers cannot use force except in self-defense and defense of the mandate.

However, United Nations peacekeepers are increasingly deployed to war zones when not all the main parties have consented, such as in Mali and Eastern DRC. There is also mounting international pressure for peacekeepers to play a more robust role in protecting civilians. Despite the principle of impartiality, United Nation peacekeepers have been tasked with offensive operations against designated enemy combatants, as in Mali and the DRC. “Contemporary mandates have often blurred the lines separating peacekeeping, stabilization, counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, atrocity prevention, and state-building,”

Determining the effectiveness of United Nations mission demands investigating the structure and how are peace operations staffed and funded? Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan send the most troops to United Nations peacekeeping missions, while the United States, Japan, and France are the top funders. The top troop contributors to African Union Missions in Somalia (AMISOM) are Uganda, Burundi, Ethiopia, and Kenya, and funding comes largely from the United Nations and the European Union. The disconnect between those nations that send troops and those that fund missions is often a source of conflict. Wealthy nations spend the most on peacekeeping, yet they send relatively few troops; meanwhile, countries that either sends troops or whose citizens are directly affected by peacekeeping missions often have less say in how they are designed and mandated.

A 2014 internal review of peacekeeping practices related to civilian protection exposed some of these tensions. Researchers found that peacekeepers failed to protect civilians on several occasions. Countries that fund the annual UN peacekeeping budget of nearly $8 billion were angered by the findings, while troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) demanded raises to the reimbursement rates their soldiers receive for serving in UN missions, rates which had not increased in more than a decade. (The UN reimburses countries that contribute troops a little more than $1,000 per soldier per month, and African Union Missions in Somalia(AMISOM) troops now earn roughly the same allowances as United Nations peacekeepers.Both India and Brazil have cited their countries’ personnel contributions to UN peacekeeping in their bids to become permanent members of the Security Council, and several African governments have complained about having little say in the design and mandating of UN operations on the continent. “They would like to escape the tutelage of the UN in future crises,” says says Richard Gowan, an expert on multilateral security institutions at the European Council on Foreign Relations.

Leaders in Africa and within the UN have called for African forces to play a larger role in securing peace and stability on the continent, but budget constraints persist. While the UN has a regular peacekeeping budget, the AU must continually seek out donors, such as the UN, the EU, and the United States, to fund its missions. Only 2.3 percent of the AU’s budget comes from AU member states.“Countries with more developed military capabilities—countries from the OECD—need to come back into peacekeeping in a way they haven’t been in recent years” —Bruce Jones, Brookings Institution “When the African Union deploys a mission, it always needs to find external assistance,” says GWU’s Williams. As a result, the African Union cannot quickly deploy or sustain troops in the field. “The lack of indigenous sources of finance also undermines the African Union's credibility as a leading player in peace and security issues on the continent and reduces its ability to exercise ownership of particular initiatives,” he says.

Peace operations in Africa are increasingly collaborations between the UN and AU. For example, in Somalia, AMISOM member states provide troops while the UN provides funding, training, logistics, and planning support. UNAMID, a UN-AU hybrid mission in Darfur, absorbed and expanded a mission initially led solely by the AU.

The research intends to investigate UN Peacekeeping in Sudan critically.

**1.2 Statement of Problem**

The UN has played a vital role in mediating peace agreements and assisting in their implementation, helping to reduce the level of conflict in several regions especially in Africa. However, some of those accords failed to take hold then, such as in Angola in 1993 and Rwanda in 1994. Additionally, the current situations in Cote D’ Ivoire, Darfur- Sudan, DRC and Somalia unfortunately have not changed too positively. This has resulted in severe IDPs and refugee problems further compounding the security situation in and around such conflict areas. It is estimated that roughly half of all countries that emerge from war lapse back into violence within 5 years due to some challenges. This drives home the point that, to prevent conflict, peace agreements must be implemented in a sustained manner. Most of these conflicts are known to be contagious and thus have spill-over effects to other nations while new ones are also unfolding, such as in CAR, Chad and Guinea. All these complex crises cry out for UN intervention. Meanwhile, there was already the problem of the World Body having taken on too many missions in recent times; for example, within 1988 to 1994 alone, the number of bluehelmeted

troops had increased from 9,570 to 73,393 and an exponential soaring in the peace operations budget from $230 million to $3.6 billion.9 It is in view of the foregoing that this study seeks to address the challenges of PKOs in Africa after the end of the Cold War with particular emphasis on Somalia. Moreover, until very recently, it is well known that there has been a systematic neglect of Africa security matters by the trio of France, UK and USA since after the Cold War.This makes it necessary for Africans to properly understand the ongoing global reforms to ensure lasting solution to their conflicts. Kofi Annan the former UNSG reiterated this position by advising member states of the UN to seek alternative remedies of handling conflicts in their various regions Mr Tony Blair former British PM, also declared same position while commenting on the situation in Zimbabwe for African leaders to act. Since conflicts are intrinsically bound to occur, Africans must begin to address issues that will enable them manage conflicts in the continent effectively in concert with the UN.

**1.3 Research Question**

This study will seek to answer the following pertinent questions as relates to Darfur since it is our Country of interest:

1. How Effective has the United Nations been with the mission in Darfur?
2. What are the failures of the United Nations mission in Darfur?
3. What are the challenges affecting United Nations Peacekeeping Missions in Darfur?

**1.4 Objective of the Study**

The purpose of the study is to examine the functions and operations of the UN peacekeeping missionin Sudan. However, the specific objectives of the study are:

1. To assess the effectiveness of United Nations peacekeeping in Africa using United Nation Peacekeeping in Darfur as a case study.
2. To assess Failure of the United Nations peacekeeping in Darfur

iii) To explore the challenges confronting UN peacekeeping in Africa using United Nations PKO in Darfur as a case study.

**1.5 Significance of the Study**

Following the end of the Cold War, there were renewed calls for the UN to become the agency for achieving world peace, as several dozen military conflicts continue to rage around the globe. With this, there has been an increased need for peacekeeping in Africa due to increased conflict situations in the continent.

With the seemingly lax attitude of some major players in the UN towards African security, the continent’s security issues needs to be addressed adequately by Africans in conjunction with the UN. This study therefore, is empirically expected to benefit researchers, analysts, and policy makers in formulating a framework to overcome the challenges of UN PKO in Africa for successful Future peacekeeping. Theoretically it is hoped that its findings could stimulate further research in the field of UN PKOs. The study would also contribute to existing body of knowledge in the field of peacekeeping.

**1.6 Hypotheses**

i)The United Nations Peacekeeping in Darfur is effective.

ii) The United Nations peace keeping mission in Darfur had some failures.

ii) The challenges encountered in United Nations Peacekeeping in Darfur is high.

**1.7 Scope of the Study/Limitations**

The study examines the civil war and UN PKO in Sudan. This is because of its peculiar characteristics, its strategic position in Africa and its uniqueness in many respects. For instance due to lack of understanding of the concept of the second generation peacekeeping, the mission was faced with severe political and operational difficulties.

The study will also draw examples from UN PKOs in Africa within the pre and post Cold War era and considers strategies that could be used to improve future UN peacekeeping in Africa. It is assumed that the UN will continue to employ peacekeeping as a means of conflict resolution generally, especially in Africa.

A major limitation of this research work is the lack of relevant and contemporary literature on the specific research subject. The researcher would have loved to visit and interview the FCs of the PKOs of the country used as case study and some current UN PKOs in Africa but for the financial wherewithal. This, to the researcher is also a limitation. These limitations are not likely to affect the objective of the research work in any significant way. This is because interviews and consultations were held with some serving senior officers in PKO Departments of the United Nations Office. Additionally, since the research shall be adding to body of knowledge, the efforts made so far would definitely ginger further interest of more research in this area.

**CHAPTER TWO**

**2.0 Literature Review**

**2.1 Introduction**

This chapter gives an insight into various studies conducted by outstanding researchers, as well as explained terminologies with regards to UN Peace-keeping in Sudan. The chapter also gives a resume of the history and present status of the problem delineated by a concise review of previous studies into closely related problems.

**2.2 Concept of Conflict.**

Conflict is as old as mankind. It is a salient feature of the human society. Men must fight, even if they do not posses arms or when tools of violence are not within reach; and as Morgenthau (1948) posits, when there are no arms to fight, men will fight even with their bare fists. From birth, a baby begins the journey of conflict by crying, which is a flash of conflict. As he grows up, he bites with his teeth or scratches with the nails on his tiny fingers when he is upset. This presupposes that men will continue to fight as long as they have emotions that have the potential to love or hate; to be happy or sad; to be pleased or angry. So long as man has other men around him, there will be issues of disagreement, because interest differs and interests do clash, which may lead to disagreement or confrontation. A community or society of men thus creates room for explosive attitudes and relations.

Viewed from an extreme and religious perspective, conflict represents one of the two natures of man: ‘evil’. Cooperation, its opposite, embodies the second, which is the ‘good’ nature of man (St. Augustine, 1950). Conflict thus manifests in disagreement, anger, quarrel, hatred, destruction, killing, or war. Any untoward attitude capable of charging up the political or social environment is likely to culminate in conflict. Greed, covetousness, self-centeredness, discontent, envy, arrogance, rudeness, impunity, among other acts, are capable of producing a breakdown of human relations. In a way, these vices are innate attributes of the ‘conflict nature’ of man.

The foregoing does not suggest that there are no specific causes of conflict. Conflict arises for different reasons and there are different types of conflict in human society.

**What is Conflict?**

 Conflict is an existing state of disagreement or hostility between two or more people (Nicholson, 1992). By this, it means two or more parties do not have an accord and are as such on two different parallels on the same issue. It thus suggests the pursuit of incompatible goals. Put differently, conflict means collision course; it also refers to opposition to existing view, stand, or position.

In politics, conflict is more explicitly defined. Conflict is said to exist when two or more groups engage in a struggle over values and claims to status, power and resources in which the aims of the opponents are to neutralize, injure or eliminate the rivals (Jeong, 2000). Conflict is a demonstration of cross-purposes of distinct or similar political groups which often ends in political violence, and political violence, when contextualized in the Weberian sense, according to Anifowose, in his *Violence and Politics in Nigeria* (1982), is an acceptable weapon to ventilate anger.

Goal incompatibility implies opposing or diametrically opposed motives or pursuits. For instance, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics were pursuing incompatible goals (capitalist democracy and socialism respectively) between 1945 and 1990, an era historically referred to as the Cold War The ‘war’ implies the conflict of ideologies and irreconcilability of foreign policies. The period between 1967 and 1970 witnessed the total breakdown of relations and concord in Nigeria, as the East seceded from the federation because of irreconcilable differences with the rest of Nigeria. This led to the Civil War, which further aggravated the conflict because the East pursued the cause of sovereignty and nationhood, which ran contrary to the cause of ‘unity’ that the Nigerian government pursued.

Conflict also connotes different perceptions, which may not necessarily result in hostility. This way, conflict simply means ‘a different perception’ or view to an issue or situation (Barash and Webel, 2002). Here, it may mean a different interpretation of a motive, or a different world-view. These include religion, customs, cosmologies or values. Such differences may never culminate in direct and sharp confrontations. On the other hand however, different perceptions, values or world-views may transcend just ‘differences’ and result in the extreme connotation of conflict. Inter-faith violence is a critical example of such breakdown. Sometime ago in Nigeria, a splinter group of the Oodua People’s Congress (OPC) in the Southwest emerged as a result of growing differences in perceptions, motives interests and values. But soon after, the split and differences led to direct clashes and breakdown of law and order.

Conflict may also connote hostility or physical confrontation (Jeong, 2000). When goal incompatibility or perception/value differences reach a crescendo, a manifestation of actual hostility or clashes is possible.

In general literature, conflict is interchangeably used with other terms. This is where it becomes pertinent to mention words or terms that represent synonyms of conflict. These include contrast, disharmony, discord, struggle, contest, strife, antagonism, controversy, clash, rivalry, contest, contention, brawl, fisticuff, fight, battle, feud, combat and war. In politics, it is not too dissimilar; however, conflict technically means an existing state of disconnect between two or more parties on a prevailing issue.

It is however important to know that conflict does not always denote war. While all wars are a state of conflict, all conflict situations may not be a war situation. Why is this so? War is a state of mutually declared aggression between two or more parties prosecuted by conventional (uniformed and armed) soldiers, with the knowledge and observation of a third (neutral) party who sees to it that acts are within the rules of engagement (Waltz, 2007). Anything less or short of this cannot be the same thing as war. The conflict in Mali is a state of war. The crisis in Democratic Republic of Congo is however, not ‘war’ but ‘conflict’. The M23 in DRC is not a conventional army, and it does not have such legal personality to declare war. It is a rebel group that illegally seeks to topple a legitimate government. There have however been some rare exceptions where a war is waged by one or more states against an unconventional army. The war on terror is an example in which a war situation is created as a multinational force legitimated by the United Nations wages a war on Al-Qaeda. What makes this a “war” is that it is not only collectively executed with the mandate of the UN, but the hitherto faceless Al-Qaeda had declared war on the west and their allies.

The Somali crisis can be referred to as ‘conflict’ and not ‘war’, because the Al-Shabab is an illegitimate Islamist group that seeks most unconventional means to destabilize the state and impose extreme Al-Qaeda Sharia system on a constitutionally secular entity. In both cases, the governments have not declared war, but have only clamped down on such criminal insurgent groups within the state. Conflict is thus related to but technically different from war. Conflict is a general description of a state of chaos, including that of war situations; while war is a legally declared course of action by constitutionally recognized groups.

**Types of Conflict**

Experience in human society has shown that there are degrees of variation in conflicts. Conflicts are in types. Psychology as a discipline has espoused on intra-personal conflict. Sociology identifies inter-personal as well as intra-group or intra-unit conflict, as well as inter-group conflict. Political Science and History have identified inter-ethnic or intra-state conflict as well as international conflict.

**Intra-personal conflict**

This refers to a state of implosion in an individual shaped by the state of mind. It is however important to know that such human state is largely dictated by circumstances around him. Such situations are anger, depression, confusion, frustration, which could lead to aggression, erratic behavior, addiction and in extreme cases, suicide (Ross, 1993). This is the kind of conflict that has been described as “man against self” (Lamb, 2008), in which man continues to contend or battle with his mind and habits. Smoking, drug use, alcoholism, as well as lying are some addictive habits that man may continually contend with; even when he desires to stop, he may find himself continuing it. This is intra-personal conflict or “man against self”.

**Inter-personal conflict**

This is what has been described as “man against man” in the micro sense. This type of conflict may be direct opposition, as in exchange of blows, a gunfight or a robbery, or it may be a more subtle conflict between the desires of two or more persons (Nikolajeva, 2005). A boxing or wrestling match is a kind of game, but the act on the mat depicts conflict. Conflict in this sense is a fight between people. However, conflict does not always translate to physical exchange of blows. Malice or ‘cold attitude’ to each other already underscores conflict. Conflict thus also means implicit hostility. It may not be obvious to the third party, but the disagreeing or unfriendly parties already understand that there is a state of discontent between them.

**Man against society; man against nature**

This is an interesting type of conflict. Morell (2009) posits that “man against society” type of conflict arises when man stands against a man-made institution or practices. These may include slavery, human trafficking, child prostitution, human rights abuses, bullying, corruption, bad governance, et cetera. According to her, "man against man" conflict may shade into "man against society”. “Man against nature” is the type of conflict that depicts a state of contention between man and his environment (Lamb, 2008). Such forces of nature as global warming, climate change, rainstorm, hurricane, desertification, resistant malaria, killer insects, et cetera create a situation in which man battles with nature to overcome and master it.

**Family conflict**

This type of conflict occurs in a family unit. Sociologists would describe this as intra-unit conflict. In most cases, these conflicts arise from crisis occasioned by familial roles, expectations and role conflict. Examples include father-son, mother-father, husband-wife, brother-sister conflict. It may also imply cousin-cousin, nephew-uncle, sister-in-law or brother-in-law conflict. Such conflicts may be caused by such factors as simple as rudeness, claim to seniority, laziness, truancy at school, lying; to such extreme cases as land, property, inheritance and will dispute.

**Inter-Group conflict**

This refers to the kind of disagreement or feud that takes places between two or more sectarian or religious groups, ethnic groups, communities, or interest groups. The contention between Christians and Moslems in Nigeria is a classic example of inter-faith conflict. Nigeria has been riddled with clashes between members of the two faiths since the 1980s. The Maitatsine riots in Kano, Bulumkutu crisis in Maiduguri, Sokoto university campus riots over use of Othman dan Fodio’s daughter’s name in a pageant, Cross vs. Crescent crisis at the Ibadan university, among others, are worse scenarios of this (Folarin, 1997). The Boko Haram Islamist terrorist onslaught against Christians and the Nigerian State since 2009 has however, become the worst in the annals of Nigeria’s religious conflict. In terms of ethnic conflict, there have been: Igbo-Hausa feud that began after the military coup and counter-coup of 1966, culminating in the Civil War in 1967, Efik-Ibibio conflict, Tiv-Jukun debacle, Fulani-Birom clashes, and Itsekiri-Urhobo-Ijaw conflict in the Niger Delta. Intra-ethnic or inter-community conflicts include Ife-Modakeke, Umuleri-Aguleri, Andoni-Ogoni, and Egba-Awori (Ota) clashes.

**Intra-State conflict**

This type of conflict is confined within the borders of a sovereign state. Such economic factors as land, uneven development, resource control and revenue-sharing formula could cause a conflict within a state. Social factors as value differences as had been the case in old Sudan could also cause conflict. Socio-ethnic factors such as real or perceived ethnic balancing or ethnic cleansing such as in the case of the Nigeria-Biafra episode and Rwanda genocide chapter in 1994, could also be a factor. Political factors such as power-sharing, power equation or zoning formula in public administration, lopsidedness in political appointments, quota system and the likes could cause intra-state conflict. Other examples of intra-state conflicts are the Malian crisis, Ivorian crisis, Libyan conflict, conflict in the DRC and Central African Republic.

**Inter-State conflict**

This type of conflict is also known as international conflict. This is a conflict between two or more states. In some cases, this type of conflict degenerates to a state of war. We must remember that all wars are described as conflict. As such, all inter-state wars are same as international conflict. Inter-sate conflict can be caused by territorial encroachment by another state, breakdown of diplomatic ties, exportation of toxic or contrabands to another country, et cetera. In the 1980s, Nigeria almost cut off diplomatic ties with Italy because hundreds of tons of toxic substances dumped at Koko, a sedate village in Delta (Bendel) State, were traced to the European country. Nigeria and Cameroon have had cases of hostilities on a number of occasions, over Northern borders and lately, Bakassi Peninsula; but none ever resulted in full-scale war. The United States and Cuba have been in a perpetual state of conflict since the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. Examples of inter-state conflict that resulted in war include Iran-Iraq of 1980-1988, Britain-Argentina War of 1982 over the Falkland Islands, USA-Afghanistan War.

**Global conflict**

This should not be mistaken for inter-state conflict, although it also connotes international conflict. This kind of international conflict however transcends the type which involves two or more sovereign states. It is however instructive to note that a conflict between two or more states could become a full-blown global conflict. The Serbia-Austrian conflict of 1914 resulted in the First World War. The German-British conflict of 1939 culminated in the Second World War. There are also cases of global conflict not directly caused by states. The rise in terrorism has escalated to a global conflict in which the whole world is battling with the scourge of global terrorism and working in concert to fight it.

**Forms of Conflict**

There are certain forms or manifestations of conflict, which we must quickly and briefly examine. We have looked at war. Now, let us examine revolt, insurgency, mutiny, and (but not the least) protest. *Revolt* refers to popular uprising against established order. In some cases, a revolt may fester and culminate in *revolution*, which is described as the total sweeping off or changing of a *status quo* through a sustained and popular movement. *Protest* simply refers organized (mass) demonstration against a government, an action or an unpopular policy/decision. Such protest may be either peaceful or violent, and it could be well received by the target or brashly responded to, resulting in violence. For instance, in 2012, the South African police killed 34 miners who were peacefully protesting poor conditions of service.

*Mutiny* is an act of disobedience in the military or an uprising in the security forces against its high command or against the Commander-in-Chief, usually aimed at dismantling established order and which may result in the toppling of government. When an act of mutiny fails, the culprits usually face a Court Marshall (a military court) where sentences vary from dismissal to death of the mutineers.

*Insurgency* refers to an uprising against the state. It could be led by a religious, ethnic or sectional group. The intent is usually to destabilize the state with a view to be heard or recognized, as well as to forcefully control the affairs of the state or secede. Insurgencies have produced new states in global politics. These have included Eritrea that emerged from old Ethiopia; South Sudan that emerged from Sudan; and Slovakia that arose from old Czechoslovakia. Some insurgencies have failed to produce desired results, but have caused maximum mayhem for sovereign states, such as DRC, Mali, Kosovo, and Nigeria.

**Theories of Conflict**

Theories of conflict are the explanations put forward to explain causes of conflict. The causes of conflict are numerous and complex, thus creating problem of analysis of specific conflict situations. The theories are advanced to simplify the causes by looking at them in categories.

The theories explaining causes of conflict include *structural* theory of conflict, *Marxist* theory, *international capitalist* theory, *realist* theory, *biological* theory, and *psychological* theory of conflict.

**Structural Theory of conflict**

The structural theory attempts to explain conflict as a product of the tension that arises when groups compete for scarce recourses. The central argument in this sociological theory is that conflict is built into the particular ways societies are structured or organized. It describes the condition of the society and how such condition or environment can create conflict. Structural conflict theory identifies such conditions as social exclusion, deprivation, class inequalities, injustice, political marginalization, gender imbalances, racial segregation, economic exploitation and the likes, all of which often lead to conflict (Oakland, 2005).

Structuralists maintain that conflict occurs because of the exploitative and unjust nature of human societies or because of domination of one class by another. The theory is however deficient in its on-sidedness of looking at causes of conflict. It, for instance, does not see the bright sides of racial or ethnic diversity and the strength that a society may derive from pluralism. It only sees the flaws. The structural theory thus makes sense only when conflicts are viewed from the broadest possible perspective, and only if the observer opts to ignore alternate causes of the conflict.

**Marxist Theory of conflict**

The Marxist theory is an offshoot of the Marxian explanation of society. Society is divided into unequal classes: the one is strong, rich and noble and bears the tag of bourgeoisie, who controls the instrumentality of state; while the other is deprived, socially deflated, financially infantile and is called the proletariat. There is a constant struggle between the two, but he that has the financial muscle controls both the state and the poor, and that is the structure of society. Thus, the Marxist stand is that the state is itself a product of the irreconcilability of class antagonisms (Lenin, 1917). The state is therefore structured to be in a perpetual state of conflict.

The rich controls the state as well as means of production. The rich thus grows wealthier at the expense of the poor, who lives at his mercy and is implicitly embittered by the development. The central argument of Marxism is thus that capitalism is at the heart of the state, and that same capitalism is exploitative and oppressive and has been responsible for the polarization of the society (and state) into two incompatible classes.

The limitation of Marxism is similar to that of structuralism. It looks at every issue of conflict from the viewpoint of dialectical materialism alone. This economic prism is not enough to capture every aspect of conflict causation.

**International Capitalism Theory of conflict**

This theory captures the historical import of colonialism and imperialism. According to Hobson (2006; 1902), in his classic, *Imperialism: A Study*, the external drive of western nations propelled by the Industrial Revolution began to create numerous platforms for conflict. The search for raw materials, need to invest surplus capital and search for new markets outside Europe compelled an imperialist pathway as the western countries desperately sought such markets, raw materials and investment climates at the expense of the peace and prosperity of the locals in what is now known as the Global South. This led to colonization, as well as collision of cultures and civilizations and ultimately conflict.

Imperialism thus became the last and highest stage of capitalism (Lenin, 1917: 43). This international capitalism theory aptly explains the collaboration of western financial markets and capital today, as it solidified and extended their economic influences all over the world, and has leveraged them for economic exploitation of the developing economies, which has created imbalances between what is now the North and South.

**Economic Theory of conflict**

Economic theory of conflict explicates the economic undercurrents in conflict causation. There is considerable interface between politics (power, resources or value) and scarcity. People seek power because it is a means to an end, more often, economic ends. Communities feud over farmlands, grazing fields, water resource, et cetera, and groups fight government over allocation of resources or revenue. Scarcity, wants, needs, or the fear of scarcity is often a driving force for political power, contention for resource control, and so forth. Conflict is thus not far-fetched in the course of such palpable fear or threat of scarcity. Just as the fear of poverty and deprivation could lead to fraud or corruption; so is threat of or real famine, deprivation, mismanagement of scarce resources, could propel conflict over resource control.

**Realist Theory of conflict**

Political realism explains conflict as an inherent attribute of man. As far as men live with their ‘baggage of emotions’, so will conflict remain a part of their habitat; and as long as man remains a ‘political animal’ with interests different from others, so shall conflict of interests remain a feature of society. More importantly, as long as there are scarce resources where most men are ambitiously seeking comfort or control of resources, conflict is inevitable. Realism is a good blend of the Marxist, international capitalist and economic theories in the explication of conflict.

The realist theory describes conflict as a product of the innate selfish nature of man, who continues to pursue his own best interests even if the ox of others is gored. This selfish nature of man leads to “competitive processes” between actors who seek to have all or most of available scarce resources. It is such attribute that is taken to the inter-state level, which leads to erratic behavior, hegemonic propensities, imperialism, et cetera, that can impel resistance as well as violent opposition and consequently heat up the international system.

**Biological Theory of conflict**

This theory explains that human nature is genetically transferred from generation to generation. Just as parents can genetically transfer their godly qualities and ingenuity to their offspring, so can the evil nature of man be genetically transferred. The argument goes that since our ancestors were instinctively violent beings and since we evolved from them, we must bear aggressive or destructive impulses in our genes.

This theory explains that the irresistible outbreaks of violent impulses are ascribed to fixed biological propensities. As such, aggression is spontaneous and could be uncontrollable. This line of thought underlines the assumption about the greatness of certain people, clan or family; or the pride, arrogance and aggressiveness of a particular nation or group.

. haves-not, the strong and the weak, the dominant and the vulnerable; a situation that is often accompanied by perpetual struggle between the divides. These are the stimulating factors in local and international conflict, as well as the basic characteristics of the global human society.

**2.3 CONCEPT OF PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY.**

 The concept of preventive diplomacy may be defined as: Action (diplomatic, political, military, economic and humanitarian) taken by governments, multilateral (the UN as well as regional groups) organisations and international agencies (including non-governmental actors) with the aim of: preventing severe disputes and conflicts from arising between and within states; preventing such disputes and conflicts from escalating into armed confrontation; limiting the intensity of violence resulting from such conflicts and preventing it from spreading geographically; preventing and managing acute humanitarian crises associated with (either as the cause or the effect) such conflicts Preventive diplomacy is one of the most original contributions of the UN system to the maintenance of international peace and security. The UN Charter states that the goal of the organisation is "to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to peace..." (Article 1, paragraph 1 of the UN Charter). The concept of "peacekeeping" involves the prevention, containment, moderation, and termination of hostilities. Yet, the usage of the term has been considerably imprecise and dependent on the prevailing international climate. The first specific and consistent usage of the term is attributed to the former Secretary-General of the United Nations, Dag Hammarskjold. For Hammarskjold, whose name is associated with preventive diplomacy much in the same way as Woodrow Wilson's is associated with collective security, the simple goal of preventive diplomacy was to keep local conflicts from being entangled in superpower rivalry. Hammarskjold's concept envisaged a number of instruments, such as "hotlines", risk-reduction centres and transparency measures.

While the end of the Cold War removed the rationale for preventive diplomacy developed by Hammarskjold, the concept was resurrected and given a new definition by the UN Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali. In his landmark report: An Agenda for Peace, the Secretary-General defines preventive diplomacy as "action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur." The new notion of preventive diplomacy is specifically distinguished from other types of UN action, such as "peacemaking", "peacekeeping" and "peacebuilding". The Agenda for Peace defines "peacemaking" as "action to bring hostile parties to agreement", while "peacekeeping" involves "the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned, normally involving United Nations military and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as well". "Peacebuilding", a major innovation of the Agenda for Peace, is "action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict"

The renewed emphasis on preventive diplomacy is in part the result of a growing disillusionment with peacekeeping. Greater emphasis on preventive diplomacy is one of the options that could, in the long-term, reduce the need for expensive and politically more difficult peacekeeping operations in many parts of the world. Preventive diplomacy has the potential to enhance the legitimacy of the UN's peace and security role by measuring it against a broader framework than mere peacekeeping functions that are so susceptible to periodic setbacks. Moreover, to a much greater extent than peacekeeping operations, the exercise of preventive diplomacy could be decentralised, i.e., undertaken by agencies other than the UN, including regional organisations and non-governmental organisations. Because preventive diplomacy relies primarily on non-military instruments, it provides opportunities for greater burden-sharing within, and decentralisation of, international peace and security arrangements. Preventive diplomacy can be applied to a broad range international security problems (both traditional and non-traditional) by a number of actors and agencies acting preferably, but not necessarily, within a multilateral framework.

The instruments of preventive diplomacy vary widely, from a simple telephone conversation during a crisis to the deployment of military units, from the peacetime monitoring of events in potential trouble spots to the dispatch of fact-finding and goodwill missions at the onset of a crisis. In a narrow, if more familiar, sense, preventive diplomacy is about suppressing or resolving disputes which have an immediate potential to escalate into armed confrontation. In a broader sense, preventive diplomacy seeks to establish the necessary long-term background conditions which inhibit the use of force as a means of dispute settlement. As such, the instruments of preventive diplomacy may be divided into two categories: peace-time measures and crisis-time responses.

**Peace-time Measures**

* Confidence-building measures provide mutual clarification of the strategic intentions and military capabilities of states in a potentially adversarial setting. Typically, confidence-building measures include transparency and information exchanges, advanced notification of military exercises and deployments and monitoring of regional arms agreements.
* Institution-building refers to formal or informal ways of organising attention, expertise and resources in pursuit of a common set of interests or objectives. Institutions develop principles of conduct, generate regularised consultations and build trust. In the long-term, institutions constrain unilateral preferences and actions of actors and promote cooperation. Institution-building need not be an overtly formal affair with a charter and bureaucratic apparatus. Regular consultative gatherings could be more desirable in certain circumstances where actors might wish a degree of informality and flexibility. A key aspect of institution-building is "norm-setting", or inducing rule-governed behaviour among the actors. Such norms could include multilateralism, non-interference and non-intervention and pacific settlement of disputes. In its broad sense, institution-building might be helped by consultations and dialogue initiated primarily by non-governmental actors, but attended by government officials (who may profess to participate in their "private" capacity). Such "Track II" processes could serve as testing grounds for ideas concerning more formal and inter-governmental norm-setting and cooperation.
* early-warning involves monitoring of developments in political, military, ecological and other areas (such as natural disasters, refugee flows, threat of famine and the spread of disease) that may, unless mitigated, lead to outbreak of violence or major humanitarian disasters. In recent years, considerable international interest in early-warning has been developed in relation to human rights violations and refugee movements.
* preventive humanitarian action is concerned primarily with preventing and managing the humanitarian costs of political conflicts as well as the political and humanitarian consequences of slow-moving natural disasters such as droughts and famine. . Early preventive humanitarian action can save thousands of lives and millions of dollars in subsequent remedial action. This an area in which NGOs, bilateral and multilateral development agencies and regional organisations could play an important role as agents of preventive diplomacy.

**Crisis-time Responses**

2.a. fact-finding involves the collection and analysis of timely and reliable information on conflict situations. Fact-finding is clearly linked the notion of early-warning described earlier, and could be undertaken on a "peace-time" basis, but it is more specific to a given crisis situation. Fact-finding must be comprehensive, covering domestic, regional and global aspects of a conflictand investigating the social, economic, strategic and political factors underlying it.

* good offices and goodwill missions are usually undertaken before or at the onset of a crisis and involve the dispatch of senior official/s, such as the UN Secretary-General or his personal envoy/s. The aim of such missions is not necessarily to engage in serious mediation efforts, but rather to express the concern of the international community as well as to promote a climate of trust and to establish the areas of agreement between the parties to a conflict.
* crisis-management aims at reducing the immediate possibility of violent action in a conflict situation and may require measures such as reconciliation, mediation and arbitration to help diffuse tensions.
* preventive deployment illustrates the difference in orientation between preventive diplomacy and peacekeeping. Peacekeeping involves separation of rival forces who have mutually consented to such action following a settlement of their conflict. Preventive deployment involves dispatch of units to trouble-spots to prevent the widening/ escalation of a conflict with or without the mutual consent of the rivals. Thus, preventive deployment, unlike peacekeeping, might not be a strictly neutral exercise. It could be undertaken with a view to support the likely victim by deterring the actions of the likely aggressor. Preventive deployment could also involve the establishment of demilitarised zones which would create a physical barrier between the antagonists.

**Preventive Diplomacy and the Use of Force**

One of most difficult questions about preventive diplomacy is its relationship with the use of force. Robert Gates, a fomer director of the CIA, has argued that in order to be successful, preventive diplomacy must be backed up by the threat of force. Yet, a strong case can be made against this proposition. The key goal of preventive diplomacy is to reduce the necessity of force and to give priority to diplomatic and political instruments.

The concept of preventive diplomacy should not be confused with deterrence. The latter seeks to prevent war by raising the costs of aggression. The attacker is presented with the threat of unacceptable damage should he proceed with aggression. Preventive diplomacy seeks to prevent aggression through norms, institutions, confidence-building measures, and a wide variety of political and diplomatic processes. In other words, the instruments of preventive diplomacy are fundamentally non-military in nature. Moreover, since one of the norms of preventive diplomacy is to encourage pacific settlement of disputes, it would seem especially odd to consider force as a legitimate instrument of preventive diplomacy.

Preventive diplomacy must be distinguished from coercive diplomacy. In coercive diplomacy, force is used to intimidate an adversary and influence its behaviour so as to make him do what he would not otherwise do. The goal of coercive diplomacy not necessarily to prevent war, but to use the threat of war to promote the interests of a state or an alliance system.

Under certain circumstances, it may be possible to envisage the use of force in support of preventive diplomacy. The UN's concept of preventive deployment, as outlined above, envisages the use of force to prevent crisis escalation. But the role of force here as envisaged by the Un Secretary-General is fundamentally different from the use of force envisaged by the former CIA Director. The latter's idea of force fits the notion of coercive diplomacy, not preventive diplomacy.

Force plays a fundamentally different role in preventive diplomacy. If used at all, it is geared to preventing the escalation of disputes into armed conflict, to prevent humanitarian disasters, and to limit the scale and spread of violence. The use of force in preventive diplomacy must be legitimised through a multilateral framework, while coercive diplomacy is not usually associated with multilateralism. Preventive diplomacy has more in common with collective and cooperative security than with balance of power geopolitics. If force must be used, then it must be used legitimately. Even so, the use of force in preventive diplomacy should only be considered as a last resort, after all other diplomatic measn are exhausted.

**Preventive Diplomacy and Multilateralism**

While preventive diplomacy need not be an exclusively multilateral enterprise, multilateralism enhances the appeal and legitimacy of preventive diplomacy efforts and hence their prospects for success. A multilateral security order increases the political cost of aggression; its participants are less likely to resort to force to settle their disputes with others. Multilateralism discourages states from designating adversaries and developing exclusive or closed security alliances against them, alliances which inevitably aggravate the security dilemma.

While the UN has been, and remains, the chief multilateral framework for preventive diplomacy, the latter can also be undertaken by regional organizations with an interest in the maintenance of regional peace and security. While the role of regional organisations in the maintenance of peace and security is not new, in many cases, their peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding functions are constrained by lack of resources. The resources required for a preventive diplomacy role are, however, not beyond their reach. Given their greater familiarity with peace and security problems in their neighbourhood, regional organisations are well-placed to specialise in certain aspects of preventive diplomacy such as early-warning and pacific resolution of disputes (the latter function involves provision of good offices, mediation, investigation and conciliation and is authorised by the UN Charter under Article 52, Chapter VIII). Despite an inconsistent record in conflict-control, regional organisations have in the past demonstrated an ability to compensate for the deficiencies in the UN system.

**Preventive Diplomacy and Strategic Culture**

Like most strategic concepts and diplomatic tools, prospects for preventive diplomacy are shaped by the specific political, strategic and normative conditions prevailing within a particular region. Instruments of preventive diplomacy that are workable in one region may not prove suitable for another. Thus, some of the traditional measures of preventive diplomacy, such as confidence-building and institution-building, which have been popular and effective in Europe, may require considerable rethinking and adaptation in order to be relevant and useful in the other parts of the world. Important differences in theatre conditions as well as the historical and cultural roots of conflict would complicate the creation of Helsinki-type arrangements in regions such as the Middle East and the Asia-Pacific. The relative importance and usefulness of the instruments is likely to vary from region to region, depending on the security challenges of different regions. The regime of preventive diplomacy associated with the UN system or developed in the European context often relies on explicit, formal and verifiable measures. But the strategic culture in other parts of the world, such as the Asia Pacific region, may support different styles of policy-making on regional cooperation. The

Asia Pacific region shows a preference for informal policy structures and modalities over legalistic procedures. Recent debates on security cooperation within the ARF suggest that in order to be acceptable to most Asian actors, a mechanism for preventive diplomacy needs to be ad hoc rather than institutionalised, informal rather than legalistic, consensual rather thatv confrontational, and low-key rather than high profile. Instruments of preventive diplomacy in the region will be shaped by the preference of regional actors for a pragmatic, informal, gradualist and consensus-seeking approach to multilateral institution-building.

**Preventive Diplomacy and Leadership**

Much of the theoretical literature on preventive diplomacy has ignored the issue of leadership. While collective bodies like the UN and regional organizations may provide the organizing framework for preventive diplomacy, its actual undertaking depends on actors who offer leadership, resources, and mediation skills. Great powers tend to dominate the rule-making, crisis-management and enforcement functions in any system of international order. In conflicts involving great powers or their clients, preventive diplomacy depends, first and foremost, on great power consent and leadership. The Concert of Europe, which succeeded in preventing a major European war for half a century, provides a historical model of such a system of preventive diplomacy.

But great powers are unlikely to be neutral in a given conflict situation. Moreover, the collective management of a security order by the great powers is likely to be resented by those excluded from the privileged club. For example, any suggestion today for a preventive diplomacy system in the Asia Pacific region managed by a great power Concert is sure to be bitterly opposed by the region's lesser states, especially the ASEAN members. Moreover, great powers should not, and do not, have a monopoly on leadership. Recent international history shows that middle powers are also able to play a key role in preventive diplomacy. While lacking in structural power, middle powers can provide ideas (intellectual leadership) and management skills (entrepreneurial leadership) in institution-building and conflict management. In the Western Pacific, Australia and Canada have already demonstrated the usefulness of middle power leadership by promoting ideas and initiatives about confidence- and security-building measures, and playing an important role in the development of the ARF.

Finally, small powers may be able to develop a preventive diplomacy regime by acting in their collective capacity. ASEAN clearly hopes to play such a role within the Asia Pacific region. It clearly rejects the Concert approach and demands that any efforts at regional security cooperation must be based on respect for the principles of equality and sovereignty. ASEAN has provided the institutional framework for the ARF and intends to have a major say in the development of its peace and security role. The ARF may be the only major regional security institution involving the world's major powers in which agenda-setting and direction is provided by a coalition of small powers. While ASEAN cannot shape or dictate the regional balance of power, it certainly hopes to exercise a moderating influence on great power geopolitics by promoting a framework of restraint, engagement and rule-governed behaviour. Such a role underlies ASEAN's strategy of "engagement" of China, which it presents as a far more feasible and desirable alternative to a policy of "containment".

**2.4 The Concept of Peacekeeping**

Peacekeeping involves the coordinated presence of military, police and civilian personnel responsible for a wider range of task such as humanitarian assistance, policing, human rights and electoral monitoring, social and economic rehabilitation and reconstruction. There is the traditional and multidimensional PKOs.

The traditional UN peacekeeping was developed during the Cold War era as a means to resolve conflicts between states. This is by deploying unarmed or lightly armed military personnel from a number of countries, under UN command, between the armed forces of the former warring parties. Peacekeepers could be called in when the major international powers tasked the UN with bringing closure to conflicts threatening regional stability and international peace and security. Peacekeepers were deployed when a ceasefire was in place and the parties to the conflict had given their consent. UN troops observed from the ground and reported impartially on adherence to the ceasefire, troop withdrawal or other elements of the peace agreement. This gave time and breathing space for diplomatic efforts to address the underlying causes of a conflict. An example of this was the UNEF operation in response to invasion of Egypt by Israel, France and UK in 1956.

The end of the Cold War precipitated a dramatic shift in the UN and brought about multidimensional peacekeeping.

In a new spirit of cooperation, the SC established larger and more complex UN PKOs, often to help implement comprehensive peace agreements between protagonists in intra-state conflicts. The UN DPKO was created in 1992 to support this increased demand for complex peacekeeping. Example of this was UNTAG which was the first of such missions and it was a resounding success. The success was due to the full cooperation of the warring parties, the

contributory support of the UNSC and the timely provision of the necessary financial resources. Another example of multidimensional PKO was ONUMOZ. The then UNSG described the accomplishment of it’s mandate as a remarkable achievement. A number of factors contributed to its success, among them were the strong commitment to peace and reconciliation demonstrated by the Mozambican people and their leaders.

Other factors were the clarity of the ONUMOZ mandate, the consistent support provided by the UNSC and the international community’s significant political, financial and technical support for the peace process. ONUMOZ represented an example of what could be achieved through the UN when all forces joined together towards a common goal.

Maj Gen Lawrence Onoja speaking on the conduct of peacekeepers emphasizes that UN forces must above all behave in such a way as not to take part in a conflict. It must not be used either to protect certain positions or one of the parties or to oblige one part to accept a certain political result or to influence the political balance. Boutros Boutros-Ghali expressed the importance of UN peacekeeping thus: United Nations peacekeeping stands out as

one of the Organisation ’s most original and ambitious undertakings in its effort to control conflict and promote peace. It is an inspired innovation. The Blue Helmets will continue to break new grounds as the UN is called upon not only to contain conflicts and alleviate the suffering they cause, but also to prevent the outbreak of war among nations and to build towards enduring peace. Kofi Annan also emphasised the use of PKO for conflict prevention in Africa in his 1998 report to the UNSC thus: Since 1970, more then 30 wars have been fought in Africa, the vast majority of them intra-state in origin. In 1996 alone, 14 of the 53 countries in Africa were afflicted by armed conflicts accounting for more than half of all war related deaths world-wide and resulting in more than 8 million refugees, returnees and displaced persons. The consequences of these conflicts have seriously undermined Africa's efforts to ensure long term stability, prosperity and peace of its peoples…. Preventing such wars is no longer a matter of defending states or protecting allies. It is a matter of defending humanity itself.

This would involve sourcing of troops from TCC, according to Brig Gen SY Bello, NA’s ability to promptly deploy troops for UN PKO is hampered by funding and bureaucracy. The same situation applies to most armies of developing nations who incidentally are the major TCC to UN PKOs.30 According to Col Owonubi NA troops undergo general peacekeeping courses as part of normal training. In addition those earmarked for PKOs are given specific training on the particular mission highlighting background of the conflict.

They are also enlightened on the culture of the people and other vital areas. On the mandate and ROE of troops deployed on UN PKO Brahimi recommended in his panel report in 2000 that PKOs should have military capacity to accomplish assigned mandates.

This study observed that during the Cold War the rivalry between the super powers was played out mainly in the Third World, where regional conflicts were fuelled by those super powers. This was in their desire to preserve or expand their sphere of influence, they were however careful to avoid direct military confrontation. When a regional conflict threatened to escalate and draw them into such confrontation they sought to contain it, at times using the UN PKO.

However, after the Cold War the balance of nuclear terror disappeared. Thus ambitious and troublesome local leaders were no longer tightly controlled by the super powers in their respective spheres of influence. Therefore, many ancient ethnic conflicts in Africa, long contained during the Cold War, re-emerged often with brutal violence.

Furthermore, this study believes the new unrest in Western Europe after the Cold War caused the industrial nations of the West to shift their attention and financial assistance from South to North.

These factors further worsened the plight of some African countries pervaded by bad governance, natural disaster, poverty and famine. This has resulted in increased conflict in Africa after the Cold War era. The evidence is the high number of UN PKOs ongoing in Africa compared to other continents of the globe. Of the 18 ongoing UNPeacekeeping and Political Missions worldwide 8 are in Africa, one of which is the largest and most expensive.

**2.6Conflict in Darfur (Sudan)**

Despite claims by the government of Sudan that peace has been achieved in Darfur, violence continues. Indeed, a major offensive launched against rebels in Central Darfur’s mountainous Jebel Marra region in 2016 caused considerable suffering and displaced more than 100,000 people between January and March alone. Conflict in Darfur is rooted in historicalcycles of violence and injustice that persist today. The current phase of conflict started in 2003, when the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) took up arms against the government of Sudan. This led to a vicious counteroffensiveby government forces supported by the Janjaweed, a militia drawn primarily from camel breeders of North Darfur who operated in North and West Darfur with the support of the Sudanese government, and formed into a full paramilitary wing that undertook joint operations with the government’s Popular Defence Forces (PDF), another paramilitary force. Civilians were the primary target of these attacks and villages were burned, people killed and women raped with the apparent aim of driving civilians off their land. Displacement has been a deliberate strategy of the war. Since 2003, almost half the population have been forcibly displaced, many more than once, fleeing either to neighbouring countries, to urban areas within Darfur or elsewherein the country. Since the height of the violence in 2003-2004, and despite two signed peace agreements in 2006 and 2011, violence continued, albeit at a lower level. Those fighting this war have gradually splintered into smaller groups, with an increase in fighting among the Janjaweed and between other former government collaborators. As a result, the landscape has become increasingly complex as intercommunal conflict has intersected with fighting between government and rebels, and with criminality fuelled by the chaos. In 2014, the pattern of violence changed again, when the government of Sudan launched major offensives againstJEM and the faction of the SLA led by Minni Minawi. These offensives, known as “Operation Decisive Summer”, led to a massive increase in the level of fighting and drove the number of attacks on civilians up to levels not seen since the height of the violence in 2003-2004.

Since the conflict began, at least 300,000 people are estimated to have been killed (although casualty data is not regularly updated), and around 3 million have been driven from their homes (approximately 2.6 million of whom are internally displaced within Sudan and approximately 350,000 of whom have fled to Chad). Camps for internally displaced people (IDPs) within Darfur are primarily located around urban areas and are administered by the few

humanitarian agencies allowed by the government to operate in Darfur. Their location and the longevity of this displacement has led to rapid urbanisation, with all the associated problems this brings. While some of the displaced have returned to their homes during the course of the war, particularly when there has been a lull in the fighting, most have not. Those who have returned, as previously documented, have been mostly driven by terrible conditions of displacement rather than by a realistic expectation of safety on return. In fact, many have returned at considerable risk to themselves.

**CHAPTER THREE**

**RESEARCH METHODOLOGY**

**3.0 INTRODUCTION**

This chapter states the various methods used in the research, as well as the population of the study, and sampling techniques used in determining the sample size for the research. How data was collected and analysed is also discussed in this chapter.

The main objectives of this research were achieved through quantitative methods, as inferential statistics were used to measure the level of accuracy and validate responses from the respondents in accordance to the objectives of the research.

**3.1 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK**

Conflict resolution is a comprehensive term, which implies that the deep-rooted sources of conflict are addressed and resolved.

Duffey expressed the view that this is a new theory of problem-solving in order to iuachieve the desired result. He maintains that the conventional settlement method merely settles conflict on the surface rather than resolve conflict as in conflict resolution.

Resolution of conflict addresses the deep rooted sources of conflict, changing behaviour, attitudes and structures. This will ensure that behaviours are no longer violent, attitudes are not hostile and structures are not exploitative. The process of conflict resolution includes becoming aware of a conflict, diagnosing its nature and applying appropriate methods. This is in order to discuss the negative emotional energy involved and enable the conflicting parties to understand and resolve their differences. Furthermore it is to resolve the differences to achieve solution that are not imposed, but agreed to by all the key parties, and also address the root causes of the conflict.

Kevin Avruch and Peter Black brought culture question to the fore in conflict resolution. They opined that culture, as a concept, is a powerful analytical tool. Also, they argued that it is necessary to attend to the local understandings of being and action which people use in the production and interpretation of conflict behaviour. They referred to this cultural knowledge as the local common-sense about conflict which are determined by language, social, political and economic structure, religion and ethno-psychology.

Maj Gen Chris Garba explains that certain procedures have been established for resolving conflicts thus: By agreement of the parties involved, by friendly intervention of a third state or of an international organisation in order to help the disputants reach an agreement, by binding and final decision of an international agency, either the UN or an international tribunal, by means of self help or self defence and finally by unlimited armed intervention or war.

The means of achieving this includes conflict settlement, conflict prevention/preventive diplomacy, conflict management, conflict transformation and conflict resolution

**3.2 RESEARCH DESIGN**

The research design used for this study was the Historical research design. A comprehensive study of the efforts of the United Nations in Sudan, the challenges they face and their success story will be carried out and properly analyzed.

**3.4 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY**

The data for this research work was gotten from various sources, they include text books, letters, Newspaper Articles, Documentaries, and websites of Governmental and Non-Governmental Organizations. Field trips were also undertaken, this was necessary to allow the researcher conduct oral interviews in order to gather relevant information for the purpose of carrying out this study.

**3.5 DATA ANALYSIS**

Qualitative descriptive data analysis was used for this research data analysis , this refers to analyzing non-numeric information such as interview transcripts, notes, video and audio recordings, images and text documents .

**CHAPTER FOUR**

**4.1 Effectiveness of the United Nations peace keeping Operations in Darfur**

In stopping atrocities in the Darfur region, the international organizations (UN, EU, and AU) were slow to react. International responses finally came in the wake of pressure from aid agencies and the media. The pressure they exerted was sufficiently strong that the US brought the matter to the attention of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). The slow response by the international community to the Darfur crisis was in part due to the ongoing North-South peace talks, which had reached a crucial phase. The participants felt that any act that would put pressure on the Khartoum government would run the risk of destabilizing the talks, which had achieved impressive progress towards ending the 21-year-old civil war.

De Waal (2007) did a study on Darfur and the failure of the responsibility to protect and concluded that the Khartoum regime accurately predicted that the international body was too preoccupied with the north-south peace process to take any notice of the western region, and that their counterinsurgency operation would achieve a quick victory, an assessment which in retrospect was wrong. In May 2004, the U.S. State Department, after a full investigation of the atrocities, declared the killings in Darfur to be “genocide.” Alex De Waal points out the importance of labeling the Darfur crisis genocide, “because it broadens the usage of the term “genocide” to include ethnically targeted killings, rapes and displacement perpetuated in the course of counter-insurgency, a significant expansion of the customary usage of the term to refer to the attempt to eliminate entire population”.

Reeves (2010) observed that the EU and the AU could not agree on the use of the term genocide, though there was no dispute about the fact that atrocities were being perpetrated by the Khartoum government and its proxy Janjaweed militias, and many more lives and property were being lost or destroyed as the world debated about what to call the crisis. The United Nations Security Council passed several resolutions which added Darfur as an additional mandate under the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), which was overseeing the north-south peace process established a committee to monitor the implementation of the measure on Darfur. In July 2007, UNSCR 1769 reflected consensus among all members of the Security Council concerning the UN/AU hybrid operation in Darfur, to be called the UN African Mission in Darfur. Prendergast, Ismail and Fowler (2008) found that the success of the CPA which has brought relative peace to South Sudan since it was signed in 2005 is the need for a strong coordinated action by the international community. The CPA was realized in large part because the international community demonstrated strong leadership, invested heavily in diplomacy, and applied coordinated leverage on the parties to the conflict. For the Darfur case, any peace process must receive backing from the core group of countries with the most leverage over the parties. In the case of Darfur, these include the U.S., the United Kingdom, France, and China, backed by focused incentives and pressure from the UN Security Council through the AU mediation mechanisms already in place. Aboagye (2007) found the following broad observations on the effectiveness of the hybrid nature of the peace keeping mission that impact on training: a) Increasing trends towards AU and regional deployments, well before the policy view of building organic African capacities for peace support interventions. b) Complexity of mandates, missions and end-states that are affected by new multidimensional and multidisciplinary actors and range of complex issues, such as DDR (and SSR), gender, sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA), humanitarian assistance (and in other missions, transitional administration, mine action, etc.). c) Effect of spoilers and high Chapter VII ‘use of force’ threshold. d) In tandem with other external factors, a concomitant trend towards hybrid operations in its various interpretations, including a dependence on external assistance and support. e) In spite of these challenging developments, the AU System has lacked strategic management capability, and has been perceived as not being able to utilize donor funding for recruitment and establishment of such a capability. f) The dearth of planning and management capability was worsened by the AU’s preoccupation with numerous complex hot conflicts. g) Donor dependency syndrome (including multiplicity of donor support agendas: G8, EU, NATO, Arab League, etc.), coupled with lack of financial, logistical and strategic lift capacity, and regional ownership.

Today, UNAMID is the largest peacekeeping operation in the world. However, from its initial authorisation of nearly 26,000 its force strength has been reduced to just under 16,000, of these, 13,809 are currently deployed. It ismandated under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, allowing for the use of force in some circumstances. The protection of civilians is at the centre of the mission’s mandate, with the mission called upon to “contribute to the protection of

civilian populations under imminent threat of physical violence and prevent attacks against civilians, within its capability and areas of deployment.”The mission is also tasked with “contributing to security for humanitarian assistance, monitoring and verifying implementation of agreements, assisting an inclusive political process,

contributing to the promotion of human rights and the rule of law, and monitoring and reporting on the situation along the borders with Chad and the Central African Republic.”Eight years since its deployment, however, conflict in Darfur not only rumbles on but appears to be on the increase. From the start, UNAMID has faced enormous political and logistical challenges including the inability to fully deploy, attacks on the mission and continuous government obstruction. The government’s un-willingness to cooperate with

UNAMID has also led to the downsizing of the mission and ongoing discussions of an exit strategy – a discussion which is generally used by the government of Sudan as a threat against the ability for the force to continue to operate .

Also there were Interviews with civilians, the majority of whom were living in IDP camps. While there is some recognition that the presence of UNAMID has, on balance, been betterthan the alternative of no mission, there was a clear assessment of its failings. Their conclusion, however, remainedunequivocal: in a context in which civilians remain fundamentally unprotected by their own government, UNAMIDnot only should remain but should do far more to bring out about the peace that has so long been awaited.

Despite the harsh criticism that UNAMID has received over the past ten years, much of it justified, the research did identify a number of ways in which UNAMID’s intervention was viewed as positive. First, civilians pointed to physical protection provided by UNAMID, particularly in and around displacement sites. While the general consensus was that the level of protection was woefully inadequate, there was an appreciation that UNAMID provided protection in some circumstances. In addition, a number of IDPs recognised that UNAMID was playing a role in reporting on, and bringing attention to, the

Situation in Darfur.With regard to protection, there was reference to protection in and around the IDP camps –often in contrast to the lack of protection in their home areas. “UNAMID has played a big role in delivering messages spreading the culture of peace. Finally, there was acknowledgement that UNAMID forces have assisted in the delivery of humanitarian assistance – albeit assistance that is severely inadequate: There are many good things they have made like construction of schools in some areas. Also they provide paramedics in some hard situations. Of course, it is never enough that UNAMID has played a role in making what little there is available.It is worth noting that the lack of humanitarian assistance is also something that is very much recognised by the UN.Humanitarian organisations suffer from similar government obstruction to those faced by the mission itself, in terms of visas, customs clearance and access restrictions. According to the UN and AU, five humanitarian agencies leftDarfur between August 2015 and April 2016, either because they were closed down by the authorities or because financial and operational difficulties became insurmountable. Inevitably, this exit of key agencies has exacerbatedchronic deficits in service delivery.

**4.2 Failures of the UN peacekeeping mission in Darfur**

The peace process in Darfur failed to bring a lasting peace to the violence-beset region of Darfur. Earlier in the introductory section, this paper identified five major factors that thwarted the Darfur peace process. The failures are thus discussed below.

**4.2.1 Mutual Mistrust**

In the situation of civil war or intrastate conflict, mutual trust is a vital factor for effective negotiations towards a sustainable peace agreement. Mutual trust makes sure that confidence between the actors, increases their willingness to negotiate as well as compromise, avoids the 'security dilemma', in addition to helping them feel secure with the results of the negotiations. According to Darby and MacGinty, (2003) a successful peace process requires that the protagonists are more willing to negotiate in good faith, and also that the negotiators are quite committed to a sustained process. Roy Licklider (2001) ( also adds that a workable settlement requires flexibility and, compromise which in turn requires mutual trust. Parties who lack mutual trust rarely reach an effective peace agreement. Adrian Guelke (2003) identifies factors that undermine peace negotiations, the pursuit of opposing aims by the major antagonists are among the main hindrances for a negotiated settlement.

In the Darfur peace process, confidence and trust involving the GoS and the rebel movements has been not noteworthy. From the very beginning, the parties did not negotiate seriously. Bad faith on all sides hindered the 2004 N'Djamena as well as Addis Ababa peace efforts. In the same way, in the Abuja negotiations of 2005 also the 2006 that led to the signing of the DPA, the government and rebels continued to see each other with acute suspicion and loathing. The parties did not engage in serious plus flexible negotiations or show any willingness to make compromise. Instead they rejected the claims of their adversaries, recriminations, accusations and insults. Accordingly the parties failed to reach a comprehensive and sustainable agreement in the Abuja negotiations.

There are two factors that created mistrust between the government and the rebels. First, is the appalling scale of the violence as well as atrocities that incited hatred plus broken relationships among various tribes in Darfur who previously had good relations. Characterizing internal conflicts - civil wars, Peter Wallensteen(2001) writes that such conflicts result in the breaking up of already existing social relationships For example, Wallensteen argues that in such conflicts, families are divided, friendships are destroyed, and local communities are shattered. This social breakup often creates psychological wounds among communities that ultimately incite hatred and mutual distrust.

A report by the UN Commission of Inquiry for Darfur assert the Sudanese army and its proxy Arab militias continue to conduct indiscriminate attacks, including killing civilians, torture, pillaging, and forced displacement, throughout Darfur. This actions of the government forces, destruction of villages, enforced disappearances, rape as well as other forms of sexual violence, and their Arab militias against African tribes made worse the social relationships plus created a social divide among the Darfur tribes along with diminished trust among the rebels, who represent the various tribes, as well as the government of Sudan. Thus, this social divide may have diminished the willpower of actors to come to the negotiating table in good faith to finish the conflict. The Government of Sudan lacked the political commitment to get a negotiated plus durable settlement to the conflict. The dire need of commitment may stem from the GoS' conviction that negotiated settlements that help rebels to have their demands met may encourage rebellion in other marginalized regions of Sudan so as to get their demands during negotiations.114

**4.2.2 Weaknesses of the Mediation Process**

In most peace process, mediators and external actors that influence the mediation process act a dominant role in its successes or failures. Even though often mediators and external actors have a positive role in the peace process, still there are times when they have aided to induce failure. As Licklider, (2005) states, mediators seem to be increasingly oriented towards bringing peace, which practically means some sort of negotiated settlement, though some sort of players want the settlement twisted in favor of one side. Licklider also adds, external pressure does not always promote peace, of course. Apparently, internal violence is often promoted or made possible by outside assistance of various sorts. Thus, mediators and external actors may complicate the outcome of a peace process by focusing on a quick outcome rather than a long-term solution-oriented process of mediation or by skewing the outcome to one side.

On the other hand Lederach (1995) argues that in mediation, adequacy and the clarity of the framework of the process determines the outcome. The aim of this argument is that a hasty and quick-fix-oriented process does not result in sustainable solutions acceptable to everyone. In the case of the Darfur peace process, mediators used ineffective mediation strategies. To a degree, if not exclusively, throughout the Darfur process two main factors related to the processes of mediation have undermined the result of the negotiations. These are incompetence of mediators as well as misguided mediation strategy.

**4.2.3 Inconsistent Strategy of Participation**

Whether the stakeholders in a conflict are properly represented as well as if the peace process is inclusive play a pivotal role in making or breaking the outcome of a peace settlement. Licklider observes that a workable settlement usually has to involve all major parties. MacGinty and Darby (2003) also say that one major criterion for a successful peace process is that all major actors in the conflict are included. This means that a peace settlement that does not involve all stakeholders in a conflict cannot be sustainable. The peace process as well as the successive settlement lacks legitimacy amongst the excluded groups, and these groups outside the process may acts as spoilers. Stedman's concept of spoilers supports this argument. As Stedman articulates, if one of the warring parties is skeptical about its security after the agreement or in the future government, certainly it would spoil the agreement.Licklider supports Stedman's argument saying, even a small but dedicated group can commit a series of violent acts that can bring about the collapse of the peace process.Thus, for any peace process to be thriving, it should include all affected parties as well as stakeholders in the conflict.

**4.2.4 Fragmentation of the Rebel Movements**

Hottinger (2006) on a study on the Darfur Peace agreement finds that in Darfur, the fragmentation of rebels posed a serious challenge to the success of the peace process in Darfur. When the Darfur conflict broke out in 2002-2003, the SLM/A and the JEM rebel groups existed in Darfur. Yet, these two rebel groups gradually split into several factions. By November 2006, twelve rebel factions existed in Darfur. Kelly Campbell (2008) also observes that the amount of factions has since increased and as of January 2008, to around 27 rebel factions that now existed in Darfur, more than double the amount of rebel factions in 2006.

This is attributed to disagreements over political agendas for negotiations, power struggles among commanders, as well as ethnic affiliation In order to undermine rebel unity, the government of Sudan also has incited rebel divisions by infiltrating the rank in addition to the files of the rebel groups. The government has also used buy-out tactics in separate deals with some factions, igniting more divisions as well as weakening organized rebel resistance.

The rebel fragmentations begun as early as 2004 after a group of commanders defected from JEM as well as established their own faction, the National Movement for Reform and Development. The group demanded their representation in the Abuja peace process, except for fear of further divisions with discord amongst rebels, the AU mediators refused to identify the splinters. Likewise, the Sudanese Liberation Army suffered fragmentations. The SLA dissidents raided the Arab villages in Sudan plus provoked the neutral Arab tribes.

**4.2.5 The Inability of the DPA**

The DPA of May 2006 is the only chief agreement in the history of the Darfur peace process. The DPA agreement includes four key areas: security arrangements, wealth-sharing, power-sharing as well as the Darfur-Darfur dialogue. The flaws and discrepancies in its provisions turned the DPA into a ‘self-defeating’ agreement. The agreement actually failed to achieve peace and also, its aftermath saw to the continued conflict, and worsened security as well as humanitarian crisis. The trouble with the DPA partly is due to its weak power along with resources-sharing provisions and also security arrangements that did not accomplish expectations of the rebels.

4.3**Challenges Confronting United Nations Peacekeeping in Darfur**

The following challenges of peace operations in Darfur can be attributed to a study by the United Nations’ study on the African Union Mission in Darfur.

**4.3.1 Infrastructure and Resource Inadequacies**

The geography of Darfur renders distribution of humanitarian support difficult. Darfur indeed has very few transportation routes as well as scarce water supplies. During the rainy period, railways and roads become nearly impenetrable, requiring UNAMID to employ aerial transportation to bring aid. In the 2013 rainy season, torrential downpours brought a heavy toll throughout Darfur, destroying and damaging the homes of more than 530,000 people. The United States supported UNAMID in relief efforts for flood with heavy equipment as well as air assistance.

**4.3.2 The Government Interference**

The Sudanese Government allowed UNAMID into Sudan in 2008, but since then has restricted the mission’s access to certain areas of the region. In 2013 the Sudanese Government failed to approve custom clearances for UNAMID equipment on several occasions, leaving the mission without important infrastructure like helicopters. Khartoum has also limited entry into the country as a whole by implementing stringent visa requirements for UN staff and other humanitarian workers. These types of restrictions further complicate UNAMID’s task of delivering humanitarian aid to the ravaged region. UNAMID and the UN continue to negotiate issues of access with the government, but entry into certain locations is still being denied. On February 1st the government shut down the International Committee of the Red Cross within the country. History is repeating itself: Recall that it shut down 12 international organizations in Darfur in March 2009. UN peacekeeping - by its principles - can only operate with the cooperation of the government.

**4.3.3 Ongoing Conflicts**

Since mid-2013 violence has increased in Darfur at the hands of Arab militias who have caused the displacement of almost a half a million additional civilians. As it stands, 3.5 million Darfurians need humanitarian assistance. Khartoum has responded to rebel groups in Darfur with its Rapid Response Force or Rapid Support Force (a reconstitution of the Janjaweed) armed with approximately 4,000 militia. This force is responsible for attacking civilians, terrorizing villages, and looting markets. Recently, the force burned more than 35 villages, raped women and girls, killed dozens of people, and forced thousands to flee. It is hauntingly similar to the attacks of 2003 to crush the rebels in Darfur.

**4.3.4 Unstable Neighbors**

There are usually concerns of a possible outbreak of violence owing to the movement of people from Sudan into South Sudan that could negatively impact security in Darfur. Both countries have been unsuccessful in agreeing on a concrete citizenship plan for persons of South Sudanese origin currently living in Sudan. The UNHCR estimates that hundreds of thousands of the South Sudanese are threatened with becoming a stateless grouping unless the two countries reach an arrangement regarding their status. Additionally, crises in South Sudan as well as the Central African Republic threaten generally the stability of the region as well as Sudan as a whole. In South Sudan, continuing fighting plus an influx of IDPs along with refugees pose a threat to Sudan’s borders and the general security. In the Central African Republic (CAR), fighting and political demonstrations in the northern regions have created instability in Sudan; In March 2014, a number of militants from Sudan went into Central African Republic and demonstrated, beside Seleka forces, against the French Peacekeepers

**4.3.5 Safety of Humanitarian Workers**

Rebel groups have increasingly directed attacks at humanitarian workers and peacekeepers Since UNAMID first deployed in 2008, more than 191 uniformed personnel have been killed as a result of insurgent attacks. Humanitarian workers have also been victims of abduction and car-jacking. In the last year, the UN has seen increased attacks on their personnel. In July 2013, a UN base in South Darfur was attacked, leaving 7 Peacekeepers dead and another 17 injured. In December of the same year, unidentified assailants in South Darfur attacked a UN Convoy, killing 2 peacekeepers (Fleshman, 2006).

**4.3.6 Slow Implementation of the Doha Document**

A number of measures in the Doha Document have not been met on schedule, including those related to the ceasefire and security arrangements. Disagreements among the government and the Liberation and Justice Movement, together with a lack of buy-in by non-signatory movements, are obstructing the implementation of the agreement. In addition, the Government of Sudan has not transferred funds to Darfur Reconstruction and Development Fund, halting recovery efforts in the war-torn country. Fighting between the government forces and rebel factions, as well as among diverse tribal groups, also stand as hindrance to peace and stability in Darfur.

**CHAPTER FIVE**

**FINDINGS, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION**

**5.0 Introduction**

The objectives of the study were to

i)To assess the effectiveness of United Nations peacekeeping in Darfur.

ii)To assess Failures of the United Nations peacekeeping in Darfur

iii) To explore the challenges confronting UN peacekeeping in Darfur.

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**5.1 Findings**

Findings from the study revealed the following:

* The UN peace keeping missions in Darfurhave been effective.
* The UN has over the years recorded some failures in their mandate to help maintain peace in Darfur
* The UN have ecountered challenges which mitigate their effectiveness in discharging their duties in Darfur.

**5.2 Recommendations**

In order for UN Peace keeping operations in Sudan to live up to its potential, urgent action must be taken to ensure that the mission not only continues, but is strengthened. In order to achieve this, the researcher makes the following suggestions the parties involved

**To the UN Security Council**

 As recommended by the UN Secretary-General, renew the deployment of the mission with its current mandate for an additional 12 months without any reduction in personnel levels.

 Increase engagement between member states and the mission to ensure that existing gaps in equipment and personnel are promptly addressed. Ensure that the mission has the full political support of the UNSC and that all council members support the mission in fulfilling its objectives.

 Redouble efforts to achieve an inclusive, negotiated political settlement to the Darfur conflict.

Provide additional political backing to the mission to ensure that they are in a stronger position to negotiate with the government to prevent inappropriate restrictions of UN activities, for example restrictions on movement in contravention of the status of forces agreement.

**To the government of Sudan:**

 They should redouble their efforts to achieve an inclusive, negotiated political settlement to the Darfur conflict.Ensure that all UN personnel, including troops and civilian personnel, have the full range of movement and access that is provided for in the status of forces agreement. Promptly process visa applications made by the UN for mission personnel. In general, such requests should be approved unless there are compelling reasons not to do so. Where visas are refused, clear reasons should be given. Ensure that customs processing for all mission equipment and supplies is expeditious and that needed items are received by the mission in a timely manner. Comply with UNSC Resolutions calling for the disarmament of Janjaweed militias and others.

**To the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations:**

 They need to Work with troop contributing countries to ensure that all deployed troops have the necessary training and fully understand their protection mandate in advance of their deployment. Ensure the mission fulfils all aspects of its mandate and stated goals.

 Ensure that UN responds quickly and robustly to threats to civilian protection.

 Improve the quality of its monitoring and reporting, particularly in relation to human rights issues, to contribute to ensuring that the international community has access to the high-quality, accurate information needed to make appropriate policy decisions. Ideally, this information should be made public. In all circumstances, UNAMID must ensure that the information represents an accurate picture of the situation on the ground and does not distort the facts.

 Engage with the Darfuri community on the ground to build trust and manage expectations.

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